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Abstract:			
 
This thesis focuses on the role of agency during political transition processes in divided 
societies. To be more specific, it examines how the Iraqi political elites view democracy 
and what type of political institutions they support. The years between 2012 and 2015 
are of great significance and the final US withdrawal at the beginning of the period 
marked the conclusion of military occupation. That event made the Iraqi political elite 
central to the political process. Previous studies have focused on structural issues in 
post invasion Iraq, highlighting factors that could facilitate democracy or systems that 
could undermine prospects for a democratic system in the country. A gap in the 
literature on Iraq is identifiable as there is a lack of any real attention to the issue of 
agency. The theoretical contribution of this study is that it illustrates and underlines the 
importance of elite perspectives for the democratisation process in a country divided 
along ethno-religious lines. The study argues that democratic institutional arrangements 
are needed as the means to reconcile different, and at times conflicting, political 
interests. Having established this point, the research analyses the role of agency in terms 
of key political players in forming, arranging, and setting up institutions. Extensive 
field research collating original empirical data was carried out in Iraq, Baghdad and 
Erbil, from 2011 to 2015. This study surveys the Iraqi House of Representatives, the 
Iraqi Presidency, and the Iraqi Council of Ministers, and involves interviews with 
highly placed decision makers in the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, as well 
as members of the Constitution Drafting Committee. Key participants include; the 
President and the Prime Minister, Speakers of the Parliament, and the Chair of Iraqi 
Constitution Drafting Committee. The participants include members from all the main 
ethno-religious groups in this divided country. Based on this new data, the specific 
views of Iraq's political elites are analysed, and their preferred types of political system 
are articulated, providing a concise contribution to current knowledge of democracy 
building in Iraq. The first empirical finding is that elites of the minority groups conceive 
democracy as power sharing, while members of the majority understand it as majority 
rule. The second finding is that larger groups support majoritarian institutions, while 
smaller groups support consensual ones. Those findings confirm previous academic 
thinking, for example Lijphart's theory on consensus democracy. The third finding is 
more surprising. All groups support a consensual arrangement of federalism and a 
majoritarian constitution. This unexpected support for these types of institutional 
arrangements required investigation in more depth to determine how political elites 
view federalism in Iraq, and how the constitution, if the opportunity arose, might be 
amended. It is argued that the future possibilities of Iraq’s polity depend largely on 
political agreements between the political elites representing the main groups in Iraq. 
The stability of the country rests mainly on the ability of its elites to arrange political 
institutions in such a way as to accommodate the different interests of the groups they 
represent. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Regime Change and Democracy in Iraq    
 
1.1 Introduction  
In February 2003, President George W. Bush declared that ‘all Iraqis must have a voice 
in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected’ (Bush 2003). 
The United States prosecuted the war and as a result the Iraqi regime collapsed. The 
challenge was not in toppling the regime, which was relatively easy, but in what had to 
be done next (Baker and Hamilton 2006). After the US invasion, the main debates on 
the future of Iraq have revolved around democracy building. Central to the debate is 
whether a democratic Iraq is feasible. Although some writers argue that general 
conclusions about the feasibility of imposed democratisation cannot be drawn 
(Beetham 2009: 445), there is a growing literature on what should be involved in 
attempts to build democracy (Lawson 2003; Makiya 2003; Byman and Pollack 2003; 
Byman 2003a; Byman 2003b; Nader 2003; Anderson & Stanfield 2004; Dawisha 2004; 
2005a; 2005b; Diamond 2005a; 2005b; Katz 2006; Tessler, Moaddel, and Inglehart, 
2006; Gupta 2007; Visser & Stanfield 2007; Moon 2009; Munson 2009; Khalilzad 
2010). In the main, the existing literature addresses and discusses the structural factors 
as challenges to the process building and is split on the structural issues. Some work 
highlights those structures that are obstacles, while other studies point out those 
structural factors that could help transition.   
 
This thesis will offer an alternative perspective, focusing on the role of agency.1 To be 
more specific, it examines how the Iraqi political elites view democracy and what type 
of political institutions they support. The existing literature on the feasibility of 
democracy in Iraq addresses structural factors. The aim of this research is to inspect the 
support for democracy among members of the Iraqi political elite and so determine the 
feasibility of it being applied in the country. Their specific views and preferred types 
of political system are analysed, providing a concise contribution to current knowledge 
of democracy building in Iraq. In this way, the thesis, in addition to locating the position 
																																																						
1 This approach could be regarded as an alternative approach as far as the study of the case of Iraq is 
concerned – otherwise agency as a variable to explain transition has along strand of literature.  
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of the main research question within the existing literature on democracy building in 
divided societies, also deals with the views and the preferences of the political elite as 
factors in helping or hindering the emergence of democracy. The focus is on the role of 
the agency and political actors in democracy building in Iraq.2 Agency is about volition 
and political choice, having the ability to make choices or decisions that have 
implications for politics. This thesis locates its focus on agency,3 in the broader 
literature which has dealt with this issue at length (e.g. Foweraker, J. and Landman, T. 
1997; Colomer, and Pascual 1994; Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992; Przeworksi 
1991; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986).  
 
The focus of this thesis is narrowed to study the elite agency in democratic transitions. 
The thesis is about elite views of democracy and their attitudes towards the concept of 
democracy as it is functioning in Iraq. There has been an extensive literature on the role 
of elite agency as an explanatory factor for democratic transitions in Latin America and 
Southern Europe; the 1980s and early 1990s focused on agency as a fundamental 
variable in explaining shifts in political systems (see, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead 1986). It explained transitions from authoritarian rule,4 based on political 
factors hypothesised in terms of elite behaviour, or agreement among elitea, ‘elite 
pacts,’ ‘elite settlements,’ ‘elite negotiation’ and ‘elite agreements’ (see chapter 3, sec. 
3.3).  
 
																																																						
2 The subsequent chapters of this thesis will primarily focus on the views of the political elite with regards 
to the meaning of democracy and the arrangements of political institutions, therefore, this thesis does not 
discuss structural factors and external actor. Of course, there are other significant issues such as, security, 
political violence and the role of insurgents, and corruption which are extrinsic challenges to democracy 
building in Iraq (see; e.g. Ghanim 2011; Rubin 2006; Diamond 2005a; 2005b; Anderson and Stansfield 
2004). Further, this thesis does not cover the disputes over oil and finance in relation to democracy 
building and their impact on Iraq’s transition (see; e.g. Birdsall and Subramanian 2004; Mahdi 2007a; 
2007b; Billon 2008; Ryan 2010; Muttitt 2012; Al-Basri and Al-Shebahi 2013). A growing literature has 
already dealt with such structural extrinsic factors; hence, the scope of this study is justified (see chapter 
9, section 9.3) with its objective; filling the gap in the literature and in knowledge on the views of political 
elite in a deeply divided society –i.e. Iraq - by subscribing the feasibility of democracy to the broader 
spectrum of regime change and democratic transition. 
3 This thesis makes a difference between popular agency and elite agency and relates itself to the latter 
(i.e. by elite agency, the thesis refers to political elites). Chapter three, also makes it clear how agency is 
measured and how it is deployed in the analysis (see chapter 3, sec. 3.3).  
4	It is worthy to note, as Przeworksi (1991: 51-99) has identified, a breakdown of an authoritarian regime 
may reverse, or it may lead to new dictatorships, even if the outcome is not a return an old or a new 
dictatorship, transitions might get stuck somewhere along the way in regimes that limit contestation or 
suffer from a threat of military intervention. 
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Moreover, the literature has also elaborated on the role played by political elite in 
democratic transitions and consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe 
(Highly and Gunther 1992). This part of the literature comprises of different case 
studies,5 such as, the model of elite settlement in Spain (Colomer 1991; Gunther 1992); 
the consequences of elite settlements in Mexico (Knight 1992); elite settlements in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (Peeler 1992); the unification of the elite and 
democratic consolidation in Italy (Cotta 1992); elite pacts in Uruguay (Gillespie 1992); 
elite negotiation in Argentina and Chile (Cavarozzi 1992); the role of elites in Peru in 
the 1980s (Dietz 1992); the role of elites in the political transition of Brazil (Bruneau 
1992); the Portuguese transition to democracy, where the political elite had an indirect 
role in facilitating the move away from authoritarian rule to democratic governance 
(Graham 1992); and the role of the political elite in the Polish transition from 
authoritarian rule (Colomer and Pascual 1994). In all those cases, the primary focus has 
been on the elite agency variable (political elite), which has been regarded ‘logically 
and factually before the existence of regime stability or instability to peaceful or 
disruptive mass mobilisation and participation.’The central argument has been that 
‘elite consensus requires agreement on the worth of political institutions and the rules 
of the political game that is played within and around those institutions’ (Burton, 
Gunther and Higley 1992: 323). This thesis also agrees with this main argument, as it 
bridges the attitudes of the Iraqi political elite to democracy and their preferences for 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The insights that this study provides are based on in-depth data and empirical findings 
of elite views and opinions on democracy among the Iraqi political elite. The views are 
of those who run day-to-day politics in Iraq, making decisions that affect the lives of 
millions of people for better or worse. Those political elites have serious insights into 
what works and what does not and, hence, how the formal institutions should be re-
arranged. For the past decade, they have been party to a constant endeavour involving 
trial and error, to build democracy. In this study, they express what democracy means 
to them, how the Iraqi democratic political system should look, how federalism should 
be operationalised, and how the constitution, if the opportunity arose, should be 
amended.  
																																																						
5 The type of case study employed in this thesis has been discussed in this chapter sec. 1.4. 
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The participants in this study are the top decision makers in the Iraqi power structure 
and include: two Presidents, two Prime Ministers, and two Speakers of Parliament, in 
addition to the President of Iraqi Kurdistan and two Prime Ministers of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG), 14 ministers from the Iraqi Council of Ministers and 15 
members of the Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee, including the Chairman and the 
Deputy Chairman. Additionally, the questionnaire on Iraq’s political institutions 
surveyed 100 Iraqi members of parliament. All those interviewed also participated in 
the survey (Chapter 4). The participants were drawn from all ethno-religious groups 
and all significant political parties in the Iraq parliament. In terms of its empirical depth 
on the feasibility of democracy in Iraq, with a focus on the political elites’ views, it 
might justifiably be asserted that this study is unprecedented.   
 
This chapter starts with a summary of the political situation in Iraq (section 1.2). It will 
first describe the key political developments before 2003, and will then go more in-
depth with an overview of the period after 2003, which has been characterized by the 
United States’ withdrawal and democratic practices such as elections and 
representation in the midst of political turmoil. This section will also justify the 
selection of the specific period (2011-2015) which is central is my research. Thereafter, 
the chapter defines the concepts and identifies measurements for examining regime 
change and democracy in general. It will also focus on defining and measuring the type 
of political regime and levels of democracy in Iraq (section 1.3). The next section 
(section 1.4) will provide a rationale for the case selection, hence why the thesis focuses 
on Iraq. Finally, the subsequent chapters of the thesis are outlined (in section 1.5). The 
rest of the thesis will consist of two main parts: while chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
predominantly theoretical, the chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are very empirical relying on 
original large-N surveys and new data from semi-structured interviews with political 
elites in Iraq. The conclusion (Chapter 9) will bring theoretical and empirical 
contributions together, to discuss the implications of my findings 
for potential development of democracy in Iraq. 
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1.2 The Situation in Iraq  
Pre-2003 Iraq: Politico-historical Context  
Iraq6 is a relatively new country, and was an invention of the British. In 1918, Great 
Britain occupied the three Ottoman Empire provinces (Arabic: Wilayat) of Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basra. During the years 1920-21, those three wilayats were joined 
together to form a new territory within Iraq’s present borders, under a League of 
Nations’ Mandate administrated by Great Britain (Tripp 2007; Dawisha 2009). The 
wilayat of Mosul was the Kurdish populated area in the north, the wilayat of Baghdad 
was the Sunni Arab-populated area in the centre, and that of Basra was the Shia-
populated area in the south. From the start of Iraq’s foundation these different ethnic 
and religious groups lacked a sense of coherence. There was a lack of a shared common 
history or national awareness among them as each had its own distinctive history.  
 
During the monarchy (1921-58), there was a form of democracy and pluralism that led 
to the emergence of various political parties (Bashkin 2009; Dawisha 2005). It 
contributed not to a realisation of an Iraqi national identity but in each groups’ 
recognition of their role as political actors, further pursuing their individual causes. 
From the mid1940s to the mid1950s, political parties were established along ethno-
religious lines; the Constitutional Union Party (1949) led by Nuri Said was composed 
mainly of Sunni Arabs; the Socialist People’s Party (1950) led by Salih Al Jabr was 
mainly composed of Shia Arabs; and the Kurdistan Democratic Party under the 
leadership of Mustafa Barzani, throughout the 1950s, was pursuing the Kurdish cause 
(Tripp 2007).  
 
Since the overthrow of the British backed monarchy in 1958 and the establishment of 
an authoritarian republic, Iraq’s subsequent regimes aimed at the consolidation of the 
state’s power based on Arab nationalism, an ideology in which ‘unity’ (Arabic: Wahda) 
became the core value to develop a common sense of belonging and advance a national 
identity. However, the 1974 Kurdish armed revolt over issues of autonomy (Kurdish: 
																																																						
6 Iraq was a name the British gave to the territory of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and 
Mosul. Originally the name was used in reference to areas around Basra. The literal word of al A’raq in 
Arabic means the sides of the two rivers and the land between them along their length. 
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Khosary), and the 1977 Shia Karbala demonstration (Arabic: intifada) against the 
government, reflected antipathy towards such unity.  
 
Under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003), Iraq degenerated into a personal dictatorship and 
the one-party rule of the Ba’ath Party (see, Makiya 1989). Hussein consolidated his 
hold on power and made an effort to control Iraq’s territory through single identity,7 
secular, Arab Nationalism. Iraq’s territorial unity, however, was maintained at gun 
point. The differences between groups were suppressed by coercion at the expense of 
groups’ rights and freedoms. Iraq’s nationalism, also, remained problematic and an area 
of contestation; it was attractive primarily to the Sunni Arabs, was rejected outright by 
the Kurds, and failed to gain support among the Shia (Dodge 2003; Galbraith 2006). 
Therefore, the sense of belonging to one group, a single Iraqi nation, failed to develop 
fully. Instead, affiliations were based on ethno-religious groups. In pre-2003 Iraq, 
during the monarchy (1921-58), the authoritarian republic (1958-68), and the Ba’ath 
regime (1968-2003), the Sunni Arabs ruled Iraq and controlled its apparatus of rule 
while the Shia were suppressed, and the Kurds were marginalised (Tripp 2007; Marr 
2011).  
 
Post-2003 Iraq: An Overview    
The 2003 US-led war on Iraq was an act of external intervention with the purpose of 
changing a regime that was deemed to be a potential threat to international security. 
This conclusion was based on the belief that the Iraqi government had weapons of mass 
destruction. Removal of the dictator would also, it was assumed, facilitate the 
promotion of   democracy and peace in the region. 8 The United States and the United 
Kingdom initiated the 2003 Iraq military invasion (Cornish 2004; Crammer and Thrall 
2012) resulting in the collapse of Saddam’s regime. On May 1, 2003, President Bush 
																																																						
7 As a unity slogan of modern states, nationalism is ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1). That is, the boundaries of the state 
end when the extension of a nation ends. The political process of building a ‘nation state’ understood in 
Gellner’s conception as ‘one nation one state’ has been a rather problematic process in the making of 
modern Iraq. 
8 Between 1990-2002 the Security Council issued 11 resolutions on Iraq and about its position in relation 
to international peace and security in the region and also issues related to proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and long-range missiles. These resolutions include: 661 (6 August, 1990); 678 (29 
November, 1990); 686 (2 March, 1991); 687 (3 April, 1991); 688 (5 April, 1991); 707 (15 August, 1991); 
715 (11 October, 1991); 986 (14 April, 1995); 1284 (17 December, 1999); 1382 (29 November, 2001); 
and 1441 (8 November, 2002).  
	 19	
stated ‘mission accomplished’ when declaring the end of the major combat operations. 
This marked the end of the invasion period and the beginning of the military 
occupation. UN resolution 1483 on 22 May, 2003, recognised the United States and the 
United Kingdom as occupying powers (i.e. the authority), and called upon them to 
facilitate structures by which the peoples of Iraq could govern their political affairs.  
 
Vertical Ethnoreligious Divide  
The United Nation’s resolution 1546 on 8 June, 2004, terminated the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) and endorsed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). 
Nevertheless, Iraq remained under occupation and the United States and United 
Kingdom were the de-facto authorities. The nature of the IGC was sectarian: 25 of the 
political elite were appointed by the CPA following the approximate proportions of the 
ethno-religious divisions in Iraq: 13 Shia Arabs (52 percent), 5 Sunni Arabs (20 
percent), 5 Kurds (20 percent), 1 Turkmen and 1 Assyrian. For the first time since Iraq’s 
formation, ethno-religious groups became the basis of the political system. Those 25 
members of the political elites signed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) to 
be, in effect, the provisional constitution for Iraq until the adoption of a permanent 
constitution and the formation of a permanent government. 
 
During 2005, Iraq’s constitution was drafted (see Chapter 8). It was ratified in a national 
referendum on October 15, 2005, with 79 percent in favour. Subsequently, in the 2005 
December parliamentary elections all groups participated, with a high turnout of 79.63 
percent. The three main electoral lists were ethno-religious coalitions, with various 
Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish political parties forming pre-electoral intra-group coalitions. 
The Shia coalition (United Iraqi Alliance) led by Ibrahim Ja’afari won the largest 
number of seats, 128. The Kurdish Coalition (Dichromatic Patriotic Alliance of 
Kurdistan) led by Masoud Barzani won 53, and the Sunni Coalition (Tawafuq) led by 
Tarriq al-Hashimi came in third place with 44 seats.  
 
The first permanent Iraqi government was formed in May, 2006. Following 6 months 
of negotiation, the Iraqi political elite agreed on an ethno-sectarian composition for the 
apparatus of rule. The Iraqi president was Kurdish, with two Vice Presidents, one Sunni 
and the other Shia. The Prime Minister was Shia, with two deputies, one Sunni and the 
other Kurdish. The Speaker of the House of Representatives was Sunni, with two 
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deputies, one Shia and the other Kurdish. This was the balance of power, based on a 
power sharing agreement.  
 
Iraq’s political system is that of a parliamentary republic, in which the parliament elects 
the president, who then names the nominee of the largest parliamentary bloc as prime 
minster. With the support of the House of Representatives, the prime minster forms the 
government and holds most of the executive power. In Iraq informal political 
agreements (see Chapter 6) among the political elite of the three main groups precedes 
its formal political system. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of consecutive Iraqi 
parliamentary elections (2005, 2010, 2014), the ethno-sectarian formula for power 
distribution has remained (see Table 1.1). 
 
	
TABLE	1.1	ETHNO-RELIGIOUS	DISTRIBUTION	OF	POWER	IN	IRAQ	(2005,	2010,	2014)	
KURD	PRESIDENT	OF	REPUBLIC			 Sunni	Vice	president		 Shia	Vice	president		
SUNNI	SPEAKER	OF	PARLIAMENT		 Kurd	Deputy	 Shia	Deputy	
SHIA	PRIME	MINISTER	 Kurd	Deputy	 Sunni	Deputy	
 
 
Moreover, the formation of the cabinet in Iraq has been based on multi party coalitions 
(cross group political coalitions) in which the government has been based on 
proportional representation. For the past three rounds of elections, Shia coalitions have 
won the majority of the seats in the parliament, and they have formed the government 
based on a cross group coalition. The elections in post 2003 Iraq have brought about a 
shift, not only in Iraq’s regime, but also in the identity of power. For the first time in 
Iraq’s history, the silenced Shia majority have become the majority in government 
causing a shift in power from the Sunni Arabs to the Shia Arabs.  
 
Horizontal Ethnoreligious Divide  
Iraq is a federal state (Chapter 7). Its federal structure is constituted of 1 region (the 
Kurdish region) and 15 provinces (the Shia and Sunni governorates). The provinces 
that are composed of the majority of each group are territorially linked. The three 
Kurdish provinces in the north have enjoyed self-rule and a form of autonomy since 
1992, and introduced the idea of federalism to protect their region. Since 2005, the 
Kurdish region has its own parliament, a government and military forces, known as the 
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Peshmarga. Since late 2012, the 4-5 Sunni provinces in the centre have proposed the 
idea of the formation of a region similar to the Kurds. The territorially linked 9-10 Shia 
provinces in the south constitute a de facto Shia region. Thus, the three main groups are 
geographically concentrated in different areas. 
 
Ethnically speaking, three regions underpin the 18 provinces in Iraq. The three major 
identity groups are divided along ethnic and religious lines9 and the demographics of 
the main groups have shaped the political map of the country: the Kurds in the north 
(18-20 percent of the population), the Shia in the south (50-55 percent), and Sunnis in 
the centre and the west (28-30 percent). With ambiguous and overlapping borders, these 
percentages are disputed and are at best approximations (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Iraq is an oil rich country, though its economy had been undermined by wars and 
sanctions throughout the 1990s and up to 2003. Due to its oil, Iraq has been able to 
rebuild its infrastructure, for example, daily oil exports rose from 1.8 million barrels 
per day (bpd) in 2005 (see Figure 2) to a record of 4.750 million bpd in January 2016. 
This level of production did not last and output has fallen to 4.412 million bpd since 
July, 2016. Nevertheless, Iraq’s economic resources are also reflected in its ethno-
religious divisions. The Kurdish provinces in the north and the Shia provinces in the 
south have most of Iraq’s oil reserves. Although the Sunni provinces do not have oil, 
Iraq’s major oil refineries are in the Sunni populated areas and Iraq’s largest water 
reserves are also in the Sunni areas. The two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, that 
run the length of the country, pass through the Sunni populated areas to the southern, 
Shia populated, areas (Al-Ansari 2016). That has given the Sunni upstream control of 
water and is a factor in the relationships between the northern Sunni and southern Shia 
provinces (see Figure 1.1).  
FIGURE	1.1	IRAQ’S	18	PROVINCES	(MAP	ON	THE	LEFT)	AND	THE	THREE	GROUPS	(MAP	ON	THE	RIGHT)	
																																																						
9 As a Muslim majority country, Iraq is a mosaic of religions and ethnicities. Besides Muslims, which 
are divided between two sects, Shia and Sunni, there are other religious minorities such as Christians, 
Jews, Yazidis, Sabians, Shabaks, Kaka’is and Baha’is. In terms of ethnicity, there are Arabs, Kurds, 
Turkomen, Assyrians, Armenian and Kildanis. 
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The members of the Iraqi House of Representative are elected through multimember 
open lists for each province. Table 1.2 shows the ethno-sectarian distribution of the 
Iraqi House of Representatives in the 18 provinces based on the 2010 parliamentary 
elections. Table (1.2) confirms that Iraq’s society is deeply divided along ethno-
religious lines. There is a strong sense of identity among members of the same ethnic 
or religious group who act as blocs during country wide elections. The three 
consecutive parliamentary elections in 2005, 2010 and 2014 have made the divisions 
between the main Iraqi groups highly visible. Almost all major political parties in post 
2003 Iraq are ethno-religiously based. This holds true for the Kurdish,10 Sunni11 and 
Shia12 political parties. In the 2005 elections, political parties formed pre-electoral 
coalitions but in 2014 many of them formed post-electoral intra-group coalitions. The 
Shia coalition holds 172 seats, the Sunni 74 and the Kurdish 62. The remainder of the 
seats were for several other smaller parties and the 8-seat quota for minorities. After 
three rounds of elections, the sizes and the ratio of different groups in the parliament 
remained relatively static.  
																																																						
10 Five major Kurdish political parties united by the Kurdish cause are; the Kurdistan Democratic Party, 
the Kurdistan Patriotic Union, the Change Movement, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan 
Islamic Group.  
11 Five major Sunni political parties in Iraq that represent the Sunni Arabs are; Accord Front, Iraqi 
Dialogue Front, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Ahl al Iraq, and Liberation and Reconciliation.  
12  Five major Shia political parties that all have a Shia spiritual leader are; the Islamic Supreme Council 
of Iraq and al Aziz al Hakim as spiritual and de facto leader of the party; Sadrist Trend, with Muqtada 
al-Sadr as spiritual and de facto leader of the party; the Islamic Dawa Party; Nuri Kamal al Maliki and 
Ibrahim al-Jafari run a branch of the party; the Fadhila Party, and Muhammad al-Yaqubi as spiritual 
leader of the party.  
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TABLE	1.2:	ETHNO-SECTARIAN	DISTRIBUTION	OF	PARLIAMENTARY	SEATS	2010	
PROVINCES	 Seats	Allocated	 Shia		 Sunni		 Kurdish		
SHIA	MAJORITY	 	 	 	 	
NAJAF	 12	 12	 -	 -	
MISAN	 10	 10	 -	 -	
MUTHANA	 7	 7	 -	 -	
DHI	QAR	 18	 18	 -	 -	
KARBALA	 10	 10	 -	 -	
QADDISYA	 11	 11	 -	 -	
BASRA	 24	 24	 -	 -	
WASIT	 11	 10	 1	 	
BABIL		 26	 13	 3	 -	
BAGHDAD		 68	 46	 22	 -	
SUNNI	MAJORITY	 	 	 	 	
DIYALA	 13	 4	 8	 1	
ANBAR	 14	 -	 14	 -	
SALAH	AL-DIN	 12	 -	 12	 -	
NINEVA	 31	 -	 23	 8	
KURDISH	MAJORITY	 	 	 	 	
KIRKUK	 12	 -	 6	 6	
SULAYMANIYA		 17	 -	 -	 17	
ERBIL		 14	 -	 -	 14	
DUHOK	 10	 -	 -	 10	
	 	 	 	 	
COMPENSATORY		 7	 4	 2	 1	
MINORITIES	 8	 -	 -	 -	
TOTAL		 325	 169	 91	 57	
	 	 	 	 	
	
FIGURE	1.2	IRAQ	CRUDE	OIL	PRODUCTION		
 
Precipitate Withdrawal: Fragile Security  
The presence of the US troops as occupying forces within Iraq led to a growing 
opposition to the United States. The polling in 2006 indicated that 79 percent of Iraqis 
had a ‘mostly negative’ view of the United States’ impact on their country, and ‘61 
percent approved of attacks on US-led forces’ (Baker and Hamilton 2006: 35). Those 
polls reflected views throughout Iraq, with the exception of the Kurdistan region where 
the US invasion was perceived as liberation. In other words, there was no safe-haven 
for US-troops in Arab Iraq. The US considered a withdrawal13 and a deadline of the 
																																																						
13 The United States was facing a twofold-pressure from within Iraq (as mentioned above) and back 
home. By 2007, polls showed the majority of the US electorate were in favour of withdrawal. 
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31st December, 2011, was set for the withdrawal of American military personnel from 
all Iraqi territory. The last troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011, marking the end of 
military occupation.  
 
There has been a considerable amount written on this precipitate withdrawal. It has 
been argued that a premature departure from Iraq would destabilise the country and 
lead to greater sectarian violence. To foster a legitimate democratic government would 
have required a long-term extensive commitment of financial, military, and political 
resources (Dobbins et al 2003; Feldman 2004; Baker and Hamilton 2006; Ryan 2010; 
Sky 2011). In 2006, the Iraqis Study Group Report (Baker and Hamilton 2006: 32-7) 
concluded that without the support of the United Sates, the Iraqi government was not 
capable of governing, sustaining or defending itself.  
 
The effect of withdrawal was to stimulate political instability. It can be argued that the 
emergence of the militant religious group known as Daesh,14 in central Iraq in 2014, 
was a result of the failure to accommodate the Sunnis and their demands in the 
apparatus of rule (Cockburn 2014; Sekulow 2014; Cockburn 2015; Stakelbeck 2015; 
Stren and Berger 2015). That is, Daesh can be seen as an outcome of the on-going 
sectarian war within Syria (Reuter 2015).15 Daesh seized the opportunity presented by 
on-going Sunni protests in Iraq (2013-2014) by attacking Arab Sunni populated areas. 
These areas were the least organised politically, the most neglected socio-economically 
and weakest militarily, hence the most vulnerable. By 2013, the Sahwa was effectively 
non-existent due to al-Maliki’s reluctance to integrate them into Iraq’s security forces. 
 
In the aftermath of the American withdrawal, Shia Prime Minister al Maliki aimed to 
centralise power. Part of his policy was the systematic marginalisation of the Sunni by 
refusing to integrate them into the Iraqi security services. He dissolved Iraq’s Sunni 
																																																						
14 Daesh stands for the abbreviation of the Arabic name of the organization, Dawla Islamiya fi al Earaqe 
wa Sham, translates as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant ISIL. Daesh captured the two largest Sunni 
provinces, Nineva and Anbar, and announced an Islamic Caliphate linking the Sunni populated areas in 
Syria and Iraq.   
15 Originally begun as protests against the Ba’ath regime in Syria, it then took the form of violence 
conflict and war against the regime. The regime in Syria suppressed the consecutive protests throughout 
2011, which lead to nationwide uprising. With Iran, as the main Shia force in the region, being heavily 
involved in supporting the Syrian regime, the nature of the conflict changed from people against the 
regime to a Sunni-Shia divide within and across Syria, which then spilled over to Iraq.    
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Awakening (Arabic: Sahwa) who were the main forces16 driving Qaeda out of Iraq in 
2006 (Benraad 2011).  
 
The Iraqi forces’ offensive against Daesh was ineffective as a military solution lacked 
a political agreement among the political elite of the three main groups. In response, 
the Sunnis formed their military force, the National Guard. Following this, a political 
agreement was reached and Iraqi forces, including the Kurdish Peshmarga, the Sunni 
National Guard, and the Shia Hashd participated in the Mousl offensive. The ethno-
religious divide manifested itself proportionately in the number of Iraqi forces; Shia 
25000, Kurd 15000 and Sunni 10000. Since then, Daesh has been perceptibly weakened 
in Iraq and Iraqi forces have retaken considerable territory. The causes of Iraq’s 
instability and conflicts are political. However, the potential solutions are also political. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on political institutions and how the political elites view 
Iraq’s political system.  
 
Justification for the Time Period  
Iraq is a deeply divided society whose ethno-religious divisions are deep rooted, a fact 
that is reflected in the politics, the economy, and the state’s military. This thesis, 
therefore, examines the views of Iraqi political elite with reference to their ethno-
religious backgrounds. Furthermore, a fundamental characteristic of Iraqi society is the 
politics of ‘collective identities’ (Pierce 1981; Karolewski 2010). It is unthinkable to 
discuss the politics of Iraq without reference to the influence of collective identities, 
because in Iraq such identities are not only the building blocks for political action to 
mobilise groups to influence political outcomes, they are also the basis for political 
representation and territorial claims. The term ‘group’ is used to connote a means by 
which people identify themselves and differentiate themselves from others (Anderson 
1991; Castells: 1996; Baumann: 1996; Bauman: 2004; and Gillespie: 2006), 
specifically in two forms: ethnicity (Arab-Kurd) and religious sect (Shia-Sunni).  
 
																																																						
16 Also called the Sahwa movement, mainly sponsored by the US military, they were composed of tribal 
leaders, Sheikhs, who came together to ensure the security of their communities. In the Sunni areas, they 
included; al-Majlis al-Waṭanī li-Inqādh al-ʻIrāq (the National Council for the Salvation of Iraq), Ḥarakat 
al-Inqādh al-Sunnī (the Sunni Salvation movement), al-Majlis al-Waṭanī li-Ṣaḥwat al-ʻIrāq (the 
National Council for the Awakening of Iraq), and Ḥarakat al-Ṣaḥwah al-Sunnīyah (the Sunni 
Awakening Movement).  
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An important source of identity-based politics involves ethnicity. In a deeply divided 
polity such as Iraq, ethnicity is a crucial base from which to mobilise identity groups 
for territorial claims (‘Arab lands’ versus ‘Kurdish lands’). For example, Kurds claim 
the Kurdish areas based on the historical geography of a Kurdish region. Religion is 
another source of collective identity. In Iraq, Islam embodies itself in the form of two 
main sects, Shia and Sunni, and sectarian violence at times stems from the political 
differences between these two sects. This thesis takes into account the views of the 
political elites of those groups whose views on the political system in Iraq are perceived 
through their ethno-religious divisions; the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurd.  
 
This thesis studies the years from 2005 up to the present day, with a particular focus on 
the 2012-2015 period. The data collection in this thesis was carried out during the 
Parliamentary round (2010-2014), a period with significance unique to Iraq. In 2011, 
the last US troops left the country, marking the end of military occupation. This 
withdrawal has magnified the significance of context in Iraq, in relation to the 
emergence of democracy or any other stable form of political system. With the US 
withdrawal, the task of Iraq’s democracy building was left to Iraqi’s themselves, in 
particular to their political elites; in effect, to the ethno-religious groups. Therefore, it 
is essential to know the views of those political elites on Iraq’s political system and 
political institutions, how they view democracy, and what sort of political institutions 
they prefer. Collecting, collating and assessing this knowledge will be at the core of the 
empirical chapters in this thesis.  
 
1.3 Regime Change and Democracy 
Concepts and Measurements  
Before the question ‘Has a regime change taken place in Iraq?’ can be answered, 
answers to other questions are necessary. These include: ‘What is regime change?’ and 
‘How can it be measured?’ A political regime is a system of rules that govern political 
rights and the extent to which they are exercised, and their effects on control over state 
activity (Przeworski et al. 2000: 18). A political regime has two defining parameters: 
(a) institutionalised rules between government and the people; and (b) institutionalised 
procedures between different parts of the apparatus of rule. Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 
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26) define the characteristics of regimes in terms of ‘authority patterns’ that are 
equivalent to the mechanisms of rule; authority patterns are the institutionalised 
functions through which states operate, the machinery of government. When those 
authority patterns change the regime as a whole shifts. The 6 component variables that 
combine to provide authority are investigated below. 
  
A regime change, therefore, requires a shift in the two key dimensions of a political 
regime; ‘relations among governing institutions and relations between institutions and 
the society at large’ (Maoz 1996: 219). Operationally, a regime change can be defined 
as the movement of a state from one type of government to another, only when a state 
previously designated as one regime type is then designated as another regime type 
(Gurr et al. 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993). Such a move can occur within non-
democracies (autocracy-anocracy), between a non-democracy and a democracy 
(anocracy-democracy), and move towards, or away, from either type.  
 
The Polity IV17 (P-IV) database was used to measure regime change in Iraq. It measures 
different political regimes against three types of polities; democracy, autocracy, and 
anocracy. The P-IV has operationally defined each type (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  
 
Democracy is defined as a system that has institutionalized certain particulars; a 
citizen’s political participation and the guarantee of personal freedoms; institutions 
through which policies and leaders alternate according to the expressed will of the 
citizen body; constraints on the executive’s exercise of power. Autocracy is defined as 
a system that also has distinctive features; the restriction and suppression of political 
participation; the selection of chief executives through a regularized process of 
selection within the political elite; a lack of institutional constraints on the executive’s 
excursive of power. The third type is anocracy, a polity that exhibits mixed qualities of 
both of democracy and autocracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 12-13).  
 
																																																						
17 The Polity IV project is a continuous Polity research tradition of coding the authority characteristics 
of states for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. The original Polity conceptual scheme was 
formulated and the initial Polity I data collected under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr and informed by 
foundational, collaborative work with Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for 
Political Inquiry (1975).   
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The overall regime type is indicated by subtracting the ‘autocratic value’ from the 
‘democratic value,’ to provide a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full 
democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). Regimes that fall between the ranges from -6 to +6 
are anocracies, +6 and above are democracies, and -6 and below are autocracies (See 
Table 1.3).18   
	
TABLE	1.3:	POLITY	IV	REGIME	TYPES	AND	AUTHORITY	COMPONENT	VARIABLES		
REGIME	TYPE	 Regime	Score	 Authority	Component	Variables	
DEMOCRACY	 +6	to	+10	
Competitiveness	of	participation	
Regulation	of	participation	
Openness	of	executive	recruitment	
Competitiveness	of	executive	recruitment	
Regulation	of	Chief	Executive	Recruitment	
Executive	constraints	
ANOCRACY	 -6	to	+6	
AUTOCRACY	 -6	to	-10	
 
 
The P-IV’s conception of democracy is procedural and it only concerns the machinery 
of government based on the above authority component variables (‘authority patterns’). 
It regards other features of democracy, such as the rule of law, civil systems of checks 
and balances, freedom of the press, as means to, or specific manifestations of, those 
authority patterns.19  
 
In order to understand the position of this thesis concerning definitions of democracy, 
a brief elaboration is necessary. The notion of democracy understood in its modern 
sense is a compound-idea. The pre-modern idea of democracy could be understood 
merely as participation, rule primarily by the people. The modern interpretation of the 
idea of democracy, however, has a peculiar twist, representation that is rule primarily 
																																																						
18 Furthermore, P-IV measures regime type by coded values which have six authority component 
variables. The operational definitions of each variables as follows: (1) The Competitiveness of 
Participation; refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be 
pursued in the political arena. (2) Regulation of Participation; refers to the extent that there are binding 
rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. (3) Openness of Executive 
Recruitment; refers to the extent to which the recruitment of the chief executive is open to the politically 
active population to attain the position through a regularised process. (4) Competitiveness of Executive 
Recruitment; refers to the presence of the selection of chief executives through popular elections among 
two or more political parties or candidates. (5) Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment; refers to the 
procedures to transfer executive power, and the extent of its institutionalisation. (6) Executive 
Constraints, refers to the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives the checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial powers (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002: 19-27).  
19 Moreover, the P-IV does not include coded data on civil liberties. To measure those features of 
democracy that concern political rights and civil liberties in Iraq, one could use the Freedom House (FH) 
database. The Polity PIV is better in measuring regime change.  
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for the people. John Stuart Mill, in support of a democratic government argues that 
‘participation must be as great as the community in question allows it’ and ‘the ideal 
type of a perfect government must be representative’ (Mill 2003: 314). The two ideas 
of participation and representation are the crux of any modern democratic idea. 
 
There are different conceptions of large scale and minimal democracy. Scholars who 
focus on the participation side of democracy by society at large argue in favour of a 
modern viable theory of democracy, central to which is the notion of participation (e.g. 
Bateman 1970; Blumberg 1968). Their stand is against a ‘procedural democracy,’ and 
they propose a more egalitarian and grass-roots form of democracy (e.g. Gutmann & 
Thompson 1996). Among them there is a strong tendency towards a democracy that 
requires citizens to be engaged in creating ‘public opinion’ (e.g. Fishkin 1995). 
Furthermore, they equate the meaning of a consolidated democracy with a system that 
provides and protects ‘liberties’ (e.g. Diamond 1999). Their argument is that the 
performance of democratic institutions depends in measurable ways upon ‘social 
capital’, that is an actively engaged citizenry (e.g. Putnam 2000). Having said that, the 
complexity of society becomes central to the way democracy functions, hence, society 
and its freedoms become the yardstick by which democracy ought to be measured.  
 
Scholars who focus on the representational elements of democracy, what might be seen 
as the machinery of government, argue for a minimalist conception. Schumpeter 
proposes a theory of democracy which is ‘no more definite than is the concept of 
competition for leadership’ (Schumpeter 2003: 10). Adam Przeworski uses language to 
defend a Schumpeterian conception of democracy using a Popperian standard (2003: 
12). Democracy, as a system in which political leadership is elected through frequent 
competitive elections (Schumpeter 1942: 269), is regarded as the only system in which 
citizens can change political leadership with ballots without resorting to bullets (Popper 
1962: 124). Depending on the point of departure, it has been argued such minimalist 
conceptions reduce democracy to a set of institutions that allow the people to elect, and 
also periodically remove, their rulers (Shapiro 1996: 82). Democracy can be conceived 
of as a political system that institutionalizes the changing of governing officials (Lipset 
1981: 33). Based on those minimalist definitions of democracy, institutional 
arrangements and the political elite become central to the way democracy functions.  
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Although this thesis focuses on representation, it does not disregard the participation 
base (i.e. Iraq’s ethno-sectarian division). This thesis takes the social bases of 
participation to be foundations for the type of representation applied. Accordingly, 
Iraq’s democracy through divergent perspectives of ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq, the 
Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds, are all explored. It does so with reference to the views 
expressed by the political elites who represent those groups, and their preferences for 
certain institutional arrangements. A minimalist conception of democracy is endorsed 
(Chapter 3). 
 
Regime Change and Democracy in Iraq  
To return to the question, ‘Has there been regime change and democratisation in Iraq?’, 
one of the chief objectives of the invasion was regime change linked to the introduction 
of a representative government. According to the US Army General Tommy Franks, 
who led the invasion of Iraq under the codename ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom,’ the 
objectives of intervention were, specifically, ‘to end the regime of Saddam Hussein … 
eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction … to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources 
… to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-
government’ (Sale and Javid 2013). In other words, the main purposes in intervening 
militarily in Iraq were concerns for international security, safe access to oil, regime 
change and replacing an authoritarian system with a representative regime. Regime 
change can be seen as an end in its own right and a precondition for the fulfilment of 
all the other US objectives. Iraq’s 2003 regime change has resulted in an elimination of 
an autocracy and the introduction of a hybrid anocracy regime, characterised by 
political instability and government ineffectiveness (Maoz 1996). 
 
Figure 1.3 tracks Iraq’s annual Polity scores from 1946 to 2015 with a referent grid 
denoting vertical thresholds for democracy (+6 and above) and autocracy (-6 and 
below). Iraq’s Polity score is +3 (Iraq’s autocratic vale +1 subtracted from its 
democratic value +4). Although this places Iraq closer to a democracy than an 
autocracy, Iraq clearly does not meet the threshold to enable it to be labelled a 
democracy.  
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FIGURE	1.3	ILLUSTRATES	IRAQ’S	REGIME	TREND	FROM	1945	TO	2015		
 
Source:	Polity	IV,	country	report	Iraq	2010.		
 
The graph provides information on Iraq’s specific political conditions. The solid blue 
line indicates Iraq’s general regime scores over time with a score of -9 for the years 
1980 to 2003 (-10 full autocracy). The solid red line at the upper right hand corner refers 
to the period of active factionalism (i.e. regime instability and infectiveness) from 2010 
onwards. The broken line denotes an interruption20 (from 2003 to 2009) that includes 
the period of military invasion and occupation. The capital letters mark the initial point 
of regime change, letter C denotes coup d’état events (1958, 1963, 1964 and 1968) and 
letter S denotes regime collapse in 2003. The abbreviated designation of the intervening 
state and an orange caret at the point of intervention denotes direct external military 
regime change intervention, in this case that of the US-led 2003 invasion. 
 
There are six authority component variables that the P-IV measures for Iraq’s polity for 
the year 2010 (the parliamentary round 2010-2014). First, the ‘competitiveness of 
participation’ is factional. Iraq is characterised by ethnic-based political factions that 
compete for political influence in order to promote the interests of particular groups 
																																																						
20 An interruption refers to a period in which a country is occupied by foreign powers terminating the old 
regime. The P-IV has coded the intervening years as an interruption (Iraq 2003-2009). Cases of foreign 
‘interruption’ are treated as ‘system missing.’ 
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and programs. Second, the ‘regulation of participation’ is sectarian. In Iraq, political 
demands are characterised by different interests among multiple identity groups and 
alternate between intense factionalism and government favouritism. The Shia have 
secured central power. They favour their group members in central allocations and have 
restricted the political advancement of the Sunni and Kurds that they see as competitors. 
Third, Iraq’s ‘openness of executive recruitment’ is ‘open’ to an extent. Chief 
executives are chosen by a combination of two methods elite designation and 
competitive election. Iraq’s presidency is allocated to the Kurds. Kurds nominate 
different candidates who then compete for the majority of votes within the Iraqi House 
of Representatives. In 2014, the Kurdish Candidates, Barham Salih and Faud Masoum, 
ran for the post of President and Masoum won. Fourth, Iraq’s ‘competitiveness of 
executive recruitment’ is ‘transitional.’ Iraq has adopted two transitional arrangements 
for designation and competitive election. This illustrates the principle of 
proportionality. After the national parliamentary election in Iraq, each group is ascribed 
a share in the federal government in proportion to their numerical strength (e.g. the 
formation of the council of ministers and apportionment of ministers to each group). 
Fifth, the ‘regulation of chief executive recruitment’ is ‘designational.’ Iraq has been 
practising a transitional arrangement to regularise the distribution of power. The chief 
executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal 
competitive elections. This applies to the President (Kurd) and the two Vice Presidents 
(one Shia and one Sunni), the Prime Minister (Shia), and the two Deputy Prime 
Ministers (one Kurd and one Sunni). Sixth, the ‘executive constraints’ indicates an 
intermediate category. In Iraq, the limitations on the executive power fall in a moderate 
category in the middle of the two extremes of slight and substantial limitations. The 
executive, in the person of the Prime Minister, has more effective authority than 
accountable groups, such as the House of Representatives or the Federal Court, but is 
subject to partial constraints by them. In consequence, Iraq can be classified as a semi-
democracy, an anocratic polity which fails to meet the threshold for a minimalist 
concept of democracy. 
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The lack of further democratisation has, in part, been caused by ‘active factionalism’.21 
Iraq’s diverse identity has not been effectively integrated and managed within its 
mechanisms of government. It is rather politicised and mobilised as restrictive identity 
factions. This fact can be seen in the competitiveness of political participation within 
the central authority. The focus of this thesis is primarily on this period of active 
factionalism, in the form of ethno-religious divisions that are tracked in the red line in 
the upper right hand corner of Figure 1.3. It is crucial to analyse how the elite members 
of different groups view democracy within this period, and what type of political 
institutions they prefer. This is the missing piece in the jigsaw of established literature 
on democracy building and regime change.  
 
1.4 Case Selection and Relevance 
The very nature of this study is a case study. A case study has been conceptualised as 
‘the intensive study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
cases’ (Gerring 2004: 342; Gerring 2013: 139).  This definition reconstructs case 
studies in a way that emphasises comparative politics, which has been closely linked to 
this method. Single-country studies are of great importance and the field of comparative 
politics has benefited greatly from single country studies (e.g. Dahl 1961; Lijphart 
1968; Scott 1976; Popkin 1979; Tilly 1986; O'Donnell 1988; Tarrow 1989; Putnam 
1993; Varshney 2002). Recent works (see, Landman 2000; 2008; Landman and 
Carvalho 2017) have used case studies in comparative perspectives, among other 
issues, to explain democratic transitions and institutional design.  
 
The case study method has several advantages. Within the discipline of political 
science, case studies are more useful to give descriptive inferences, propositional depth, 
and internal case comparability. They are also helpful to provide insight into causal 
mechanisms. They are useful when the causal proposition at issue is invariant; when 
the strategy of research is exploratory; and when a significant variance is available for 
only a single unit or a small number of units (Gerring 2004: 352). Those are the 
																																																						
21 I have borrowed the term ‘active factionalism’ from Marshall and Jaggers (2002: 2-3). They argue 
when factionalism (i.e. the politicised identity difference -e.g. ethno-religious cleavages) is active, ‘it 
challenges the coherence and cohesion of authority patterns within the shared, central polity.’ 
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probable objectives for a thesis based on a case study, as far as the general attributes of 
case studies are concerned.  
 
There are different methods available to case study researchers to select their cases.22 
Of all the methods, perhaps the most controversial, is the crucial-case method (see, 
Gerring 2006: 189-190). Gerring (2004: 348) has argued that one way for a case study 
to be able to make a credible claim to provide evidence for causal propositions of broad 
reach is to choose ‘crucial cases’ (e.g. Reilly and Phillpot 2003; Desch 2002; Goodin 
and Smitsman 2000; Kemp 1986).  A case is said to be crucial when its design exhibits 
the two characteristics of ‘most likely’ and ‘least likely.’23 That is to say, ‘most likely 
cases for one theory become the least likely case for its antithesis, and vice versa,’ so 
that ‘the distinction is one of research design and objectives rather than the inherent 
characteristics of a case.’ (Eckstein 1975: 119).  For that same reason, ‘crucial cause 
study proceeds best when a case is treated in both senses and confronted with both 
theory and counter theory’ (ibid). The case study of this thesis is a ‘crucial case’ as it 
tests the question of the feasibility of democracy in Iraq against a most likely theory, 
(i.e. consensualism), and a least likely counter theory (i.e. majoritarianism), with 
reference to political elites’ attitudes. By virtue of being a crucial case, the findings of 
this thesis and the lessons drawn from it could apply to other cases with a similar 
context - in particular, other multi-ethnic countries in the Middle East.  
 
This thesis is a single-country case study and its primary virtue is the depth of analysis 
it provides. The insight that this study shares is in-depth data and empirical findings of 
elite views and opinions on what works best for Iraq. This case of Iraq as a case study 
is important in comparative politics in general, and in democratisation studies in 
specific. Iraq is one of the most critical cases in the Middle East, in terms of the 
feasibility and the likelihood of democracy becoming embedded. Due to its central 
geographical location within the Middle East, what happens there inevitably influences 
neighbouring states. Iraq’s stability, or lack of it, is a key determinant of the geo-
political situation in the whole region. In addition, its unique multi-ethnic and sectarian 
																																																						
22 Those methods include; typical, divers, extreme, Deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar, 
most-different (see, Gerring 2006) 
23 The characteristics of most-likely and least-likely cases, and their relation to the design of this thesis 
have been further discussed in chapter two, in the last part of section 2.7.  
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divides, combined with the manner in which democracy was introduced, provide the 
country with numerous experiences from which others can learn, making it a potential 
model for transition in other states.  
 
Iraq’s position in relation to the Middle East is both critical and crucial in another sense 
as well, as Iraq sits geographically between the two poles of fundamentalism in the 
Muslim world, Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Those two regimes, surrounding Iraq, 
are not only undemocratic24 but also hostile to democracy and liberal values. Both view 
Iraq as their proxies as Iraq’s population is comprised of both Sunni (45-48 percent) 
and Shia (50-55 percent). Iraq is at the heart of a region which Samuel Huntington 
(1991) labelled the last stronghold of authoritarianism in the world.25 Due to its crucial 
position, Iraq has been perceived as a portal for democracy into the Middle East, 
including those two bastions of Muslim fundamentalism.26  
 
It was President George W. Bushes’ belief that the establishment of ‘a free Iraq at the 
heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution’ 
(Bush 2003). An objective of the United States’ military invasion, therefore, was to 
bring democracy, hoping that Iraq would be the first phase in a comprehensive 
transformation of politics in the greater Middle East (Fukuyama 2006: 12). The free 
Iraq, to which the US president aspired, has not materialised and Iraq’s status is clearly 
not that of a free country (see Freedom House 2015 database). 
 
This highlights the second major factor that makes Iraq a critical case; Iraq’s own 
conditionality and setting. In the Iraqi context, particularly in relation to the feasibility 
of democracy, three characteristics are important: it is a deeply divided society, the 
religion of Islam is dominant, and it is a rentier state, highly dependent on its oil 
revenues. The established literature on the possibility and likelihood of democracy in 
																																																						
24 Some might argue that Iran could be regarded as a guided democracy, here I refer t undermocraticness 
of those two regimes in terms of being hostile to liberal democracy.  
25 This argument was valid as long as the Arab countries were concerned with the exception of Lebanon’s 
power sharing, and of course Israel - the latter is not an Arab country. 
26 I make this assumption based on a premise developed by Huntington, the snow balling effect; the 
democratisation of countries A and B is not a reason for democratisation in country C, unless the 
conditions that favoured it in the former also exist in the latter (1991: 16). That is, the three countries are 
Muslim majority countries. They all have Sunni and Shia groups. They are oil rich countries. If 
democracy was successful in Iraq, it is more likely to be successful in those other two countries as well.    
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societies that are divided along ethnic lines suggests that such states face significant 
challenges in introducing and maintaining democracy (Lijphart 1969; Horowitz 1985). 
Linked to this issue is the question of constitutional design and institution and 
democracy building in divided societies. Despite its divided society, it is 
overwhelmingly Muslim and Islam plays a fundamental role both in state and society. 
This opens another related topic, the debate on democracy and the compatibility of 
Islam and democracy in Muslim countries. As Iraq is an oil rich rentier state27 (e.g. 
Birdsall and Subramanian 2004; Mahdi 2007a; 2007b; Billon 2008; Ryan 2010; Muttitt 
2012; Al-Basri and Al-Shebahi 2013), Iraq is also a relevant case for anyone examining 
the relationship between democracy and oil. Of the 23 countries that derive their income 
primarily from oil and gas sales, none is a democracy (Diamond 2010). This opens the 
debate on modernisation and democracy (Chapter 2).  
 
The method by which democracy was introduced to Iraq is worthy of special 
consideration. Democracy was brought to Iraq on the back of a military invasion and 
was imposed through a military occupation. Empirical studies have shown that foreign 
interventions have been ineffective in promoting long term democratisation (Enterline 
and Greig 2005) and that externally imposed democracies rarely lead to full 
democratisation. The evidence shows, therefore, that military interventions tend to be 
ineffective in spreading democracy (Downes and Monten 2013; Beetham 2009). With 
a focus on the significance of an organised social base for democratisation, Hippler 
(2008) offers an explanation for the limited success of external democracy building in 
post-war societies. He concentrates on the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. With respect to history, there is a contrary view that contends, democracy is quite 
frequently established by undemocratic means. Laurence whitehead,28 refers to four 
cases in which democratic institutions had been acquired under American armed forces, 
these include, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany (Whitehead, 1996: 59). This 
																																																						
27 A rentier state is defined and its wider implications for my own analysis is demonstrated in chapter 2 
(see section 2.2).  
28 Whitehead (1996: 5-24) has identified three international dimensions of democratisation; first, 
'contagion,' that focuses on the study of actors and the motivations of external powers. Second, 'control 
perspective,' confines itself to explaining the calculation of the dominant powers and links it to the power 
politics tradition in international relations. Third, 'consent,' is a perspective that tries to analyse the 
complexities of the consolidation process; therefore, it focuses on means that could establish consent. 
The focus of this thesis confines to the third approach; it concentrates on the internal dynamics of 
institution building and mutual accommodation - it concentrates on the consent end of democratisation. 
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opens the international aspect29 to this issue, including that of international state 
building. 
 
It has been argued that Iraq’s democracy, if established effectively, increases the 
chances and likelihood of it becoming ‘a successful model’ of democracy for the 
Middle East (e.g. Alterman 2003: 158; Byman 2003b: 72; Baracati 2004: 158; Ryan 
2010: 65). The chances of an effective realisation of democracy as a political system is, 
in fact, subject to contextual aspects: social, cultural and economic. While the 
established literature has addressed these different aspects of Iraq’s context, 
concentrating on the structural, this thesis examines the views of a correct application 
of democracy in Iraq with reference to the views and preferences of the Iraqi political 
elite. 
  
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
Following on from this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will summarise and assess the 
previous studies which have focused on the question of the feasibility of democracy in 
Iraq. This chapter identifies a gap in the literature, as there is a neglect of the importance 
of agency in examining the feasibility of democracy in Iraq. As well as filling the gap 
in the literature, this thesis will provide a departure from established approaches, as it 
examines the feasibility of democracy through the divergent views of the political elite. 
Chapter 3 will develop a theoretical framework based on two premises, political 
institutions and political elite. It also articulates the main hypotheses and presents a 
model for the thesis. Chapter 4 explains the methodology, data collection and analysis, 
research design and justifications, and also addresses ethical considerations.  
 
Chapter 5 will examine the political elites’ values and goals, as well as their conceptions 
of democracy, with reference to related and relevant literature from a different aspect: 
Islam and democracy (Al-Fanjari 1973; Enayat 1982; Sisk 1992; Esposito and Piscatory 
1991; Esposito 1991; 1992; Esposito and Voll 1996; Brumberg 2003; Abu El Fadel 
2004). Given that Iraq is a Muslim country, where the majority of the political elites 
																																																						
29 The international dimension of democratisation and other arguments put forward on the three modes 
of democracy imposition (i.e. whitehead 1996) are discussed in chapter two sec. 2.4.  
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are either Muslims or Islamic, it was essential to examine to what extent Islam plays a 
role in the political elites’ conceptions of democracy. Moreover, Chapter 5 examines 
the different definitions of democracy held by different groups, in relation to the two 
consensus and majoritarian ideals, where the Shia conceive it as majority rule, and 
Sunni and Kurds as consensus. It is argued that the political elites’ conceptions of 
democracy matter and how elites perceive the idea of democracy could either build trust 
or destroy it. This thesis shows that the conception of democracy as majority rule in 
Iraq has undermined trust between members of different ethno-religious groups who 
belong to the political elites.  
 
Chapter 6 will contribute to the debate on institutional engineering in culturally and 
ethnically divided countries using data from surveys carried out with members of the 
elite groups. There are different views on political institutions and their feasibility and 
function in deeply divided societies. Some scholars recommend power sharing 
institutions (e.g. Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1984; Reynolds 1999), while others suggest 
majoritarian institutions (Horowitz 1991; Sartori 1997; Reilly 1997; 2001). The 
approach of this thesis will contribute to both bodies of literature. The preferences of 
the political elite for formal political institutions affect the outcome of the type of 
democracy in a country. This chapter discusses the preferences of the political elite 
from divergent perspectives, on all of the key institutional arrangements. The debate is 
then extended to cover institutional design in divided countries.  
 
Chapter 7 assesses the preferences of the political elite and their support for different 
forms of federalisms and federal structures in Iraq by using data from interviews and 
surveys involving key political players. The chapter is both general and specific, 
contributing to the general literature on federalism in different forms. The idea of power 
sharing and the distribution of powers between the central government and other 
administrative units is investigated (e.g. Watts 1998; Norman 2006). Federalism as a 
source of political stability, including the idea that a federal system can reduce the 
likelihood of secession (e.g. Simeon 1998; Linz 1997; Simeon and Conway 2001) is 
analysed. A further issue related to federalism, and relevant to the case of Iraq, is the 
politics of recognition, which in turn is interconnected to identity politics, when 
different ethno-religious groups strive to politically exist based on their identity 
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(Gutmann 1994; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Carens 2000; Kymlicka 2001), and this 
too is examined. The main contribution of the thesis relating to these three areas30 is 
provided through a detailed analysis of the preferences of political elites, both intra-
group and inter-group. Specifically, this thesis contributes to the existing literature on 
federalism in Iraq (e.g. Brancati 2004; Smith 2005; Salamey and Pearson 2005; 
Anderson and Stansfield 2005; Galbraith 2006; Anderson 2007; Visser and Stansfield 
2007; Alkadiri 2010; Natali 2011; Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri 2012; Danilovich 
2014).  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of conversations and surveys with members of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee, on the topic of the Iraqi constitution. The findings 
will provide insight into the constitution and so contribute to the relevant literature 
which, currently, is mainly concerned with the role of Islam and federalism (Brown 
2005a; 2005b; Morrow 2005; Jawad 2013). The findings extend the empirical data on 
these issues, from the perspectives of the members of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee. There has been much controversy and speculation on whether the Iraqi 
constitution is inherently democratic or not because of the second article. This chapter 
will argue that the different groups’ perceptions of the constitution have changed since 
it was drafted, and will address the challenges of introducing amendments that lie 
ahead. Finally, Chapter 9 will revise the key assumptions derived from the main 
hypotheses tested in the previous chapters, revisit the model, and determine a way 
forward for future research. 
	 	
																																																						
30 the three areas, as mentioned earlier include, (a) power sharing and distribution of power, (b) political 
stability and territorial unity, (c) politics of recognition and identity.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
The Feasibility of Democracy in Iraq: Previous Research 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 1970s, the world witnessed a wave of democratisation. Countries in Latin 
America began transitions to democracy, followed by Asian countries, while in the 
early 1990s many countries in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa also moved 
towards democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; 
Linz and Stepan 1996; Doorenspleet 2000; 2005). Samuel Huntington called it the 
‘third wave’. He contended that the number of democratic governments has doubled in 
a very short period of time, providing empirical evidence that ‘between 1974 and 1990 
at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy’ (Huntington 1991: 12). The phrase 
has been criticised, as many of those transitions proved to be shifts towards semi-
authoritarian rule (e.g. Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Doorenspleet 2000). However, 
the third wave, nonetheless, brought optimism and enthusiasm for the promotion of 
democracy in the Third World to subsequent US administrations. The Middle East was 
the only region which remained authoritarian31 and was seen as an example of 
'exceptionalism' with its specific social, cultural,32 political and economic conditions 
making democracy less likely (Aarts 1999; Rubin 2002).  
 
Still, the 1990s was an optimistic period in history, and not only US politicians but also 
political scientists thought democracy could spread throughout the world. One of the 
most influential and prominent scholars was Francis Fukuyama who argued that the 
United States’ aim was to promote democracy in the hope that Iraq could be the opening 
gambit of a comprehensive plan aimed at transforming the politics of the greater Middle 
East (2006: 12).  However, the question as to whether democracy is feasible in Iraq has 
yet to be answered.  
 
																																																						
31 With the exception of Israel and Lebanon; the former is not an Arab country, and the latter’s experience 
of consociation degenerated into a civil war –characterized by conflict and politico-militant 
fragmentations, e.g. the presence of Hizballah.  
32 A more recent scholarly work argues against this concept of Middle East ‘exceptionalism,’ and instead 
it contents that the Arab culture is not inherently incongruent with democracy (see, Pratt 2006). 
	 41	
This chapter will summarise and assess previous studies which have focused on this 
question. Based on an extensive literature review, it is clear that six approaches can be 
distinguished. The first approach can be located within the more general modernization 
approach, and argues that countries need a certain level of modernization before they 
can make a transition to democracy. The second approach focuses on the impact of 
international promotion of democracy, while the third approach focuses on the impact 
of ‘democracy by force’ and military international interventions. The fourth approach 
debates whether state-building is needed before a country can make a transition to 
democracy, the so-called ‘sequence debate’. The fifth approach focuses on the 
importance of specific types of political institutions to understand the feasibility of 
democracy in a country, while the final, sixth, approach emphasises the importance of 
political culture. 
  
This chapter will not only discuss the main theoretical elements of these approaches, 
but will also explore whether the conclusions can be supported by empirical evidence 
as described in previous key studies. It will become clear that the evidence is mixed. 
Moreover, there is one important missing link, which has been ignored in the studies 
so far, which is how political elites view democracy. This is a crucial question when 
trying to understand the feasibility of democracy. This missing variable will be central 
to the analysis found in the remainder of this thesis.   
 
2.2 The Modernization Approach 
The Theoretical Idea 
Modernization, as expounded by Max Weber, is 'rationalisation' (Weber 1905). The 
institutionalization of rationality in socio-politico-economic spheres of modern 
societies has played a significant role in institutionalizing liberal values in the West. 
Modernization indicates political development through rationalization of government 
apparatus, and the concentration of power through institutional expansion. The 
modernization approach aims to establish a correlation between cultural and economic 
structures with the political structures of modern societies.  
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Seymour Martin Lipset's article in 1959 has been recognised as one of the foundational 
texts of modernization theory. Lipset argues that all the various aspects of economic 
development (i.e. industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education) are so 'closely 
interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy' 
(Lipset 1963: 41). That is to say, certain economic and social structures are necessary 
for the emergence of democratic political institutions, where they do not exist, and for 
their maintenance, where they do. Economic development brings about changes in the 
social structures that tend to, or are more likely to, produce democratic political 
institutions (Lipset 1959). 
 
There is a connection between the idea of the spread of democracy linked to economic 
development as manifested in a free market economy. Modernization in this regard 
highlights the importance of the western model of political institutions and economic 
industrialization. Economic liberalization and political democratisation pre-supposes 
the acceptance of the former as a pre-condition for the latter. Three general 
characteristics underpin modernization theory: economic (free market), cultural (liberal 
values) and political (democratic institutions).33 
 
General Patterns: Previous Empirical Studies 
A fundamental question is whether societies become liberal if they become 
industrialized, and whether states become democratic if they reach an advanced level 
of development. On the one hand, democracies are more likely to emerge as countries 
develop economically (e.g. Hayek 1944; Lipset 1959; Freidman 1961; Riker and 
Weimer 1993; Przeworski and Limongi 1993). On the other, democracies, it is 
suggested, can be established independently of economic development and there is no 
absolute relationship between democracy and economic development (e.g. Pye 1966; 
McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Kohli 1986; Marsh 1988).34  
 
Optimism is apparent in the early expressions of the economic form of modernization 
as a catalyst to the formation of political democracy (Lipset 1959). Such optimism, 
																																																						
33 Section 2.1 discusses the economic pattern, and sections 2.4 and 2.7 will discuss the political and 
cultural patterns of modernization theory respectively.  
34 There is also another proposition that maintains democracy hinders economic growth in less developed 
countries (e.g Feng 1977; Cohen 1994).  
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however, has been criticised on the premise that it was wrong to assume changes caused 
by economic development would necessarily be favourable to democracy. Instead, it 
has been argued that democracy is likely to emerge with the presence of political 
institutions capable of channelling and responding to socio-economic changes 
(Huntington 1968). Although such critics shifted the focus from the economy to 
political institutions, they agreed with modernization theory's core assumption that 
economic development leads to profound social changes. In early 1990, for instance, 
propositions were made that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank ought to make political democratization and economic liberalization the 
preconditions for economic assistance (Huntington 1991: 17).  
 
In the 1970s there was growing scepticism towards modernization, in particular from 
those who focused on the economic aspects. Various studies, in the case of Latin 
America (e.g.  Frank 1970; Cardoso and Enzo 1979), found that the international 
economy had caused countries to be 'dependent' and remain underdeveloped. This 
phenomenon is known as dependency theory, the core idea of which is that 
underdeveloped countries have their own unique characteristics and are not a 
primordial version of developed countries. The theory did not accept a concept of an 
inevitable, assumed, universal path of development, be it economic or otherwise. In a 
similar vein, with a focus on the political aspect, other studies showed that development 
forced on many underdeveloped countries resulted not in democracy but 'bureaucratic 
authoritarianism' (O'Donnell 1973).    
 
A study of statistical analysis for seventeen Latin American countries with a robust 
empirical test of the ‘economic development thesis’ has shown that the positive 
relationship between economic development and democracy was not upheld - infirming 
the main claims of modernization theory (e.g. Landman 1999). A more recent study to 
demonstrate the relationship between economic development and democracy by 
quantitative empirical evidence, confirms that economic development has positive 
effects on democratic performance; nevertheless, these effects vary across diverse 
aspects of performance and also across regions (see, Foweraker and Landman 2004). 
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It has also been argued that early modernization theory failed to differentiate between 
democracy's sustainability (i.e. consolidation) and the establishment of democracy (i.e. 
democratisation) (Przeworski 1997). This critique showed that economic development 
played a significant role in supporting the former but not in promoting the latter. That 
also implied that if democracy were to enter an economically better off country it would 
be maintained, or conversely, if a rich country became democratic it was less likely to 
revert to non-democratic systems. Recent retests of modernization hypotheses with new 
data suggests that modernization assumptions have stood up well (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Epstein et al. 2006).  
 
Positively correlating with democracy's survival, it has been argued that Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is the single most important factor to be considered. This 
probability increases, to the point that no democracy has ever been replaced in a country 
with a GDP of more than $6,055 (Przeworski 1997; 2004). Nevertheless, all the studies 
that suggest economic development sustains democracy (e.g. Lipset: 1959; Prezworski 
2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Epstein et al. 2006; Peerenboom 2008) are based on 
countries where citizens are involved in the generation of national wealth. They are 
representative of other wealthy autocratic countries, where oil is the prime source for 
the generation of national wealth. That is to say, oil is an intervening variable that could 
make the emergence of democracy less likely in oil dependent countries where national 
wealth does not positively correlate to democracy, such as in the petro states in the 
Persian Gulf.   
 
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies 
Extensive studies have examined Iraq’s oil wealth in relation to sustaining its political 
system. The literature covers the disputes over oil and finance in relation to democracy 
building and their impact on Iraq’s transition (e.g. Birdsall and Subramanian 2004; 
Mahdi 2007a; 2007b; Weede 2007; Billon 2008; Ryan 2010; Muttitt 2012; Al-Basri 
and Al-Shebahi 2013). Those studies suggest that Iraq’s oil has not undermined but 
rather sustained Iraq’s economy and politics. Furthermore, looking into the future, 
forecasts for political and economic conditions in Iraq for 2013-2017 suggest that oil 
reserves could lead to an expansion of oil firms and could help gross domestic supply 
increase by an average of 9 percent (Iles 2012). 
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In Iraq, oil is a political commodity and has direct impact on the political system. A 
majority of those who argue against Iraq’s democracy refer to Iraq’s poor economic 
conditions or the resource curse narrative. One of the arguments against the likelihood 
of democracy in Iraq, as far as modernization theory is concerned, is that Iraq is an oil-
dependent country. The core of the argument is that to rely heavily on oil to generate 
wealth as the primary source of GDP is not favourable to democracy (Rosser 2006; 
Ross 2001); among the 23 countries that derive their income chiefly from oil and gas 
sales, none are a democracy (Diamond 2010). One of the greatest concerns for post-
war Iraq is the possibility of becoming a ‘petro state’ (Lawson 2003), in which oil 
revenues go directly to a national government which typically has high levels of 
corruption.  
 
Iraq is an oil dependent rentier state. The theory of 'rentier state' implies, in an oil-
dependent country, that the state does not need to tax its citizen as it has an external 
flow of income (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987). The distinguishing mark 
of a rentier is that the rent comes from outside and goes directly to the state (Luciani 
2013: 91). Therefore, oil-rent could alleviate the need for political representation and 
political accountability as those who are in power sell oil and buy legitimacy, as in the 
case of the Gulf states.    
 
Iraq being an oil rich country has, to some extent, managed to build its infrastructure 
successfully. Daily oil exports rose from 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2005 to a 
record 3.08 million bpd in April 2015. Since 2005, Iraq has entered into a different 
phase of economic development. Although the economy of Iraq has been oil dependent, 
from 2004 to 2011 the contribution of oil to the total GDP was reduced from 70 percent 
to 43 percent. Oil has been a major contributor to the rebuilding of other aspects of the 
economic infrastructure.  
 
The GDP in Iraq was worth 168.61 billion US dollars in 2015. Despite its fragile 
security, Iraq's economy has been booming. Foreign investment, real estate projects, 
finance and, in some parts of the country, agriculture have expanded This has all 
resulted in a rise in GDP per capita from 3856.3 US Dollars in 2005, to 4963.10 US 
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dollars in 2015. Subsequently, poverty has shrunk from 54 percent to 19 percent using 
the World Bank’s measure of the ratio of the population that lives on less than one 
dollar per day (Al-Basri and Al-Sebahi 2013). Iraq’s wealth has grown, the country has 
witnessed some improved levels of economic development but as section 1.3 
demonstrated, Iraq is neither a free country, nor does its political system meet the 
minimum threshold for democracy. Growth in wealth and the emergence of democracy 
do not, so far, correlate positively in Iraq.  
 
Conclusion 
If it is accepted that national wealth is the most significant factor for ensuring regime 
stability, and it is the case of a rentier state that oil is the most valuable resource in 
generating national wealth, then it follows that oil is the most significant factor in 
regime survival, be it democratic or otherwise. This conclusion is applicable to both 
democratic and non-democratic regimes. Wealth derived from oil has sustained the oil 
rich autocracies of the Gulf States. Therefore, if a county is not democratic, oil revenues 
could hinder democratic transition since the wealth generated strengthens the apparatus 
of state and maintains the political system of a rentier state.  
 
The three consecutive rounds of Iraqi national elections have not alleviated the concern 
that Iraqi leaders would buy legitimacy through the sale of oil. This could be the case 
particularly in intra group representation.35 Iraq’s oil, so far, has not reduced the need 
for political representation, but it has not helped transition either. Wealth does play a 
fundamental role, and in Iraq it favours the sustainability of its political system which 
at present is an anocracy (see Section 1.3).  
 
Therefore, modernization theory does not hold true in the case of Iraq. The country is 
rich but it has not democratised, in direct contradiction of the modernization hypothesis. 
In addition, Iraq is dependent on oil which appears to make it even harder for such a 
process to manifest. Economic development could lead to a form of democracy in Iraq, 
and in one sense that looks promising given the existence of elections, a multi-party 
																																																						
35 That is to say, those groups who have direct access to oil revenues (the Kurds and the Shia) could 
lead electoral campaigns more effectively compared to the other groups (Sunnis).  
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assembly and federalism, but there is, at the same time, the crucial variable of oil that 
makes it unlikely.  
 
2.3 International Promotion of Democracy 
The Theoretical Idea 
International promotion of democracy36 is rooted in the assumption that the increase in 
democratic regimes positively correlates with international security and stability. That 
is based on the notion that democratic systems of governance resolve conflict internally 
without the need to resort to violence. Internationally, wars between democratic 
countries are less likely as they distribute wealth nationally and make better trading 
partners (Doyle 1983; Gleditsch 1992). Democracy as a political system ensures both 
political stability and economic prosperity.   
 
Allied to this idea is the notion of the universality of democratic principles and 
practices. The principles of equality, human rights and rule of law, as well as the 
practices of participation, representation, and accountability, are seen as aspired to in 
all societies, and not necessarily just as western export models. The promotion of those 
values, however, seems to be the task of democratic countries (Hermann and Kegley 
1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). A sample of state and non-state actors supporting democracy 
as the ‘provider’ shows assistance is democracy-assistance-from-the-north. According 
to democracy assistance factsheets, the leading countries in supporting democracy are 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and, with the lion’s share, the United States. 
 
Since the aftermath of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy has become a 
defining characteristic of US international interventions, specifically aiding democratic 
transitions and assisting developmental programs. The belief that the international 
promotion of democracy contributes to both the security and economic interests of the 
United States has made international democratisation a key feature of its foreign policy 
(Kagan 2006; Smith 2012; Cox, et al. 2013; Sedaca and Bouchet 2014) and successive 
																																																						
36 There are other terms closely related to this topic, such as international support for democracy, 
democracy assistance and democracy building. This is also presented in terms of ‘good governance’ to 
help governments to enforce the rule of law to protect human rights and to limit corruption. 
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US administrations have accepted this policy as a core element of their foreign aid 
(Carothers 2004; Finkel et al. 2006).  
 
General Patterns: Previous Empirical Studies  
Different studies have investigated theoretical explanations and have looked for 
empirical evidence for democratisation (see; Stephan 1986; Doorenspleet 2005; Grugel 
snd Bishop 2014). Stephan (1986) has systematically characterised the primary 
coalitional and institutional paths to democratisation, he identifies the role of external 
powers in three distinct categories; internal restoration after external reconquest; 
internal formulation; and externally monitored installation37 (1986: 65). There is also a 
tendency to divide international democratisation into two different processes: 
democracy promotion and democracy assistance. Democracy promotion is viewed as 
the hard-form of democracy support, including military interventions and economic 
sanctions, while democracy assistance is the soft-form of democracy support in the 
sense that it occupies the positive ground (Burnell ed. 2000). In their support for 
emerging democracies, either to help transition or to help consolidate, the US initiatives 
are more conducive to democracy promotion while the EU programs are linked to 
democracy assistance. International support for democracy, therefore, is interlinked 
with the ‘transition paradigm’ (Carothers 2004: 180). In a way, conceptually, 
democracy promotion is associated with cases in transition and democracy assistance 
with those of consolidation. However, in a host country the two processes of democracy 
support overlap; some principles must be consolidated to make way for transition, i.e. 
elections, political parties, institutions and civil society are all mutually re-enforcing 
factors for transition as well as the consolidation of emerging democracies. Both terms 
are used interchangeably in this study.   
 
Contemporary theories about democratisation consider the promotion of democracy 
(Carothers 2000; 2002; Burnell 2000; Ottaway and Carothers 2003; Carothers 2004; 
Bjørnlund 2004). There are two main views, the first of which sees democratisation as 
																																																						
37	It has been argued that, under the supervision of external powers the primary internal actor (i.e. the 
authoritarian regime) initiates change from within it does so while preserving its many interests. 
However, when the internal opposition parties initiated reform these could categorised in four different 
types a- society led regime termination, b- party pact, c- organised violent revolt, d- Marxist-led 
revolutionary war (Stephan 1986: 65-66). 
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an all-encompassing process of transforming the host country (e.g. Kumar and de 
Zeeuw 2006). Democracy promotion is a comprehensive process covering social, 
political, and economic sectors. The second is a more focused view of democratization; 
the single most important factor is ‘political institutionalisation’ rather than civil society 
(Diamond 1994: 15). Democracy promotion translates to the spreading of democratic 
political systems. A distinction could be made between these two viewpoints as 
developmental and political respectively. Both views have been criticised, the former 
for being unassertive and ineffective, while the latter for being assertive and its potential 
to become confrontational with host governments seen as counterproductive (Carothers 
2009: 5-6). From the donors’ perspective, international promotion of democracy ought 
not to marginalise the state in favour of civil society (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007). 
It is also contended that to rely on agreements with the state could undermine efforts to 
make it accountable (van de Walle 2001), when recipient states learn to play a reform 
game with international donors.  
 
A review of current literature indicates three general patterns in international promotion 
of democracy. The first involves elections and the institutionalisation of political 
parties. 38  The second enhances the rule of law and improvements to the justice sector. 
The third develops civil society and a supportive media.39 In international promotion of 
democracy, supporting the effectiveness of electoral systems and the functionality of 
political parties are intertwined. Elections are mechanisms by which governments 
attempt to gain international legitimacy. Consequently, support for elections has 
become a primary element in international democracy promotion from the donor-side. 
Empirical studies have shown that international support for free and fair elections has 
played a crucial role in democratic transitions (Bjørnlund 2004; Lopez-Pintor 2000). 
Closely related to supporting electoral programs is the role of political parties. In newly 
emerging democracies, political parties are pre-conditions to elections, because they 
are the organised mediums through which the diverse demands of citizens are 
represented. Various scholarly studies (e.g. Schoofs and de Zeeuw 2004; Carothers 
2006) have found that international support for the institutionalization of political 
parties have been constructive in assisting democracy in recipient countries.   
																																																						
38 For international support on cases of Latin America (see; Angell 1996; Grabendorff 1996). 
39 State actors promote democracy through international organisations and NGO’s such as USAID, NDI, 
KAS, NED, IFES, IDEA (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007). 
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Another fundamental aspect of international democracy promotion has been the 
enhancement of the judicial system in establishing the rule of law. The rule of law can 
be conceptualised as those publicly known laws, the sum of which make up a system 
that treats all citizens alike and preserves their political rights and civil liberties 
(Carothers 2003). Although a wide range of donors have designed programs for 
reforming the justice sector in developing countries (Mendelsohn and Glenn 2000), the 
two regions that have attracted most scholarly attention are Latin America and Eastern 
Europe (e.g. Salas 2001; Carothers 2003; Skaar et al. 2004; Channell 2005). In those 
two regions, to strengthen the rule of law, the international donors’ focus has been on 
reforming and improving the function of legal systems, processes motivated by 
economic liberalisation and political democratisation. It has been noted that in the case 
of Latin America, the process has been hindered by local stakeholders’ unwillingness 
to reform (Carothers 2003) while in Eastern Europe the obstacle has been the nature of 
the process itself as it has taken place without the active involvement of key 
stakeholders (Channell 2005). To help recipient countries re-write laws accomplishes 
little, in terms of promoting democracy, if parallel substantial investments are not 
provided to positively change conditions for implementation and enforcement 
(Carothers 1998: 11). 
 
The empowerment of civil society could facilitate the promotion of democracy. The 
development of civil society becomes manifest when members of the society form an 
associational domain on a voluntary principle to protect their interests. Such a domain 
is separate from, and enjoys autonomy in relation to, the state (White 1994: 379). 
Academic studies focusing on ‘social capital’ (e.g. Putnam 1993) as the missing 
variable that could make democracy work and encourage international donors to 
promote democracy through an enhancement of civil society. In empowering civil 
society, one aspect, in particular, has been given significant attention, which is freedom 
of expression. Empirical studies (e.g. Howard 2003; Hume 2004; Becker and Vlad 
2005; Kumar 2006) suggest that the media as a resource-rich channel has been a high-
impact factor in spreading democratic political awareness in civil societies. In certain 
contexts, it has assisted democracy through helping to create a vibrant and politically 
aware civil society.   
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Another possible agent of democratic transition are social movements. Whilst Robert 
Putnam (1994) sees democracy as the result of virtuous behaviour in the form of the 
civic community (Putnam et al 1994). Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman (1997) argue 
that democracy is the result of political struggles for rights.40 They have identified the 
key connections made between collective action and individual rights and have tested 
these in the context of the selected cases of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain (in their 
modern authoritarian regimes). Using statistical techniques and employing these to 
illuminate historical processes, the work presents a defence of democracy as the direct 
result of collective struggles for individual rights.  
 
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies  
The efforts of international promotion of democracy precede the 2003-Iraqi invasion. 
As October 1998, the Clinton Administration approved ‘the Iraq Liberation Act’ to 
establish a program to support a transition to democracy. The Act stated that the United 
States should have a policy ‘to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam 
Hussein from power and Iraq and to promote the emergence to a democratic 
government to replace that regime’ (Public Law 105-338; SEC. 3). It was an assistance 
to support a transition to democracy, focusing mainly on Iraqi democratic opposition 
organisations. The Act allocated $97 million to support Iraq’s civil society and 
opposition groups (ibid; SEC. 4-5). The soft-end approach, however, did not result in 
regime change and it did not initiate transition. Saddam Hussein remained in power 
until 2003.  
 
After the 2003 invasion, and during the 2004-2011 military occupation, the United 
States was determined to democratise both the apparatus of rule and Iraqi civil society 
and concentrated on three issues: electoral monitoring through international 
organisations such as the European Union Commission and the United Nations; 
political parties were supported through organisations such as the National Democratic 
Institute; and support for a diverse civil society was channelled through NGO’s such as 
USAID and other international donors.  
																																																						
40 By measuring social mobilisation and citizenship rights and analysing their statistical mutual impact, 
within and across national cases. 
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In Iraq, understanding the nature of political parties is key to comprehending the 
structure of civil society. It has been well established that in modern societies political 
parties are central players in democratic politics and it is inconceivable that other social 
movements and networks will supplant the many roles undertaken by parties 
(Huntington 1968: 408; Smith 2009: 108-121; Lapalombar 1966: 3). Political parties 
have myriad roles (Cammack, Pool and Tordoff 2002: 98-102; Katz 2008: 301; Smith 
2009: 128) and, in Iraq, they link members of different groups to the machinery of 
government, reconcile conflict by accommodating different interests, and enhance 
political communication within and across different groups. The main political parties 
are established along ethno-religious lines (see Section 1.2) and share the common 
characteristic of ‘patron-client relationship’ (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1981: 276-7; 
Cappedge 2001: 176).  
 
As a consequence, international donors are faced with a dilemma. If they support Iraqi 
political parties in their existing undemocratic structures, strengthening such political 
parties could undermine the democratisation of Iraqi civil society. If they do not support 
political parties to institutionalise them, parties remain weak, and as no other social 
organisation could perform the many functions of political parties, this could also 
subvert the process of democratisation. Nevertheless, these remain suggestions and 
guidelines at best. When it comes to political parties in Iraq, for the most part, the 
groups that parties represent are prioritised over democratic principles and practices.  
 
In the interview with Lisa C. McLean, Country Director of the National Democratic 
Institute, she stated that the NDI is training all political parties in Iraq on democratic 
principles and that they ‘give suggestions and guide lines and enable parties to be 
committed to practising democratic behaviour.’41 The NDI (2010: 5) suggests that in 
order for a political party to help the democratisation process, its commitment to 
democratic principles should be reflected not only in its written constitution, but also 
in the day-to-day interaction between leaders and members. A party must be committed 
to conducting their business based on democratic conduct. In doing so, a democratic 
																																																						
41 Please note that I am citing McLean in an interview which I conducted in July 2010 in Erbil, in the 
Headquarters of NDI in Ankawa district (see Appendix A).  
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party should allow members to express their views freely, promote the membership of 
women, encourage participation by all members, be tolerant of different ideas, abide by 
agreed rules and procedures for decision-making and hold leaders accountable to 
members and supporters. The question is, to what extent do international organisations 
have influence over the constituencies of recipient countries. In the case of Iraq, the 
democratisation process is subject to the willingness of Iraq political leaders and their 
political parties, to democratise.   
 
Despite competing political agendas, Iraqi women activists are pressing to be part of 
the political transition, highlighting the liveliness of Iraqi civil society (Al-Ali and Pratt 
2009). The civil society in Iraq, however, is refracted through the three main groups 
and, in consequence, is deeply fragmented. Therefore, the associational realm of 
citizens either does not enjoy autonomy from the state or, where it does, it is not 
powerful enough to influence the state; the power relationship is inescapably top down. 
Moreover, the literature concerning democracy assistance in Iraq (e.g. Ryan 2010; Sky 
2011) contends that Iraq’s weak civil society is a long way from becoming self-
sustaining. Therefore, to keep momentum towards democracy, Iraq will require on-
going assistance from the United States and other international democracy assistance 
donors for an extended period. 
 
Conclusion 
The success of international promotion of democracy is conditioned by the specific 
objectives, and the particular methods and approaches, used in its promotion (Burnell 
2007). Although host countries have different economic, political, institutional and 
historical constituencies, the model for democracy assistance is derived from 
democratic development in the United States and Western Europe (Carothers 2000: 85). 
The success of democracy promotion requires the acknowledgement of the 
particularities of the context in the recipient countries. There has been a tendency 
among the US Presidents to believe that their country has a ‘mission’ to promote liberal 
values and democratic principles. George W Bush’s statement; ‘we will ensure that one 
brutal dictator is not replaced by another; all Iraqis must have a voice in the new 
government, and all citizens must have their rights protected’ (Bush 2003), and Barack 
Obamas’ promise; ‘we will stand with citizens as they demand their universal rights, 
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and support stable transitions to democracy’ (Obama 2013) confirms this approach 
from both main political parties. However, the main question remains to be answered; 
in the case of Iraq, ‘Does international democracy promotion work?’ The simple answer 
is both yes and no, as it all depends on the desire and willingness of Iraqi leaders to 
abide by democratic principles and practices, as well as the United States’ readiness to 
stay the course and assist Iraq’s democracy, at both state and societal levels. 
 
2.4 Democracy ‘by Force’ 
The Theoretical Idea  
The theoretical argument for democracy by force is that authoritarian regimes oppress 
their people. Topple the regime and the people will welcome democracy. This 
conclusion is based on assumptions concerning political legitimacy which authoritarian 
regimes rarely have if the populations widely support democratic values, making the 
‘democracy by force’ mission a relatively easy sell. A connected point is that weak and 
fragile states are threats to the security and the stability of the international order 
(Fukuyama 2005). Therefore, prospective regime change operations are likely to target 
poor and fragile states or states that have been defeated in war such as Japan and 
Germany. The fundamental notion in democracy by force is that the state exists, and 
the mission is only to change regime, not to build the state anew.42    
 
The probability of ‘snowballing’ provides another theoretical option for regime change 
through democracy by force and suggests that replacing an authoritarian regime in one 
state is likely to have a knock on effect in other authoritarian regimes with similar 
contexts. A linked idea is found in the regional-policy argument, first advanced in the 
early 1990s. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1990, it was argued that if the United 
States were to sustain a large military force in the Gulf, with time, that would build the 
momentum toward democratisation. This argument evolved into an assumption that 
unless some movement towards democracy occurs, such a military deployment is less 
likely to be sustained over time (Huntington 1991: 15). To keep vital interests in the 
region and ensure stability, the US had to have a military presence, which was 
																																																						
42 The following section on democracy through the effort of state-building will make this distinction 
clearer, providing a concise explanation of what is ‘state’ and what involves the process of ‘state 
building’.   
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acceptable only in the context of promoting democracy in the region and by targeting 
regimes, such as that of Saddam that had made the Middle East unstable. 
 
General Patterns: Previous Empirical Studies 
In the literature on democracy by force, two main points emerge; the nature and style 
of imposition, and the conditionality and context of the target country. The empirical 
findings, however, suggest that democracy by force is less likely to produce self-
sustaining democratic regimes.  
 
Historically speaking, it has been the case that the US has frequently carried out the 
promotion of democracy by force of arms. Laurence Whitehead (1996: 59-91) discusses 
the US attitude towards democracy promotion in Latin America and, in doing so, he 
identifies three different forms of the imposition of democracy in the case of the 
Caribbean. First, the promotion of democracy through ‘incorporation,’ where the US 
has played a consistent, sustained, and determining role in the democratisation 
process.43 Second, democracy promotion through ‘invasion.’44 Third democracy 
promotion through ‘intimidation.’45 Out of those three methods, only in the first 
instance, Whitehead argues, ‘the result has been a fully consolidated democratic regime 
of Puerto Rico’ (Ibid: 64).  
 
Empirical studies have examined the cases of foreign interventions in relation to 
democratisation with a focus on the method of intervention (i.e. imposition). An 
examination of a global sample of states in the twentieth century have shown that a 
distinction can be made between the impact of ‘fully externally imposed’ and ‘weakly 
externally imposed’ democratic regimes. It is argued that the fully imposed cases do 
not stimulate democratisation, while the weakly imposed cases undermine 
democratisation (Enterline and Greig 2005). If a US imposed democracy, in any given 
country in the Middle East was successful, it would not necessarily stimulate 
																																																						
43 The case of Purto Rico. 
44 The case of Panama, in November 1903, Panama broke away from Colombia under the US protection, 
the new republic received immediate recognition and financial assistance, and in return, the US was 
granted large concession over the proposed canal route. In a similar instance, a second invasion of 
Panama protected the authorities chosen in the 1989 elections and terminated a tyrannical rule.    
45 The case of Nicaragua, the intimidation forced them to accept a high degree of International 
supervision of the 1990 elections. 
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democratisation in the region. If unsuccessful, however, the very process of 
intervention and imposition of democracy would undermine democratisation all 
together. This is diametrically opposed to the expectations of the United States. 
 
In a similar vein, it has been argued that externally imposed democracies rarely lead to 
democratisation, and military intervention tends to be ineffective in spreading 
democracy. A statistical examination of seventy cases of foreign-imposed regime 
changes in the twentieth century, suggests unless conditions in the target country are 
favourable to democracy, those intervening meet with little success in promoting 
democratisation (Downes and Monten 2013). Such favourable conditions include high 
levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, as well as previous 
experience with representative governance. Given that interventions tend to target 
countries that are economically poor, fragile and subject to conflict, due to their deeply 
divided societies, with little experience of representative government, the outcome of 
democracy by force remains uncertain at best.  
 
Through a focus on the significance of an organised social base for democratisation, 
empirical findings indicate the limited success of external democracy building in post-
war societies including Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Hippler 2008). This 
study reaches a similar conclusion, that without the necessary preconditions for 
democratisation in post-invasion societies, external attempts will be of little success. 
Parallel to those findings, an examination of the longevity of 43 imposed democratic 
regimes, from 1800 to 1994, suggests that the survival of democracy is firmly 
conditioned by factors that are all conducive to one particular socio-economic context 
of the recipient country (Enterline and Greig 2008). The above empirical findings not 
only indicate the uncertainty of democracy by force, but also highlight the centrality of 
context to the emergence of democracy and the extent of success in sustaining it.  
 
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies  
The Middle East, being perceived as the last stronghold of authoritarianism in the world 
(Huntington 1991), was where the US aimed to achieve the next triumph of liberal 
democracy. It was President George W. Bushes’ belief that the establishment of ‘a free 
Iraq in the heart of the Middle East would be a watershed in the global democratic 
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revolution (Bush 2003). According to the US Army General Tommy Franks, one of the 
primary objectives of intervention was ‘to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a 
transition to a representative self-government’ (Sale and Javid 2013). Regime change, 
therefore, was an end in itself and a means to secure a transition to democracy in Iraq.  
 
The early days following the regime change seemed promising to many scholars. Part 
of the literature argued for the feasibility of democracy, and Iraq was regarded as having 
the greatest potential for realising a transition. Therefore, it was believed that Iraq’s 
democracy, if established correctly, could increase the chances and likelihood of 
becoming ‘a successful model’ of democracy for the Middle East (e.g. Alterman 2003: 
158; Byman 2003b: 72; Baracati 2004: 158; Ryan 2010: 65). 
 
Empirical studies have also examined the belief that forcing Iraq to democratise could 
propel the Middle East to greater democratisation. Empirical findings on similar 
historical cases, however, do not support such an assumption (Enterline and Greig 
2008) and have shown that the likelihood of success of democracy by force is subject 
to the contextual conditionality of the host country. Iraq’s context is unfavourable for 
democracy.  
 
The existing literature addresses the structural factors as challenges to the feasibility of 
democracy in Iraq. The lack of a vibrant civil society, the weakness of a national 
identity, and the presence of a deeply divided war-torn society all contribute to creating 
a situation that is ‘extremely unfavourable for democracy’ (Moon 2009: 147) and 
indicate that Iraq is a long way from meeting most of the social pre-requisites for 
democracy (Diamond 2005: 319; Mokhtari 2008).  
 
An analysis of examples of the imposition of democracy reveals that there was not one 
case in which the primary goal of military action was, in fact, to bring democracy to an 
authoritarian state. Consequently, it has been argued that the military imposition of 
democracy in Iraq is likely to fail for reasons that go beyond the particular 
circumstances of Iraq or the Middle East (Beetham 2009). This argument is based on 
the US discourse that the prime objective of the United States military intervention was 
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to build a democratic regime but since regime change was involved, democracy was 
introduced under-military occupation and therefore viewed with scepticism.  
 
The Bush administration was both overly ambitious and unduly optimistic concerning 
the consequences of democratisation by force, both in Iraq and for the greater Middle 
East. Two factors, in particular, account for such optimism: the crisis of legitimacy and 
snowballing. Those two factors have been identified as having contributed significantly 
to the wave of the third-wave transitions to democracy (Huntington 1991: 13). The 
increasing crisis of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East came, it was 
believed, from a preference for democratic values. Iraq’s pivotal position in the Middle 
East between the two pillars of Islam, Iran and Saudi Arabia, led to an assumption that 
should it become a democracy, others in the region would follow suit. It has, however, 
been argued that those neighbours whose regimes are hostile to democracy have 
undermined the democratic process in Iraq (Fawn and Hinnebusch: 2006). Not only 
was Iraq unable to influence other authoritarian regimes to democratise, on the contrary, 
those regimes had a negative impact on the process of democracy building in Iraq.  
 
Conclusion 
The empirical findings for cases of democracy by force showed that general 
conclusions about the outcome of democratisation cannot be made. Military invasion, 
even with the specific objective of democracy building, is unlikely to result in a 
democratic regime. The military intervention in Iraq was successful in toppling the 
authoritarian regime, but it was not successful in establishing a democratic regime. 
However, Iraq does now have, thanks to the military invasion and occupation, a 
representative government, an elected assembly proportionally representing different 
groups. Nonetheless, Iraq has a long way to go before it is a fully fledged democracy.  
 
Moreover, the hope that the democratisation of Iraq by force might be the catalyst to 
democracies in other parts of the Middle East has proved to be a chimera. Indeed, events 
such as the emergence of Daesh indicate that Iraq’s process of democratisation has been 
a major cause for instability in the region. Even more telling is the fact that having large 
numbers of both Sunni and Shia within its population, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been 
able to use the country as a proxy to continue their own feud.   
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2.5 Democracy through State-building 
The Theoretical Idea   
The core idea in democracy through state building is rooted in the political form of 
modernization theory. From 1917 until 1919, President Woodrow Wilson made efforts 
to re-establish the international order relying on liberalism and democratic forms of 
government as key to peace and security in both international and domestic politics 
(Knock 1995; Paris 2001; 2004; Chandler 2006; Belloni 2007). His vision underpinned 
the modernization theory inspired by western liberal philosophy that stressed political 
development through institutional expansion, rationalisation of government apparatus, 
power concentration, and economic industrialisation. Modernization theory highlighted 
the importance of the western model of political institutionalisation. It argued that 
democracy was more likely to emerge if political institutions capable of channelling 
and responding to socio-economic changes were in place (Huntington 1968). 
Moreover, if a country is to be democratised, other democratic states must help it 
become a functioning state. This is the state-first argument.  
 
General Pattern: Previous Empirical Studies  
For Max Weber, the state is an entity which successfully claims a ‘monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence’ (Weber 1919). The state is the sum of effective institutions 
that requires territory and a population over which it can practice a uniform application 
of the rule of law.46 It can be conceptualised as the apparatus of rule (Poggi 1978; Tilly 
1985) that includes institutions, processes and practices. A nation, however, is not the 
same as a state. A nation can be defined as ‘a socially constructed community, imagined 
by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group’ (Anderson 1991: 6). This 
concept is conducive to a cultural form of a nation allowing it to stay within or transcend 
a state’s territory. A nation can also be conceptualised as merely a category of persons 
‘if and when the members of the category firmly recognise certain mutual rights and 
duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it’ (Gellner 1983: 7). This 
concept coincides with the boundaries of the state, as far as rights and duties are defined 
within the legal framework of the rule of law.  
																																																						
46 The definition of state also includes the establishment of a uniform economic structure and a polity 
that is internally organised and internationally recognised (internal and external sovereignty). Here, I do 
not intend to theories what a state is, a great scholarly effort on this issue is Robert Nozick’s (1974) work.   
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The primary characteristic of the modern state is that it acts legitimately in the name of 
the people or nation. The modern state is normally a nation-state. This combination of 
the political unit (state) and the national unit (nation) creates nationalism (Gellner 1983; 
Hobsbawm 1990). Nationalism, as an ideology, has been the driver for the development 
of nation-states (Poggi 1978). The fundamental question that arises here is what 
happens if the there is more than one nation within the boundaries of a state? In such a 
case, nationalism becomes an exclusive phenomenon, including one group and 
excluding others.   
 
State-building in deeply divided societies remains a challenge. It includes actions to 
establish the institutions of the state to enable it to perform its core functions (Fukuyama 
2004; Call and Cousens 2007; Fritz & Menocal 2007). As a process, it covers 
consolidation of power, institutionalisation of the apparatus of rule and economic 
enhancement (Fritz 2007; Belloni 2007; Hehir and Robinson 2007; Crater 2008; 
Budrich et al. 2010; Sisk and Paris 2009; Raue and Sutter 2009; Krause and Mallory 
2010; Mathilde and Hille 2010; Chandler 2010). State building assumes a sequential 
process, in building effective political institutions, the construction of state 
infrastructures, and the establishment of a stable economic system. The process, which 
is context blind, in the case of divided societies, tends to focus on a top down approach 
to institutions which can exacerbate any potential for conflict. Democratic government 
is seen as a solution to the problem of nation and state and has become the underlying 
justification for the strategy of international intervention. There is a split with some 
arguing that intervention must follow a 'sequence’; a method of putting off 
democratisation until some indeterminate future time (Fukuyama 2005; 2007; 
Mansfield & Snyder 2007). Others argue, that it should be 'gradual' (Carothers 2007a; 
2007b; Berman 2007).   
 
Those who make the case for international intervention for state building argue that the 
main reason for such interventions should be to empower weak states to have 
functioning governments that are capable of planning, executing policies and, enforcing 
laws (Fukuyama 2005: 9). This is based on the idea that governments seek order first, 
followed by economic development and, only then, democracy (Huntington 1968). 
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These views acknowledge three sequential phases to state building; a post-conflict 
reconstruction that applies to countries emerging from violent conflict; the creation of 
self-sustaining institutions; and, finally, the strengthening of the authority of a weak 
state through re-enforcing its authority (Fukuyama 2005: 135-6). It has been argued 
that it is dangerous to push states to democratise before the ‘necessary preconditions 
are in place’ and that democracy-promotion efforts should pay attention to fostering the 
preconditions for self-sustaining institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 5).  
 
In contrast to sequentialism, another view places democracy at the very outset of the 
task in the process of creating a new political order as the priority in any international 
intervention agenda (Carothers 2007b: 18). There are fewer dangers in ‘premature’ 
democratic experiments than trying to ‘hold off democratic change until conditions are 
ideal’ (Berman 2007: 14). These views imply that if democracy was left for a later 
stage, the state institutions might take shape in non-democratic forms, and those very 
institutions might strangle the emergence of democracy at a later stage.   
 
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies  
Some scholars have categorised the US intervention in Iraq as a case of nation-building 
(Dobbins 2003; Feldman 2004; Dobbins 2005; Dianmond 2006; Fukuyama 2006; El-
Khawas 2008), calling it American state building in Iraq (e.g. Tripp 2007; Rear 2008; 
Hechter and Kabiri 2008). Post-invasion Iraq has witnessed efforts to improve 
democratic legitimacy and strengthen political institutions, what this thesis calls 
‘democracy building’. However, other literature labels this as ‘nation’ or ‘state 
building’ and a distinction needs to be made here; ‘state building’ is the process of 
making state institutions effective and able to maintain the rule of law; ‘democracy 
building’, however, as far as state institutions are concerned, is the process of making 
those institutions more representative, more inclusive and more accountable. 
 
The primary challenge to the process of state building in Iraq was the lack of security, 
which was a by-product of the power shift from the Sunni to the Shia and the misfit 
between state, nation and society. The United States’ state building process in Iraq was 
carried out under military occupation after the destruction of the Iraqi apparatus of rule. 
In spite of the fact that Iraq’s conventional forces were defeated and the regime 
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collapsed, militant resistance (Arabic: al muqauama) against the occupation (Arabic: 
eh’tilal) persisted. One reason for this was that the US sent only one-fifth of the soldiers 
anticipated by the pentagon’s planners (Woodward 2004) and they proved incapable of 
filling the power vacuum created after the abolition of the regime and the conventional 
forces.  
 
The primary reason for militant insurgency was the power shift that the invasion caused. 
The three provinces of Baghdad, Saladin and Anbar, all Sunni governorates, saw the 
highest number of attacks on US troops. According to the Iraq Coalition Casualty 
Count, by December 2006, those three provinces alone were responsible for around 80 
percent of US military deaths (IBC 2006). On April 16, 2003, Paul Bremer, the 
administrator of the CPA, promulgated order Number 1 ‘the Debathification of the Iraqi 
Society.’ The order disestablished the Ba’ath Party of Iraq, abolished the party’s 
structures and removed its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in 
Iraqi society (CPA 2003: 1). Consequently, the process of de-ba’athification prevented 
former members of the Ba’ath party participating in the newly established power 
structures in Iraq.47 Although members of both the Sunni and Shia groups held the 
significant positions of authority in the Ba’ath regime, the implementation of the de-
ba’athification did not include the Shias. Prior to December 2005, Sunnis had boycotted 
the political process. With the Sunnis keeping their distance, Shias filled the majority 
of public sector, governmental positions and security posts. The Shia were in power. 
By all accounts, the de-ba’athefication put an estimated 750,000 people out of work 
and available for insurgency (Dodge 2006: 215). The initial effort of state building in 
Iraq transformed the existing cultural sectarianism into a tangible political division. 
 
The United States’ objective in state building was to introduce democracy to Iraq and 
to make the Iraqi government effective, sustainable, and capable of defending itself 
(Baker and Hamilton 2006). President George W. Bush stated ‘our commitment to 
democracy is being tested in the Middle East’ (BBC 2003). The United States was 
concerned mainly about representation and participation and pushed for elections so 
																																																						
47  The disestablishment of the Party was all encompassing and targeted members at all levels, including 
full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of UdwQutriyya (Regional Command Member), Udw 
Far (Branch Member), Udw Shu’bah (Section Member), and Udw Firqah (Group Member). Senior Party 
Members were also removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public 
sector. 
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that the Iraqi people could have a representative government and assembly by early 
2006. It could be argued that the effectiveness of the government was secondary to its 
representativeness. It could also be argued that only a representative government could 
be effective and functional, and that was the dilemma. The United States chose to make 
participation and representation the priorities as they are the two mediums through 
which government could become functional and effective. Although the Iraqis had an 
elected parliament and a representative government by 2006, the effectiveness of the 
government has seen little progress.  
 
The 2011 US withdrawal marked the end of occupation and with it the process of state 
building. That precipitate withdrawal left the job half done. It has been argued that to 
foster a legitimate democratic government in Iraq, an extensive long-term commitment 
of financial, military, and political resources was necessary (Dobbins et al. 2003; 
Feldman 2004). As early as 2006, the Iraqi Study Group had drawn attention to the fact 
that without the support of the United Sates, the government was not capable of 
governing, sustaining or defending itself and suggested that a premature departure from 
Iraq would lead to both a deterioration in stability and greater sectarian violence (Baker 
and Hamilton 2006: 32-7).  
 
It has been contended that the United States has been more successful in democratising 
states than building fresh states (Fukuyama 2005). Along similar lines, it has been 
demonstrated that the United States has had a better record in improving state capacity 
and democratic functions than in trying to build state strength where it did not 
previously exist (Monten 2014; Brownlee 2007). The United States’ chances of success 
were lowered as the invasion resulted in the collapse of the state through the elimination 
of the Ba’ath party, the only party for over thirty years, with which the state was 
synonymous. Therefore, the United States had to build state institutions at the same 
time as promoting democracy. After more than a decade, Iraq still has a dysfunctional 
government (Ghamin 2011), and an undemocratic political system.   
 
Table 2.1 provides data on democracy as measured on five different variables from 
2006, the first representative government, to 2015. Two variables draw attention to 
themselves; ‘functioning government’, where for the year 2015, Iraq scores 0.07 (l least 
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democratic and 10 most democratic) and political participation, where for the year 
2015, Iraq scores 7.22. Chapter 1 placed Iraqi political rights and civil liberties in the 
“not free” category. To what extent political participation could be helpful for the 
emergence of democracy where the government is dysfunctional is a moot point. This 
brings us back to the state building versus democratisation debate. In the case of Iraq, 
democratisation and state building efforts went hand in hand, but both were undermined 
by the premature withdrawal of the US. 
 
TABLE. 2.1 DEMOCRACY INDEX IRAQ 2006-2015 
THE	MAIN	VARIABLES		 2015	 2010	 2006	
ELECTORAL PROCESS 	 4.33	 4.33	 4.75	
FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT	 0.07	 0.79	 0.00	
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	 7.22	 6.11	 5.56	
POLITICAL CULTURE  4.38 3.75 5.63 
CIVIL LIBERTIES  4.41 5.00 4.12 
    
OVERALL SCORE:  4.8 4.00 4.01 
  
1.00 Least Democratic 10.00 Most Democratic 
 
 
	
Conclusion  
Iraq is characterised by a misfit between the nation and the state. If the nation is taken 
as a hypothetical community (Anderson 1991), then, in the case of Iraq, it is 
problematic since there are different communities in play. If the nation is taken as a 
polity where the boundaries of identity and of the state are congruent (Gellner 1983), 
again there are issues because the ethnic differences between Kurd and Arab, and the 
religious divide between Sunni and Shia, are problematic. Iraq’s deeply divided society 
remains a challenge to its statehood. This will remain so as long as the main determinant 
of a state’s strength or weakness is the outcome of the struggle between the state’s 
application of a set of rules, and other organisations within the society who apply 
different rules (Migdal 1988).  
 
The process of state building after the collapse of the state in 2003 was undertaken 
under the most severe set of circumstances imaginable given the diversity in identity 
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and the unfavourable security situation. The strategy of US for state building in Iraq 
was to have a functioning government capable of sustaining and defending itself. At 
the same time, the United States’ aimed to build a representative government and the 
two processes of state building and democracy were carried out together, but the job 
was only half accomplished. When the US withdraw from Iraq, the country did not have 
a functioning government and it was neither able to sustain nor defend itself. It follows 
that, in so far as state building was the medium through which it was hoped democracy 
would be established, the US failure in state building in Iraq, inevitably meant the 
failure to embed democracy.  
 
2.6 Political Culture  
The Theoretical Idea  
Culture is a variable in political analysis (e.g. Harrison and Huntington eds. 2000), and 
to examine it in relation to politics is to study it as political culture. Political culture can 
be defined as a ‘particular pattern of orientations to political action’ (Almond 1956: 
396). A more precise concept is to view it as set of norms, beliefs and sentiments that 
give meaning to a political process which drive and direct behaviour in a political 
system (Wiarda 2014; Welch 2013; Aronoff 2002; Almond & Diamond 1994; Kedou 
1994; Chilton 1988). Political systems are relative embodiments of political cultures, 
democratic or otherwise. A group of prominent scholars (e.g. Putnam 1993; 1995; 
Huntington 1996) argued that cultural traditions shape the political behaviour of their 
societies, reaffirming the relationship between political systems and socio-political 
conditions. This is where the cultural modernizationists derive their core idea that a 
democratic political system is the embodiment of a democratic political culture. They 
want to get to the root of the factors that cause cultural change, so that by identifying 
such factors they could predict the result of the political form of cultural transformation.  
The idea that a certain form of political culture could lead to political democracy has 
its roots in the cultural aspects of modernization theory. The main argument is that 
modernization is a profound process that transforms primordial cultures into modern 
ones (see, Lerner 1958). 48 That shift in cultural values, caused by economic 
																																																						
48	A similar understanding of modernisation in the context of the Middle East countries is developed by 
Daniel Lerner (1958). Who argued that modernization occurs when certain aspects of the cultural 
changes are stimulated by Western industrial urbanism, that is, exposure to, and presumed participation 
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transformation of modes of production and industrialisation, eventually brings about 
changes in political structures. With time, such a cultural transformation produces, or 
forms, new identities which tend towards liberal values, the cultural prerequisite to 
liberal democracy. 
 
General Pattern: Previous Empirical Studies  
Different empirical studies have examined the intricate interactions between the 
dominant cultural values in societies, relative to their political systems, particularly, to 
unravel how economic and political developments are associated. Two different 
patterns can be distinguished, the first being the attempt to identify what is the most 
important variable responsible in making democracy more likely. This includes an 
inquiry into the political culture to ascertain its primary traits and to show how the 
importance of political culture for democracy could be weighed. The second is the 
attempt to identify the most significant factor in the prevention of the establishment of 
democracy. This view treats culture as a consistent phenomenon that will not disappear. 
Empirical studies offer different and, at times, opposing findings.  
 
A study drawing on a large body of evidence from approximately 85 percent of the 
world’s population, shows that the cultural values of people are changing, which in turn 
influences their political and religious perspectives. It takes modernization as a 
predictable process of human development that inexorably leads towards a predestined 
end result in which modernization is the vehicle and liberalism is the destination 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As a process in human development, economic 
advancement brings about the kind of cultural transformation that ensures those values 
of individualism and individual freedoms are progressively more likely.  
In this study, the researchers designed a model of social change to predict the way in 
which value systems play the central role in emerging, democratic institutions. The core 
idea is that coherent cultural change, the product of modernization, is conducive to 
democratisation. It concludes that cultural changes are the most significant intervening 
variable between economic development and political end results based on a revised 
version of modernization theory. If the early theory of modernization held the 
																																																						
in, the mass media of communication and political awareness. In chapter 5, this thesis argues that Lerner 
is wrong, in the case of Iraq (see, section 5.2).   
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hypothesis that economic liberalisation could lead to political democratisation, the 
revised version suggests that cultural liberalisation could bring about the same result. 
The intervening culture variable suggests that societies are fundamentally determined 
by cultural conditions and the end result of this determinism in human progress is 
liberalism. 
 
However, other scholars draw a distinction between what is western and what is modern 
(Huntington 1996). While non-western nations might strive to become wealthy, to 
develop, and to have access to modern technology and science, this does not necessarily 
indicate their willingness to accept western values as well. This view differentiates 
modernization from liberalisation and westernisation. The process of modernization is 
not an escalator ascending to the ultimate end point of liberalism but is rather one in 
which cultures modernise alongside their own inherent and intrinsic values. Another 
line of argument portrays culture as either an obstacle to, or a facilitator of, the 
emergence of a western type of liberal democracy. The main argument contends that 
the most important distinctions between peoples are no longer ideological, political, or 
economic; ‘they are cultural’ (Huntington 1996: 21).49  
 
In relation to Islam, it has been argued that ‘governmental legitimacy’ flows from 
religious doctrine but that the ‘Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict 
the premises of democratic politics’ (Huntington 1991: 28). As far as Islam is 
concerned, such views fail to differentiate between the doctrine as articulated in the 
Koran and peoples’ interpretation of it, or indeed their implementation in practical 
scenarios. It is certain that the Islamic doctrine involves principles that may be both 
supportive and antagonistic to democracy, but the interpretation of Muslims varies on 
a spectrum from liberal to anti-liberal. Based on Islamic doctrine, governmental 
authority comes from the people and not from religious doctrine. Islam outsources 
political authority to the people. Islamic doctrine with regards to politics (Quran 42: 
38) does not prevent consultation or elections. If culture is taken as an intervening 
variable, it is a Muslim democracy, not an Islamic democracy, that has to be examined 
(Chapter 5). 
																																																						
49 There is a reoccurring theme in Huntington’s writings (1991; 1993; 1996); some cultures (i.e. 
Confucius and Islamic) show a great resistance to accepting western views of democracy. 
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The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies  
There are different views on whether the political culture in Iraq is a facilitator or a 
barrier to the emergence of democracy. Studies on either side tend not to be systematic 
analyses of the political culture in Iraq. Different authors point to structural factors that 
in their totality indicate the political culture in Iraq.  
 
Those who highlight the obstacles note the lack of a vibrant civil society, the weakness 
of a national identity, the presence of a deeply divided society and structures that are 
extremely unfavourable for democracy. It is further argued (Diamond 2004; Diamond 
2005a; Milton-Edwards 2006; Mokhtari 2008; Moon 2009; Parker 2012) that as a 
country with a society divided along ethnic and religious lines, Iraq is a long way from 
meeting most of the social and cultural conditions for democracy. One of the key factors 
holding back Iraq from becoming democratic is its legacy of an authoritarian culture 
and the absence of a historic democratic culture.  
 
Of those who argue against the possibility of a democratic Iraq, Bruce E. Moon is the 
most pessimistic. His views stem from his assessment of the prospects for democracy 
based on the historical precedents of cases with similar contexts. He advances the 
argument that both theory and evidence indicate that a set of structural factors are 
necessary conditions for transition and Iraq lacks all of them. Those structural factors 
could be summed up in the phrase, ‘lack of a democratic culture’. He concludes that, 
even in a quarter century, the odds of Iraq achieving democracy are close to zero (Moon 
2009). 
 
In response to the argument that contents the obstacles to the emergence of democracy 
in Iraq are cultural, counter arguments have been put forward that democracy in Iraq is 
not solely subject to the legacies of authoritarianism and the absence of a history of 
democratic institutions (see, Dawisha 2005). With reference to historical experiences, 
the 1921-58 era, is called the period of democratic attitudes and practices, 
demonstrating that there were traditions of political pluralism and experiences of 
representative political institutions and believes that post 2003 Iraq does not suffer from 
a deficit in democratic culture. Moreover, along similar lines, with a focus on pluralism 
and culture, it has been argued that Iraq, between 1921-58, was more democratic and 
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pluralistic than is generally believed (see, Bashkin 2009). 
 
The above arguments are presented in support of the feasibility of democracy in Iraq 
and regard the country as the best candidate in the region for democratisation. 
Supporting structural factors include the cultural variable. Daniel Byman (2003), for 
instance, points out that before the Gulf War, Iraq had probably the ‘best educated, most 
secular, and the most progressive population of all of the Arab states’ (Byman 2003b: 
72). Bearing that in mind, other scholars (e.g. Alterman 2003: 158; Byman 2003b: 72; 
Baracati 2004: 158; Ryan 2010: 65) have advanced the idea that if established correctly, 
Iraq’s democracy could become ‘a successful model’ of democracy for the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion		
It has been argued that modernization as the liberalisation of cultures is an inevitable 
process (Inghlhart and Welzel 2005). The change of value systems has been regarded 
as a cultural shift with culture being the prime intervening variable responsible for the 
emergence of political democracy. That view is opposed by those who, like Huntington 
(1996), view culture to be a persistent phenomenon, and argue cultures revive along 
value systems peculiar to themselves. In arguing for the possibility of democracy based 
on culture, the existing literature offers mixed views and propositions. Some argue Iraq 
lacks the sort of political culture that any type of political democracy requires, while 
others argue that Iraq’s political culture is a relative facilitator for political democracy, 
in comparison to other countries in the region.  
 
The fundamental question that remains is, ‘In the context of Iraq, what constitutes the 
political culture?’ What is clear is that Iraq does not have a single political culture. It 
has not been successful in creating a unified single national identity, or a coherent social 
structure. Both ethnicity and religion are component parts of the political culture. Each 
group has developed its distinctive political culture; among the Shia, religious elements 
prevail, among the Kurds, ethno-nationalism, and among the Sunni, Arab solidarity is 
dominant. In this context, it is not a matter of whether the political culture is resistant 
or receptive to democracy, but rather that the political culture of each group demands a 
specific type of democracy consistent with its values. 
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2.7 Political Institutions  
The Theoretical Idea  
The primary issue is the identification of what type of institutional arrangements are 
more effective for the emergence, maintenance, and survival of a democratic system. 
On this there is a growing literature (e.g. Rose 1992; Castles 1994; Linz 2000; Schmidt 
2002; Taagepera 2003; Müller-Rommel 2008; Vatter 2009; Flinders 2010). The issue 
is constrained by context; in particular, what types of institutional arrangements are 
better in which societies.  
 
There are two main propositions, majoritarian institutions and power sharing, a non-
majoritarian institution. Scholars, albeit using different terms, have contrasted different 
forms of liberal democracy (e.g. Dahl 1956; Finer 1975; Riker 1982). Attempts have 
also been made to contrast the two principles of majority and proportionality (e.g. 
Steiner 1971; Powell 1982). As a form of democratic governance, power sharing was 
regarded as less democratic, compared to the majoritarian form of democracy which 
was held up as the only from of true democracy until late 1960 (Bormann 2010: 2). 
Lijphart’s work challenged that assumption and accepted the premise that social 
structures (i.e. political culture) shape democratic (political) institutions (Almond 
1956). Lijphart (1968) advanced the argument that for societies that are heterogeneous, 
institutions that allow the political elite of different groups to reach political agreement 
were necessary; in effect, institutions accommodating social divisions.50 One case 
examined was the stability of the democratic system of the Netherlands which, despite 
its fragmented society, Lijphart contended was due to the presence of those 
accommodating arrangements and the absence of majoritarian practices.   
 
Lijphart developed his idea on politics of accommodation based on four principles: 
grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto into 
the theory of consociationalism (Lijphart 1977). This was both a comparative 
framework and a prescription for deeply divided countries for building democracy. 
Later it was used to assess the qualities of democracies. To assess his consociational 
																																																						
50 While for homogenous societies, where the majority can change, institutions that concentrate power 
were more effective (e.g. the United Kingdom). 
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theory, he used quantitative measures, and this led to his theory of advanced consensus 
democracy (1984; 1999).   
 
There are different views on this development. It has been argued that it was a shift 
from examining the political stability of democracies (consociation) to the performance 
of democracies (consensus) (Doorenspleet and Pellikaan 2012). It has also been argued 
that it was a shift from a focus on the cultural peculiarities underpinning democratic 
systems (accommodation) to the constitutional attributes of democracies (consensus) 
(Bormann 2010). These two views are not mutually exclusive. Lijphart himself states 
that the consensus idea emerged out of his effort to measure consociational theory more 
precisely. He refers to this development in terms of methodology, from a case study 
(1968), to comparative methods (1977), and finally to statistical methods (1984; 1999) 
(Lijphart 2008: 20).51 A consensus democracy is defined in terms of ten traits (i.e. 
institutional arrangements) that contrast the ten traits of majoritarian systems (Lijphart 
1999) (see Chapter 3).  
 
There have been both support and criticism on his typology and ideas on consociation 
theory52 and his conception of majoritarian has been questioned for insufficient 
distinctions between supermajorities, majorities and pluralities (Nagel 2000). 
Presidentialism has been a key dimension in other typologies of democratic systems 
(Shugart & Carey 1992; Fuchs 2000), yet Lijphart’s typology excludes it and this 
omission has raised concerns. The reason for excluding the Presidency as a factor lies 
in the fact that the British and Dutch systems that he explores, and concludes are best, 
are both parliamentary. His labelling of some institutions as majoritarian and others as 
consensual has also come in for a degree of criticism (Tsebelis 2002: 111; Roller 2005: 
116). 
 
Those that support Lijphart acknowledge his contributions to democratic system theory 
as extremely helpful in informing, and positively influencing, researches on the 
																																																						
51 There has been a growing literature on Lijphart (Kriesi 2008; Müller-Rommel 2008). Various studies 
have reviewed his work on consociational democracy (e.g. Andeweg 2000) and consensual democracy 
and consensus institutions (e.g. Bormann 2010), while more recent works have combined both 
consociational theory and consensus framework (e.g. Doorenspleet and Pellikaan 2012).  
52 Criticism on consociational democracy include, Brain 1975, Halpern 1986, and Horowitz 2000, to 
name few among many others.   
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feasibility of democracy (Tsebelis 2002: 115). It has also been argued Lijphart’s 
typology has been a major step forward, as the majoritarian consensus typology is more 
comprehensive than the alternative presidential-parliamentary typology (Armingeon 
2002: 82; Bormann 2010: 5) Indeed, he has been regarded as the leading authority in 
arrangements in democratic countries designed to secure a satisfactory degree of 
political sophistication among different groups in societies that are divided along ethnic 
or other lines (Dahl 1998: 192). 
 
General Pattern: Previous Empirical Studies  
In deeply divided societies, the major factor that poses the most serious challenge to 
democratic institutions is ethnic division. In particular, when different ethnic groups 
are politicised, it is believed this will eventually destabilise a democratic system. This 
phenomenon is theorised as ‘outbidding effect’. Principally, it contends that in an 
ethnically divided country, when a political party is ethnically based, the emergence of 
other ethnically based political parties is encouraged. The politicisation of ethnic 
divisions infects the political system and undermines the competitiveness of its politics 
(Rabushka and Shapel 1972; Brain 1975; Horowitz 1985). It has also been argued that 
ethnic parties, if institutionally encouraged and regulated, can sustain a democratic 
system. An empirical study based on the case of ethnic party behaviour in India 
concludes that the intrinsic nature of ethnic divisions does not threaten democratic 
stability (Chandra 2005). Rather, what could potentially threaten stability is the 
institutional context within which ethnic politics takes place. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that institutions that restrict ethnic politics to a single dimension (e.g. either 
religion or language) destabilise democracy, while institutions that encourage multiple 
dimensions of ethnic identity can sustain and stabilise it (Chandra 2005). The 
institutional regulations of ethnic parties both minimalize conflict and enhance political 
stability.  
 
The prime objective of institutional arrangement in divided societies is to 
institutionalise ethnic conflicts. A civil war is one of the most extreme manifestations 
of the effect of such conflicts. It has been argued that religious differences are crucial 
in explaining domestic conflicts (Huntington 1996). In analysing the impact of political 
systems in preventing such conflicts, with a focus on sub-Saharan African countries, 
	 73	
empirical findings have shown that among other social differences, religious 
differences are more important in the development of civil war. That analysis has 
concluded that being a consociational democracy significantly reduces the incidence of 
ethnic civil war in those countries (Reynal-Querol 2002) as the consociational system 
has reduced the likelihood of ethnic civil war caused by religious polarisation. 
 
The impact of consociational institutions, however, varies from one context to another, 
in some contexts their implications could lead to potential conflict and violence. 
Therefore, arguments have been put forward against the separation of ethnic groups, 
the case study of Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, shows that the it is rather a 
misidentification of ethnicity and demographics to regard these as a cause of conflict 
(See, Stroschein 2005). Moreover, with reference to the case of Bosnia 1995 with 
comparative insights from Northern Ireland 1998 (both places were examples of 
consociational institutions); it has been argued that problems Bosnia now faces53 are 
due to its consociational governance structure –i.e. the consociational arrangements are 
at odds with individual rights (see. Stroschein 2014).	
 
Other studies have used Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensual typologies as an 
analytic framework in comparative studies of new democracies. Specifically, it is used 
for examining the way political institutions in newly established democracies are 
formed and to classify these democracies in terms of their formal institutions as either 
majoritarian or consensual. An empirical study of South Africa classifies its formal 
institutions as of a consensus type, the function of which is subject to the informal 
practices relating to the distribution of power and the nature of party system. The study, 
however, argues that the consensual appearance of democracy on the basis of formal 
institutional criteria may be misleading because, in the case of South Africa, the party 
system impacts on the meaning of other institutional criteria. It is suggested that a 
distinction between a majoritarian and consensus democracy should be assigned a 
relative weight (Cranenburgh & Kopecky 2004), the distinction being constrained by 
more than a mere formal institution.  
																																																						
53 It has been noted that in case of Bosnia was the large amount of international aid was crucial to the 
initial state-building effort, nevertheless, the current problems of the country could not be addressed with 
International aid alone. Hence, international aid has not alleviated the consociational issues in that 
country (see, Stroschein 2014).   
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The political system of Namibia has also been examined to determine whether it 
exhibits institutional traits of majoritarian or consensual systems. The analysis of those 
traits results in a mixed outcome with ‘a moderately consensus model’ value achieved. 
It is argued that the statistical modal value represents a distorted image of Namibian 
politics. Consensus features, such as bicameralism and a rigid constitution, do not 
‘behave’ as such due to one-party dominance, and neither does proportional 
representation produce consensus politics. Lijphart's criteria are too formal, and should 
not receive equal weight as not all institutional arrangements identified by him have the 
same effect on a democratic system in making it more majoritarian or more consensual. 
It has been concluded that focusing on two criteria of power-sharing, party systems and 
government coalition, gives a better analysis. That requires the examination of political 
behaviour, specifically of governing elites, to determine the presence of cooperation 
and compromise (Cranenburgh 2006). These two studies indicate the necessity of a 
combining the earlier works of Lijphart with his more recent works.  
 
The major systematic effort to combine the two parts of Lijphart, however, only 
occurred recently. The combination of consociational theory with consensual 
framework was first presented by Doorenspleet (2012), to assess the performance of 
different democratic systems. The empirical findings show, with respect to the good 
governance indicator, that proportional representation electoral systems always 
perform best. Findings confirm the consociational hypotheses that social structures 
shape the performance of political institutions. In countries that are not divided along 
ethnic lines, centralisation works best, while in countries divided along ethnic or other 
lines, decentralisation is more effective. This latter point has been confirmed by other 
scholars who have argued that decentralisation is crucial, particularly in countries with 
deeply divided societies (Norris 2008). 
 
Not all quantitative examinations support power sharing arrangements. An empirical 
study, based on a data set of 101 countries, representing 106 regimes, tested the effect 
of three institutions in reducing conflict. Those institutions were parliamentary and 
presidential arrangements, proportional representation and majoritarian electoral 
systems, and federal and unitary structures. In the case of divided societies, the findings 
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show that parliamentarism with proportional representation appears to exacerbate or 
even inflame political violence when ethnic fractionalisation is high. The effect of 
federalism, however, is less certain (Selway and Templeman 2012). A more recent 
study based on states post-1945 with ethno-federal arrangements, shows that ethno-
federalism has succeeded more often than it has failed. The findings show that ethno-
federalism has demonstrably outperformed other institutional alternatives, and where 
they have failed, they have done so where no institutional options could have succeeded 
(Anderson 2014). 
 
It has also been argued that consociationalism has become increasingly vague and 
ambiguous as the theory has been stretched to claim relevance to all people everywhere 
(i.e. Dixon 2011). In some contexts, consociation and consensual arrangements are not 
the best solution. This is particularly the case in Northern Ireland. The attempt to make 
the consociation theory relevant to all cases of divided societies will challenge the 
coherence of consociational theory (Dixon 1997; 2005; 2011). As long as the 
consociation theory highlights the significance of context, then those who aspire to it 
should allow for the possibility that in some contexts, like Iraq, consociation could be 
the practical option and in other cases, like Northern Ireland, not so.   
 
The Specific Case of Iraq: Previous Empirical Studies 
Existing literature has addressed the subject of the feasibility of democracy in Iraq with 
reference to challenges to democracy posed by the structural factors. Additionally, there 
is a growing literature on Iraq’s transition and attempts to build democracy (e.g. 
Lawson 2003; Byman 2003; Nader 2003; Anderson & Stanfield 2004; Dawisha 2004; 
2005a; 2005b; 2010; Diamond 2005a; 2005b; Gupta 2007; Visser & Stanfield 2007; 
Moon 2009).  
 
In relation to the different types of democratic system in Iraq, different and opposing 
arguments have been put forward. It has been argued that establishing a democratic 
government in Iraq could be a risk as it empowers identity-based parties. This could 
result in ‘illiberal democracy’; as the majority Shia vote as a block, they would never 
lose power (Ottaway 2003; 2005; Brancati 2004). No scholar has so far advocated a 
presidential system for post-2003 Iraq. The only proposed system is parliamentary and, 
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on this point, there seems to be universal agreement (Dawisha and Dawisha 2003). 
However, academics disagree as to what model of parliamentary system, a majoritarian 
or a non-majoritarian alternative, would work best. Those who propose majoritarian 
institutions argue that institutional mechanisms that could help build democracy and 
prevent the escalation of conflict are electoral systems across ethnic lines, federalism 
on a non-sectarian basis, and protection of minority rights (e.g. Wimmer 2003; Visser 
2012). It has been suggested that Iraq’s new constitution reflects a liberal form of 
consociation that accommodates Iraq’s democratically mobilised groups. Iraq’s 
constitution has been examined for both shared regional and federal governments and 
self-governing local governments. It has been concluded that the constitutional 
provisions offer a satisfactory way forward for Iraqis (McGarry and O’Leary 2006).  
 
Concerning federalism, the key issue is whether majoritarian or power-sharing 
arrangements would suit Iraq better (Chapter 7). It has been argued that the 
implementation of decentralisation and devolution, mixed with federalism, should be 
the cornerstone of Iraqi democratic development (Mingus 2013). It has also been put 
forward that, in the case of deeply divided countries, Iraq being one of them, federal 
power-sharing bargains have better chances of preventing secession when potential 
secessionists believe that they could have political significance within the federal 
structure (O’Leary 2012). Some scholars, however, have warned against majoritarian 
arrangements in divided societies (Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1984; Reynolds 1999), and 
others have called for majoritarian arrangements (Horowitz 1991; Sartori 1997; Reilly 
1997). Moreover, the debate has examined almost all political institutions arguing 
particular institutions are more likely than others to successfully facilitate efforts to 
build democracy in divided societies.54 
 
Donald Horowitz (1985) contends that power sharing regimes may, in fact, serve to 
institutionalise ethnic divisions, deepening, rather than ameliorating, social identities. 
He argues they are, ‘inapt to mitigate conflict in severely divided societies’ (Horowitz 
1985: 256). Additionally, he has advanced different objections (Horowitz 1985: 568-
76; 1991: 137-45, 167-71; 1997: 439-40; 2000: 256-9) to Lijphart (1977) who 
																																																						
54 Instead of making a lengthy comparison of both views, I will address the critiques of power sharing 
and the majoritarian alternative on the two topics, electoral systems and government formation.  
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emphasises the cooperation of the political elites of different groups through 
consociational structure. Horowitz specifically criticises the motivational inadequacy 
of Lijphart, the optimism that the political elite representing group A would cooperate 
with the political elite representing group B (Horowitz 1997: 457; 1991: 140-1). He 
advances a further proposal, that consociational arrangements could potentially 
subdivide the existing ethno-religious group along different ideological lines.  
 
Horowitz (2009: 21) believes when leaders compromise across ethnic lines in the face 
of severe divisions, counter elites arise who object to one or more elements of the 
compromise. When groups begin with a single set of leaders, it is likely those leaders 
will be seen as merely party leaders, opposed by leaders of other parties seeking the 
support of the same group. Based on these two premises, Horowitz suggests an 
alternative set of institutions that cut across different ethno-religious groups. He 
advocates political parties that are not ethnically based and electoral systems that 
encourage the political elite to seek votes from not only members of their groups but of 
others. He makes reference to other academics (e.g. Riker 1962; Reilly 1997; Wimmer 
1997; Reilly and Reynolds 1999), to confirm his conclusion that political leaders are 
more willing to compromise under some electoral systems than under others. 
 
In terms of electoral systems, the integration or majoritarian methods have two main 
propositions: cutting across divisions and vote pooling (Lipset 1960; Horowitz 1985). 
Cutting across divisions (Lipset 1960; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) suggests that two-party 
majoritarianism forces parties to moderate to obtain a majority. It proposes cutting 
across ethnic boundaries and rejects segmental autonomy. There is also a proposition 
for the establishment of a number of heterogeneous federal units wherein large groups 
are divided into smaller units. In such contexts, ‘vote pooling’ has been proposed, that 
is pooling votes from the electorate of such heterogeneous federal units to form a 
majority coalition (Horowitz 1985).55 Horowitz’s critiques on power sharing and his 
alternative proposal in the context of Iraq can be criticised for being overly optimistic 
on the likelihood of a majoritarian alternative for deeply divided societies proving to 
be successful. He believes that the peoples in deeply divided societies would vote for 
																																																						
55 The other alternative is the power-sharing model, including both consociational and consensual 
(Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 1995; Lijphart 1999; Lijphart 2010). In brief, it proposes the solution that seeks 
accommodation rather than assimilation or integration of ethnic differences.  
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elites from a different ethnic or religious group. In the case of Iraq, however, the ethno-
religious divisions are not simple cultural divisions. They are deeply rooted sentiments 
and the different groups have different causes; it is very unlikely that a Kurd would 
vote for an Arab Shia to be a representative of the Kurdish cause.56 In Iraq, the political 
elite from different parties within the same group have developed similar discourses, 
and different parities within the same group have made intra-ethnic or intra-sect 
coalitions. The Shia, the Kurds and also the Sunnis, have their own internal coalitions 
and those intra-group coalitions have become the base for inter-group grand coalitions.  
 
The two majoritarian options, both cross-cutting and vote-pooling are less likely in the 
Iraqi context. If cross-cutting is considered in Iraq it becomes clear that ethnic loyalties 
are strong and groups vote as blocs. This prevents the emergence of two main parties, 
or it prevents alternation if there are two main parties. The consequence is the 
permanent exclusion of some groups, a highly undemocratic outcome. If, however, 
vote-pooling were to be adopted, this would underestimate the motives for the 
agreement during parliamentary coalition building. It would also overestimate 
incentives for moderation in cross-group voting. This view suffers from the same 
weakness as the cross-cutting majoritarian method, members of different groups do not 
vote across ethnic boundaries.  
 
It can be argued that both Lijphart57 and Horowitz do discuss the possibility of multi-
ethnic coalitions. Lijphart tends to focus on post-electoral coalitions, while Horowitz 
focuses on per-electoral coalitions. To apply each in the context of Iraq, the post 
electoral coalition translates to a political agreement and coalition building among 
different factions in the Iraqi parliament, both within the same groups and between 
different groups. While the pre-electoral system translates as coalition building from 
different lists, both within the same group and between different groups.  
 
Since 2005, all the cabinets, with the exception of the pre-electoral coalition in 2010, 
have been formed based on post electoral coalitions. Two of the leading Sunni and Shia 
																																																						
56 One might ask the question why the president of Iraq is from the Kurds and the other Arabs have voted 
for him. In fact, the case of Iraq’s President being a Kurd is a result of a political agreement among the 
Iraqi political elite, not the outcome of a specific form of electoral system. It is an informal practice.  
57 Lijphart’s views will be discussed further in Chapter Three, where the thesis uses his typology as tool 
to examine the preferences of Iraqi political elite’s preferences for institutional arrangements.  
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political leaders, Tariq Hashimi, the vice president, and Ayyad Alawai, the former 
prime minister, joined forces and formed a pre-electoral list, the Iraqqya List. Although 
the list gained the largest number of votes, it could not form a government because the 
Shia lists of State of Law and National Iraqi alliance led by Nuri al Maliki and Ibrahim 
al Jaffari respectively, formed a new coalition. This became the largest coalition in the 
parliament and they were tasked with forming the broad post electoral coalition 
cabinet.58  
 
Iraq’s federal executive is based on a broad or grand coalition. In the aftermath of the 
elections in 2005, 2010, and 2014, the political elite from different groups negotiated 
to form the subsequent cabinets through an informal power sharing arrangement. The 
federal executive operates with informal power sharing between the three main groups; 
the President is a Kurd, the Prime Minister is Shia, and the Head of the Council of 
Representatives is Sunni. Each group is proportionally represented in the legislature, 
and each group is represented in the executive in proportion to their numerical strength 
in the legislature. The Iraqi constitution grants a mutual veto, which in practice 
translates into a minorities veto (art. 142). Iraq has developed a federal system which 
has established segmental autonomy and this has also been embedded in the Iraqi 
constitution (art. 1 and art. 116-121). In the context of Iraq, as far as the informal 
political agreements are concerned, consociational power-sharing with proportional 
representation, accompanied with grand coalition, segmental autonomy and veto all 
manifest themselves.   
 
Conclusion  
The idea of building democracy through specific types of institutional arrangements 
becomes clearer in the literature on countries that are ethnically or religiously divided. 
The theory rests on the assumption that certain institutions could manage ethno-
religious conflict peacefully. The debate on institutional arrangements in divided 
societies mainly concerns resolving conflicts about the distribution of political power. 
In other words, the debate involves propositions for managing conflict through 
																																																						
58 This led to much disagreement and controversy in the Iraqi parliament. Many political elites believed 
that the formation of the 2010 cabinet was not according to the Iraqi constitution and was unconstitutional 
as the Iraqi constitution states that the largest wining list ought to form the cabinet – Chapter 8 examines 
this issue with reference to the empirical findings.  
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allocating political power among different groups.  
 
In the case of Iraq, two views, intergrationist and accomodationist, were examined in 
depth. It became apparent that those two traditions have contrasting views on the nature 
of ethno-religious groups and the function of political institutions. The former viewed 
the ethno-religious differences to be rigid; therefore they propose mechanisms that 
acknowledge those differences and suggest that political institutions ought to be built 
around them. This approach advocates power sharing mechanisms in both forms, 
formal political institutions and less formal political agreements between different 
groups (e.g. Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1969; 1999; 2008). The latter, on the contrary, viewed 
ethno-religious groups to be malleable, therefore they propose mechanisms that 
incorporate ethno-religious groups and suggest that political institutions ought to be 
arranged to force such groups to cooperate. This approach advocates power 
concentrating mechanisms in the form of formal political institutions that cut across 
different groups (e.g. Brian 1975; Horowitz 1991).   
 
In the case of deeply divided societies, one fundamental point becomes abundantly 
clear; any examination of ethnic differences, in relation to political institutional 
arrangements, indirectly involves the role and position of the political elite. Lijphart’s 
(1977: 53, 165) consociation theories emphasise the role of the political elite in 
resolving political inter-ethnic differences. Horowitz (1985; 1991) hopes to encourage 
the political elite to canvass votes across different groups. The former argues that the 
political elite could accommodate their differences through political agreements while 
the latter argues that, with the help of a certain formal institutional arrangements, they 
could rise above their ethno-religious differences. Both views are centred around the 
attitudes of those political elites.  
 
Neither, however, have addressed the views and preferences of the political elite 
concerning the feasibility of their systems. Lijphart takes it for granted that the political 
elites in divided societies will prefer his solutions and Horowitz assumes that his 
proposals would be welcomed. At best, the views of both scholars remain hypothetical 
assumptions. Thus, there is a gap in the literature on the views of political elites which 
this thesis aims to fill with specific reference to the case of Iraq. 
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Before drawing the final remarks of this chapter, a relevant point needs to be discussed 
here regarding the ‘crucial case’ method (as discussed in chapter 1, section 1.4). This 
is relevant to the two-subsequent chapters in order to clarify the theoretical issues 
discussed in chapter 3 and justify the methodological choices made in chapter 4. Harry 
Eckstein (1975) believes that for a case to be crucial it ‘must closely fit a theory if one 
is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well 
any rule contrary to that proposed’ (1975: 118). Iraq as studied by the design of this 
thesis, is a candidate for a crucial case as it is argued that it fits the power sharing theory 
(i.e. consensual), and does not fit other proposed power concentrating theories (i.e. 
majoritarian). Chapter 1, section 1.4 argued that a crucial case has a most likely and a 
least likely attribute.  The most likely case predicts to achieve a certain outcome, yet it 
does not, therefore it is used to disconfirm a theory. A least likely case, however, 
predicts not to achieve a certain outcome, yet it does, therefore it is theory confirming. 
It is believed that of all formulations, a crucial case offers ‘the most difficult test for an 
argument,’ and thus provides what is ‘perhaps the strongest sort of evidence possible 
in a nonexperimental, single case setting’ (Gerring 2006: 115).  
 
The method in which the crucial case is employed is tailored to the peculiar nature of 
this thesis as it is about the attitude of elite agency to democracy. Chapter 6 in specific, 
presents the two models of democratic institutional arrangements and tests both against 
the preferences of the elite. Both the least likely theory (embodied in majoritarian 
institutional arrangements) and the most likely theory (embodied in consensual 
institutional arrangements) are weighted with the proximity of the elite vote –i.e. 
preference (see chapter 4, section 4.4). Furthermore, Chapters 7 and 8, in a similar 
manner deal with two institutions that matter the most in the case of Iraq and run the 
test for both theories. Moreover, Gerring (2006: 121) argues it is almost always easier 
to disconfirm a theory than to confirm it with a single case. A theory that is deterministic 
may be disconfirmed by a case study and this is the most common employment of the 
crucial case method in social science settings. The focus of this thesis, however, is on 
both theory and counter theory. Gerring’s view is helpful in clarifying the outcome; if 
the theory is not disconfirmed (when the largest number of political elite prefer power 
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sharing), then it is valid -as in this single case its anti-thesis has been employed and has 
been disconfirmed (when the greatest number of elite do not prefer majority rule).   
 
2.8 Conclusion: Mixed Findings and the Missing Variable 
Based on this literature review, the feasibility of democracy in post-2003 Iraq remains 
a contentious issue. Democracy is less likely because Iraq’s wealth and income is 
generated through oil revenues. Oil is a critical variable for modernization. Democracy 
is possible because a majority of the civil society support it. Available evidence 
suggests that democracy by force is not a viable option. The United States has been 
more successful in building democracy in states that were already in existence than in 
building states anew. Post-2003 Iraq is an example of a state that has to be reconstructed 
but democracy appears to be feasible because the indications are that power-sharing 
options might work. Moreover, democracy is potentially viable because the culture 
does not suffer from democratic deficit.  
 
While current literature focuses on structural factors for the feasibility of democracy, 
this thesis marks a departure from that approach. The extent to which Iraq’s experience 
of building a democracy or, indeed, any other type of political system is determined by 
the level of knowledge of what Iraqis mean by the term democracy, their ideas on how 
to make it functional and, at the most basic level, whether they actually want it at all. 
Where representative democracies in modern societies translate in practice into rule by 
elected political elites or officials, it is vital to know the views of such elites concerning 
the political system they prefer. This is particularly so during transition periods, when 
elites have greater control of power than in situations that have already been 
consolidated. Iraq’s democracy could have elements that are congruent with liberal 
democracy and elements that are not; it could develop non-liberal but not necessarily 
anti-liberal aspects.  
 
There can be no better approach to discerning the real views of those with actual power 
than interviewing and surveying those key personnel. This thesis presents the views of 
the highest decision makers in the country including: two Presidents, two Prime 
Ministers, and two Speakers of parliament, as well as 14 Ministers of the cabinet and 
100 members of the Council of representatives. The literature on democracy in post-
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invasion Iraq is vast, yet, paradoxically, far from complete. The most distinguishing 
feature of current literature on post-2003 Iraq’s democratisation is the neglect of the 
role of agency in the process. It is this role of agency that is the major thread running 
through this entire thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
 Theoretical Approach and Hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to answer the 
main research question on the views and preferences of political elites on democracy 
and the arrangement of political institutions in Iraq. The underlying assumption is that 
elites play a pivotal role in transition processes aimed at building democracy. This idea 
is particularly relevant in the case of Iraq, where the elite have played a central role in 
forming and arranging the political institutions. The previous chapter concentrated on 
the extent to which democracy was related to either external or internal factors. It 
showed that there is a missing element in current literature (on Iraq) explaining the role 
of elite agency in the attempts to build democracy and its role in explaining the 
feasibility and, more importantly, the desirability of democracy in Iraq, as articulated 
in the views and preferences of the political elite.  
 
While assuming the importance of political institutions, in section 3.2, two different 
aspects are examined; the importance of political institutions in established 
democracies and the centrality of political institutions in divided societies as a means 
of resolving conflict, with a particular focus on Iraq. Referring to elite theories of 
democracy, in section 3.3, this chapter highlights the significance of the elite by 
addressing their role during transitions and their position in divided societies such as 
Iraq. Section 3.4 combines the two elements of the elite and political institutions to 
develop a theoretical approach to answering the main research question of how the Iraqi 
political elite view democracy.  
 
Thus the goal of this chapter is not only to summarise the main theoretical stances on 
the importance of the political institutions and the elite, but also to synthesise them to 
provide a coherent theoretical approach. This approach draws in particular on Robert 
Dahl’s (1998) framework and employs Arend Lijphart’s (1999) conceptual map on 
democratic institutions. Additionally, with reference to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), this 
chapter maps out a model of decisive cleavages in Iraq, and with reference to Bartels 
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2010, it presents a model for political socialisation process as it applies in the case of 
Iraq. 
3.2 Political Institutions Matter 
Theoretical Ideas  
Eminent scholars have studied political institutions in considerable depth. Yet there is 
a lack of agreement on a single definition (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; Moe 1990; 
Lowndes 1996; Peters 1999; Rhodes et al. 2006). In basic terms, the common 
characteristics of organisational, social and governmental institutions are that they are 
all ‘stable, with valued, recurring patterns of behaviour’ (Huntington 1965: 394). That 
is, institutions are the different organised elements of a society (Williams 1983: 169) 
that could be understood as the embodiment of particular procedures and practices 
(Lowndes 1996). Therefore, institutions conform to a pattern of interactions that are 
predictable (Peters 2005: 18). Institutions embody the organising principles that 
rationalise human interactions, be they social economic, political, cultural or religious.  
 
An understanding of politics is required before any serious examination of the forms of 
institutions can be undertaken. Politics can be best understood in terms of power, for it 
‘is about power; about the forces which influence and reflect power and its distribution 
and use’ (Held and Leftwich 1984: 144). To relate institutions to politics is, 
consequently, to understand institutions in terms of power since it is through political 
institutions that the distribution and the use of power are organised. More importantly, 
political institutions rationalise the distribution, as well as the restriction, and the use 
of power. An institution’s importance, therefore, can be determined by reference to its 
functions. The fundamental significance of political institutions is their role in 
institutionalising rationality through defining political conduct and rendering political 
behaviour predictable. In other words, political institutions rationalise political conduct 
and establish a recurring pattern of interaction between the apparatus of rule and wider 
social structures, including the population. 
 
Since the sixteenth century, the word institution as a term has had a specific connotation 
when used in relation to the practices and customs of government. Institutional 
functions could be classified into three interrelated and overlapping categories; the first 
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is ‘governs’, which includes what is formal and recorded; the second, ‘practices’, 
including what is informal and demonstrated; and the third, ‘narratives,’ which includes 
the semi-formal and spoken (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 53-69). Although this 
categorisation is followed to an extent in this research, three different forms are also 
identified and political institutions are classified as formal arrangements, less-formal 
agreements and informal establishments. In the context of Iraq, the formal institutions 
include the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers, whose functions 
have been written into the Iraqi constitution. The less-formal agreements are practices 
resulting from power sharing, such as the allocation of Iraq’s presidency to Kurds, 
which are not mentioned in the Iraqi constitutions. The informal establishments include 
ethnic, cultural or religious groupings such as religious sects, in the case of the Shia, 
which has become an informal political institution, an example of which is Sistani’s 
fatwa concerning proportional representation.  
 
Political Institutions in Established Democracies  
In a democracy, the political system is based on the belief that ‘governments need the 
consent of the governed’ (Dahl 1968; 1998; 2000). To build a government and to win 
the consent of the governed depends on the formation and the function of certain types 
of effective political institutions. There seems to be universal agreement among 
scholars on this point. Institutions as ‘restrictions on a one-sided pursuit of self-interest’ 
(Weber 1978: 43) are central in establishing democracy as a political system. To define 
democracy strictly, as applied to the apparatus of rule, however, makes political 
institutions central to any understanding of what democracy is and what it does. This is 
the case for both the structure and the function of democratic systems which can be 
understood through an examination of their political institutions. Institutions matter 
more than any other factor that could be used to explain political decisions (Peters 2005: 
164). Due to their immense significance, the study of political institutions is at the heart 
of political science (Eckstein 1963: 10).  
 
The definition of institutions that this thesis adopts is one that sees them as based on 
rules and organised practices that are relatively long lasting. A collection of such 
institutions creates a political order that fits, more or less, into a coherent system (March 
and Olsen 2008: 3-6). Institutions understood in that sense are the factors that compose 
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the architecture of different political systems and facilitate the rules that determine 
political outcomes. In democratic systems, political institutions are central to 
democratic politics because they are the mechanisms by which political actors can 
aggregate different ideas on, and practices of, how to govern. In established 
democracies, therefore, political institutions affect the prospects for democratic 
endurance, and significantly shape the logic and outcome of democratic statecraft (Dahl 
2005; Lijphart 1999; Nohlen 1996; Stepan 1996; Satori 1994; Thelen and Stenmo 1992; 
Horowitz 1991). Eminent scholars (e.g. Dahl 1956; Finer 1975; Mansbridge 1980; 
Riker 1982) have drawn contrasts between different types of liberal democracies with 
respect to their institutional arrangements. The arrangement of political institutions 
matters because different institutional arrangements construct different types of 
democratic political systems.   
 
The most notable contrast point of modern liberal democracies is between the two 
models of power sharing and power concentration models. The differences between 
them are largely down to their specific institutional arrangements. For example, 
proportional representation can be seen as a manifestation of power sharing while plural 
representation can be interpreted as a system that concentrates power. These differences 
have been studied by a variety scholars (e.g. Dixon 1968; Steiner 1971; Powell 1982; 
Hattenher and Kaltefleiter 1986; Huber and Powell 1994; Lijphart 1999). Arend 
Lijphart (1999), in particular, contrasted the defining characteristics of majoritarian 
democracies and consensual democracies. He enumerated the common traits (i.e. 
institutions) of majoritarian democracy and contrasted each with a corresponding 
consensus trait in order to name a consensus democracy (see Table 3.1). Lijphart argued 
that, in established democracies, different institutional arrangements could result in 
different democratic systems namely, the majoritarian and consensus.  
It is not only political institutions but also the type of their arrangements that are 
affected by the performance of democratic systems. Lijphart’s (1999) findings show 
that consensus systems outperform majoritarian systems on measures such as political 
equality, citizen participation in elections, and convergence of government policies and 
voter preferences. He argued that the consensual systems’ success was due mainly to 
consensual institutional arrangements. Lijphart’s findings are based on research in 
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established democracies but it is entirely valid to employ his conceptual map (Table 
3.1) to examine the case of a deeply divided polity in transition such as Iraq. 59 
 
Political Institutions in Divided Societies: The Case of Iraq 
There are different views on political institutions and their feasibility and function in 
deeply divided societies. Some scholars recommend power sharing institutions (e.g. 
Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1984; Reynolds 1999). Others suggest that majoritarian 
institutions are best (Horowitz 1991; Sartori 1997; Reilly 1997). The diverse, and even 
opposing, views on different types of institutional arrangements reinforce the 
significance of political institutions. Scholars disagree on which institutions work best 
but they agree on the fact that certain institutional arrangements are key in building 
democracy in divided societies.60 Lijphart is one advocate of power sharing institutional 
arrangements for such societies. In contrast to Lijphart’s view, there are a number of 
writers that criticise non-majoritarian systems for divided societies (Barry 1975; 
Lustick 1979; 1997; Lardeyert 1991; Van Schendelen 1983; Quade 1991; 1995; Norris 
2004; 2008; O’Leary 2005). They warn that in such societies in the longer term (e.g. 
Norris 2007: 27), power sharing institutions may produce undesirable obstacles to 
‘good governance’, such as the fragmentation of the legislative and a potential 
secession stemming from federalism. Such concerns are redundant in the context of 
Iraq because the fragmentation is not the outcome of power sharing institutions. It is a 
political reality upon which the state of Iraq has been founded. The ethnic differences 
are not pliant but solid; they are geographically concentrated in different areas, show 
resistance to integration and demand accommodation.61   
 
Lijphart’s approach mirrors the context of Iraq. His work on two contrasting systems 
of democracy serves as a conceptual map for the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
It shows how the majoritarian and consensus systems (conceptual clarity) are 
																																																						
59 In ‘constitutional design for divided societies’ (2004), Lijphart also recommends a form of consensual 
institutional arrangement for institutional engineering and building democracy in divided societies. 
60 To avoid repeating myself, I will return to this debate in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
61 These matters have already been address in Chapter 1. I will discuss the main critiques of non-power 
sharing (consensual) institutional arrangements in subsequent chapters: in Chapter 6, I examine the 
debate on institutional design; in Chapter 7, I discuss the debate on federal structures; and in Chapter 8 I 
review the debate on constitutional design for deeply divided societies, focusing on arguments that 
explain and help in understanding of the theoretical framework.  
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interpreted in this thesis, as well as illustrating the types of democratic political 
institutions that the thesis examines in relation to elite support and preferences 
(analytical parsimonious). Lijphart used the term ‘power sharing’ in his 1969 writings 
as a synonym for ‘consociational democracy’, which is a ‘grand coalition 
complemented by three secondary instruments: mutual veto, proportionality, and 
segmental autonomy’ (Lijphart 1977: 36). Consensus democracy, however, is a new 
concept closely related to consociational democracy, but it ‘is not coterminous with it’ 
(Lijphart 2008: 6). The right column in Table 3.1 shows the ten defining characteristics 
of a consensual system. Consociational and consensual conceptions have a large degree 
of overlap but remain distinct. The consociational system relies on less-formal 
agreements, whereas the consensual system emphasises formal-institutional devices.   
 
TABLE	3.1	THE	FORMAL	POLITICAL	INSTITUTIONS	OF	TWO	DIFFERENT	TYPES	OF	DEMOCRATIC	SYSTEM		
 
	 MAJORITARIAN	SYSTEM	 CONSENSUAL	SYSTEM		
	 Concentration	of	executive	power	in	
single-party	majority	cabinets	
Executive	power	sharing	in	broad	
multiparty	coalitions	
	 Executive-legislative	relationships	in	
which	the	executive	is	dominant	
Executive-legislative	balance	of	power	
EXECUTIVE-PARTY	DIMENSION	 Two	party	systems	 Multiparty	systems	
	 Majoritarian	and	disproportional	
electoral	systems	
Proportional	representation	
	 Pluralist	interest	group	systems	with	
free	for	all	competition	among	groups	
Coordinated	and	corporatist	interest	
group	systems	aimed	at	compromise	and	
concentration	
	 	
	 Unitary	and	centralised	government	 Federal	and	decentralised	governments	
	 Concentration	of	legislative	power	in	
a	unicameral	legislature	
Division	of	legislative	power	between	two	
equally	strong	but	differently	constituted	
house	
FEDERAL-UNITARY	DIMENSION	 Flexible	constitutions	that	can	be	
amended	by	simple	majorities	
Rigid	constitutions	that	can	be	changed	
only	by	extraordinary	majorities	
	 Systems	in	which	legislature	have	the	
final	word	on	the	constitutionality	of	
their	own	legislation	
Systems	in	which	laws	are	subject	to	a	
judicial	review	of	their	constitutionality	by	
supreme	or	constitutional	courts	
	 Central	banks	that	are	dependent	on	
the	executive	
Independent	central	banks	
	 Maj.	institutional	arrangements		 Cos.	institutional	arrangements		
Note:	The	institutional	arrangements	are	adopted	from	Lijphart	1999.	The	table	is	my	compilation.	This	table	explains	how	this	thesis	
understands	 the	 formal	 political	 institutions	 and,	 according	 to	 the	 above	 institutions,	 the	 preferences	 of	 Iraqi	 political	 elite	 are	
assessed.				
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The idea of consociation developed by Lijphart highlights the significance of context. 
W. Arthur Lewis is regarded as one of the most influential writers on Lijphart’s 
consociational model. Lewis has studied the politics of thirteen West African states.62 
His main argument was; ‘to create good political institutions in West Africa one has to 
think their problem through from the foundation up’ (Lewis 1965: 64). That is, the 
political culture and structure of those societies had to be taken into consideration in 
any study of them. He has argued in favour of an inclusive form of democracy for 
divided societies and against the principle of exclusion (i.e. opposition) which he 
regarded as undemocratic. Congruently, Lijphart (1977:42) has argued that the 
consociational approach does not abolish or weaken sectarian divisions but recognises 
them explicitly and turns them into constructive elements of a stable democracy. 
Lijphart’s recommendations on ‘constitutional design for divided societies’ (2004) 
have combined elements of both consensus and consociational, and he concluded that 
the successful formation of democratic government in divided societies requires two 
key components: grand coalition, that is, ‘participation of representatives of all 
significant communal groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive 
level’; and group autonomy, that is  ‘groups have authority to run their own internal 
affairs especially in the areas of education and culture’ (Lijphart 2008: 76-88).  
It is Lijphart’s view (2008: 8) that the differences between consociational and 
consensual systems do not involve any conflict and they are compatible. Other scholars 
(Doorenspleet and Pellikaan 2013) have argued that Lijphart’s earlier work needs to be 
combined with his more recent 1990s research (see Lijphart 2008). Similarly, the main 
formal political institutions of majoritarian and consensus systems (Table 3.1) and the 
less-formal agreements (Table 3.2) are used in this study to advance a framework to 
assess the views and preferences of elites on their political institutions. Drawing on 
Lijphart’s suggestion, both grand coalition and segmental autonomy are utilised as 
explanatory factors to discuss two formal institutions: federalism and constitution 
(Chapters 7 and 8). This approach relates the views of both Lewis and Lijphart, on the 
role of other politicised informal institutions through addressing democracy through 
																																																						
62 Liberia, the former British colonies of Chana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, and the former French 
colonies of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, and Niger. 
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divergent perspectives (Lewis) and the preferences of political elite for different 
institutional arrangements and less-formal agreements (Lijphart).  
This research employs only two out of four63 consociational elements; group autonomy 
coincides with segmental cleavages and ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraqi society which 
helps an understanding of the nature of social fragmentation. Grand coalition relates to 
the unwritten rules of power sharing among the different groups in Iraq and provides 
insights into the structure of the political system. Additionally, the consociational 
literature highlights the significance of political leadership, especially in reference to 
the two practices of group autonomy and grand coalition, and this corresponds to the 
logic of this research as it puts emphasis on the political elite. Reference to the two 
elements of consociational democracy are provided for explanatory purposes only, 
whereas elements of consensus-majority democracy compose the analytical framework 
of this research.  
 
This thesis recognises that consociational less-formal agreements have potentially 
positive outcomes but can lead to undesired outcomes if not put in place properly. Table 
3.2 highlights both such positive and negative possibilities.64 It is assumed for the 
purposes of this research that, in addition to formal consensual institutions, if the two 
less-formal practices of grand coalition and segmental autonomy are operationalized 
correctly and not manipulated by the group that form the majority, then positive 
outcomes are more likely which will help establish and sustain democracy. However, 
if consociational agreements are conditioned with a majoritarian operationalizing of 
formal institutions, then democracy is less likely to endure. This analysis is peculiar to 
Iraq.  
 
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
63 The other two elements are promotional representation and veto; the former will be discussed with the 
formal institutions, and the latter is implicitly established in the Iraqi constitution (see Chapter 8).   
64 The table is my compilation. This table shows the defining characteristics of consociational democracy, 
and also both positive and negative aspects of the implementation/manifestation of each indicator. 
Lijphart has not highlighted the negative aspects of his theory and these can be seen as a limitation of his 
work. 
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TABLE	3.2	THE	LESS-FORMAL	INSTITUTIONS	(POLITICAL	AGREEMENTS)		
INFORMAL	PRACTICES	 DESIRED	OUTCOMES		 UNDESIRED	OUTCOMES		
Government	by	a	grand	coalition	of	the	
political	leaders	of	all	significant	
segments	of	the	plural	society.	
Cooperation	among	the	political	leaders	
and	compromise.	
Competition	among	the	political	leaders	
and	disagreement.	
High	degree	of	autonomy	for	each	
segment	to	run	its	own	internal	affairs.	
Federation	and	autonomy	for	minorities.	 Deepening	the	segmental	cleavages.	
Consociational	System:	the	two	informal	practices	of	grand	coalition	and	segmental	autonomy	
 
The formal political institutions, at least theoretically, as outlined in the Iraqi permanent 
constitution, are democratic. Iraq has a parliamentary system in which the parliament 
names the President and the Prime Minister. Constitutionally, there is a balance of 
power between the executive and the legislative. The constitution has separated the 
judicial, the legislative and the executive powers. Iraq has a multi-party system, and 
almost all the political parties are based on ethno-religious foundations. Iraq is a federal 
decentralised government in which the legislative power is concentrated in a 
unicameral legislative. The legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of its 
legislation although, in certain cases, there are judicial reviews, and the constitution is 
inflexible. In post 2003 Iraq, consociational elements have been employed to thread 
through the formal institutional arrangements to hold it together. There is a veto for 
each of the three main groups based on provinces, to make a balance between the 
federal government and the provinces or regions, and segmental autonomy has been 
recognised and established. The three rounds of elections have been based on 
proportional representation, although the constitution does not require it, and since 
2005 all Iraqi cabinets have been formed based on broad multi-party coalition–
intergroup coalitions. 
 
Robert Dahl, after reviewing the two sides of the debate (Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s) on 
institutional arrangements for divided societies, reaches the inescapable conclusion that 
there are no general solutions to the problems of culturally divided countries. 
Consequently, ‘every solution will need to be custom tailored to the features of each 
country’ (1998: 195). One method to customise the solution for a deeply divided 
country is to take into account the views of their political leaders. That is especially true 
in the case of Iraq.   
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The answer to the question of how Iraqi formal political institutions are arranged is 
crucial in order to identify the type of political system the Iraqi political elite have 
developed so far, and which parts of it they want to see changed in the future. Lijphart’s 
(1999: 3-4) defining institutional traits of majoritarian and consensual models are 
utilised to locate Iraq’s political system within that majoritarian-consensual spectrum.  
The ideal type of a majoritarian model has the following attributes. On the executive-
party dimension, the executive power is concentrated in a single party majority cabinet. 
In executive-legislative relationships, the executive is dominant: it has a two party 
system, there is a disproportional electoral system, and there are pluralist interest 
groups. On the unitary-federal dimension: it has unitary and centralised government, 
legislative power is concentrated in a unicameral legislature, the constitution is flexible, 
the legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of its own legislation and, 
finally, the central banks are subordinate to the executive.  
 
The ideal type of a consensual model is in sharp contrast with the majoritarian ideal. 
First, on the executive-party dimension, the executive power is shared in broad 
multiparty coalitions; there is a balance of power between the executive and legislature; 
it has a multi-party system; there is proportional representation and coordinated interest 
groups. Second, on the federal-unitary dimension, it has a federal decentralised 
government; the legislative power is divided between two equally strong, but 
differently constituted, Houses and it has a rigid constitution that can be changed only 
by extraordinary majorities. In this system, laws are subject to judicial review on their 
constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts and the central banks are 
independent.  
 
The arrangement of formal political institutions in Iraq can be seen to fall into distinct 
categories.  One, the executive-party dimension: the executive power is shared in broad 
multi-party coalitions, there is a legislative executive balance of power, there is 
proportional representation, and a multi-party system, with plural interest groups. 
Second, on the federal-unitary dimension: Iraq is a federal system, the legislative power 
is concentrated in a unicameral legislature, has a rigid constitution with the legislature 
having the final say on the constitutionality of its own legislation, and the Iraqi central 
bank is independent. Therefore, Iraq’s political system has elements of both 
	 94	
majoritarian and consensual models. Out of ten traits, only three are majoritarian and 
the rest are consensual. In addition to those consensual traits, four consociational 
principles are also present in Iraq. Grand coalition is an informal practice while the 
other three principles, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual 
veto, are written into the Iraqi constitution (see Chapter 8). 
 
It is fundamental to recognise that not all formal institutions, as identified by Lijphart, 
have the same significance. Some institutions can influence a system to become more 
majoritarian or consensual than others. Iraq has a parliamentary system in which the 
Shia form a majority in the House of Representatives. As a result, the two traits of 
unicameralism and the absence of judicial review, more than others, could push Iraq’s 
political system towards majority rule. Iraq’s legislative power is concentrated in a 
unicameral legislature, the House, and the legislature has the final word on the 
constitutionality of its legislations unless it directly contravenes the constitution. In 
such a case, the Shia as the majority in the legislature could establish majority rule, 
especially taking into account the fact that Iraq’s political system is parliamentary and 
the post of Prime Minister is reserved for the Shia, based on informal political 
agreement between the three main groups.    
 
In most divided societies, a political agreement between the political leaders of different 
groups precedes the formal institutional arrangement. In the case of Iraq, the precedent 
of the formal institutional arrangements coming first has been one of the principles of 
power-sharing agreed between the leaders of the three main factions. The consensus 
has been inherently political, and Andre Kaiser (1997: 434) labels the democratic form 
of such a system as ‘negotiation democracy,’ which seems a particularly apt term for 
use in the Iraqi context.  
 
Iraq’s negotiation politics have become manifest in the four principles of power sharing 
(consociation) of grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional representation and 
minority veto. Those principles, outlined by Lijphart (2008:7), are in direct opposition 
to majoritarian principles. A hypothesis can be developed that a consensual model is 
more likely to work than a majoritarian model in Iraq. This contention can be justified 
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based on the fact that the consensual model has grown out of the consociational model.65 
Therefore, the two are congruent and Iraq’s political system is based on a set of political 
agreements that are conducive to a consociational power sharing model. It follows that 
a consensual model is more likely to be feasible. Conversely, a majoritarian model is 
less likely because it is, in principle, contradictory to the way Iraq’s political system is 
structured.  
The theoretical framework in this thesis draws on the significance of institutional 
design, yet departs from a mere constitutional approach and focuses on elites’ views on 
democracy and their preferences for institutional arrangements. Discussing democracy 
as a set of institutions puts the political elite central to the process of establishing a 
democratic system.  
 
3.3 Political elites matter 
The Theoretical Ideas  
The concept of a political elite is inter-connected with the concept of power. The 
political elite can be defined as ‘… the power holders of a body politic’ (Lasswell et al. 
1965: 3-19). The importance of the political elite in a body politic resides in their access 
to power. To discuss democracy as a set of institutions with a focus on the political elite 
is the main attribute of ‘elite theory of democracy.’ The theory makes a twofold 
assumption; power lies in institutions, and elites make institutions work (Hunter 1953; 
Mills 1956; Domhof 1967; Putnam 1976; Schwartz 1987; Bottomore 1993; Bacharach 
2010). The common idea shared by classical elitist theorists (e.g. Schumpeter 1942; 
Kornhauser 1960; Sartori 1962) is that democracy is a procedure by which the political 
elite compete for power to govern.   
 
The elite theory of democracy’s conception of political elite, in particular Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942), is akin to Max Weber’s view that ‘a person is granted the authority 
to decide, and must be allowed the freedom necessary if he is to deliberate and act in a 
responsible manner’ (cited in Parry 1969: 145). Schumpeter viewed democracy as ‘a 
																																																						
65 Lijphart (2008: 6) states that consensus democracy has grown out of his effort to define and measure 
consociational democracy more precisely.  
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method’ designed to produce trustworthy government, what he called ‘the rule of 
politicians’ (Schumpeter 1942: 269). He also defined a democratic method as the 
‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote’ 
(Schumpeter 1956: 25). Schumpeter conceived an elitist democracy based on the two 
main principles mentioned above; to arrange a set of institutions that make political 
decisions, and to have a political elite who enjoy political power. This thesis 
acknowledges both principles, but puts the emphasis on the latter. Elites have personal 
resources and they make institutions work; this is in line with Dahl’s view that political 
elites have influence over political events (1971: 128).66  
 
Elite theory has been criticised by scholars who favour a more classical notion of 
democracy developed by theorists who advocated popular political participation and 
government by the people, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2008) and John Stuart Mill 
(1946). The former was more concerned with the legislative power and participation, 
while the latter concentrated on the executive power and representation. Jack L. Walker 
(1966) follows this tradition. Walker’s criticism can be summed up in the single 
assertion that elitist theorists conceive democracy solely in procedural terms, as a 
method of decision making bound by an elite’s responsiveness to popular opinion, 
emphasising the limitation of the average citizens, on the one hand, and the trust put in 
the elite, on the other (Walker 1966: 288-295).  
 
Robert A. Dahl (1966) has responded to Walker’s critiques by elaborating on two 
distinct doctrines of the elitist theorists, one of which is anti-democratic and the other 
democratic. The former contends that popular rule is not only undesirable but regards 
it as impossible (e.g. Michels 1915, Pareto 1935; and Mosca 1939); whereas the latter 
advocates the desirability of representative government, albeit ‘with the emphasis on 
the empirical proposition that leaders do have great weight in modern representative 
systems,’ Dahl has named ‘Beer, Hartz, Lipset, Key, Mayo, Milbrath, McClosky, 
Morris-Jones, Polsby, Schumpeter and Truman’ (including Dahl himself) as holders of 
the latter doctrine and regard themselves as the advocates of ‘the elitist theory of 
																																																						
66 Conceptions of democracy by the elite as an ideal and a reality are explored from Chapters 5 to Chapter 
8.  
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democracy’ (Dahl 1966: 296). In giving weight to the political elite’s role in 
establishing democracy, derived from the idea put forward by Dahl and his fellow 
scholars, this thesis distances itself from the anti-democratic tendencies of the other 
‘elitist theorists,’ classical or otherwise.  
 
Political Elite and Transition Processes  
Although the discourse on the ‘elitist theorists of democracy’ concerns established 
democracies, it also has implications for cases involving democratic transitions. There 
have been scholarly empirical and theoretical attempts to reconcile the role of the 
political elite with the transformation of regime type. The wave of transitions to 
democracy during the 1980s, in Latin America and Southern Europe, attracted much 
scholarly attention (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Malloy and Seligson 
1987; Baloyra 1987; Needler 1987; Karl and Schmitter 1991). The literature on those 
transitions shifted the focus away from explanations based on social structures towards 
political factors hypothesised in terms of the behaviour of powerful actors or elites, 
termed ‘elitist transitions’.  
 
Research in this area studied the possible transitions from authoritarian regimes in terms 
of ‘elite pacts,’67 a precise agreement among the elite that explained the rules governing 
the exercise of power based on complementary assurances over their vital interests.68 A 
study by Terry Lynn Karl and Philip C. Schimtter shows that democratic transitions by 
pacts i.e. when elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves, are most 
likely to lead to democracy69 (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 284). Similarly, other scholars 
(e.g. Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy 1987) have found that in certain cases contingent elite 
choices eventually produce democratic adaptation or cause democratic disintegrations. 
The assumption that elites play key roles in transition can be deduced from broad 
empirical evidence and underpins the approach of this thesis. Although Iraq is a case of 
																																																						
67 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) have pointed out some presumed objectives of 
those pacts such as; to serve as temporary solutions anticipated to avoid certain troublesome outcomes; 
to pave the way for more permanent arrangements; for some of their elements to eventually become the 
law by being incorporated into constitution or statutes; while others could be institutionalized as the 
typical operating procedures of state agencies, political parties, interest associations and the like 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 37). 
68 As long as the elite actors where concerned, they were divided in two categories, pacts (the consensus 
among the political elite) and impositions (elite seize power and change regime).  
69 Compared to other cases by reform, or by revolutions, where the masses cause regime change, or 
imposition has led to limited democracy.  
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an imposed transition, it shares a fundamental characteristic with the empirical 
proposition of elitist transitions which is the centrality of the political elite during that 
transition. 
 
There have been theoretical justifications for, and attempts to theorise, the role of the 
political elite in the survival of democracy and the process of democratisation (e.g. 
Hagley and Burton 1989; Field, Higley and Burton 1990; Dye and Zeigler 1996; 
Etzioni-Halevy 1997; Higley and Burton 2006). In particular, Higley and Burton (1989) 
introduce an ‘elite paradigm’ by addressing the way domestic elite interrelations affects 
regime stability, democratic transitions, and breakdowns. The core assertion of their 
study is that democratic transitions depend heavily on the ‘consensual unity’ of national 
elites, whereas ‘disunited elites’ make a political regime unstable and cause democratic 
breakdowns (1989: 17). 
 
In subsequent studies Higley and Burton (1989; 1990; 2006) propose three elite 
configurations: disunited, consensually united and ideologically united elite. They 
argue that each of these configurations has an origin in nation-state formation. Further, 
they have developed two dimensions of elite variations: structural integration and value 
consent. The former refers to formal and informal networks and the latter denotes 
relative agreement among the elite about ‘the worth of governmental institutions’ 
(Higley and Burton 2006: 9). They further argue that when the political elite are 
disunited, structural integration and value consensus are minimal. When elites distrust 
each other, a struggle for dominance, in what might be seen as a political war, ensues. 
When the elite are ideologically united, structural integration is extensive in a strongly 
centralised manner, value consensus is extensive, and is the embodiment of a single 
ideology (religious doctrine, ethnic creed). When the elite are consensually united, 
structural integration and value consensus are extensive and ‘there is an underlying 
consensus about the worth of existing political institutions’ (ibid: 14 emphasis added).  
 
In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, a degree of consensual unity among the Iraqi 
political elite was achieved in the IGC, though imposed by the United Sates. The 
formation of subsequent Iraqi governments (2006, 2010 and 2014) based on grand 
coalitions have been the outcome of a political consensus among the elites. It is one of 
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the objectives of this study to examine this consensual unity through analysing views 
and synthesising preferences for different institutional arrangements.  
 
Before moving further forward, the two key concepts of transition and agency require 
clarification - as they are understood in the context of this thesis. First, transition is the 
interim period during which the legacies of the former regime (i.e. authoritarianism) 
coexist with the realities of a new regime (i.e. democratic) that attempts to replace it.70 
That is, the period of transition ends when political democracy has created a less 
suspicious attitude toward each other’s purposes, ideas and ideals (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986: 72). Given that established premise as a sole measure, then it could be 
argued that, in the case of Iraq, the transition has not been passed yet, as there is too 
much mistrust and suspicion towards one another among the political elite (as this study 
shows). 
 
Second, on the concept of agency, in chapter 1, section 1.1, I argued that this thesis 
makes a difference between popular agency and elite agency and the focus was 
narrowed on the later. Elite agency, as this thesis applies the term, refers to the  political 
elite. By political elite I refer to those who are the members of the apparatus of rule, 
(the legislative, the executive and the judiciary), members of the Iraqi parliament, 
members of the Iraqi government and members of constitution writing committee. And 
those are the participants in this study. Section 3.4 of this chapter presents a model to 
illustrate where the attitudes of the political elite come from to show the causal ordering 
of factors that have a bearing on elite attitudes to democracy. Chapter 4, section 4.4 
further explains how elites’ views and preferences are measured and analysed, using 
both methods surveys and interviews.71    
 
  
																																																						
70 O’Donell  and Schmitter (1986) in their work entitled ‘tentative conclusions about uncertain 
transitions,’ introduce the principle of uncertainty for transitions. A principle could very well be applied 
to Iraq as a case in transition. 
71 The views of elite and their preferences are measured with their choices for either consensual or 
majoritarian institutional arrangements, through surveys; and their interviews are more or less descriptive 
narratives -using thematic analysis. Moreover, it has been established that attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviour constitute a second major category of social and political data that can be efficiently studied 
with surveys (see, Boyd and Hyman 1975: 274). 
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The Political Elite in Divided Societies: The Case of Iraq  
In a deeply divided country, during transition, political leadership is particularly 
required to facilitate peaceful competition for power. Building democratic institutions 
relies on cooperation between elites representing different groups (Byman and Micheal 
2003: 130; Khalilzad 2010: 42). As long as the political elite are the most significant 
actors peacefully competing against one another (Case 1996), their unity guarantees the 
political stability of the newly emerging democratic system. In societies that are 
fragmented with ethnic, religious or ideological divisions, however, the political elite 
represent different ethno-religious groups who are responsible for constructing 
democratic settlements. In such societies, an essential step towards democracy is that 
elites satisfy their desire for power through peaceful means instead of resorting to 
violence (Bermeo 1992: 276; Brown 1996: 583).  
 
The discussion of the centrality of political elites in building democracy in deeply 
divided societies forms the second part of the theoretical framework. The main 
underlying proposition of this thesis is that support for democracy by the Iraqi political 
elite is one of the most important factors in building democratic institutions. That, 
however, is based on the assumption that transformation from ‘elite disunity to 
consensual unity is an essential precondition for political stability and lasting 
democratic transition’ (Higley and Burton 1989: 21). Along similar lines, Larry 
Diamond (2005c: 65) argues that when the political elite believe that the democratic 
regime is ‘better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine,’ they are 
committed to democratic norms. Their belief and behaviour correspond to democratic 
practices and democracy, consequently, could have a promising future. Similarly, 
Francis Fukuyama (1995), identifies some levels72 necessary to building democracy, 
the first of which is a normative commitment to the idea of democracy among the 
political leaders and the ruling elite. The support for democracy, which is often 
grounded in the personal satisfaction of the political elite, could lead to achieving 
democratic practices during the transition period. Political scientist, Adeed Dawisha 
has rightly stated that the answer to whether ‘Iraq goes up the rising path of democracy 
																																																						
72 The other three levels are: Level two - consolidating democracy at the level of institutions, constitution, 
electoral systems and political parties; Level three - involves the existence of civil society, interest 
groups, independent media and civil right groups; and Level four - includes phenomena such as family 
structure, religion, moral values, ethnic consciousness and ‘civic-ness’. See Fukuyama, F. ‘The Primacy 
of Culture’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 6, no. 1, (1995), pp. 7-9. 
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or down the falling road of division may very well lie in the bargaining, arguing, and 
political deal-making that are going on in Iraq in the present time of transition’ (2005: 
49). 
   
This thesis holds that the political elite are key to building democracy in Iraq. The 
United States’ strategy for post invasion Iraq placed the political elite central to the 
process of rebuilding Iraq’s formal institutions. After its military victory, the United 
States’ main drive of democracy building efforts was in creating appropriate political 
elites and this became the single most important task for post-Saddam state 
reconstruction (Manning 2006: 727; Nader 2003: 482). War and regime collapse 
abolished formal political institutions and created a political vacuum. On 16th May, 
2003, Paul Bremer73 issued regulation Number 1, announcing the establishment of The 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)74, and on 13th July, 2003, in regulation Number 
6, he declared the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (CPA 2003). The Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), chosen by the US administration in Iraq, was made up of 25 
people representing Iraq's diverse religious and ethnic groups on a proportional basis: 
thirteen Shia, five Sunni, five Kurd, one Turkmen and one Christian. In Lijphart’s view, 
this was a manifestation of power sharing, which has been criticised on a variety of 
grounds, ‘but no one has questioned its broadly representative composition’ (Lijphart 
2008: 76). With the institutionalization of the ethnic and religious fragmentations into 
the apparatus of rule, the Iraqi Governing Council, those 25 members of their respective 
elites were tasked with drafting the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).75 In 
consequence, the elite took the first steps in drafting the Iraqi constitution.  
 
In post 2003 Iraq, the political elite have had a central role in shaping Iraq’s politics 
and forming its political system. Their views and preferences concerning democracy 
																																																						
73 Paul Bremer, an American diplomat, was US administrator to Iraq. He served as the head of the CPA 
from May 11, 2003, until limited Iraqi sovereignty was restored on June 28, 2004. 
74 The CPA was established as a transitional government following the invasion of Iraq. Citing United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), the CPA granted itself the executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on April 21, 2003, 
until its dissolution on June 28, 2004. 
75 The TAL was Iraq's provisional constitution that was signed on March 8, 2004 by the Iraqi Governing 
Council. It came into effect on June 28, 2004 following the official transfer of power from the CPA, to 
a sovereign Iraqi government. The law remained in effect until the formation of a new government in 
May 2006, when it was superseded by the permanent constitution that had been approved by referendum 
on October 15, 2005. 
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are, therefore, of great importance and underpin the adaptation and practices of political 
action that are of the essence in establishing democratic institutions and their functions. 
The following section will combine the two parts of the theoretical framework, the 
importance of political institutions and the significance of the political elite, to address 
the main research question. 
 
3.4 Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical Approach 
Conceptually, the political elite and the political institutions are important because of 
their connection with the notion of political power. Political power can be understood 
as decision making with a ‘severely sanctioned choice’ and political institutions are the 
organising principles of politics through which these sanctioned choices are made. 
Governmental institutions, by default, become the home to the political elite. This 
thesis, however, recognises political power as both actual and potential. In the case of 
Iraq, actual power of the political elite comes from the groups that they represent while 
their potential power comes from the position they hold in the formal institutions of 
government. For example, the Prime Minister is a Shia, his remit is written into the 
Iraqi constitution and can be categorised as potential power. However, the extent of 
what he can actually do, actual power, depends to a great degree on Shia support.  
 
Therefore, the theoretical approach to assessing views of elites combines elements of 
institutionalist and elitist approaches rather than simply employing an institutionalist 
one, in the sense of putting political institutions first in any political analysis (e.g. Hay 
2002; Peters 2005; Rhodes, Binder and Rockman 2006). This approach acknowledges 
and draws on the centrality of political institutions while putting the role of political 
elite first.  
 
The two composing elements of the theoretical approach of this thesis, the elite theory 
of democracy and the institutionalist approach, have been criticised separately as a set 
of political norms and as a guide to empirical research respectively. To combine both 
approaches minimises the weaknesses of and answers the criticisms levelled at both. 
That is, within the scope of this thesis both the significance of elite theories of 
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democracy during transition and the importance of institutional arrangement in divided 
societies are acknowledged and defended.  
 
The political norm of the ‘elite theory of democracy,’ has been criticised for limiting 
the normative theory of democracy and dividing society into elites and citizens (e.g. 
Walker 1966). This thesis, although employing the ‘elite theory of democracy,’ is not 
an apology for elite rule, but rather offers a pragmatic analysis of how representative 
democracy functions in modern societies, whether homogenous or heterogeneous, 
strongly unified or deeply divided. By placing the emphasis on incorporating formal 
institutions, this approach admits the possibility of institutional vigour enabling non-
elite individuals to become members of the elites. The membership of the ruling class 
and those that are subject to rule is not fixed or static. Membership changes and such 
mobility is at the heart of representative democracies. Given Iraq’s context, the 
approach of this thesis is realistic and pragmatic (see Chapter 4) and recognises that the 
survival of democracy in a deeply divided society is inextricably linked to the attitude 
of the political elite, since democratic decisions can only be reached through 
accommodation and compromise between divergent group leaders.  
 
The ‘elite paradigm’ has been criticised on the grounds of its lack of conceptual clarity. 
It fails to draw a clear line between elites and non-elites. Along similar lines, it is also 
vague as to the scope of an elites’ power (e.g. Cammack 1990). This thesis addresses 
these criticisms and responds to the concerns raised through conceptual clarity and the 
exactness of expression.  
 
The precise definition of ‘political elite’ in this thesis draws a clear distinction between 
the political elite and non-political elite. All those in the political elite are members of 
formal political institutions (the legislature, executive and the judiciary) who also 
happen to be political party members and members of different ethno-religious groups. 
However, the term political elite does not include religious elites, such as the Shia 
Mujtahid and the Sunni A’lim, unless they are directly involved in politics or their 
views, stances and fataws shape political decisions through membership of a formal 
political institution. The terms ‘elites’, ‘political elite’, ‘the ruling elite’, and ‘political 
leaders’ are used interchangeably to refer to members of the formal institutions who are 
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the top decision makers. Concerning the scope of elite power, the actual power of an 
individual within an elite is related to the informal institutions of which that individual 
is a member and includes factors such as the size of their ethnic group or their sect, 
while the potential power is due to the formal institutions of which the political elite 
becomes a member of, such as the powers of the Prime Minister or the President as 
stated in the constitution.  
 
Some scholars have expressed concerns that to understand a political system primarily 
in formal-legal institutional terms is inadequate and narrows focus (Macridis 1963; 
Eulau and March 1969; Drewry 1996). This thesis addresses such concerns. With 
institutions, three connotations, informal, less-formal and formal, are used. Informal 
institutions are social complexes that ‘give order to social relations’ (Weber 1978: 40), 
such as a religious sect and ethnicity, specifically when they become the defining 
cultural characteristics of a group and form ‘ethno-religious segments.’ This thesis 
refers to such institutions as ‘informal institutions’ and sheds light on their divergent 
political perspectives on Iraq’s democracy. The term less-formal refers to political 
agreements between different groups such as grand coalitions and segmental autonomy. 
Formal institutions constitute the formal governmental institutions of consensus and 
majoritarian systems as identified by Lijphart (1999).  
 
Assessing the Political Elites’ Views on Democracy  
One way to determine the views of the political elite concerning democracy is to ask 
them about the meaning of democracy as they see it and to examine their support for 
political institutions. Such an approach combines elites and institutions and is a 
theoretically valid and relevant method. However, the examination of democracy and 
what it means ideally, as opposed to what it does in reality, is a categorisation of 
democracy developed by Robert Dahl (1998). With the modifications that the structure 
of this thesis requires, this method used by Dahl is utilised. Dahl makes the assumption 
that democracy can be best understood in two contingent forms, as ideal and as actual 
government (1998: 29). That is, to define democracy as an ideal involves questions 
such as, ‘What is democracy?’ and ‘Why democracy?’ Whereas to define democracy 
as an actual political system necessitates identifying political institutions required in a 
democratic system, as well as the conditions that favour such institutions. This method 
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applies the theoretical framework to answer the main research question in three over 
lapping and interconnected sections (see Table 3.3).  
 
This theoretical framework assumes that the Iraqi political elite see democracy as 
desirable. Their specific views on democracy can be further deconstructed by asking 
the questions; ‘What does democracy mean?’ and ‘What type of democracy is 
supported?’ Only by understanding what exactly Iraqi political elites mean by 
democracy can there be any progress in analysing their preferences for a certain type 
of democratic system. From that knowledge comes the ability to identify, and discuss, 
the implications of such a system in Iraq. Put simply, it is only after knowing the 
meanings they attach to their conceptions that their choices can be understood.76    
 
Dahl’s (1998) method of understanding democracy is employed (see Table 3.3) to 
answer the main research question, as well as Lijphart's ideas (1999) on democratic 
institutions to formulate an analytical structure corresponding to the theoretical 
framework. The centrality of political institutions in divided societies, and the 
significance of political elites in building democracy during periods of transition, is 
emphasised. 
TABLE	3.3	UNDERSTANDING	DEMOCRACY	AS	IDEAL	AND	ACTUAL	AS	EXAMINED	IN	THIS	THESIS		
	 IDEAL		 ACTUAL		
POLITICAL	ELITE		
DIVERGENT	PERSPECTIVES	
Values	and	Ideas		 Democratic	Political	Systems	
What	is	democracy?		
	
What	political	institutions	
does	Iraq’s	democracy	
require?	
What	conditions	do	those	
institutions	require?	
What	does	democracy	mean?		
Why	do	they	support	
democracy?		
What	type	of	political	
institutions	do	Iraqi	political	
elite	support?	
What	works	best	and	what	
are	the	challenges	in	building	
democratic	institutions	in	
Iraq?		
Chapter	5	 Chapter	6	 Chapters	7	and	8	
 
As Table 3.377 shows, Chapter 5 answers the question ‘What is democracy?’ by 
																																																						
76 It is vital to note that I have given different discourses on definitions of democracy (see Chapter 1). In 
this present chapter, I have given a preliminary understanding of democracy. Those, nevertheless, were 
views in the literature and democracy as perceived in other contexts. The meaning of democracy in the 
context of Iraq, however, as in what it means to Iraqi political elite and what type of political system do 
Iraqi political elite craft out of the ideal of democracy, is further clarified from the context of this thesis 
by showing how the political elite understand democracy.  
77 I have borrowed the idea, as well as the table layout, from Dahl (1998), with the modifications that 
this thesis requires – i.e. the chapters and the questions relating to democracy in Iraq.  
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examining how democracy is viewed as an ideal among the political elite, why they 
favour democracy and what values or norms do they serve with their conceptions of 
democracy. Knowing these views is essential because the first step in building 
democracy, as Francis Fukuyama (1995: 9) believes, is a normative commitment to the 
idea of democracy among political leaders and the ruling elite. Larry Diamond (2005c: 
66) has argued that the elite have significant, disproportionate, power and influence, 
and feels elites matter the most in ensuring the stability of democracy, not only in their 
behaviour but also in their beliefs. He further argues that democracy is built on two 
dimensions (norms and behaviour) and three levels (elite, organisation, and mass 
public).78  
 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the role of norms and beliefs at the elite level. A narrative 
analysis is used to show what the Iraqi political elite refer to as ‘democracy,’ and to 
illustrate the sort of ideas they find ‘democratic.’ The intention is to determine whether 
political elites representing different ethno-religious groups have similar or divergent 
conceptions of what democracy is and whether the conceptions of elites from different 
ethno-religious groups differ in relation to the main ideals of democracy. A further 
aspiration is to show where their views overlap by indicating the type of ideas and goals 
that elites from each group appeal to while defining democracy. Finally, the crucial 
issue of whether any such differences in definition matter is addressed. 
 
After defining democracy as an ideal within the context of Iraq, democracy as an actual 
political system is explored. As the theoretical framework in Table 3.3 suggests, this 
will be done in two parts to answer the two sub questions derived from the main 
research question; ‘What democratic system?’ and ‘What works in Iraq?’  
 
Chapter 6 examines the type of democratic system that the majority of the Iraqi political 
elite support. A mechanism has been formulated using Lijphart’s 1999 
conceptualisations of consensus and majoritarian systems (see Table 3.1) to serve as a 
survey (see Chapter 6). Lijphart contrasts the two models and these are presented under 
two dimensions, each comprising of five variables (i.e. formal institutions) on which a 
																																																						
78 This research discusses the first and second levels, the elite and organizations i.e. institutions. The third 
level of mass public is beyond the grasp of this paper.  
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particular country, in this case Iraq, ‘may be at either end of the continuum or anywhere 
in between’ (Lijphart 2008: 7). The survey, in this way, gives the political elite the 
option to choose either consensus or majoritarian formal political institutions. Chapter 
6 initially examines the support for different types of democratic systems among the 
three main groups, to show what group supports which type of democratic system. It 
goes on to examine the support of all groups combined, to pin down the institutions on 
which a majority of all groups agree. From this analysis, a picture of Iraq’s preferred 
political system, and whether it lies at either end of the continuum or somewhere in 
between the consensus and or majoritarian democracy models, can be drawn.   
 
Chapters 7 and 8 address the last part of the main research question. Chapter 7 focuses 
on federalism as a formal institution, with in depth empirical evidence from interviews 
and surveys (see Chapter 4). These sources suggest how operationalizing federalism 
could be managed through the divergent perspectives of the main groups in Iraq. 
Segmental autonomy as a less-formal political practice is used as an explanatory factor 
to further discuss Iraq’s federalism. An examination of what elites, from different 
groups, mean by federalism, and what type of federalism, majoritarian or consensual, 
they support is also addressed. Chapter 8 examines Iraq’s constitution through an 
analysis of responses from members of the Constitution Drafting Committee. The 
chapter treats the constitution as a formal institution, and steps beyond the mere ‘text’ 
by articulating the views of the committee members ascertained from structured 
interviews and surveys (Chapter 4). Thematic analysis is used to discuss the 
constitutional challenges as seen from divergent perspectives. The first of these 
involves a discussion on the role of Islam in drafting the constitution to illustrate the 
compatibility or contradictions between the established provision of Islam and 
principles of democracy and, crucially, how the Iraqi political elite have reconciled the 
two. The second constitutional challenge stems from the idea of the ‘democraticness’ 
of the Iraqi constitution. The chapter explores ‘grand coalition’ as a less-formal political 
practice (see Figure 3.1) to inspect the vagueness of some articles and, hence, ambiguity 
in their implementation, specifically by asking whether the formation of the Iraqi 
government in 2010 was according to the constitution or not.79 The third issue involves 
																																																						
79 That is the idea of ‘grand coalition,’ as the coalition among the Shia lists to form the majority or the 
grand coalition among all major lists of Shia, Sunni and Kurds.  
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ideas and efforts to bring about constitutional amendments, to show what parts, if any, 
of the constitution are more likely to be amended and to show how and why views have 
shifted after a decade of living under the constitution. 
 
Dimensions of cleavage and a Model for political socialisation  
In this section, I have two main objectives, first, to present the most decisive dimensions 
of cleavage in the context of Iraq, and second, to explain the nature of political 
socialisation, as stems of those cleavage dimensions (how they are translated in 
politics). Having established those two premises, using the general idea of the proximity 
of factors affecting connections of democracy and preferences for different institutional 
arrangements, the section provides greater clarity on where ethno-religious 
identification sits in the causal ordering.  
 
One method to identify the type of cleavages, is the method used by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967: 47) categorising the decisive dimensions of cleavage in the Western politics. 
One ought to be cautious to describe the context of a country, using the technical 
concepts tailored to describe the context of totally different country. Having this in 
mind, I will be only borrowing the framework and the structure of presentation.80 It is 
argued that there are two important types of cleavages, territorial and functional. 
‘Territorial’ cleavages are involved in defining the nation, such as church-government 
cleavages over national morals and secularism. 81 ‘Functional’ cleavages, are both 
industrial and economic, these are interest based cleavages over worker and owner or 
primary and secondary economy.82  
 
If we apply the same framework to the context of Iraq, then the territorial cleavages 
become primary, and functional cleavages become secondary. In other words, the 
																																																						
80 Lipset and Rokkan (1967), when they discuss the cleavages in western politics and how those 
cleavages were translated into party politics, terms that describe issues peculiar to the western countries. 
For example, for the cleavage of land-industry, the critical junctures is industrial revolution 19th century, 
while the issue is tariff levels for agricultural products vs. freedom for industrial enterprise – these are a 
part of the history of the west, and also the issues are also issues that have concerned the west. Although 
this thesis adopts the framework of cleavage-critical juncture-issues, it does so with incorporating the 
specific feature of the context of Iraq, social, political and historical.   
81 It is argued that these cleavages were stirred in the ‘national’ revolutions that swept Europe beginning 
in France (see, Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
82 These cleavages were stirred by the industrial reloutions, beginning in Britain (see, Lipset and Rokkan 
1967).  
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functional cleavages are refracted through territorial cleavages – in the context of Iraq. 
There are three decisive dimension of cleavage in Iraqi politics (see table 3.4). First, an 
ethnic divide, between Arabs and Kurds, this can be dated back to 1920s and the 
formation of Iraq as a nation state. This cleavage, a defining characteristic of Iraqi 
politics, has become manifest in issues such as Kurdish ethno nationalism versus Iraqi 
nationalism. Second, a religious sect divide, between Sunni Arab and Shia Arab, and 
this can be traced back to the mid 7th century (see chapter 5). This cleavage, has shaped 
Iraq’s politics since the countries establishment, prior to 2003 the Sunni Arab ruled 
Iraq, and the 2003 invasion brought a shift in power and the Shia became the rulers of 
Iraq. Currently the issues of this cleavage revolve around the principle of power sharing 
and majority rule between the two sects. There is a third cleavage, and it is relatively 
new, secularism versus fundamentalism. This cleavage is less decisive compared to the 
other two, because it is refracted through the other two.83 
 
TABLE	3.4	THE	DECISIVE	DIMENSION	OF	CLEAVAGE	IN	IRAQI	POLITICS		
CLEAVAGE		 CRITICAL	JUNCTURE		 ISSUES		
KURD-ARAB	 The	formation	of	the	modern	nation	state	of	
Iraq	in	1920.	
Kurdish	ethnonationalism	vs.	Iraqi	
nationalism,	(translated	into	subject	vs.	
dominant	culture)	powers	to	the	region	
vs	power	to	the	centre	–	federal	vs	
unitary.		
SUNNI-SHIA	 The	killing	of	Ali’s	second	son	Ali	Karbala	
(modern	southern	Iraq)	in	year	680	AD.	(1920-
2003	secular	Sunni	dominance,	2003–present	
sectarian	Shia	dominance)		
The	Sunni	vs.	Shia	struggle	for	power,	
(translated	to	subject	vs.	dominant	
culture)	power	sharing	vs.	power	
concentrating	proposals.		
SECULARISM-
FUNDAMENTALISM	
The	removal	of	the	Ba’ath	regime	(2003)	and	
drafting	the	new	constitution	in	2005	
The	position	of	religion	of	Islam	in	
defining	national	morals	vs.	secularism.	
Islamism	vs.	liberalism	-	Islamic	
provisions	vs.	democratic	principles	(in	
the	case	of	the	constitution)	
 
Reference to the previous three rounds of national elections in Iraq (2005, 2010, 2014) 
makes the above case of decisive dimensions of cleavage stronger. Those elections (see 
chapter 1, section 1.2) clearly show that there is a primacy of ethno religious identity. 
It further showed that, the cleavages in Iraq are concentrated in geographically different 
areas (see chapter 1, table 1.2). It was argued that the cleavages are not malleable and 
resist to change (i.e. integrate and assimilate), moreover, they are bases for political 
																																																						
83 That is to say, the ethno-religious cleavages are cutting across the third cleavage (secularism-
fundamentalism) and thus making it less decisive in political matters. For example, the three main groups 
(Shia, Sunni, Kurd) have different political parties including secular or Islamic parties.  The secular 
political parties of group A would not form alliance with other secular political parties from group B, at 
the expense of their group A’s interests.  
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mobilisation, as all politically significant postictal parties in Iraq are based on ethnic or 
religious cleavages (see, footnote; 6, 7, and 8).  
 
The result of national election in Iraq are of great importance, for understanding not 
only the nature of cleavages but also the form of political socialisation. Elections show 
the degree of political interest of the voters and their general political orientations 
(Campbell and Kahn 1952: Campbell et al. 1960). There is a metaphor that presents the 
electoral process as an ‘echo chamber’ in which ‘the people’s verdict can be no more 
than a selective reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them’ 
(Key 1966: 2). In the case of Iraq, what has been presented to the peoples of different 
groups, have been their causes and their needs and interests, but these have been done 
through political parties from those groups. Therefore, It can be deducted that the party 
candidates, of different groups, in the national election, receive the vote of their 
supporters in proportion to those candidates’ devotion to groups’ cause, and interests. 
Ethno-religious cleavages and the political of socialisation, therefore, are mutually self-
reinforcing.  
 
Bartels (2010) has shown that the theoretical account of voting behaviour offered in 
‘The American Voter’ drew heavily upon the metaphor of a ‘funnel of causality.’ In 
which proximate influences on voting behaviour were subject to explanation, 
considering temporally and causally prior forces. In other words, temporal priority and 
causal priority are inseparably linked, events ‘follow each other in a converging 
sequence of causal chains, moving from the mouth to the stem of the funnel’ (Campbell 
et al. 1960: 25). The main argument contended that ‘funnel of causality’ would allow 
going back in time (through causal chain) in search of other antecedents of proximate 
to vote choice. The changing patterns of voting behaviour, 84 therefore, could be applied 
in a framework to the ‘political translation’ of external non-political factors into 
politically relevant consideration (Campbell et al. 1960: 29-33). That is to say, the 
political attitudes to elections could, in fact, be explained by other causal factors that 
are not necessarily political, such as ethnic sentiment or cultural taste- opening a door 
to incorporate non-political factors in explaining political attitudes.  
																																																						
84	On explanation for changing patterns of voting behaviour (see, Boyd 1972; Miller et al. 1976), with a 
particular focus on elite behaviour and its electoral implications (see, Page 1978). 
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It has been argued, that in some circumstances, the analogy between the 'voting 
decision' and a carefully 'calculated decision' could be incorrect, as for many voters 
political preferences may better be considered analogous to cultural tastes, votes seem 
to be matters of sentiment and disposition rather than ‘reasoned preferences’  (Berelson 
et al. 1954: 310-11). That is particularly the case in Iraq, as members of a group vote in 
a bloc. In Iraq, the ethno-religious identity is a proximate factor,85 other less proximate 
factors include issues of the day, immediate socio-economic concerns, and perceptions 
of politics in the current moment.86  
 
So far, it follows that in the context of Iraq ethno-religious identity is the primary 
proximate factor, which sits at the very outset of causal ordering. Those cleavages are 
bases for political socialisation, the political elite elected through ethnic-based parties, 
are anticipated to fulfil the expectations of their electorate. Therefore, their attitude to 
democracy is filtered through their groups interests (see chapter 5 and chapter 8). On a 
similar vein, they support a form of institutional arrangements that would best serve 
their groups causes and interests (see, chapter 6 and chapter 7).  Those institutional 
arrangements once more could feed into the cleavages, to further strengthen position of 
different groups (see Figure 3.1).   
 
Based on what have been argued so far, it could be argued that the primary source of 
elite’s attitudes to democracy, is in fact the ethno-religious cleavages they represent. 
Moreover, the views of the elite agency on the meaning of democracy are measured by 
assessing their norms and values -by interviews through qualitative descriptive 
narratives. And elite agency’s support for different institutional arrangements are 
measured by surveys, through identifying the directions of their preferences (see 
chapter 4. Section 4.4).  Additionally, as figure 3.1 shows the causal order of the main 
factors that have bearing on the attitude of political elite to democracy. It shows that 
the ethno-religious cleavages are at the outset, followed by political socialisation.   
 
																																																						
85 The ethno-religious identification is incorporated to the model of ‘funnel of causality,’ a factor which 
the model neglects. 
86 It is worthy to note that this assertion is true about the national elections in Iraq, for different groups 
vote in a bloc, in this case ethno-religious identification is the most proximate factor to electoral vote. 
Political parities within different groups, have different platforms for socio-economic concerns and they 
compete for their voters support, as a secondary proximate factor.  
	 112	
FIGURE	3.1	ILLUSTRATES	PROXIMATE	FACTORS	WITH	BEARING	ON	ELITE	ATTITUDE	TO	DEMOCRACY	
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
Main Hypotheses and Findings  
The main hypotheses and findings derived from the implications of the theoretical 
framework are as follows:  
 
The first hypothesis (Chapter 5) states that: There are differences between groups in 
terms of concepts of democracy as an ideal. Shias are more likely to define it as majority 
rule, Sunnis are more likely to define it as power sharing, and Kurds as consensus. 
 
Chapter 5 will show that different groups have different perceptions of democracy, as 
well as having different notions as to what values and goals can be best achieved 
through that democracy. Therefore, democracy as an ideal, in a society divided along 
ethno-religious lines, makes the different political attributes of groups more discernible. 
  
The second hypothesis (Chapter 6) states that: It is more likely that members of groups 
that are smaller than other groups in the system will support a system based on 
consensus. 
 
Chapter 6 will confirm that size of groups matters but, additionally, there are other 
factors that determine a group’s support for either a consensus or a majoritarian system, 
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including legacy, history and different ethno-sectarian causes. A further examination 
of the views and preferences of the Iraqi political elite for two formal institutions, 
federalism and constitution, is also undertaken. 
 
Chapters 7 will show that support for a specific type of federalism is key to building 
democracy, but there are interesting assumptions that only a federalism that guarantees 
the segmental autonomy of each group will keep the country from falling apart. That 
is, a federal system with segmental autonomy is absolutely necessary but this form of 
federalism is hard to achieve in the face of realities in Iraq.  
 
Chapter 8 will show that the constitution is key, and even if constitutional challenges 
are addressed satisfactorily, then there is the likelihood that the interpretation of the 
constitution will remain problematic. Iraq’s constitutions remain a challenge to the 
feasibility of democracy in the long term.  	
Chapter 9 will present, and also revise, the key assumptions derived from the main 
hypotheses tested in the previous chapters, revisiting the model and why it is a relevant 
issue. The key nature of this model in answering the main research question is 
explained. The model will demonstrate that if political elites can rise above ethno-
sectarian differences then it is more likely that a consensus system will be established. 
However, the issue of capacity or will to rise above ethnic or religious background 
remains problematic. Through testing the main hypotheses, the model also leads to the 
conclusion that if democracy is to be embedded satisfactorily as a system to be 
practised, then the political elites must reach agreement between the key players on 
establishing a consensus democratic system coupled with consociational, less formal, 
agreements. That is to conclude, consensualism is a means to resolving political conflict 
among different groups, as well as being a desirable goal in its own right.  
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FIGURE	3.2	DIAGRAM	SHOWS	THE	STRUCTURE	OF	THE	EMPIRICAL	CHAPTERS	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework derived from the main research 
question, which asks how the Iraqi political elite view democracy. The argument has 
been put forward that during transition, in divided societies, the elite matter for two 
main reasons; they are legitimate players acting on behalf of their groups, and they are 
in a position to exercise their influence over decisions that affect the overall process of 
building democratic institutions. The approach of this thesis, however, is a mixture of 
institutional and elitist, arguing that while institutions matter, the importance of the 
political elite is central to Iraq’s democracy building.  
 
The chapter articulated the theoretical framework with respect to two particulars, the 
political institutions and the political elite. It categorised institutions as formal, less 
formal or informal, and defined the political elite as the members of Iraq’s apparatus of 
rule, members of formal institutions. Elite theory of democracy was used to highlight 
the role of elites and institutions in relation to the feasibility of democracy in a deeply 
divided society, paying particular attention to the two elements of elites and institutions. 
The theoretical framework, in turn, provided a method to assess the views and the 
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preferences of the political elite, by examining their values, definitions of, and support 
for, democracy. 
 
The main hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were, first, it is likely 
there are differences between groups with regard to conceptions of democracy as an 
ideal. Second, it is more likely Shias define it as majority rule, while Sunnis will define 
it as power sharing, and Kurds as consensus. Third, it is more likely that the members 
of a group will support a consensus system the smaller it is in relation to other groups 
involved. The next chapter will explain the methodology of the thesis and the research 
methods used to implement the theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
Research Design and Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Research design is the plan to conduct research that involves the intersection of a 
philosophical worldview, a strategy of inquiry, and research methods (Creswell 2009: 
5). Pragmatism is a particular paradigm that provides a rationale for mixed methods 
research and is the philosophical worldview of this thesis. Triangulation is a strategy 
that approaches a research question from multiple angles to cross validate findings and 
is the strategy of inquiry used in this thesis. The research method is mixed and combines 
qualitative and quantitative method in a distinctive ‘mixed methods’ inquiry (Rorty and 
Murphy 1990; Patton 1990; and Cherryholmes 1992; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; 
Bryman 2006; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Greene 2005; 2007). Different terms 
have been used to denote this approach, including mixed methodology, multimethod, 
and/or qualitative and quantitative methods. ‘Mixed methods’ is used in this work, 
following other recent research (Creswell 2009; Bryman 2006; Tashakkori and Teddlie 
2003).  
 
This chapter provides the overall research design in relation to the theoretical 
framework developed in the previous chapter. In Chapter 3, Dahl’s (1998) model on 
understanding democracy as an ideal and an actual was employed. It was argued that 
to define democracy as an ideal involves questions such as, ‘what is democracy?’ In 
this study, the questions include, ‘what do political elites mean by democracy?’ and 
‘why do they favour it?’ To define democracy in reality involves identifying the 
political institutions and conditions that such institutions require in order to identify the 
preferences of a political elite for institutions, and how they should operate (i.e. political 
system, federalism and constitution). Taking the theoretical framework and hypothesis 
into consideration, mixed methods design is the appropriate tool to collect relevant data 
and conduct effective analysis. To reveal what political elites mean by democracy, and 
how they define it, elite interviews are the appropriate tool. To assess their preferences 
for political institutions (see Chapter 3, sections 2.2 and 2.3) and examine their support 
for different institutional arrangements, surveys are the most suitable device.  
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The employment of mixed methods in this thesis, in turn, informs the research design. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the design of this research, comprising the intersection of its 
philosophical worldview, its strategies of inquiry, and the research methods used.87 
Some limitations and potential weaknesses in the research design are identified and 
ethical issues are addressed before a conclusion is drawn.  
 
 
FIGURE	4.1:	THE	RESEARCH	DESIGN		
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
87 The design of the research owes much to Creswell 2009: 5.  
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4.2 Philosophical worldview 
Pragmatism as a Philosophy to Social inquiry  
Scientific inquiry has become manifest in two traditions; discovering facts and, 
constructing theories. Georg Henrik von Wright (1971) distinguishes the two main 
traditions as Aristotelian (i.e. teleological) and Galilean (i.e. causal). He argues that 
these two traditions have evolved separately with regards to methodology. First, 
positivism as the philosophy of science, represented by August Comte and John Stuart 
Mill, relies on scientific ‘explanation’ regarding causal relations. Second, a reaction 
against positivism, the anti-positivist philosophy, represented by Max Webber and 
Wilhelm Dilthey, attacked the positivist view of explanation, emphasising 
‘understanding’ (von Wright 1971: 4-7).  
 
Positivism,88 assumes there are observable political events, actors and structures about 
which one could make ‘reasoned, informed and intelligent, analytical statements’ 
(Landman 2000: xvii). Therefore, in practical terms, ‘every explanation, be it casual or 
teleological can further our understating of things;’ however, ‘understanding’ is also 
connected with ‘intentionality’ in a way ‘explanation’ is not (von Wright 1971: 6). It is 
this psychological ring of intentionality that the anti-positivists (e.g. interpretivists, 
constructivists) emphasis; that is, human actors, attach personal meanings to their 
actions - i.e. not only observing the act but also the meaning attached to it helps us 
understand it in each social context (see, Berger and Luekmann 1980; Lincoln and Guba 
1985; Schwandt 2007; Crotty 2007; Neuman 2013).   
 
The debate most fundamentally concerns different stances on how the social world 
works. Karl Popper (1972) presents a continuum stretching from the most irregular, 
disorderly, and unpredictable ‘clouds’ on one end, to the most regular, orderly, and 
predictable ‘clocks’ on the other. Deducing from observations of natural phenomena 
that deterministic laws govern all nature, Popper makes the statement that ‘all clouds 
are clocks, even the most cloudy of clouds’ (Popper 1972: 210). Views such as 
Popper’s, who take the social world as ‘clock like,’ measurable and predictable (known 
as ‘behavioural’), has become a dominant tradition in political science. Subsequently, 
																																																						
88 Also, positivism has a deterministic view and claims that causes determine outcomes; therefore, it 
seeks explanation and theory verification (see, e.g. Smith 2003; Burbules and Phillips 2000). 
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political science has tended to treat political events as natural phenomena - using similar 
explanatory logic as found in natural sciences. Nevertheless, there have been concerns 
about the ‘applicability to human subject matters of a strategy used in hard science’ 
(see, Almond and Genco 1977). It has been argued that understanding political reality 
requires not only examining the determinate aspect but also the creative and adaptive - 
the human property - aspect too (Almond and Genco 1977: 497). Therefore, the social 
disciplines, to progress scientifically, require ‘their own philosophy of science based 
on explanatory strategies, possibilities, and obligations appropriate to human and social 
reality’ (ibid: 522). 89 
 
The above argument has two clear implications; firstly, it is an argument against the 
imposition of the laws of hard sciences on the social sciences. Secondly, it is also a call 
for a coherent philosophy that combines the two traditions of positivism and 
interpretivism - a characteristic peculiar to the social sciences. It is my view that 
pragmatism provides such a peculiar philosophical worldview and makes its 
ontological stance clear about ‘how the world works.’ Here I mainly rely on the 
philosophy of John Dewey on Pragmatism (1920; 1925; 1931; 1938; 1941). Dewey’s 
philosophy on the nature of knowledge cartels and the dualism of mind and matter 
(Dewey 1931). His philosophy has implications for relating the two philosophical 
paradigms (i.e. positivism and interpretivism), the distinction between which has been 
the main topic in philosophy of knowledge in social research (see, Guba & Lincoln 
1994; Denzin & Lincoln 2005).  
	
To Dewey (1920; 1925) these two views; a) to think that the world exists apart of our 
conception of it (i.e. positivism); b) to think that the world is a product of our conception 
of it (i.e. interpretivism), are equally valid assertions about the substance of human 
experience. In other words, the world in which we live constrains our experiences, and, 
our interpretations of such experiences confine our understanding of the world. Thus, 
pragmatism puts a heavy emphasis on human experience in forming an ontological 
																																																						
89 The position of this thesis on the big question of ‘how the world works’, is akin to Almond and 
Genco’s, the world is a sum of observable facts the study of which should be done through scientific 
methods correspondent to the nature of the social sciences. It acknowledges that the world works as 
‘clock like,’ but leaves room for intentionality (the human element) – clouds and clocks are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather complementary. The view of this thesis is further clarified in the following 
discussion, as it accepts pragmatism as the philosophical stand point for social research.  
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foundation to arrive at ‘warranted assertions’ about social events. In so doing, it draws 
on the elements of the two different traditions for arriving at knowledge in social 
sciences90 –i.e. positivism and interpretivism or constructivism (see, figure 4.2).  
 
For Dewey (1920), an experience is built around two inseparable parts, the sources of 
beliefs and the meanings of actions. That is, experiences create meaning by bringing 
beliefs and actions in contact with each other; therefore, ‘pragmatism concentrates on 
beliefs that are more directly connected to actions’ (Morgan 2014: 1051). Moreover, 
pragmatism, as ‘a doctrine of meaning’ holds that ‘the meaning of an event cannot be 
given in advance of experience’ (Denzin 2012: 81). Pragmatism highlights the 
significance of linking meanings and actions in the process of inquiry that is central to 
the search for knowledge (see; Dewey 1941). To Dewey, ‘warranted assertions’ are 
outcomes of inquiry, a process in which knowing and doing are inseparable; knowledge 
is the result of meaning implied in practice. This corresponds to the design of this thesis 
and the central research question – what do political elites mean by democracy? And 
what are their different preferences regarding institutional arrangements?  The elites’ 
attitudes towards democracy constitutes what they mean by democracy, in the context 
of Iraq. This connection between attitude and meaning is central to pragmatism as a 
philosophy to social research. 
	
FIGURE	4.2:	PRAGMATISM	AS	THE	PHILOSOHPY	OF	SOCIAL	INQUIRY		
 
																																																						
90	The key concept in Dewey’s pragmatism is ‘inquiry’ (see, Morgan 2014), he believes that experiences 
involve a process of interpretation (see; Dewey 1920). Interpretation makes inquiry a self-aware 
decision-making about the observable circumstances. That is, inquiry is the connection between 
observable facts, and interpretation of such facts, hence, it is bridging the two philosophical standpoints 
of positivism and interpretivism, while acknowledging the significance of both in the process of 
generating warranted assertions (i.e. knowledge).   
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There have been efforts to make pragmatism a coherent philosophy of social research 
(Morgan 2014; Goldkuhl and Cronholm 2010; Goldkuhl 2008; Goldkuhl 2005; 
Gronholm and GoldKuhl 2004). Goldkuhl (2008) calls for a ‘full pragmatism’ in 
conducting social research, that includes three forms; functional, referential and 
methodological. Functional pragmatism holds that knowledge should be useful for 
action (useful and applicable); referential pragmatism focuses on knowledge about 
action (explanatory); methodological pragmatism indicates that we learn about the 
world through actions and that knowledge is based on actions (experience and 
interpretation) (Goldkuhl 2008: 2). The nature of this thesis relates to the three forms 
of pragmatism, the warranted assertions that this thesis will arrive at are aimed to be 
both useful and applicable (knowledge for action). It is explanatory in a sense; through 
surveys, it explains the attitude of the elite to different institutional arrangement 
(knowledge about action).  It also holds that the warranted assertions of this thesis are 
based on observing the attitude of the political elites towards democracy (knowledge 
through action).  
 
The appropriateness of the research design is justified by the philosophical stance taken 
in this thesis in relation to acquiring knowledge and its interpretation (Guba 1990; 
Mertens 2005; Crotty 2007).  Pragmatism is the philosophical worldview of this thesis 
–in its methodological sense. That is, pragmatism presents a paradigm that allows the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. It is a form of methodological 
pluralism that advocates for what works best in a particular research context (Jupp 
2006: 179-180). It utilizes both positivist and interpretivist worldviews, opening the 
door to multiple methods of data collection and analysis (Gray 2009: 37; Johnson and 
Onweugbuzie 2004). The appropriateness of pragmatism in approaching the main 
research question lies in the fact that it allows the use of different available methods to 
examine views of the political elite on democracy and measure their preferences for 
formal institutional arrangements.  
4.3 Strategy of inquiry 
Mixed Methods Strategy  
Research methods in the social sciences can be divided into two traditions: quantitative 
and qualitative (see, e.g. Ragin 1989; Tarrow et al. 1995; Mahoney and Goertz 2006). 
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Prominent scholars have argued that the difference between the two traditions should 
not be exaggerated (Denzin 1978; Marsh and Stoker 2002; Hammersley 1992). Alan 
Bryman (2012: 633-4) mentions different ways by which qualitative and quantitative 
research can be combined, including triangulation, completeness, asking different 
questions, contextuality and diversity of views. This thesis uses those techniques to 
achieve greater reliability and validity, enhance research credibility, and to ensure the 
most comprehensive account of Iraq’s politics possible could be rendered. The main 
research question is deconstructed into two sub questions; ‘What do political elites 
mean by democracy?’ and ‘What are their preferences for different institutional 
arrangements?’ The use of qualitative research is justified as it enables a contextual 
understanding of democracy, federalism and the Iraqi constitution when combined with 
external data gained through surveys.  
   
This thesis seeks to understand what the political elite mean by democracy 
(interpretivist), as well as try to explain the support for different institutional 
arrangements among its members (positivist). It combines elements of both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches; it uses words and numbers, open ended questions in 
qualitative interviews and closed questions in quantitative surveys. Using this mixed 
methods approach ensures that the research outcome has a strength which ‘is greater 
than either quantitative and qualitative research’ (Creswell and Plano 2011). Table 4.1 
shows the employment of quantitative and qualitative methods in forming a mixed 
methods approach.  
TABLE	4.1	MUTUAL	USAGE	OF	QUANTITATIVE	AND	QUALITATIVE	METHODS	
RESEARCH	CRITERIA		 COMBINED	RESEARCH	METHODS	
Two	types	of	research	question		 Asking	qualitative	and	qualitative	questions	
The	way	questions	are	developed		 Pre-planned	(quantitative)	participatory	
(qualitative)	
Two	types	of	sampling	procedure		 Probability	and	purposive	
Two	types	of	data	collection		 Elite	survey	and	elite	interview	
Two	types	of	data	analysis	 Numerical	and	textual	or	Statistical	and	textual	
Two	types	of	conclusions		 Objective	results	and	subjective	interpretations	
Source:	Tashakkori	and	Creswell	(2006:	3-7)			
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Concurrent Triangulation Design  
As Table 4.1 shows, the concurrent triangulation design helps to analyse and compare 
results from the first two empirical chapters. Chapter 5 records in depth interviews and 
examines the different concepts of democratic ideals among the Iraqi political elite. The 
data is analysed using the strategies for qualitative analysis (Strauss 1987; Corbin and 
Strauss 2008: 65) such as thematic analysis, text analysis and constant comparison. 
Chapter 6 provides extended surveys on elite support for formal political institutions. 
The data is analysed using numerical analysis to show the relationship between two 
variables, group size and support for consensus democracy. The results of the two 
chapters are then compared. The concurrent triangulation design cross tests the findings 
on the meaning and support for democracy. It interprets the quantitative findings of 
Chapter 6 in light of the qualitative findings of Chapter 5. For instance, identifying the 
way the Shia political elite define democracy (Chapter 5) helps understand their support 
for some political institutions and not others (Chapter 6).  
 
TABLE	4.2	CONCURRENT	TRIANGULATION	DESIGN 
QUALITATIVE		 	 QUANTITATIVE	
CHAPTER	5	
Elite	interviews			
What	does	the	elite	mean	by	
democracy?	
	 CHAPTER	6	
Elite	survey		
What	type	of	democracy	does	the	
elite	support?	
	 	 	
QUAL.	Data	Analysis	
Democracy	through	divergent	
elite	perspectives.		
	 QUAN.	Data	Analysis	
Support	for	types	of	democracy	
through	divergent	perspectives.	
	 Data	Results	Compared		 	
 
Concurrent Embedded Design  
Table 4.3 illustrates the concurrent embedded design in Chapters 7 and 8. The results 
in both chapters could be embedded because they are both formal democratic 
institutions and the participants of both are the political elite. Chapter 7 discusses 
federalism and begins with the larger number findings, quantitative elite surveys (both 
within and across different groups), before narrowing the focus to analyse elite views 
expressed in interviews to show what is understood by federalism. The qualitative data 
is embedded in the quantitative data and the synthesis of both types of findings show 
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what particular types of federalism attract support, as well as how federalism is more 
likely to be operationalized in Iraq. Chapter 8 starts with in depth interviews on the 
constitution and then examines the data from the surveys on support for a consensus 
constitution. The quantitative findings are embedded in the qualitative interpretations.  
  
 
TABLE	4.3	CONCURRENT	EMBEDDED	DESIGN	
QUANTITATIVE	 	 QUALITATIVE	
CHAPTER	7	
Qualitative	data	(interviews)	is	
embedded	in	quantitative	data,	
(survey)	the	broad	groups’	
perspectives	on	federalism	and	
the	elites'	views	on	federalism.		
	 CHAPTER	8	
Quantitative	date	(survey)	is	
embedded	in	qualitative	data	
(in	depth	interviews),	the	Iraqi	
constitution	discussed	with	the	
elite	and	then	the	views	of	a	
broader	number	of	elite	is	
addressed.	
	 	 	
Analysis	of	findings		
What	type	of	federalism	works	
best	in	Iraq	and	how	federalism	
should	be	operationalised.	
	 Analysis	for	findings		
How	to	get	the	constitution	
right	and	what	are	the	areas	
that	need	to	be	amended	if	
necessity	arose.		
 
 
4.4 Research Methods 
Mixed Methods 
The theoretical framework, together with the model of the hypothesis, is congruent with 
the mixed methods research design. The theoretical framework showed that to answer 
the main research question, two forms of data were required: democracy as ideal 
(qualitative), and democracy as actual (quantitative). Philosophically, the mixed 
methods approach91 adopts a pragmatic method, based on a view that it is both socially 
constructed and based upon the reality of the world (Johnson et al 2007; Gary 2009). 
That is also the philosophical stance of this thesis, which holds that, at the elite level, 
knowledge of Iraq’s political system can be gained through examining political elites’ 
conceptions of democracy and analysis of their preferences for particular political 
																																																						
91 It is worth mentioning that the mixed methods have been regarded as an effective strategy for 
conducting comparative research (see, Liebermann 2005). 
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institutions. This thesis has collected data by employing the two methods of interviews 
and surveys of Iraqi political elites.   
Interviews with Elites  
Extensive literature on interviewing elites (Dexter 1970; Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987; 
Rubin and Rubin 2012; Mosley 2013) confirms the significance of this method in 
collecting qualitative data, in particular, regarding political issues (Pierce 2008: 119). 
Chapter 3 identified elites as exercising a disproportionately high influence on the 
outcome of events. It has been argued that the majority of work by political scientists 
is concerned with the study of decision makers with a key tool being elite interviewing 
(Burnham et al. 2004: 205). Beth Leech suggested that in elite interviewing, it is 
appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic in hand, and this approach 
has been followed in this research (2002: 663).   
 
Interviewing political elites, therefore, is a key to obtaining information on political 
issues. Oliver Halperin and Sandra Heath contend that ‘elite interviews can enable a 
researcher to make inferences about the beliefs or actions of a wider population of 
political elite’ (Halperin and Heath 2012: 273). Although elite interviewing, in specific 
cases, could be used exclusively to determine a political elite’s views on democracy or 
related topics, this approach has been criticised as ‘unrepresentative and atypical’ 
(Devine 2005: 141). Notwithstanding that criticism, nevertheless, it is not binding in 
the context of the subjects explored in this thesis in the context of Iraq, in particular 
democracy, federalism and the constitution. These are controversial issues on which 
political elites tend to express views that are representative rather than unrepresentative 
of their groups’ interpretations.  
 
The strength of elite interviewing is dependent on three factors: the socio-political 
context, the questions asked, and the position of participants. In this thesis, all of those 
factors contribute to the strength of elite interviewing. Iraq is divided along ethno-
religious lines and, as a whole, is in transition. The Iraqi political elites, representing 
different groups, propound what they truly believe in relation to controversial issues 
would be in the best interests of their faction. The questions asked concern issues of 
great importance in shaping Iraq’s politics in addition to democracy. The elite that were 
interviewed all held significant political positions, and as representatives of their groups 
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had little option other than to express their group’s stance. By targeting different 
political leaders among the Shias, Sunnis and Kurds (see Appendix A), the general 
political patterns among these groups with regards controversial issues could be 
discerned.  
 
Two main rounds of elite interviews were undertaken in Iraq, one in July 2011 and 
another in September-October, 2012 (with a smaller number carried out up to 
December 2013). During the first interview, six questions were asked pertaining to the 
definition of democracy and obstacles to building democracy (see Appendix B). The 
participants were key members of the political elite in Iraq including: the President of 
the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Head of the House of Representatives, the Head 
of the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament, the Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, other key 
political party leaders in Iraq and Kurdistan, and 14 Iraqi government ministers.  
 
Three different types of interview questions were employed concentrating on 
challenges to building democracy, federalism and the federal structure in Iraq from July 
2011 to December 2013 and the Iraqi constitution. The questions on federalism were 
put during the same interviews that covered democracy building. Those interviewed 
included: the President, Jalal Talabani and the current President, Fuad Masoum, the 
former Vice President, Tariq al Hashimi, the former Prime Minister, Ibrahim al Jaffari, 
the former Speaker of Parliament, Ayyad Samarai and the current Speaker of 
Parliament, Salim al Jaburi, the Iraqi Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani and two 
consecutive Prime Ministers of the Kurdistan region, Barham Salih and Nechirvan 
Barzani. In addition, 14 other ministers from the Iraqi Council of Ministers were 
interviewed. All those interviewed on the constitution were members of the Iraqi 
constitution drafting committee: 16 members, including the chairman of the committee, 
Humam Hamoody, out of 69 members (See Appendix C).  
 
With the exception of two interviews, all the interviews were conducted inside Iraq, in 
Baghdad, Basra, Erbil and Sulaimania, with the majority in Baghdad, specifically in the 
House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers building (for full list of 
interviewees, see Appendix A).  
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All the interviews on democracy, apart from one, were conducted in person, in either 
Arabic or Kurdish, with the exception of one or two, which were in English. Interviews 
lasted between 45 to 60 minutes and were recorded, translated and transcribed. Only 
one response was via email following a meeting and discussion. Some responses were 
in writing following meetings and discussion with the participant as some participants 
preferred to respond in that way. The interviews on the Iraqi constitution were a 
combination of in person discussions and written replies. The constitution committee 
members were questioned together and, as the issues were highly legalistic, preferred 
to provide lengthy written responses in Arabic and Kurdish languages, which were then 
translated (see Appendix B). Irrespective of the medium of response, all those 
interviewed were met in person to ensure that there was no misunderstanding of the 
questions being asked. Questions were printed out in the appropriate language so that 
if time ran out for oral reply, the respondent could address the issues later and respond 
in writing.  
  
Elite Surveys  
The surveys were in two languages, Arabic and English, as almost all the Kurdish 
political elite in the Iraqi House of Representatives or the Iraqi Council of Ministers 
speak Arabic rendering a Kurdish version of the questions unnecessary. The surveys 
were carried out at the same time as the interviews, in the same locations. Initially, two 
rounds of surveys, on support for federalism and different democratic systems, were 
carried out during a visit to Baghdad in July 2011. In September-October 2012, a 
second round was conducted in which the same survey was revisited, together with two 
other surveys, one on political support for federalism and the other on the Iraqi 
constitution, the latter only for members of the Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee.  
 
The survey on formal political institutions was based on Lijphart’s 1999 conceptual 
map on different institutional arrangements. The respondents had the option to choose 
between the two contrasting types of democratic system to reveal what type of 
institutional arrangements they would prefer (See Appendix D). Although Lijphart’s 
conceptual map is a starting point, it is not a blue print or a model for Iraq’s political 
system. Arend Lijphart (1999) has defined majoritarian democracies by ten 
characteristics and has contrasted them with consensus democracies, making it clear 
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that political systems may fall on a scale or spectrum between majoritarian to 
consensus. The ten characteristics that he has identified for majoritarian and consensus 
models serve as a point of reference against which a political system can be measured: 
in the case of this thesis, to measure the desirability of a particular political system to 
the Iraqi political elite.  
 
The questionnaire was composed of ten questions that included all the characteristics 
of majoritarian and consensus democracies. The first option in each question was a 
majoritarian element and the second option a consensus element. This survey, however, 
does not restrict choice to a consensual model or a majoritarian model but rather gives 
the opportunity to choose between those formal political institutions that form either 
model, or choose a different model that combines elements of both. If, for example, a 
respondent chooses 7 elements of consensus and 3 elements of majoritarian, the 
desirability is measured as 70 percent consensus. This applies to members of a group 
to denote a certain percentage of a particular group support or desire for a specific 
institutional arrangement. There were 100 participants in this sample divided 
proportionately between groups based on their percentage of seats in the Iraqi House of 
Representatives, 52 Shia, 28 Sunni, 18 Kurds and 1 each from the Christian and 
Turkmen communities (see Section 5). 
 
The second survey was on federalism in Iraq and was divided those in favour of, and 
those against, a federal system (see Appendix E). The ratio of participants was as above 
but were not the same individuals. The survey was carried out primarily in the Iraqi 
House of Representatives in Baghdad, and the Iraqi Council of Ministers offices. All 
the top decision makers that were interviewed on democracy and federalism also 
participated in the two separate surveys on federalism in Iraq and different institutional 
arrangements.  
 
In the survey on the constitution, each question had 3 elements and, unlike the previous 
surveys, had to be treated differently. For example, question three, on the established 
provisions of Islam, has three components: 1. compatibility with democratic principles; 
2. incompatibility with democratic principles; and 3. undecided (see Appendix F). 35 
out of the 69 Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee participated, comprising of 16 Shia, 
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8 Sunni, 8 Kurd and 3 from other minorities. The surveys were distributed in the Iraqi 
House of Representatives and other Iraqi cities where some members of Constitution 
Drafting Committee were located. For the surveys on political institutions and 
federalism, the questionnaires were distributed during breaks in sessions of the House 
of Representatives. This necessarily involved access to the Iraqi House of 
Representative (IHR), contact with the Iraqi IHR and other politically significant 
political elites in Iraq. 
 
4.5 Setting and Sampling 
Setting  
The demographic profile of Iraq is such that each ethnic group or sect inhabits a 
different part of the country. Kurds are located in the 4-5 provinces of the North East, 
Sunnis are predominant in the 5-6 provinces of the Middle, and the West, while Shia 
are the majority in the 7-8 provinces of the South and South East. Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the numerical size of all the 18 provinces represented in parliament and, based on the 
2010 elections, displays the number of each ethnic or religious group in different 
colours in each. 
FIGURE	4.3:	THE	ETHNO-RELIGIOUS	DISTRIBUTION	OF	MEMBERS	OF	PARLIAMENT	BY	PROVINCE.	
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In the Iraqi 2010-2014 and 2014-2018 parliaments, the Shia composed 52 percent of 
the total population, Sunnis 28 percent and Kurds 18 percent. Figure 5 illustrates the 
demography of each province represented in the Iraqi House of Representatives in the 
Iraqi parliamentary elections of 2010, and the parliamentary members of each province 
based on ethnic or religious background. The data was accessed in February 2014. In 
addition to the numbers shown in figure 5, others from the minorities include; 5 
Christians,1 Baghdad, 1 Erbil, 1 Ninawa, 1 Dhuk, 1 Kirkuk; 1 Yazidi, 1 Shabak from 
Ninawa, and 1 Sabea from Bagdhad, a total of 8 seats based on a quota system. This 
data was helpful in setting and conducting the surveys.  
  
Changes in the number of the seats allocated to each province alters the numerical 
strength of a certain ethno-religious group. Prior to the 2010 elections, the Iraqi 
parliament passed a law, adding seats to each province in a complicated process that 
ultimately favoured the Shia. In total, 77 seats were added affecting all 18 provinces. 
The Shia received 45 seats, the Sunni 22 and the Kurds 10. Although the Shia actually 
formed 48 percent of parliament based on 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections, the 
percentage increase in seats was 58, the Sunnis increase of 22 actually formed 31 
percent of the parliament, and the Kurd’s percentage increase was 13, translating to 21 
percent of the parliament. This represented an overall 10 per cent increase in Shia seats 
even before holding the elections, enabling them to claim a majority in parliament in 
2010. By identifying who is Sunni and who is Shia among the Arab representatives, it 
becomes clear that the additional seats and the changes to the numbers of the main 
groups had resulted in a clear advantage to the Shia. The following pie charts illustrate 
this point.   
 
Sampling 
This research takes the numerical strength of each group in the Iraqi parliament based 
on the 2010 elections, to devise a sample representing the Iraqi political elites’ 
preference for either consensus or majoritarian democracies. The sample was derived 
from the total number of parliament Members and the number for each group in the 
years 2010-2014. This representative choice enhances the validity and the reliability of 
this research. Table 4.4 indicates the base for the sampling process.  
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Table 4.4 shows the total number of Iraqi parliament members from each group. As the 
Shia represent 52 percent of the parliament, the number of Shia participants in this 
research is 52, the Sunni percentage is reflected by 28 respondents, and there are 18 
respondents, mirroring the percentage held by the Kurds. The other minorities account 
for only 2 percent, therefore, they will have two respondents, one Christian and one 
Turkmen. However, the sampling used is Random Sampling (Burnham et al. 2004: 86-
7), the purpose being to use a technical and rigid procedure to eliminate bias in choosing 
respondents. To improve the accuracy of simple random sampling ‘stratified random 
sampling’ has been used, as relevant information about the members of the Iraqi 
political elite and their backgrounds is available. Additionally, to improve ‘systematic 
random sampling’, the Shia have 52 respondents in both surveys but include those 
holding divergent views such as the political factions affiliated to either Muqtada Sadr, 
Abdul Aziz al Hakim or Ayatullah Ali Sistani. This principle has also been applied to 
Kurds and Sunnis.    
 
The questionnaires on support for different institutional arrangements and federalism 
were distributed in the Iraqi House of Representatives and the Iraqi Council of 
Ministers. Each questionnaire surveyed 31 percent of the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives (100 out of 325). The Iraqi Constitution Article 49 states that the 
Council of Representatives consists of a number of members, based on a ratio of one 
seat per 100,000 Iraqis representing the entire Iraqi people. The 100 respondents were 
sampled accordingly. With the Shia composing 52 percent of the parliament, this 
equates to 52 percent of the entire population. Therefore, out of the 100 participants the 
52 respondents among the Shia is representative sample of the Shias in parliament at a 
ratio of 1: 3.19 and this sample is representative of the Iraqi Shia population at a ratio 
	 TABLE	4.4	IRAQI	PARLIAMENTARY	ELECTIONS,	2010	AFTER	77	SEATS	ADDED		 	 	
GROUPS	 Shia	 Sunni	 Kurd	 Minorities	 Compensatory	 TOTAL	
NO	OF	SEATS	 166	 87	 57	 8	 7	 325	
PERCENTAGE		 52%	 28%	 18%	 2%	 2%	 100%	
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1: 319, 230. For the Sunnis, with 28 respondents, this sample is representative of the 
Sunnis in parliament at a ratio of 1: 311, and of the entire Sunni population in Iraq at a 
ratio of 1: 310,714. Kurds have 18 respondents and this sample is representative of 
Kurdish Iraqi Parliament members at a ratio of 1: 3.17 and of the Kurdish population 
in Iraq at a ratio of 1: 316,666. The same equation applies to the two respondents of 
other minorities.  
 
For the survey on support for different institutional arrangements, 25 percent of the 
Iraqi Council of Ministers, 12 ministers out of 31 and 15 additional Ministers of the 
State, including Iraq’s current and former Presidents, were all involved. The 
respondents in each of the surveys originally totalled  more than 200 but through a 
process of elimination this number was reduced by half. A response was dismissed 
when it was incomplete, fortunately a rare occurrence, or because a group had exceeded 
allocation. For example, there were 35 Kurdish respondents, but only 18 of these were 
selected at random, to ensure a representative sample.  
 
4.6 Limits of the Research Design  
So far this chapter has demonstrated the appropriateness of the research design for 
answering the main research question and test the main hypothesis. Nonetheless, any 
weakness applicable to a mixed methods design could potentially be a weakness in this 
research and needs to be addressed. 
 
Technical Limitations   
There are there potential weaknesses in terms of operational and technical aspects (see 
Gary 2009; Krahn et al. 1995). In depth interviews combined with quantitative data 
increases the time required for the research; the synthesis of findings and interpretations 
from two approaches with lack of integration can be problematic; and, finally, at times 
inconsistent findings can emerge that add more complexity than validity.  
 
The collection and analysis of vast amounts of qualitative and quantitative data did 
require considerable time. However, the time was necessary to ensure the highest 
possible levels off credibility were achieved.  
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In order to meet the challenge posed by of lack of integration in the analysis of the 
findings, the chapters that are similar in content are analysed together (see Table 4.2 
and 4.3). Another factor that helps synthesise both qualitative and quantitative data is 
the similarity of the questions, the respondents, and the level of analysis. Chapters 5 
and 6 deal with democracy (ideal and actual), while Chapters 7 and 8 both deal with 
formal institutions. The participants in all chapters are the political elite and the level 
of analysis is at the individual level, helping compare and triangulate the findings of 
each of the two chapters taken together.  
 
The third concern that the diversity of the contents of data could add more complexity 
is valid. However, on the other hand, diversity of data could also be seen to improve 
reliability. In this research, complexity issues have been reduced by the simplicity of 
the research design. In addition, the themes explored to answer the main research 
question and test the hypotheses are kept concise.  Each chapter tests only one single 
hypothesis, and both the themes of analysis and the variables are clear.   
 
Methodological Concerns  
There is a view that mixed methods is another version of positivism, locating itself 
within the thinking of positivism because it rarely reflects the constructionist or 
subjectivist views of the world (Giddings 2006: 198). That is a view firmly rejected in 
this thesis. In addition to using surveys and quantitative measures, this thesis also pays 
attention to qualitative methods that focus on meaning, symbolism and further the 
norms and the values of the political elite. The mixed methods approach offers the ‘best 
of both worlds’ and, as Jennifer Greene (2005: 275) has put it, mixed methods inquiry 
offers ‘understanding more defensibly, more comprehensively, more insightfully and 
understanding with greater value consciousness and with greater diversity of values.’ 
 
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
The Role of the Researcher  
The field of political science has an established literature on the status of the researcher 
as an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ and the effect on conducting fieldwork and academic 
	 134	
research (see; e.g. Adler and Adler 1987; Horowitz 1986; Krieger 1985). The insider-
outsider divide has been categorised in terms of third party positions such as an explicit 
outsider and ‘an apparent insider’ (Carling et al. 2014). In the context of Iraq, such 
categorisation could be translated as ethnicity, language, political affiliation, religion 
and religious sect and names. An outsider might not have access to the extensive 
background information on the different groups but, nevertheless, could treat groups 
objectively without bias. An insider might have extensive knowledge and experience 
of the context but the potential to be inclined to the group of which he is a member 
remains a challenge to the objectivity of research.  
 
In this case, in this thesis, there is a combination of both outsider, as a researcher from 
the University of Warwick, and insider as a Kurdish Iraqi Sunni Muslim. One of the 
potential drawbacks is previous knowledge of those participating in the interviews and 
personal attitudes towards the issues under examination. The challenge was to remain 
objective, and gain the participants’ acceptance as an unbiased outsider. By developing 
the sampling method for all groups to be presented in this study according to their 
numerical strength, this challenge was dealt with satisfactorily. During the interviews, 
all groups were treated equally in terms of allocation of time. 
 
The researcher had the advantage of sharing ethnicity with the Kurds, religious sect 
with the Sunnis   and with the Shia, the fact that the researcher’s middle name was Ali, 
all helped to engender trust and smooth communication.92 As an insider, it is crucial to 
be aware of personal bias, and attempts have been made to replace it with an all-
inclusive attitude towards the Iraqi political elite representing different groups.  
 
In fieldwork, language remains one of the most important tools. All contact with the 
Arab political elites was in Arabic and it was particularly important that Arabic words 
were used that captured the essence of English academic terminology and concepts. 
																																																						
92 The name ‘Ali’ played an important role in helping to build connections with the Shia political elite. 
Had the name being Omar, this would have been a great barrier to even the consideration of answering 
many of the questions asked.Those two names are religiously sensitive in Iraq, especially in Baghdad; 
the Shia favour the name Ali as it is the name of a cousin of the Prophet (his rightful successor), and they 
dislike the name Omar. Omar, the second Khalifa according to Shia narrative, had prevented Ali’s 
immediate succession after the Prophet – the Sunnis reject this. One of the high official Sunni political 
elite informed me that in 2013 in Baghdad alone, 384 people were assassinated just because of their 
names (Omar) and he had the list documented.  
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This was also the case in relation to the Kurdish language and the researcher’s status as 
an insider. Simple translation of terms had the capacity to lead to misunderstanding, 
without the knowledge of how such terms might be interpreted by individuals within 
an elite. The translation of a political term is a prime example of  when there might be 
a need to know how certain terms are used in the Iraqi context, as opposed to the 
application of mere linguistic expertise  For example, in Iraq the political elite use al-
tawafuq for political agreement, while the general term al-tawafuqi refers to the Iraqi 
political system, the two are very different and only a researcher with insider status 
could correctly appreciate the implications of using one term or the other.   
 
Voluntary Participation 
This research is based on studying groups of politically significant people, the key 
political elite and decision makers in Iraq. Awareness of their rights is essential and 
various ethical concerns have been taken into account before, during, and after this 
research. The first principle was that participation in interviews or surveys was 
completely voluntary, anyone was entitled to decline if they so wished, and those that 
did volunteer had the absolute right to withdraw at any time for any reason.  
 
Informed Consent  
Another principle closely related to voluntary participation is informed consent. All 
participants were fully informed about the purpose and potential benefits of this 
research, the process through which participants would be selected, procedures that 
would be followed, and any risks that might be involved were discussed. This principle 
was taken extremely seriously since its correct application formed the basis for other 
ethical principles that were also adopted. All the participants were drawn from various 
political elites and included members of parliament representing different sections and 
sects. Informed consent was crucial, since to ensure the integrity of the outcomes, each 
participant had to consent to participation and be briefed on the objectives. In practice, 
however, informed consent required more than only introducing the procedure and the 
objective of the study, the researcher had to be entirely open about his own background 
and provide reassurance that he was not biased towards any group,  
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Privacy  
The right to privacy gave participants the opportunity to decide what information they 
were willing to share publicly. During previous fieldwork in Iraq, participants were 
selective in their responses, and at times raised points on certain issues only on the 
understanding that they would not to be quoted on that specific information, for 
example, in cases of discrimination and corruption. This research has factored that kind 
of issue into account and the thesis has been produced on the basis that the participants 
know best why they should or should not be quoted. In a highly politicised, and at times 
violent, environment, where different sects and ethnic groups constantly strive for a 
larger share of power, especially in the House of Representatives, privacy is of the 
essence. The right to anonymity for any individual providing information is of 
paramount concern. Responses to the surveys in this research are all anonymous and 
only gender and sect/ethnic backgrounds were indicated in the results. 
 
Harm and Safety  
Research that could cause harm to participants is fundamentally unacceptable. In the 
case of this research, harm could result in indirect ways, based on publication of named 
responses to politically sensitive questions. The interviewees in this study, however, in 
the main, gave their consent to the content of the interview being published with the 
exception of a few that indicated which information they did not want to be revealed. 
This study takes safety as a fundamental requirement and ensures the dignity, rights, 
safety and well-being of all involved, avoiding unreasonable risk or harm to 
participants. In that vein, the safety of the researcher was also an issue for appropriate 
consideration, since the work involved extensive and frequent travel in potentially 
volatile areas over extended periods of time, on occasion as long as two months. 
Sensible precautions were taken to minimise any potential risk.  
 
Excellence and Integrity 
The researcher has at all times striven for excellence in the conduct of this research, 
aiming to design and produce work of the highest quality and ethical standards. In 
relation to integrity, all legal, regulatory and ethical requirements in the United 
Kingdom and in Iraq have been fully observed. Further, the need to maintain a 
knowledge and awareness of relevant and current legislative and regulatory 
	 137	
requirements, codes of practice of professional bodies, University policies and 
procedures, including the access of support and guidance provided by Research 
Governance & Ethics, have all been acknowledged. The research will be appropriately 
reviewed, and necessary regulatory ethical approval will be obtained. 
 
Honesty, Accountability and Cooperation  
To foster and support honesty in relation to this study, the research design, 
methodology, data, findings and results have been made available to scrutiny, subject 
to appropriate confidentiality conditions applicable to personal or commercially 
protected data. There are fully auditable records of timesheets, participants’ consent, 
all relevant approvals, and access to, and interpretations of, any associated legal 
agreements, grant terms and conditions. Additionally, the wider consequences of this 
work in terms of the need to engage critically with the practical, ethical and intellectual 
challenges that are inherent in the conduct of high quality research have been taken into 
consideration. The requirements and guidance of any professional bodies in this field 
of research, especially those of supervisors, have provided an essential contribution to 
the outcome of this study. 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter outlined the research design of this thesis with reference to (a) its 
philosophical worldview, (b) its strategy of inquiry, and (c) the research methods 
deployed. It was argued that it is the philosophical worldview, pragmatism, that 
provides a rationale for mixed methods research. The chapter also identified 
triangulation in the strategy of inquiry, which approaches the main research question 
from multiple angles to cross validate the findings of this thesis. It also examined the 
combining of qualitative and quantitative methods for the collection of relevant data. 
Interviews were deemed the most appropriate tool to ascertain how a political elite 
defines democracy, and how they define it, while surveys were used to assess their 
preferences for a number of political institutions and to examine their support for 
different institutional arrangements.  
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The chapter explained the sampling procedure used, including how the groups were 
sampled according to their numerical strengths in the Iraqi House of Representatives. 
The thesis uses data collected from three different surveys on three topics: elite support 
for political institutions (Chapter 6); elite support for federalism (Chapter 7); and, 
political elite preferences on controversial themes in the Iraqi constitution (Chapter 8). 
Interviews with members of elites were also conducted on political views on democracy 
(Chapter 5), their preferences for Iraq’s federalism and also issues in the Iraqi 
constitution (Chapter 7 and 8).  
 
This chapter acknowledged that the research design has both technical and 
methodological limitations. The technical limits included time, the difficulty in 
synthesizing qualitative and quantitative findings, the diversity of data and the process 
of interpreting and analysing different types of data. These concerns were addressed by 
employing the triangulation strategy to synthesise the different types of data. In terms 
of analysing the issues of complexity, the qualitative and quantitate questions asked are 
on the same topic in each chapter. Another methodological concern of this thesis is that 
pragmatism is regarded as another form of positivism, which rarely reflects 
constructionist or subjectivist views. This concern is mitigated through an approach 
that, in addition to using surveys and quantitative measures, also utilises qualitative 
methods that focus on meaning, symbolism and aspects that further the norms and 
values of the political elite. This is done with the help of in depth interviews with 
members of the elite. 
 
Finally, the ethical considerations sections discussed both the role of the researcher and 
the safety of the participant. In particular, the issues relating to an insider and outsider 
in conducting research on political questions, and with participants who hold political 
positions, were emphasised. The researcher, being an insider, has managed the issue of 
bias using two methods; asking similar questions in elite interviews, and adopting 
numerical representation in surveys (sampling). The next chapter will be the first 
empirical chapter and will discuss democracy in Iraq as a Muslim majority country. It 
will focus on how the Iraqi political elite, as members of different ethno-religious 
groups, define democracy.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
How the Iraqi Political Elite Define Democracy  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the views of the Iraqi political elite towards democracy and 
identifies what members of that elite mean by democracy. In the light of their views, 
the instrumental value of democracy, in terms of what goods or values it might deliver 
(as opposed to its intrinsic qualities, or values) is explored. The values that the political 
elite wish to promote through their interpretation of democracy, and the goals they hope 
to achieve, are also fully articulated and the position of the political elite representing 
different ethno-religious groups in Iraq, in relation to the two ideals of democracy, 
majoritarianism and rule through consensus, are illustrated. This chapter focuses on the 
question whether and to what extent that elite members of different groups in Iraq 
define democracy in different ways, with reference to different democratic ideals. The 
more specific hypothesis which is central in this chapter is as follows:  the larger groups 
are more likely to define democracy as majoritarianism, while smaller groups are more 
likely define it as rule through consensus. 
  
The context of Iraq, characterised by ethno-sectarian divisions, has made democracy a 
contentious subject. The views on democracy held by political elites belonging to the 
same religious sect but from different ethnic backgrounds, for example Sunni Kurds 
and Sunni Arabs, are different. Similarly, elites from the same ethnic group but from 
different sects, for example, Arab Sunni and Arab Shiite, also hold differing views on 
democracy. The practical operation of democracy has been equally problematic as the 
ethno-sectarian cleavages in Iraqi society have been subsumed into the governmental 
apparatus. Post-2003, Iraq was built on a political consensus between the three main 
groups and the complexity of that political system is manifest in the relationships 
between the three main groups around which the political system is designed. Lack of 
harmony between them, or the fundamental disagreement of any one of those groups 
with proposals, could threaten political stability and the very existence of the system 
itself. The ethno-religious arrangement of politics in Iraq provides the rationale for the 
structure of this chapter, as it approaches views on democracy through the divergent 
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perspectives of elite members of the three main groups; the Shia, the Sunni and the 
Kurds. 
 
Iraq, in addition to the deeply divided nature of society, has a majority Muslim 
population where any examination of the concepts of democracy requires a preliminary 
understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics. Consequently, this 
chapter reviews the relevant literature on three issues; the Sunni-Shia divide in Islam, 
the relationship between Islam and politics, and the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. It begins by discussing these issues as dealt with within the broader 
literature, and then contextualises each in the politico-religious situation of Iraq. The 
chapter goes on to examine the views of the three main groups on democracy. The Shia 
define democracy in terms of majority rule while the Sunnis are torn between the two 
ideals of democracy. The Kurds define it through an emphasis on attributes which 
equates to the consensual ideal. The views of different groups confirm the hypothesis 
but the findings show that within each group interpretations of democracy are subject 
to factors that go beyond the issue of numbers of adherents in any group. The ultimate 
ambitions of each group, in fact, impacts on their interpretation of democracy as an 
ideal. Further variables such as religion, culture and ethnicity, as well as history, 
grievances or alliances, also affect whether concepts of democracy are likely to be 
majoritarian or consensually based.   
 
The chapter will also show that the views of the political elite matter, and moreover, 
their different interpretations of democracy matter since those interpretations could 
directly build trust or destroy it between the separate groups. It will provide an overview 
of different groups’ perceptions of their position in Iraq. It goes on to examine the 
definitions and operations of democracy as the majoritarian ideal, as a major cause of 
distrust between the constituent elements of the Iraqi political elite. The chapter, then, 
makes the case for the consensual alternative as the more appropriate for the rebuilding 
of trust and, hence, as a means of sustaining Iraq’s polity.  
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5.2 Islam and a Muslim Majority Country 
The Sunni Shia Divide  
The two main sects in the Islamic world are the Sunni and the Shia, comprising 85 
percent and 15 percent respectively of adherents. Fourteen centuries ago, the Sunni-
Shia split started with a disagreement as to who was the legitimate successor to the 
prophet of Islam and how that decision should be arrived at. The Shia insisted that the 
rightful successor was Ali, a member of the prophet’s house. The Sunni, however, 
favoured using ijma (consensus) to determine who the rightful successor was, Khalifa 
(see; e.g. Nasr 2007; Madelung 2008; Hazleton 2010). For that reason, the 
distinguishing features of Shia and Sunni should be seen in ‘their political ethos,’ and 
in particular in ‘issues on Islamic history’ (Jabri 1979: 132; Enayat 1982: 19). Although 
other writers argue that the differences between the two sects should be studied as 
cultural (e.g. Lewis 1940) or social (e.g. Watt 1961), there is an argument that their 
difference can be seen as inherently political, out of which cultural and social 
differences then emerged. That is to say, the Shia have a specific political attitude 
towards religion which sets them apart from the rest of the Muslim population. To the 
Shia, one person (imam) embodies both political and religious authorities in the concept 
of imamat, while for the Sunni the two authorities are separate. This thesis proceeds on 
the understanding that the Shia constitute a political sect within Islam. 
 
The Sunni-Shia divide has characterised Iraq’s history and politics for a considerable 
period. That division, particularly in the Arab context, has at times led to sectarian 
violence (see; Chapter 1). Given the Iraqi context, it is appropriate to regard the divide 
as a difference in political doctrine because, as identified earlier, the difference between 
the two sects is basically political in nature. Shia Arabs comprise 50-52 percent and 
Sunni Arabs 30 percent of the total population of Iraq, and if the Kurds, at 18 percent, 
and Turkmen, at 2 percent, the majority of whom are also Sunnis, are counted, the 
Sunnis a comprise 48-50 percent of the population (see table 5.1) Those percentages 
are disputed and the subject of controversy among the members of the Iraqi political 
elite. In the Iraqi context, however, the religious-sect divide relates to Arabs only, and 
although Kurds are Sunni they do not consider themselves a part of this divide as 
ethnically they are different from both Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs. 
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TABLE	5.1	HE	DISTRIBUTION	OF	RELIGIOUS	SECT	AND	ETHNICITY	OF	IRAQ’S	POPULATION		
SECTS	OF	ISLAM		 ETHNIC	GROUPS	
	 Arab	 Kurd	 Turkmen	 	
SHIA	 50%	 1%	 1%	 	
SUNNI	 28%	 18%	 2%	 	
 
Islam and Politics  
There are two different discourses on the relationship between Islam and politics as 
perceived by Islamic scholars in the Muslim world, and external observers and writers. 
Firstly, the prevailing view among Islamic scholars, both Sunni and Shia, is that Islam 
and politics are inseparable since, in addition to faith, Islam concerns social and 
political aspects of life (e.g. Mawdudi 1948; Qutb 1964; Khomeini 1970, Qardawi 
1987). Reference to those scholars suggests that the political system of Islam is based 
on three principles: unity of God (tawhid), the prophethood of Mohammed (risalat) and 
vicegerency (khilafat). There is universal agreement among Islamic scholars on tawhid, 
risalat and khilafat. The divergence is only apparent on the type of khilafat, where their 
conceptions of khilafat differ on whom and how it should be arrived at; the difference 
is political. The Sunni believe political polity should be based on consensus, ijma, while 
the Shia believe the rightful successor must be a member of the household of the 
prophet.   
 
The second discourse can be found in the growing literature that examines the 
relationship and interaction between Islam and politics (e.g.  see; Martin 1987; Roy 
1994; Choueiri 1997; Denoeux 2002; 2011; Mandeville 2007; Ayoob 2008; Volpi 
2010; Tibi 2012; 2013). This includes two different stances: a view that acknowledges 
the interconnection between Islam and politics, and one that rejects such a contention 
and is, it might appear, ironically promoted by those on the right in terms of a political 
attitude towards Islam. It must be borne in mind that the question as to whether Islam 
is or is not political, or should or should not be a part of the political aspects of life, lie 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
In the context of Iraq, however, whether Islam and politics are separate or integrated 
does not merit a lengthy discussion. In Iraq, there is a socio-political reality that cannot 
be ignored; Islam has a significant presence within the state and is the official state 
religion. Islam limits the legislative power; the second Article in the constitution, for 
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example, reads, ‘no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of 
Islam.’ Moreover, Islamic individuals are members of state institutions. The majority 
of those who are in positions of power are Muslims, if not Islamic. Olivier Roy (1994: 
viii), identified the term Muslim as pertaining to a cultural reality, while the use of 
Islamic suggests a political connotation. The majority of the Iraqi political leaders are 
Islamic, this is to say, they are members of a certain Islamic political party in Iraq, with 
the exception of the Kurds, the majority of whom are Muslims but not Islamic.93 Thus, 
in Iraq, Islam and politics are linked and inseparable.   
 
The above given, takes us back to a topic discussed at length in chapter 2, section 2.6, 
namely the cultural form of modernisation - Muslim-majority society and the feasibility 
of democracy. A key proponent of the modernisation theory, Daniel Lerner, believed 
that the rest of the world would follow the Western concept of modernity, 94 ‘what 
America is... the modernising Middle East seeks to become’ (Lerner 1958: 79). 
Interwoven to his conception of modernity was a distinctive personality, a modern 
individual.95 Moreover, Lerner argues that the mass media plays a crucial role in the 
modernisation process (1958: 52). This thesis shows that  the people of Iraq have 
constructed their particular roadmaps to modernity with regards to the meaning of 
democracy and that the meanings most top Iraqi decision-makers attach to democracy 
are entirely different from the meaning of democracy understood in its western sense, 
i.e. liberal democracy.  
 
																																																						
93 I do not tend to argue that all the Sunni or the Shia political elite are religious; of course there are 
secular individuals and parties within the Sunni and the Shia groups. The Kurdish political parties and 
political elite are mainly secular but, again, in Iraqi Kurdistan there are two Islamic political parties that 
combined have 16 seats out of 111 parliamentary seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament.  
94 Using the case of six Middle Eastern countries (Muslim majority), he has tried to put forward a theory 
to show how and why the worldwide modernisation process is taking place. This work is comprised of a 
technique for measuring the process, and an application of theory in those countries. 
95The work present as a typology of cultural transition. 'Modern,' is sought to be urban, literate, 
financially stable, interdependent, and to have a rather secular worldview and able to understand various 
world situations. Traditional, on the contrary, is said to be rural, non-literate, living at a subsistence level, 
respectful of authority, to have a local worldview, and rather devout. In between, there is 'transitional.' It 
is put into different categories on their proximity to a modern lifestyle, ‘transitionals are people who 
share some of the empathy and psychic mobility of the moderns while lacking essential components of 
the modern style, notably literacy’ (Lerner 1957: 13). 
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Muslims and Democracy 
The literature on Islam and democracy, which also includes Muslims and democracy, 
concentrates on the particular issue of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 
Timothy D. Sisk (1992: xi) points out two main stances among Muslims on the 
compatibility issue, one that ‘places priority on a religious foundation for the state’ and 
another that sees the essential doctrine of Islamic thought and practice to be compatible 
with democratic ideas and institutions. In other words, among those Muslims who 
aspire to the idea of democracy there are two different tenets held: those believing the 
first hold that a democracy within Islam is feasible, while those adherents of the second 
argue that western democracy is a suitable political system for Islam.96  
 
Therefore, the advocates of an Islamic democracy believe that Islam has both the 
freedoms and the political structure for a democratic system. Ahmad Shawqi Al-Fanjari 
argues in Islam that rhuma (kindness) is the equivalent of what is regarded as freedom 
in Europe and tarahum (mutual kindness) is synonymous with democracy (see; Al-
Fanjari 1973). Along similar lines, John L. Esposito (1996: 18-29) argues that the 
concept of ijma (consensus) can both legitimatise and become the procedure for an 
Islamic democracy. Hamid Enayat (1982: 135) points out that Islam has the legal 
prerequisite for a democratic system; the rule of law. That argument can be seen to be 
based on the fact that in Islam the power of any government must be subject to, and 
limited by, the sharia law - a set of laws driven from the Quran and tradition.  
 
Based on the above arguments it could be argued that Islam can produce its own unique 
democracy, distinct from western democracy both in notion and function. In parallel, 
albeit different to the above arguments, there is another view that asserts the democracy 
found in the west is the appropriate system for Islam. With reference to several verses 
in the Quran (49:13, 11:119, 6:12, 6:54, 21:107, 27:77, 29:51, 45:20), Khaled Abu El 
Fadel (2004: 5-36) points out three principles: pursuance of justice; a consultative non-
autocratic method of governance; and the institutionalisation of mercy and compassion 
in social interactions. He concludes that ‘democracy is an appropriate system for Islam,’ 
because it endorses a form of government that is most effective in helping Muslims to 
																																																						
96 There are other views among Muslims that reject all notions of democracy –democratic ideas, 
democratic values and democratic practices- e.g. the Wahabis who are a part of the Sunni sect mostly 
concentrated in the Saudi Arabia.  
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promote those principles. That is to say, a democratic system helps Muslims to promote 
their religious values; hence, democratic practices are not only compatible with but also 
enhance Islamic principles. 
 
Concerning the different types of democracy (majoritarian and consensus) there is a 
view among Muslims who aspire to an Islamic democracy whose conception of an 
Islamic democracy is consensual rather than majoritarian which is based on an 
interpretation of Islamic history (e.g. Esposito & Voll 1996; Esposito 2000). 
Accordingly, Daniel Brumberg (2003: 269) pinpoints a lack of unity among Muslims 
and argues it is exactly this absence of unity that requires a form of power sharing and 
political institutions that emphasise agreement and cooperation with a promise of 
inclusion that could promote accommodation in Muslim majority countries. Therefore, 
some writers have argued that in studying the compatibility of different ideals of 
democracy with Islam the focus should be on what Muslims want, rather than what 
Islam is (e.g. Hashemi 2004; Graham 2002). Correspondingly, Bernard Haykel (2004: 
80) has named two leading Muslim scholars, the Sunni scholar, Yusuf al-Qardawi, and 
the Shia scholar, Mohsen Kadivar, who accept the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy and argue Muslim rulers must be elected for a fixed term of office.  
 
In the case of Iraq, the existing literature covers Islamic movements’ involvement in 
the democratisation processes (see; Bayat 1998; 2007; Clark 2004; Henfer 2011), but 
there is a gap in the literature which is twofold; firstly, on the conception of different 
democratic ideals with regard to different religious sects and ethnicities; and, secondly, 
on what type of democratic ideal Muslims in a Muslim majority country desire, in terms 
of institutional arrangements. This chapter, together with other empirical chapters, aims 
to fill those two particular gaps and constitutes in its own right an innovative and 
original contribution.  
 
5.3 Democracy: Shia views 
The Shia in Iraq 
The main distinctive feature of the Shia sect in Iraq is political. Almost all Shias have 
the same doctrine concerning politico-religious leadership; they all agree on Ali's 
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religious supremacy and political authority as the only rightful successor of the Prophet 
(Jafri 1979; Jabar 2003; Nakash 2003; Shanahan 2004; Lower 2008; Nafissi 2009;  
Rizivi 2010). The Shia doctrine ties issues of faith to political authority, and regards 
the Shia Mujtahids of our present time as spiritual and political leaders. The major 
feature   of Shia politics is that religious sect and political power are two in one. 
Therefore, any form of political system, with respect to the Shia sect, inevitably has to 
address the role of religion. The three significant power brokers in the Shia community 
are the Grand Ayyatullah Sistani, Abdul Azziz al Hakim, and Muqtada al Sadr. They 
are the leading Shia clerics who have been heavily involved in Iraq’s politics since the 
2003 invasion. For instance, Vali Nasr (2006: 231) has argued that Sistani has a 
pragmatic approach to politics as one man one vote, and has adopted democracy to turn 
the tables on the Sunnis in Iraq. 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical framework articulated the theory that the 
political elite define the ideal of democracy on two terms: what values are best served 
with democracy, and what goals democracy can achieve. Subsequently, the first 
hypothesis stated that members of the Shia group are more likely to support a 
majoritarian notion of democracy compared to members of other groups (Kurds and 
Sunnis). In this section, this hypothesis, through the implication of the theoretical 
framework, has been developed to illustrate the political elite’s views on democracy as 
an Ideal. The hypothesis that elite members of the Shia group favour democracy as 
majority rule is confirmed but their idea of democracy is not a liberal one.    
 
Defining Democracy: The core value  
To recap, derived from the theoretical framework of what values are thought to be best 
served with the idea of democracy, the hypothesis that Shia political elite are more 
likely to support the Ideal of democracy as rule of majority was proposed. This was 
based on the assumption that Shias form the majority in Iraq. However, it is logical to 
ask to what extent the Shia worldview tolerates the idea of democracy and, specifically, 
what type of values and goals could it serve. To ascertain answers to those questions 
the first Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Ja’afari,97 was interviewed. 
																																																						
97 Ibrahim al Ja’afari was the Iraqi Prime Minister for the transitional government from 2005-2006 and 
previously one of the two vice presidents in the Iraqi interim government from 2004-5. He was also the 
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Ja’afari, in his effort to define democracy as an ideal, began by creating a structure by 
which the very idea of democracy could be addressed from a Shia perspective. The 
structure was a framework consisted of two types of laws, fixed and flexible. 
Compulsory duties (wajb) are the fixed laws that constitute the five pillars of Islam (i.e. 
prayers, fasting, zakat, and pilgrimage). Compulsory prohibitive laws (haram) are also 
fixed and these include a set of proscriptions against, for example, adultery, killing, 
drinking alcohol, hypocrisy and telling lies. Ja'afari further explained that those dos and 
do nots fall into a hierarchy of acts from permitted to non-permitted in five categories; 
wajib compulsory duty; mustahhabb recommended; mubahh neutral; makruh disliked; 
and haram sinful. In his view, the fixed laws are where democracy has no influence 
and he re-affirmed that 'in the Islamic political thought the compulsory duty and the 
sinful are red lines. Those are fixed points and Allah His Almighty has commanded so.’ 
This is an explicit limitation on the very idea and understanding of democracy.   
 
Further concerning values, liberal democracy, both consensual and majoritarian, 
understood in its modern sense, is not value free. It is vital to point out, from the Shia 
perspective, how democracy, as an ideal, favours Islamic values at the expense of 
liberal norms. Ja’afari believed that liberalism and Islam are two different world-views; 
philosophically, he referred to liberalism as the right of the individual to choose to live 
life as he/she pleases, while he referred to someone as Islamic if he/she implements the 
laws discussed above, the compulsory dos and do nots. Such an individual chooses to 
live a life as Allah pleases. Therefore, he viewed Islam and liberalism to be inherently 
different, stating, ‘it is not correct for a Muslim even to say I am liberal or liberalist’ let 
alone uphold liberalist values or philosophy. With this in mind one could argue that, at 
least in theory, democracy through a Shia perspective (i.e. Ja’afari’s interpretation) 
clashes with the liberal notion of democracy. Even if a limited democracy that holds 
merely political elections is accepted, the Shia perception could hardly encompass such 
an “electocracy”. The interpretation as to the role of religion limits the scope of voting. 
As Ja’afari stated, some aspects are ‘out of question and cannot be put to voting’ 
referring to the fixed laws. Democracy as an ideal is acceptable as long as it serves 
																																																						
main spokesman for the Islamic Dawa Party the largest Shia party in Iraq. He is Shia Arab with a 
moderate Islamist ideology. Currently the foreign minister of Iraq.  
	 148	
Islamic values, and this can provide a hint as to the nature of democracy that the Shia 
worldview favours.  
 
Therefore, from a Shia perspective the divine is always present as a moral guardian, 
and the ideal of democracy must be mitigated by the supremacy of the divine laws. To 
this end, it is clear that the values Ja’afari wishes to serve with the idea of democracy 
are Islamic values. For example, he was against a democracy that ‘leads to same sex 
marriage”. Further, it could be deduced that the goal is to locate the ideal of democracy 
between the two ends of compulsory duties and sinful actions, bearing in mind, 
democracy must at least serve as a means of implementing the compulsory and 
preventing the sinful while working in the domains of the recommended, the natural 
and the disliked. In other words, this is to locate democracy within the flexible laws, 
under the restrictions of the fixed laws of Islam, as interpreted through the perspective 
of the Shia sect. That, by definition, puts in place an Islamic democracy instead of a 
liberal one. To accept Islam as the foundation for democracy is a matter of faith, 
therefore it is shared by all those who are religious in the Shia political elite. To view 
democracy through such a perspective is, in fact, to view it as an instrumental tool. To 
see democracy as an instrumental tool, one that has no special value in itself but which 
protects and enhances principles such as individual rights and freedoms, is a perspective 
shared by Liberals too. In the case of the Shia, democracy is seen as an instrument to 
protect and enhance Islamic provisions as interpreted through the Shia doctrine.  
 
Democratic Ideal: The main goals   
The theoretical framework stated that the meaning of democracy as an ideal becomes 
clearer with reference to the values and goals political elites attach to their support for 
a specific ideal of democracy. This section corresponds to Chapter 3, to show the Shia 
elite’s values and ideas on democracy as an Ideal, what democracy is, and what goals 
they wish to achieve by it. In the discussion above, the role that religious values play in 
the Shia conception of democracy was explained, the following paragraphs demonstrate 
the Shia political elite’s support for a majoritarian form of democracy and explains why 
the Shia favour a majoritarian democracy in the context of Iraq.   
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Throughout the interview, Ja’afari demonstrated his support for majority rule in two 
ways; directly by favouring the very idea of democracy as the rule of the majority, and 
indirectly by criticising the idea of consensus democracy. Firstly, by democracy Ja’afari 
meant a political form of democracy restricted to elections and a system of checks and 
balances. He favoured the idea of democracy in terms of majority rule and stated that 
‘the best thing about democracy is that the larger in society is the large in the 
government’. Further, he strongly believed that consensus is opposite to democracy, 
arguing a consensual system wherein the smaller parties have a veto power is, in 
essence, antipathetic to the very idea of democracy, for in such a case ‘the majority 
cannot do much.’ He expressed concerns that the Shia majority's power has been limited 
in the apparatus of rule due to power sharing. Secondly, Ja’afari criticised the consensus 
system for it was imposed through invasion, practised under occupation and, because 
of it, the Iraqi people had never truly experienced real democracy, by which he meant 
a non-consensual democracy.  
 
Ja’afari, whose views to a large extent resemble the Shia house in Iraq, as the following 
paragraphs will demonstrate, believed consensus in Iraq has resulted in a paradox; those 
who were socially and numerically greater have become smaller in the government, and 
those who were socially and numerically smaller have become greater in the 
government. Nevertheless, those who are socially greatest are also predominant in the 
Iraq government and House of Representatives where the Shia are the majority, yet they 
claim that their power is limited due to the need for consensus. Thus, one could argue 
the goal Ja’afari aims to achieve by democracy is a majority rule, in which the Shia 
power is neither restricted nor limited by the presence of other groups, despite the 
constitutional restrictions on majority rule. The above views expressed by Ja’afari 
indicate the presence of a strong element of constitutionalism. Liberals favour a self-
binding democracy with a constitution that does not allow majorities to abolish 
democratic principles such as abolishing elections or eradicating freedoms. Some 
democratic principles ought to be channelled appropriately (i.e. majority rule) for 
liberal values to flourish. The Shia appear to wish for a different type of self-binding 
system based on Islam’s demands on the individual and society as a whole. The Iranian 
polity since 1979 could be an exemplar of the Iraqi Shia’s vision of a constitutional 
democracy. To comprehend correctly the positions outlined by Shia ministers, 
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discussed below, it has to be borne in mind that support for majority rule or a 
majoritarian democracy is in the context of Shia rule of Iraq and the Shia conception of 
democracy as discussed above. 
 
Ja’afari's views, in particular his support for the democracy as majority rule, were 
shared by almost all other Shia ministers. In their responses to whether they preferred 
the Iraqi government to be based on consensus or majority, five out of six ministers 
favoured a government based on majority. Minister of State, Dr Sahib Qahraman, 
however, stated that Iraq’s democracy is still in its formative phase but favoured a 
‘majoritarian system for the future’ while supporting pluralist and disproportional 
representation in the interim. Similarly, Planning Minister, Ali Yusuf Abdul Nabi Al-
Shukri, stated that in Iraq 'democracy needs time' and he was in favour of a type of 
democracy based on the majority. Human Rights Minister, Muhammad Shiya al-
Sudani, believed that a government based on majority would be a better choice for Iraq 
and he was in favour of disproportional representation as the preferred electoral system. 
Likewise, the Minister of State for Tribal Affairs, al-Shaikh Jamal al-Batigh, asserted 
'Iraq's democracy is an infant and it will take time until it grows up and becomes 
mature,’ and he also favoured majoritarian democracy. Minister of State, Diaa Najm 
al-Asadi, stated that democracy in Iraq is at the very beginning of the road, and 
preferred a majority government with disproportional representation.  
 
The only minister who was not in favour of a majoritarian democracy among the Shia 
was Minister of State, Bushra Hussein Saleh, from the Islamic Virtue Party, 
representing the Sadrist Movement. In contrast to other Shia ministers, Bushra favoured 
consensus and proportional representation as she believed that to be the only system 
that could ‘represent all segments of Iraqi people’. In Iraq, the Sadrist Movement is 
known as the alternative voice in the Shia house. They are the Shia nationalists and 
have a stronger sense of Iraqi solidarity compared to other groups within the Shia 
community. However, while there are different views in the Shia family, the vast 
majority are in favour of a majoritarian democracy. The main goal that the Shia political 
elite want to achieve is to be able to form a government based on majority, that is, 
Shia’s form the government, and then establish a majoritarian form of democracy under 
the supremacy of their religious sect.  
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Conclusion  
In this section, the in-depth empirical data confirmed part of the first hypothesis that 
the Shia political elite support a majoritarian democracy in Iraq. Their support was 
based on Dahl’s method that democracy as an Ideal could be best understood in terms 
of value and goals discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.4). Correspondingly, the way in 
which values and goals form ideas on democracy among the Shia political elite was 
discussed. The data shows that religious values play a significant role in shaping the 
nature of democracy. From the Shia perspective, the Ideal of democracy is viewed as a 
form of Islamic democracy and not necessarily a liberal democracy. Shias support 
democracy as long as it serves their religious values. Furthermore, the data shows the 
goal for which the Shia elite support democracy, which is to bring about a majority 
based government and to establish a form of majoritarian Islamic democracy.  
 
Moreover, the Shia views’ on democracy discussed in this section are also underpinned 
by a paradox of two particulars. First, the Shia political elite in general support Iraq's 
democracy because the late 2005 elections made Shias the majority in the Iraqi House 
of Representatives and, subsequently, the ruling group in Iraq when they were tasked 
with forming the coalitional government. In other words, Shias owe much of their 
political power to democracy having been suppressed under previous Iraqi 
governments. Second, the Shia political elite have fears deeply rooted in Iraq’s history 
and its centralised central authorities. That is why, with the exception of the Minister 
from the Sadrist Movement, they support a government based on the majority, as they 
are the majority.  
5.4 Democracy: Sunni's view   
The Sunni in Iraq  
The Sunni Arabs in Iraq have a nationalistic attitude towards Islam.98 The idea of Arab 
solidarity among the Sunni Arabs is a part of a broader vision that takes Iraq as an 
extension of the Arab Nation. Sunni secular Arabs advocated Arab Nationalism as the 
national identity and in their encounter with Nationalism, similar to other Arab 
																																																						
98 While the Shia’s in Iraq, as shown previously, have a religious attitude towards nationalism – i.e. 
religious sect has become the base of identity. 
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countries, they understood it as patriotic attachment to a specific territory (Haim 1956: 
132; Sharabi 1970: 119). While Arab writers made efforts to reconcile Islam and Arab 
nationalism, to show the two were not contradictory, such efforts, nevertheless, 
confirmed the Arabic identity of Islam. A typical example is provided by the Prime 
Minister of Iraq, Abdul Rahman al Bazaz (1965-66), who argued, ‘Islam does not 
necessarily contradict Arab Nationalism unless their political aims differ, but this is 
unthinkable’ (Bazaz 1972: 200). It is Hamid Enayat’s view that Arab nationalism has 
often ended where it had started; with the glorification of Arabism as a commanding 
value in Islam (Enayat 1982: 114).  
 
With the Iraqi Sunni Arabs, both secular and religious elements are referred to in this 
research, since what they have in common is Arabic ethnicity and, of course, the fact 
that they belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. A defining characteristic of the Sunni Arabs, 
whether secular or religious, is this twofold identity. On the one hand, they regard 
themselves as a part of the Arab nation, and as a part of the broader Islamic Sunni sect. 
Arab solidarity and Sunni solidarity are twin characteristics of Sunni Arab nationalists 
in Iraq. It is because of this blend of religion and nationalism that their views are more 
secular compared to those of the Shia. Furthermore, Chapter 1 (section 1.2) showed 
that Sunni Arabs are the Iraqi nationalists, for they have been the ruling elite of Iraq as 
a nation-state, which was by definition a secular state.  
 
The testing of the hypothesis, and the implications of the theoretical framework 
examined in this section, follows a structure similar to the previous section. In this 
section, nevertheless, the second part of the first hypothesis is tested, that is that the 
Sunni Arab political elite are more likely to define the ideal of democracy as one of 
power sharing compared to the Shia who conceptualise it as majority rule. This 
hypothesis is based on the conventional wisdom that in a socially divided group, those 
in the minority are more likely to support consensus (see Chapter 6). Again, this support 
for democracy as an ideal is discussed with reference to the values and goals that the 
Sunni elite wish the idea of democracy to serve.  
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Defining Democracy: The core value  
The core value that almost all Sunni political elite want an ideal democracy to serve is 
that of Iraqi nationalism, the notion of ‘Iraqiness’. In other words, ideas concerning 
preserving an Iraqi identity underpin the Sunni political elite’s views on democracy. 
That is because, for the past century, the identity of the Iraqi nation-state has been 
synonymous with the identity of the secular Sunni Arabs. Therefore, in sharp contrast 
to Shias, whose core value is sect, the Sunni’s is secular; for example, nationalist, Tariq 
al Hashimi,99 held the highest Sunni position in Iraq as the vice president (2013). 
Hashimi conceptualised the ideal democracy in terms of establishing the rule of law, 
building institutions, and developing a single identity. Further, unlike al-Jaafari who 
positioned democracy between the two ends of halal and haram as a safeguard to 
Islamic values, Hashimi referred to democracy with respect to ‘Iraqi identity’ as a core 
value for the unity of all Iraqis. Hence, secular in his approach, Hashimi expounded his 
non-sectarian aspirations in his participation in the drafting of the Iraqi constitution. In 
his words, he aimed ‘to have a state of law, to have a civil state, a state of institutions, 
and to have an Iraq of identity not an Iraq of different sects.’ Hashimi’s appeal to an 
Iraq of identity is, by definition, a secular one, and his conception of democracy is 
moderate and inclusive. In addition to Sunni nationalists, he also seeks the support of 
the Shia nationalists.  
 
A fundamental issue very closely related to the idea of Iraq’s identity, in relation to the 
idea of democracy is the question of majority. Both Sunnis and Shias claim to be Iraq’s 
majority. Sunni Arabs refute the Shia’s contention and argue that the Sunni community 
is composed of the Sunni Arabs, the Sunni Kurds and the Sunni Turkmen. Accordingly, 
Hashimi asserted if those three ethnic groups join forces, then the Sunnis form the 
majority as, in his words; ‘we will be about 55 percent of the total population of Iraq.’ 
The two opposing views on who is the majority is interesting and provide helpful 
insights. As the previous section showed, the Shias view democracy as majority rule, 
and so they see themselves as the majority. Among the Sunnis there are some who also 
view democracy as majority rule, but with the Sunni’s interpretation of the majority. 
																																																						
99 After chasing him for a long time from Qatar to Istanbul, finally I managed to meet al-Hashimi on 
Friday, April 26, 2013 in Istanbul. He held the Sunni's highest political position in the post 2003 Iraq 
and was also looked on as the icon of Sunni politics in Iraq. This interview was conducted in both Arabic 
and English. 
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Hashimi, for instance, favours a majoritarian system over a consensus one, because in 
his view the Sunni nationalists and the Shia nationalists could co-operate to become the 
majority to form the government and ‘establish a real civil state’. Hashimi, 
nevertheless, was one among the very few in the Iraqi political elite to be able to rise 
above ethno-sectarian divides and bridge the gap between the different groups in Iraq. 
He headed the al-Iraqyya list for the 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections, a list which 
composed of members of both the Sunni and Shia political elites with secular and non- 
secular movements. The list received a majority of the votes and also the majority of 
the seats in the parliament. 
 
The paradox of similarities and differences characterises the political stance of the Iraq 
political elite, specifically between the Sunni and the Shia, in post 2003 Iraq. For 
example, similar to Ja’afari, Hashimi favours majoritarianism, but on an entirely 
different basis. Ja’afari’s stance is that Shias are the majority and that the majority ought 
to rule, whereas Hashimi’s goal is a plural type of democracy, in which different sects 
and ethnic groups combine to form a majority. Ja’afari and Hashimi both aspire to 
democracy, the former to an Islamic form while the latter to a more egalitarian and 
liberal form. Similar to Ja’afari, Hashimi believes that Iraq’s democracy was not set up 
correctly under the occupation but, with an entirely different discourse, Ja’afari 
criticises the imposition of consensus, whereas Hashimi criticises the monopolisation 
of power by one segment of the population, the Shia. 
 
Democratic Ideal: The main goals  
Dahl’s method of understanding democracy with reference to values and goals could 
provide a clearer vision of the main goals. In terms of values, such as nationalism and 
Iraqi identity, all Sunni Arabs share their Sunni solidarity. This is mainly due to Iraq’s 
political history in which Sunni Arabs have been ruling and acting as de facto owners 
of Iraq since its establishment (chapter 1 section 1.2). Nevertheless, when it comes to 
goals Sunni Arabs are polarised into two distinct camps over what they want to achieve 
with the idea of democracy. In other words, on the matter of the values that democracy 
can serve, almost all Sunnis are Iraqi nationalists, while on the goals that democracy 
can achieve, they lack unity and have two different conceptions of the idea of 
democracy. 
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The Sunni, then, are split over the two democratic ideals of majoritarian and consensus. 
For example, Culture Minister, Dr Saadun al-Dlemi from the Iraqi National Alliance, 
like Hashimi, favours a majoritarian democracy and argues that 'democracy cannot be 
built on ethno-sectarian bases’ and supports a national list and majoritarian 
disproportional representation. On the contrary, Ayad al-Sammarai, the 2009 speaker 
of Iraqi House of Representatives100 believes that the formation of government should 
be based on consensus and argues that any form of majoritarian system favours the Shia 
majority, who monopolise the Iraqi apparatus of rule. Likewise, Education Minister, 
Mohammed al-Tamimi, and Salman al-Jumaily, the head of the al-Iraqyia list, favoured 
consensus democracy101 with proportional representation. A similar view was shared 
by Salim al Jaburi, the current (2014) speaker of the Iraqi parliament.  
 
When it comes to their ideas on democracy, the Sunni share similar values to those of 
Iraqi nationalists, but they lack a unified goal. In other words, they lack a unified 
democratic discourse.  On the other hand, a considerable majority of the Shia supports 
a majoritarian democracy while the Sunnis are split over the two conceptions of 
democratic ideals of majoritarian and consensus. This, in fact, has undermined the 
political strength of the Sunnis in Iraq, and, so far, they have not been able to join Sunni 
Arab groups together let alone, the Sunni Kurds, or the Sunni Turkmen, to form a 
majority. In the case of Sunnis, it is evident that values play a fundamental role in 
defining democracy but so does a clear idea on the goal intended to be achieved through 
democracy. Due to these Sunni divisions, it was easier for the Shia to marginalise them 
in the ‘democratic process.’ The Sunni, for the most part, blame this on the US 
withdrawal; with the end of the occupation, it became possible for the marginalisation 
of Sunnis to be carried out in a systematic manner. Thus, in the absence of the 
occupation came the consolidation of power by the Shia, under Maliki. Hashimi 
																																																						
100 In July, 2011 he was elected as the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Islamic Party. He is also head of the 
Iraqi Accord Front, which is an Iraqi Sunni-Islamist political coalition created on October 26, 2005, in 
the Iraqi Parliament the coalition Tawafuq. I met al-Sammarai in the Iraqi House of Representatives in 
his office on September 15, 2012 at 12:42 and the duration of the interview was 40 minutes. 
101 There might be a concern as to whether the Iraqi politicians have used expressions such as consensus 
or majoritarian democracies during the interviews. In Iraq, there are two common terms used to make 
reference to two different types of rule al tawafuqyya meaning ‘to reach consensus’ and al aghlabyya 
meaning ‘the majority.’ I have not translated their expressions into Lijpharts terminologies, rather I have 
described the features of both models (consensus and majoritarian) and they have preferred either model.   
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informed me that Maliki had 4 million US Dollars of the national budget at his disposal 
which he could spend with no audit in and, no final statement of, the expenditure, and 
could be simply authorised by his signature. This capital was used on judiciary, the 
media and security forces loyal to Maliki to serve a specific political agenda as well as 
targeting other politicians who had proved to be his opponents: ‘This is what happened 
to Traiq al Hashimi, and Rafe al Isawi and other politicians,’ according to al-Hashim in 
a reference to the removal by Malikiof of Sunni Arab officials he accused of being 
involved in terrorist acts against the government.  
 
In the previous section, the Iraqi Shia concern over a Sunni return to power was raised. 
This anxiety was the underpinning factor leading to two outcomes; Shia support for a 
majority government, and the marginalisation of Sunnis. Looking at the situation from 
a Sunni perspective, as those accused of such ambitions, the matter looks entirely 
different. Hashimi, along with other Sunni elite, regarded the Shia’s fear to be one 
sided, in that the mistrust went only one way, from the Shia towards the Sunni. The 
main reason for Shia aggression, Sunnis believe, is because they are afraid of losing 
power, and assume Sunnis are a threat and are still harbouring ambitions to regain 
power. Hashimi declared that the Shia assumptions are untrue because ‘we are not 
targeting them, we do not have any hard feelings towards them.’ This phenomenon of 
mistrust is of great importance vis a vis the building of democracy in Iraq and will be 
returned to at a later stage in the chapter. However, mistrust has been a highly 
significant factor in generating pessimism among the Iraqi political elite, the main 
solution for which is the introduction of a set of consensual democratic institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
The Sunni perspective of the ideal of democracy is a secular one and avoids a sectarian 
approach. They make reference to the people of Iraq as Iraqis irrespective of sect, and 
define Iraqi identity as loyalty to the boundaries of the Iraqi state. Such ‘unity’ is the 
core value which Sunnis want to serve with the idea of democracy. Further, Sunnis are 
not in favour of sectarian or ethnic divisions of Iraq in terms of ‘Sunni versus Shia’, or 
‘Kurd versus Arab’. The ethno-sectarian divide in Iraq after 2003 has, perhaps, 
disadvantaged Sunni Arabs more than others. The ethnicity factor is their weak link 
with rest of the country as they do not have the support of Shia Arabs. From the sect 
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side of the issue, ethnicity has weakened their position as Sunni Arabs do not have the 
support of the other Sunnis who are Kurds. On the other hand, Sunnis have used both 
sides of their identity as suited, for example, an appeal to nationalism to gain the support 
of the Shia nationalists as in the 2010 elections, or an appeal to religion to draw the 
support of Kurds who are Sunni to counter the hegemony of the Shia in the apparatus 
of government. However, they have not been successful in countering feelings of 
belonging to the Shia sect as more important than commitment to nationalism. Among 
the Kurds, belonging to their ethnic group is more important than religion. 
  
To sum up, the theoretical framework has been helpful in showing the secular nature of 
Sunni nationalism, as well as highlighting the two different goals which different 
Sunnis wish to achieve with the idea of democracy, that is consensus and majoritarian. 
The significance of the chosen method is that its use is vital in order to understand not 
only how but why the Sunni view democracy differently. Using this methodology 
shows that their different conceptions of democracy and their support for a particular 
ideal of democracy is subject not only to their group size or the values that they share 
in common but also to the goals that they want to achieve. Hence, their weakness is due 
to a lack of an agreed goal that would unify them. The hypothesis that Sunni are more 
likely to define democracy as consensus has been partially confirmed; nevertheless, the 
conception of democracy as a result of a group's size is tempered by historical legacies, 
present realities and political goals, as well as the ways in which groups see themselves. 
 
5.5 Democracy: Kurdish views 
Kurds in Iraq  
The Kurds’ struggle within Iraq is not religiously based but rather a matter of identity. 
The defining characteristic of Kurdish politics is ethno-nationalism (Kurdish: 
Kurdayati); the idea of self-rule based on belonging to the Kurdish ethnic group 
(Kurdish: Kurd bun). Kurdayati is the common motto of all Kurdish political parties of 
whatever persuasion and, in the context of this research, of all the Kurdish political 
elites. Kurdayati predates the establishment of the ‘nation-state’ of Iraq. Kurdish revolts 
armed, political or civilian, were in response to the imposition of Iraq’s boundaries in 
the period 1917-1920 by Great Britain, and also in response to the imposition of an 
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Arab identity which sought to eradicate their Kurdish identity by Iraqi central 
authorities in the years 1960-1990 (see Chapter 1). This history has manifested in the 
Kurds’ quest, post 2003, to protect their identity through building Iraq’s democracy. In 
other words, Kurdish politico-cultural identity is the core value that Kurds want to serve 
with the idea of democracy. The primary political goal of Kurds is self-rule, in the form 
of federalism, with greater autonomy for the Kurdish region within Iraq.  
 
The Kurdish political elite are secular in their interpretation of the ideal of democracy. 
Although they are Muslims, they do not see themselves as involved in the Sunni-Shia 
sect divide; their pursuit is one of ethnic identity. Therefore, democracy from a Kurdish 
perspective, by default, includes the notion of Kurdayati. Within Iraq, they favour an 
ideal of democracy which reflects their ethno-nationalist quest.  
 
This section, in a process similar to that adopted in previous ones, analyses the views 
of the Kurdish political elite with reference to the theoretical framework, in particular 
Dahl’s method in understanding democracy as an ideal (see chapter chapter 3 section 
3.4). Throughout this section, the hypothesis that the Kurdish political elite are more 
likely than members of the Shia and the Sunni elites to support consensus democracy 
is tested. The confirmation of this hypothesis will be dealt with at the end of this section. 
Initially, however, an illustration of the value that they want to serve with their idea of 
democracy and the goals that they want to achieve are investigated.  
 
Defining Democracy: The core value 
In defining democracy, as accepted by Kurdish leaders, reference is made to discussions 
with Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, and to relevant parts of an 
interview with Jala Talabani, the President of Iraq.102 Talabani believed strongly in the 
consensual ideal of democracy, and further regarded proportional representation as 
more democratic than a system of plural representation. Barzani, similar to Talabani, 
defined the ideal of democracy as consensus and a form of power-sharing. Barzani’s 
and Talabani’s views on democracy are shared by all those in the Kurdish political elite. 
																																																						
102 Note: they are the leaders of the two main Kurdish political parties, and also the two main rivals. The 
discussion of this divide is not the concern of this thesis, so with the divisions within the Sunni or within 
the Shia, here, the main concern is with the particular characters of each group that distinguishes it from 
the other. 
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Barham Salih, the former Deputy Prime Minister of the Iraqi Federal Government, the 
former Prime Minister of KRG, and Nechirvan Barzani, the current Prime Minister, as 
well as Displacement and Migration Minister, Dindar Najman Shafiq, and Trade 
Minister, Khairalla Hasan Babakir, all favour consensual democratic systems with 
proportional representation. 
 
Kurds believe that the political, demographic and ethnic nature of Iraq requires the 
formation of the government on the basis of participation and consensus among 
different groups. From a Kurdish perspective, Iraq cannot be ruled democratically by a 
single segment. This stance was re-affirmed by Barzani when he stated that, ‘the rule 
of a particular group has failed in Iraq; therefore, the application of the principle of 
majority to form the government will end in failure and hinders the success of 
democracy.’ Therefore, the Kurds’ promotion of democracy as consensus is, in fact, 
based on their desire to prevent the centralisation of power which, in Barzani’s view, 
has created fear among the peoples of Iraq. Different parts of the population worry that 
only a certain group speaks on behalf of the majority and imposes itself on everyone 
else.  
 
The core value which democracy could serve, for Kurds, is enabling participation and 
the protection of minority rights, including those of the Kurds. Taking into account the 
principle of power sharing and consensus among different factions, in their opinion, 
guarantees democracy. That is because, in Barzani’s view, if in Iraq the principle of 
majority is to be applied, then minorities and other segments cannot participate in the 
apparatus of rule and he believes that ‘does not suit the concept of true partnership, but 
will lead to the marginalisation of other segments.’ Marginalisation is the concept that 
both Kurds and Sunnis refer to when they address the implication of a majority rule; 
this is to say, Shia majority could potentially monopolise power. Hence, the main values 
by which Barzani and others of the Kurdish political elite want to serve with democracy 
in Iraq as a country of multiple nationalities and religions are coexistence and political 
action towards a common good. 
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Democratic Ideal: The main goals  
The goals which the Kurdish elite want to achieve with the idea of democracy are 
partnership and power-sharing, both aimed at creating a consensus system in Iraq. 
Chapter 1 showed that since Iraq’s formation, the forcing of three main segments into 
the boundaries of the Iraqi state has resulted in a lack of a collective feeling of 
belonging, a view that Barzani shared. He also identified a history of coups and revenge 
by successive regimes that has caused intolerance and prevented coexistence. Barzani 
stated that the political elite need to rectify those historical mistakes by transforming 
the whole system to a democratic one by ensuring real participation by groups in the 
decision making process. That is to say, democracy is a democracy in so far as it 
respects consensus and, on that basis, Kurds support it.  
 
Furthermore, Barzani favours a system of proportional representation for which he gave 
several reasons. First, he believed it to be closer to true democracy, as it achieves justice 
in the distribution of parliamentary seats based on the proportion of voters. Second, he 
thought that this system gives smaller parties a chance to be represented in parliament, 
which encourages supporters of smaller parties to exercise their voting rights and cast 
their votes. Without this system, he argued, the larger political parties will drown out 
the voices of the smaller parties. Third, adopting this system, in his view, helps to 
reduce wasted votes, and parliament will, as a result, reflect a better expression of the 
wishes of the citizens. Fourth, in countries with different ethnic, religious and sectarian 
groups, he believed it to be essential that all ethnic groups are part of the political 
process and this can only be guaranteed through a system of proportional 
representation. 
 
Other minorities including, Christians and Turkmen, have preferences similar to those 
of the Kurds. Yunadim Yousif Kanna, former member of the Iraqi Governing Council 
in 2003-2004, and the Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, 
believes that central to the process of building a democratic Iraq is a culture that 
promotes acceptance of others. He further augured that consensus democracy is the 
better choice because consensus, in his words, ‘could save the society form a majority 
dictatorship’. Kanna favoured an electoral system that would take into account the 
smaller groups, in a way that prevents their marginalisation. Likewise, Abbas al-Bayati, 
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General Secretary of the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkoman, argued that under the 
present conditions the government should be based on consensus and, similar to Kanna, 
he favoured proportional representation. Like the Kurds, the value that these other 
minorities want to serve with the idea of democracy is that of minority rights and 
freedoms, and their goal is to establish a democratic system that guarantees these rights 
and protects their freedoms through a consensus system.  
 
The vast majority, if not all, of the Kurdish political elite, support a consensual 
democratic system and this is also true for the political elites of the principle minorities, 
the Christians and the Turkmen. Their support for such a system is primarily based on 
a desire to prevent a system of rule that gives one segment the right to talk on behalf of 
all the segments in Iraq. Kurdish views and perceptions on democracy and how it 
should be built in Iraq, are clear and their ideas are coherent in comparison to the Shia 
and the Sunni positions. This is true for two main reasons. The Kurds have more 
experience and they have been governing themselves since 1992, therefore, their views 
on what Iraq needs and what type of democracy in Iraq would serve their interests best 
are more specific. The other two segments view democracy through their sectarian 
divisions, the Shia on the issue of the compatibility of democracy with Islam and 
presenting a Shia version of democracy for  Iraq, while the Sunnis in their vision of 
democracy make reference to an Iraqi identity, which for the past century has been a 
secular Sunni Arab identity.  
 
Conclusion  
Based on what has been argued so far, it can be concluded that the Kurdish political 
elite have a clear vision about their participation in Iraq’s democracy as almost all of 
them define democracy in terms of power sharing and support a proportional electoral 
system. Returning to the third part of the first hypothesis, that the Kurdish political elite, 
as well as members of other minorities, are more likely to define democracy in terms 
of consensus compared to the Shia and the Sunni political elite, the qualitative findings 
of this section confirm that hypothesis. The application of the theoretical framework 
has been helpful in identifying not only the fact that the Kurdish political elite define 
democracy as consensus but also in explaining why they do so.  
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The main reasons for their support of democracy lies in the values that they seek to 
protect, that is power-sharing, minority rights, and partnership, all of which being 
rooted in their quest for ethnic identity. The Kurds in Iraq have not adopted a sectarian 
approach and avoided becoming a part of the Sunni-Shia struggle. Hence, in post 2003 
Iraq, they see themselves rather as stabilisers and part of the solution, not as a part of 
the problem, in the building of a democracy. For them, this democracy must serve the 
values they uphold, tolerance and coexistence, and in turn help in the achievement of 
their goal of protecting their identity and nourishing their kurdayati by democratic 
means while safeguarding their Kurd bun within the boundaries of Iraq.  
5.6 Elites’ view: Why does it matter? 
The previous sections examined how each group defined democracy, and the different 
goals and values that each group wished to realise with reference to their ideal of 
democracy. This section (5.6) now discusses why those different views on democracy 
matter, and assesses their significance in relation to building democracy in Iraq by 
returning to a fundamental element of the main research question; What type of 
democracy could potentially work in Iraq?  
 
The views of members of all the different groups, Shia, Sunni, Kurds and other 
minorities are referred to. It is worth to noting that what follows is not a personal 
normative stance concerning democracy in Iraq, but rather an interpretive approach of 
the views and concerns of the Iraqi political elite. This section argues that the different 
views on democracy among Iraqi political elites reveal two fundamental particulars: 
first, the attitude of the Iraqi political elite with regards to their optimism or pessimism 
in relation to their position in Iraq and, second, the attitude of the Iraqi political elite 
towards each other, as manifested in political mistrust.   
 
Optimism and Pessimism   
Section 5.3 showed that, in general, the Shia demonstrate optimism in relation to their 
position in Iraq. This can be deduced from their support of a government based on 
majority, and their refusal to consider power sharing alternatives that could potentially 
undermine their monopoly hold on power. This idea of support for a government based 
on majority is coupled with a preference for centralisation to consolidate the state’s 
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power in their own hands. That could be explained with reference to Iraq’s historical 
legacies. As Chapter 1 highlighted, Iraq’s central authorities have witnessed military 
coups orchestrated, in the main, by the elite members of the political, secular, Sunni 
Arabs. Hence, the Shia worries concerning the Sunnis returning to power, through coup 
or otherwise, can be seen as logical. This fear was clearly demonstrated during Maliki’s 
premiership and his efforts at that time to marginalise both the Sunnis and the Kurds in 
conjunction with consolidating power in his own hands. Shia support for a 
disproportional electoral system could be explained by the fact that proportional 
representation brings more voices into the Iraqi Parliament, and turns the existing social 
segments into potential political rivals through institutionalising their forces.  
 
Section 5.4 showed that, compared to the Shia, the Sunni are rather pessimistic about 
Iraq’s democracy. This is due to several reasons; after the invasion there was a shift in 
power from the Sunni to the Shia (see chapter 1 section 1.2) and, in the 2010 elections, 
the Iraqyya list, Hashimi’s list, won the majority of seats but it was prevented from 
forming the government (see chapter 8). Those two reasons were accompanied by a 
systematic marginalisation of the Sunni political elite under the premiership of Maliki, 
whose policies, in Hashimi’s view, shifted the process of building democracy to 
‘restoring some sort of dictatorship and tyranny in Iraq’. Specifically, he was highly 
critical of the way that Maliki ruled the country, to the extent that he stated; ‘very easily 
I could say that Maliki has a style of dictatorship in his mood and philosophy to rule 
the country … he is a sectarian person, very deeply sectarian.’ He added that if a 
dictatorship was combined with a sectarian mind-set, then the end result would be a 
personality that would not serve democracy. Further, Hashimi expressed his worries 
over Sunni marginalisation which, he believed, could lead to the possibility of 
bloodshed and the breakout of a total civil war. One way to prevent such an outcome, 
he suggested, was for the central government to consult the six Sunni governors (which 
he was not optimistic the monopoly Shia government would do). That being the case, 
the Sunni in Iraq are not optimistic about their position in the post 2003 Iraq.  
 
Section 5.5 showed that Kurds have mixed feelings concerning the meaning of 
democracy in Iraq. The Kurdish political elite see the fall of the Ba’ath regime as a 
historic event which gave the Iraqi people an opportunity to initiate political pluralism 
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and freedom. Barzani agrees that Iraq's democracy is unique in the region, yet it is at 
the beginning of a road in which many obstacles lay scattered. He argued that 
democracy is threatened from two directions. On the one hand, democracy is struggling 
with the centralisation of power, referring to the role of the Shia monopoly on the 
apparatus of rule. On the other hand, terrorism and extremist ideas constitute major 
challenges to democracy in Iraq. Hence, the Kurds’ concerns over democracy stem 
from the two main groups, those Shias who strive for hegemony over Iraqi politics and 
those Sunnis who resort to political violence. Having said that, although Kurds are 
optimistic, they do have their own concerns about Iraq’s democracy; if one group 
violates the principle of power-sharing, through violence or other means, then it 
threatens Iraq’s whole political system let alone democracy.   
 
The Majoritarian Ideal Makes a Difference 
In interviews with the leading members of the Iraqi political elite, the main challenges 
to democracy in Iraq were confronted. The majority of them, regardless of their ethno-
religious backgrounds, alluded to mistrust between the Iraqi political elite as one of the 
main challenges to be faced. This lack of trust could be related to their views on the 
democratic ideal (majoritarian and consensus) and their expectations of how a 
democratic system could empower them, and minimise the power of their rivals.103  
 
Shia lack of trust towards Kurds and Sunnis is twofold. First, towards the Sunni, who 
have been the rulers of Iraq in the past, the Shia worry about the possibility of a Sunni 
return to power, either through a democratic process, where Sunni’s, Kurds, Arabs and 
Turkmen, join forces and form a majority government, or through undemocratic means 
such as a military coup (since the majority of former Iraqi military officials (the Ba’ath) 
were drawn from the among the Sunnis). In the December, 2005 elections the Iraqyya 
Sunni list, led by Hashimi, received the greatest number of votes. Hashimi was tasked 
with forming the government but the second and third groups on the electoral lists did 
not allow this to happened (this will be discussed further in Chapter 8. Further, the 
implementation of the de-ba’athification order outlined in Chapter 2 deprived the 
Sunnis from the opportunity to hold governmental positions. From 2007 to 2011, the 
																																																						
103 For example, how democracy could empower the Kurds as a minority and limit the power of the Shia 
as a majority. This also applies the other way around, the Shia’s expectation of democracy as a system 
to make the larger, the stronger and the smaller, the less powerful. 
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Sunni sahwa were the main forces to drive Qaeda out of Iraq, but Maliki was reluctant 
to integrate them into the Iraqi security forces. These two examples are clear 
manifestations of mistrust. The Shia’s mistrust of the Kurds dates back to early 2010. 
After realising they were the majority, the Shias favoured more centralised power in 
Baghdad. Then, with the Shias majority in power, specifically under Maliki’s 
premiership, efforts were made to reduce the powers of regions including the Kurdistan 
Region, and to consolidate power in Baghdad. The concern was that a strong Kurdish 
region in the north might declare independence104 and, hence, it was seen as a threat to 
Iraq’s territorial integrity.  
 
Mistrust, as the major challenge to Iraq’s democracy, has been that of the minorities of 
the majority. There is a lack of trust from the Sunnis towards the Shia, by whom they 
believe they have been systematically targeted and marginalised. Likewise, Kurds fear 
another centralised authority in Baghdad. Their concern in post-Saddam Iraq is the 
possibility that dictatorship might change hands from a secular Sunni, as was the case 
prior to 2003, to a sectarian Shia dictatorship post 2003. Thus, the top Sunni and 
Kurdish political elite shared their concerns at interview, conveying their complaints 
that although they are, in theory, partners in government with the Shia, in practice, they 
do not share in power. 
 
The qualitative findings of this study suggest that the implementation of a majoritarian 
democracy, in the context of Iraq, could breed lack of trust among its political elites, a 
mistrust of all by all. It is crucial to acknowledge that the idea of majority, instead of 
resolving issues, causes a protracted conflict between the main ethno-religious groups 
in Iraq.  
 
If the concept of majority, with reference to the views of members of different groups, 
is examined, it can be seen that the rights of ‘the majority’ is rather a problematic issue 
in Iraq. The ‘majority’, both as an ideal and as a reality, lacks the consent of different 
groups, and consequently lacks legitimacy. As an ideal, talking in sectarian terms, on 
the one hand, Shia claim to be the majority, while on the other, the Sunni claim to be 
																																																						
104 On various occasions, Masoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, had made the statement that 
if the Iraqi central government did not respect the principles of power sharing they will consider the 
option of independence.  
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the majority (Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen). Therefore, given the sectarian divide, 
a definite majority is hard to achieve. Sunnis claim to be 55 percent of the population, 
a figure claimed also by the Shia. The mutually exclusive calculations of the majority 
lead to a stalemate at best but at worst a constant conflict. A majority is hard to achieve 
not only because there is disagreement on who constitutes the majority, but also because 
there is no agreement on what the majority is. Shias favour an exclusive majority, 
referring to the Shia sect, while Sunnis talk about an inclusive majority with reference 
to Iraqi nationalism.  
 
Therefore, the majoritarian from of democracy, even as an aspiration, is entangled in a 
logical inconsistency for the majority, in the context of Iraq, is torn between the two 
conceptions of being inclusive of all groups and exclusive to one group only (i.e. the 
Shia). Having said that, the ‘majority’ as ideal is subjective, and the reality is contested, 
further complicating the task of building democracy on the basis of such a majority. 
Consequently, effort made to build democracy on such a foundation is a contradiction 
in terms, for it becomes the cause of mistrust, and the heart of conflict among different 
groups (see Chapters 7 and 8).  
 
The common Shia view of democracy as majority rule, and as ‘the majority' they claim 
the right to rule, brings about the mistrust discussed previously on two counts. Firstly, 
mistrust of the Shia towards anyone who undermines ‘their majority’ rule, or weakens 
their hold on power. This has been manifested in the marginalisation of the other two 
groups, and in the refusal to engage in any sort of power sharing, a refusal underpinned 
by accusation and fear of a Sunni comeback to power and a Kurdish secession from the 
country. The Shia majoritarian conception of democracy is coupled with the supremacy 
of their religious sect. Secondly, from the Sunnis’ perspective, the Shia idea of majority 
rule serves only the Shia majority. Confirmation of this comes from the majority Shia 
government’s neglect of Sunnis. This government was made up of only Shias and 
imposed stricter measures against the Sunnis. From a Kurdish perspective, the Shia 
majority, in addition to monopolising power, is also a threat to their Kurdish identity, a 
centralised authority that makes decisions on behalf of all and is seen to impose an Iraqi 
Shia Arab identity in the name of a form of Islamic democracy.  
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The Consensual Ideal Makes a Difference   
In a divided country such as Iraq, when the majoritarian ideal of democracy does not 
seem to be practical, the consensus alternative is left as the viable option. From here 
on, the case is made that consensus democracy could both build trust and help solve 
conflict. Consequently, support for a consensual system is the foundation upon which 
Iraq’s political system can be sustained.  
 
Consensus105 if implemented correctly could become the practical democratic 
alternative in a divided society. Political consensus has the potential to build trust 
among Iraqi political elites, and to limit, or least institutionalise conflict, among the 
elites of different groups. A very brief reference to the values that the political elite 
aimed to achieve with their conception of consensus democracy makes the argument 
become clearer. In the view of the Iraqi political elite, defining democracy in its 
consensual ideal serves values of inclusivity, tolerance, coexistence, decentralisation of 
power, and power sharing. These are all conducive to promoting trust among the 
members of different groups in a deeply divided society. As trust is a pre-condition for 
democracy, and democracy is the means of solving conflict, then it follows that the sort 
of democracy that helps build trust (i.e. consensus) in fact could institutionalise conflict.  
 
Moreover, consensus gives the larger groups the greater part of the apparatus of 
government, while giving the other groups a share. That, by default is closer to justice 
as it is based on fairness giving it a greater degree of legitimacy as it enjoys the consent 
of the many different groups in a polity. Therefore, the hypothetical assumption could 
be accepted that power sharing could reduce the existing mistrust among different 
groups in Iraq. Shias having their share of, rather than the monopoly over, state powers 
could take away the concerns of Kurds and Sunnis, and satisfying these groups through 
sharing of power could take away Shia fears of a Sunni Arab coup or a Kurdish 
secession.  
 
																																																						
105 Please note that by consensus I refer to the alternative of power concentrating majoritarian democracy. 
This includes different forms of power sharing (consensus and consociation). In this chapter, I have 
borrowed the terms majoritarian and consensus from Lijphart but in their definitions the Iraqi political 
elite were making reference to ‘majority rule’ and ‘the coalition rule’ based on power sharing and 
political agreements among the three main groups in Iraq.  
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A power sharing consensus is more practical when compared to other majoritarian 
alternatives. The foundations of Iraqi politics after 2003 has been a political consensus 
among all politically significant groups in Iraq. To view the ideal of democracy as form 
of political consensus, therefore, makes a fundamental difference and it is the only 
feasible alternative for Iraq’s polity. The remaining chapters (6-8) examine the 
assumption that consensus is the pre-condition to building Iraq’s political system, and 
the contention that majoritarian traits (e.g. majority rule and centralisation of power) 
are more likely to hinder establishing Iraq’s political system.   
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining the Sunni-Shia divide, the nature of the relationship 
between Islam and politics, and the compatibility of Islam and democracy, including 
the possibility of an Islamic democracy. The main thrust was the development of the 
argument that in the context of a Muslim majority country, the issue is not the 
compatibility of Islamic doctrine with democratic principles but rather Muslims’ views 
on the democratic ideal and its practices. The chapter demonstrated that Iraq is a deeply 
divided country and although all those in the Iraqi political elite are Muslims, their 
views and stances on democracy diverge significantly. The chapter examined the 
different ways in which members of the political elite view and interpret the idea of 
democracy.  
 
The chapter tested the first hypothesis that political elites are more likely to have 
different conceptions of the ideal of democracy, either consensus or majoritarian, based 
on the size of their group. The idea that the Shia political elite are more likely to 
understand democracy as majoritarian can be justified (section 5.3). However, their 
understanding of ‘democracy’ is subject to their religious sect, in addition to their size. 
Section 5.4 confirmed to an extent that some of the Sunni political elite defined 
democracy as consensus, while others veered more to the majoritarian basis for 
democracy because there is a belief that they are in the majority. Yet, the Sunnis’ 
conception of how the majority should be arrived at was in total opposition to the Shias’ 
idea of what constituted a majority. Section 5.5 confirmed that the Kurdish political 
elite, and the elites of the Christian and Turkmen minorities, almost invariably define 
democracy in consensual terms, and hence favour a system for Iraq based on consensus. 
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This chapter showed that the great majority of those who are part of the Iraqi political 
elite, regardless of their ethno-religious backgrounds, see a lack of trust as the major 
challenge to democracy. Based on the findings, the conclusion reached through this 
research is that in the Iraqi context the definition of what is a majority and the practical 
application of a majoritarian interpretation of democracy would most likely be the cause 
of significant mistrust among Iraqi political elite. The conclusion was also reached that 
consensus could re-build trust, and that the building of consensus is subject to the elite’s 
support for consensual institutional arrangements. This conclusion was based on two 
arguments: first, any sort of attempt to impose a majority rule could undermine trust, 
while a consensually based system could help build trust, and was a pre-condition of 
democracy. Second, although difficult, it is not impossible to build trust among the Iraqi 
political elite; it requires consensual institutional arrangements in a form of power-
sharing that could command the consent of all groups in Iraq, and further enhance the 
legitimacy of democracy. 
 
To sum up, an understanding of the different views on democracy discussed in this 
chapter is central to answering the main research question of how Iraqi political elites 
view democracy. Through examining the values that those elites wish to promote and 
the goals that they have set themselves through democracy, this chapter focused on the 
question whether and to what extent that elite members of different groups in Iraq 
define democracy in different ways, with reference to different democratic ideals. The 
more specific hypotheses which was central in this chapter was, the larger groups are 
more likely to define democracy as majoritarianism, while smaller groups are more 
likely define it as rule through consensus. The findings in this chapter confirmed this 
hypotheses, however, a fundamental challenge remains, the Shia political elite who are 
the majority define democracy as majority rule. Therefore, confirmation the hypothesis 
necessitates thinking about institutional arrangements, this is to say, how the different 
conceptions of democracy translate in the institutional arrangement. This chapter serves 
as the foundation for the following chapter that focus on the elite’s support for 
institutional arrangements. The next chapter will examine the preferences of political 
elite for formal institutions and investigates their support for either majoritarian and/or 
consensual systems.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
Political Elites’ Support for Consensus and Majoritarian 
Institutions 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the views and preferences of the Iraqi political elite on formal 
institutions in Iraq. Preferences are not assumed but rather the particular institutions 
that have the support of the majority are identified. The process of that identification is 
not limited in scope other than the limitations imposed by the investigation of the 
specific views on the topic under consideration. Only those political institutions that 
have the support of the greater number of political elite, both within each group and 
also across different groups, are considered. Such a consensus on the significance and 
importance of institutions suggests a very crucial question: what are the formal 
institutional arrangements that the Iraqi elites as a whole support?  
 
The primary assumption underpinning the theoretical approach of this chapter is the 
notion of the homogeneity of the political elite, as developed in the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3. Various studies have drawn attention to the fact that the ‘unity 
of national elites’ is one of the most important determinants of regime forms (Aron 
1950; Ake 1967; Castles 1974; Putnam 1976; 1977; Huntington 1984). This chapter 
deals with the unity of the political elite on the value of political institutions who 
concur, regardless of their ethno-sectarian backgrounds, that the first step in building 
Iraq’s political system is effective political institutions.106 There is a universal 
acknowledgement of the importance and significance of political institutions, an 
example of which can be seen in the 2014-2015 Daesh incident.107 At the beginning of 
the country’s collapse, the Iraqi parliament and cabinet remained active, mainly due to 
the political elite’s determination to maintain the political institutions.  
 
																																																						
106 I have come to this conclusion through my encounter with the Iraqi political elite during the past four 
years of field work and data collection. I have not come across a single member of the political elite who 
has doubted the importance of political institutions in building Iraq’s political system.   
107 See chapter 1, section 1.2 in particular the subheading ‘precipitate withdrawal: fragile security,’ 
moreover, footnotes 9 and 10 elaborate on this matter.    
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During a period of regime change, when a country moves from ‘a non-democratic to a 
democratic government the early democratic arrangements gradually become practices, 
which in due time turn into settled institutions’ (Dahl 1998: 84). That has been the 
situation in the aftermath of the invasion and the political elite has shaped political 
institutions, democratic or otherwise (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). Federalism became 
a part of the Iraqi constitution after the Kurds, with Shia support, introduced the idea in 
2003. Iraq is now a federal state. The Shia demanded elections as early as 2005 and 
established a proportional representation for the entire system. The Sunni voted for the 
Iraqi constitution in the referendum only after the addition of Article 142, guaranteeing 
Sunni demands would be taken into consideration.  
 
In the case of deeply divided societies, any examination of ethnic differences in relation 
to political institutions indirectly involves the role and position of the political elite. 
Power-sharing arrangements emphasise their role in the resolution of ethnic differences 
(e.g. Lijphart 1969; 1977). The concentration of power leads to the need for politicians 
to appeal for votes across a wide spectrum of society (e.g. Horowitz 1985; 1991). Both 
views are centred on the attitudes of elites. The former argues that they could 
accommodate their differences through agreements, while the latter argues that with the 
help of formalised institutional arrangements, they could rise above their ethno-
religious differences. Elites have, implicitly, become central to either approach; yet 
neither have explored the views and preferences of the elite concerning the desirability 
of power sharing-power or systems that concentrate political power. There is a gap in 
the literature on elites’ support for political institutions, which this research aims to fill.   
 
The surveys on support for different elements of majoritarian and consensual models 
enable an investigation of support for different formal institutions. Each group of 
respondents is categorised according to their ethno-religious or ethno-sectarian groups 
(Shia, Sunni, Kurds and other minorities). The objective is to illicit the preferences of 
individual members within each group and then assess the overall support for either 
majoritarian or consensus democracy. The hypothesis is:  
 
There is a negative relationship between the size of a group in a divided society 
and the support for consensus democracy. Elites from larger groups are less 
likely to support consensus democracy compared to elites from smaller groups.  
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This chapter explores the support for different institutional arrangements within and 
across ethno-religious groups and examines the views of elites with regards to their 
ethnic group. This element has two dimensions; executive-party and federal-unitary. 
The hypothesis was tested on ten variables within each group. The conclusion reached 
is that not all formal political institutions in Iraq have the same impact on propelling 
the political system to become either more majoritarian or less consensual. The findings 
on federalism and constitution are of particular interest and form the subsequent 
empirical chapters in this thesis. It will be demonstrated that the overall support for 
either system is far from clear, with the outcomes suggesting a leaning towards a 
mixture of a system with elements of both scattered randomly across the respondents.  
 
6.2 The Shia Perspective 
Introduction  
The formal institutions supported by the Shia political elite are identified in this section 
and their preferences for institutional arrangements in terms of the executive-party and 
the federal unitary dimension are explained. Each dimension consists of a cluster of 
five variables relating to institutions that together constitute a political system. Through 
a close examination of the support for those institutions, the type of political system 
that the Shia favours can be established. The findings show that the majoritarian 
elements the Shia prefer are fundamental to the re-enforcement of their power in Iraq. 
Although the Shia are the majority in terms of the general population, and in the House 
of Representatives, their support of different aspects shows that their preferences are 
shaped by more than one single factor.   
 
Shia Support for Majoritarian and Consensual Institutions  
The Shia supports a political system that establishes the principles of government and 
opposition.108 In November 2015, the leading Shia cleric, Ammar al Hakim,109 was 
asked which type of political system he wished to see. Al Hakim argued that the 
																																																						
108 Please note that from here and on, I will be heavily relying on findings from my own field work 
research, the time and place of interview together with the full title and occupation of the interviewees 
are provided separately (see Appendix A). 
109 He is the leader of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the largest party in Iraq's Council of 
Representatives until the 2010 elections. 
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political parties in one group should form pre-electoral alliances, for example, Kurdish 
parties with different Shia and Sunni political parties. These alliances would cut across 
the three main groups. The electoral campaign would be based on two political factions, 
each having within it political parties from all three groups. The outcome of elections 
would produce a government and an opposition, the cabinet being formed from the 
winning Alliance list, while the losing faction would provide the official opposition. 
This is a clear support for disproportional representation since the implementation of 
this plan would give the Shia a majority in both government and opposition. 
 
Ibrahim al Ja’afari’s preference for political institutions reflects his understanding of 
democracy, as rule by the majority. On the executive-party dimension, he supported all 
majoritarian elements, except that relating to the party system, where he supported the 
multi-party system as necessary in the context of Iraqi society. He favoured the 
concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets, and also executive-
legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant; majoritarian and 
disproportional electoral systems, as well as pluralist interest group systems with free 
for all competition among groups.  
 
On the federal-unitary dimension, Ja’afari preferred a unitary and centralised 
government, and also the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature. 
He was in favour of a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. 
Further, he supported a system in which the legislature had the final say on the 
constitutionality of legislation. Ja’afari also supported a system in which the central 
banks were subordinate to the executive power. To summarize, Ja’afari supported all 
five majoritarian variables on the federal-unitary issue. 
 
Human Rights Minister, Mohammed Dhya al-Sudani, on the executive-party 
dimension, supported three elements of majoritarian democracy. He favoured 
concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets, and also 
majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems. On the federal unitary dimension, 
he supported the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature. He 
favoured a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority, and a 
system in which the legislature had the final word on the constitutionality of its own 
legislation. Similarly, Works and Planning Minister, Nassar al-Rubayie, from the 
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Sadrist Shia movement, supported the concentration of executive power in single-party 
majority cabinets, the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature and 
a system in which the legislature had the final word on the constitutionality of their own 
legislation.   
 
The preferences of a sample among the political elite from different Shia political 
parties has been provided above. The preferences of members of the legislative, a wider 
number of Shia participants in the House of Representatives are now examined.  
 
The Executive-Party Dimension  
The data presented in Table 6.1 shows that there is strong support for majoritarian 
variables among the Shia in the Iraqi parliament, with 52 percent supporting 
majoritarian institutional arrangements overall, on both dimensions. Taking responses 
for the first five variables that compose the executive-party dimension, it can be seen 
that the support for majoritarian institutions is 56 percent. This is manifested in their 
overwhelming support for the concentration of power, in a single-party majority cabinet 
where 44 out of 52 respondents, 85 percent, chose that approach. In the aftermath of 
the 2014 elections, when the State of Law Coalition led by Nuri al-Maliki won the 
largest number of seats, 92, he warned that he would form the government by 
concentrating power in a single majority cabinet government. Maliki’s statement 
confirmed the Shia’s preference for a majoritarian system. 
 
The other majoritarian variables with strong support was the electoral system, where a 
majoritarian disproportional system was supported by 83 percent and a two party 
system, which was supported by 56 percent. This data indicates support for a form of 
majoritarian system in line with the model put forward by al Hakim, where he 
advocated disproportional electoral arrangement and the division of Iraq into two 
political fronts as the only way a two party system could be understood in Iraq.   
 
The other two variables on the executive-party dimension are the executive-legislative 
relationship and interest groups. Table 6.1 shows the majority of Shia parliament 
members supported consensus institutional arrangements. There is a 58 percent support 
for coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise and 
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concentration, and very strong support, 87 percent, for an executive-legislative balance 
of power. This indicates a preference for an active parliament, in which the Shia form 
the majority, and the desire to establish a form of checks and balances between the 
parliament and the government to ensure  a balance between those two branches of 
power.  
 
At first glance, the mix of support for the first and second variables on the executive-
party dimension seems to be contradictory but in the context of Iraqi politics the 
responses re-enforce a single fact. The Shia support a majoritarian arrangement for the 
concentration of executive power, but since the executive power in Iraq is by default 
consensual, they favour a balance of power between the parliament, where they have a 
majority, and the government, which is based on a consensus.  
 
The Federal-Unitary dimension  
On the federal-unitary dimension, the overall support is 50 percent for both majoritarian 
and consensual variables. This could be misleading because it might be argued that on 
the federal unitary dimension, the Shia preferences favour both models equally. That, 
however, is not the case. On the specifics, their support favours a majoritarian system 
in a way that benefits the Shia in Iraq. On the government type, there is 60 percent 
support for the consensus variable of federal and decentralised government. This 
support is explained  in the next chapter, where the type of federalism preferred by the 
Shia is one which decentralises power administratively, gives power to local 
administrative units at the province level, but maintains a strong federal government. 
69 percent of the Shia support the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral 
legislature. Establishing another house that has equal powers would undermine the 
legislative power of the House of Representatives where the Shia have a majority, 
another point elaborated upon in depth in the following chapter.  
 
Concerning the type of the constitution, 77 percent supported a flexible constitution 
that could be amended by a simple majority. This is a majoritarian arrangement that, in 
the context of Iraq, could only favour a single group capable of making up a simple 
majority in the House. The Shia have that simple majority, composing 52 percent of 
the legislature.   
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On the type of legislation, 52 percent supported a system in which the legislature has 
the final word on the constitutionality of the legislation. This, again, gives power to the 
House of Representatives, and in the context of Iraq, giving power to the legislative 
branch is, in fact, giving power to the majority in the House, the Shia, which they would 
see as democracy in action. The last variable on the federal unitary dimension is the 
central bank, where the consensus approach was supported by 90 percent.  
 
TABLE	6.1	THE	SHIA	POLITICAL	ELITE	SUPPORT	FOR	MAJORITARIAN	AND	CONSENSUS	INSTITUTIONS			
	 	 MAJ.	 CONS.	
THE	EXECUTIVE-PARTY	DIMENSION	
The	Concentration	of	Power		 84%	 16%	
Executive-Legislative	Relationship	 14%	 86%	
Party	system	 55%	 45%	
Electoral	System		 82%	 18%	
Interest	Groups	 43%	 57%	
	 	 	 	
THE	FEDERAL-UNITARY	DIMENSION	
Government	type	(Federal	or	Unitary)	 41%	 59%	
The	Legislative		 70%	 30%	
The	Constitution		 77%	 23%	
The	Legislation		 52%	 48%	
Central	Bank		 10%	 90%	
N=52	
 
Conclusion  
Overall, the majority of the Shia political elite support a majoritarian system on the 
concentration of executive power in a single majority cabinet, a two party system, 
disproportional electoral system, unicameral legislative, a constitution that can be 
amended by a simple majority, and a legislature that has the final say on the 
constitutionality of legislation. A different majority supported a consensual system on 
the executive legislative balance of power, coordinated interest groups, federal 
decentralised government and an independent central bank.  
 
The findings in this section show a clear support for majoritarian principles, particularly 
the federal-unitary dimension. The Shia support variables that clearly favour their group 
as the majority and support two majoritarian variables that are at the heart of the Iraqi 
political system; the type of legislative power and the nature of legislation, the 
concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, and a system in which 
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legislature have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation. This 
shifts power in favour of the majority in the parliament and a unicameral legislature, as 
the only legislative power, ensures that the will of that majority is neither limited nor 
mitigated by another legislative house.  
 
The findings of this section, however, show that the support for the two models is not 
clear-cut. Even within the same group, there are variations and support is not absolute. 
Group is a significant, but not the only factor at play and not all the institutions that are 
categorised as majoritarian are supported by the members of the larger group. 
Moreover, on four variables the support of the majority of the Shia was for consensual 
institutions. Support for different institutional arrangements is clearly influenced by 
other factors, such as the political context and the system that is already in place.   
 
6.3 The Sunni Perspective 
Introduction  
This section examines the formal institutions that the Sunni political elite support in 
Iraq. Their preferences are examined in two dimensions; the executive-party 
dimension, and the federal unitary dimension. The views of the responses from key 
political elite will be discussed and the preferences of the larger number of respondents 
in the House of Representatives will be examined.  
 
The findings show that the majority of the Sunni elite support consensual arrangements 
but on certain variables their support for specific institutions could rather disadvantage 
their position in relation to the Shia majority. It will be demonstrated that group size 
plays a role but there are other factors involved including the way that they perceive 
themselves as a group and the positions that they hold. All play an equally significant 
role in influencing their preferences for institutional arrangements.  
 
Sunni’s Support for Majoritarian and Consensual Institutions 
The Iraqi Vice President (2010-2014), Tariq al-Hashimi, supported a political system 
that could establish a government and an opposition. Similar to al Hakim, he believed 
that Iraq needs two opposing national political groupings. Al Hashimi is an Iraqi 
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nationalist and he believed in forming cross group coalitions. In the run up to the 2010 
national elections, he joined forces with Shia Ayyad Allawi and formed the Iraqi 
National Movement, known as the Iraqiya list. His views are shaped by the way he 
understands Iraqi society, which he sees as in terms of sectarian cleavages, with two 
main sects, the Shia and the Sunni. He regards Kurds as Sunnis -although they are 
ethnically different from the Sunni Arabs.  
 
His appeal to the political elite in other groups, however, is not sectarian and he believes 
the two sects in Iraq could learn to live together. In his view, Iraq’s nationalism, 
Iraqiness, is the solution. In his interview, he stated that if the Sunni Arabs, the Sunni 
Kurds, and the Shia nationalists were to join forces, they could form a national front. 
His responses to the questionnaire on the political institutions also reflected his views 
as outlined in the previous chapter. Concerning the concentration of the executive 
power, he favoured majoritarianism, with executive power concentrated in a single-
party majority cabinet. He supported an executive-legislative balance of power; a 
multiparty system; and an electoral system with proportional representation. Regarding 
interest groups, he preferred a pluralist interest group system with free for all 
competition among groups.  
 
On the federal unitary dimension, al-Hashimi preferred consensual characteristics on 
all five variables; federal and decentralised government; division of legislative power 
between two equally strong but differently constituted Houses; and a rigid constitution 
that could only be changed by an extraordinary majority. He believed that there should 
be a review of the constitutionality of legislation by the supreme or the constitutional 
court: ‘if such bodies were not politicised by a certain sectarian group’, obviously 
referring to the Shia, and he supported an independent central bank. 
 
Ayad al-Sammarai, the former speaker of the Iraqi parliament, preferred consensus 
based models for institutional arrangements. On the executive party dimension, he 
favoured the consensus elements of executive power sharing in broad multiparty 
coalitions, an executive-legislative balance of power, a multiparty system and 
proportional representation. For interest groups, he supports a pluralist interest system 
with free for all competition among groups, a majoritarian characteristic.  
 
	 180	
On the federal unitary dimension, al-Sammarai again preferred all the consensual 
elements of federal and decentralised governments, the division of legislative power 
between two equally strong but differently constituted Houses, a rigid constitution that 
can be changed only by extraordinary majorities, and an independent central bank. For 
the legislation, he favoured a system in which the legislature has the final word on the 
constitutionality of its own legislation, a majoritarian approach.  
 
The current Head of the House of Representatives, Salim Abdullah al-Jaburi, preferred 
consensual institutional arrangements on 8 variables. The only two majoritarian 
institutions that he chose were interest groups and the legislation. Mohammed al-
Tamaimi, the Education Minister, similar to al-Samari and al-Hashimi, supported 8 
consensual traits. The Trade Minister, Khairulla Hasan Babakr preferred three 
majoritarian traits; plural disproportional representation; the concentration of 
legislative power in a unicameral legislature; and a flexible constitution that could be 
amended by a simple majority. The Culture Minister, Saadun al-Dulaimi, preferred 
three majoritarian institutions; concentration of power in a single-partly cabinet, a two 
party system, and unitary decentralised government.  
 
A pattern could be discerned in the above responses. The Sunni political leaders have 
different or opposing views on the key variables, such as the concentration of executive 
power, the legislative and the legislation. The responses from a wider number of the 
Sunni political elite, members of the House of Representatives, are explored below.   
 
The Executive Party dimension  
On the executive party dimension, there is a 75 percent support for consensus among 
the Sunni members of the House of Representatives. On the specifics, there is a strong 
support, 68 percent, for consensual concentration of executive power sharing in a multi-
party coalition. That indicates the approval of the majority of the Sunni parliament 
members for a government that is based on a broad coalition. The data also shows a 
very strong support, 96 percent, for an executive-legislative balance of power. This high 
percentage could be explained by concerns that the Sunni parliament members have 
with the executive power, for example, as the Prime Minister is Shia. Bearing in mind 
that the speaker of the Parliament is Sunni, it becomes clear that Sunni support for an 
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executive legislative balance of power is, in fact, a preference for a balance of power 
between the two sects in the apparatus of rule.  
 
With regards to the two variables of party and electoral systems, the data shows a strong 
support for consensus. There is 82 percent support for a multi-party system and 89 
percent support for proportional representation. The Sunni support for a multi-party 
system can be explained by their numerical strength in the parliament. After the 2010 
elections, the Sunnis made up approximately one third, 28 percent, of the House. It is, 
therefore, no surprise that they strongly support a multi-party system, as a two party 
system gives them little chance to secure a place in government, as the majority Shia 
would always win and be the ruling party.  
 
The Sunni Arab’s support for a consensual electoral system of proportional 
representation can be explained with their acceptance of the political reality in Iraq, 
representation in the apparatus of rule in proportion to numerical strength. The Kurds, 
although Sunnis, do not share a political platform with the Arab Sunnis. The Shia, 
although Arab, do not share a political platform with the Sunni Arabs. Therefore, it is 
a rational choice for Sunnis to support proportional representation. The last variable on 
the executive party dimension is the interest groups, with 60 percent support for the 
majoritarian trait of pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition 
among groups.  
 
The Federal-Unitary dimension  
The data shows a 64 percent support for consensual institutions on five variables of the 
federal unitary dimension. Although the majority support consensus on the specific 
variables, the support for majoritarian traits is greater. The only two consensual traits 
that have a majority of support are government type and the central bank. There is 100 
percent support for a federal and decentralised government.110 There is also a strong 
support, 94 percent, for the consensual basis of an independent central bank.  
 
																																																						
110 Please note that some of the Sunni political elite involved in this study support a unitary and 
decentralised government, but they were not among the parliament members. They were members of the 
council of ministers.  
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All the Sunni parliament members who participated in this survey supported the idea 
of a federal state. While they may have differing views regarding the specific details of 
how Iraq’s federalism should be put into practice, fundamentally, almost all believe 
that in order for Sunnis to have political independence, a federal region similar to Iraqi 
Kurdistan is needed. They felt this was the only way that they could escape the 
hegemony of the Shia and protect themselves from being marginalised.  
 
On three significant variables, the legislative, the constitution, and the legislation, the 
greater number of the Sunni supported majoritarianism. This is an interesting result 
because one might expect the minority Sunni Arabs to support consensus on those 
variables. There is a 54 percent support for the concentration of legislative power in a 
unicameral legislature. This support could be in part explained by the belief of the Sunni 
political elite that they could join forces with the Sunni Kurds and Shia nationalists in 
the parliament.  
 
There is a 54 percent preference for a flexible constitution that could be amended by a 
simple majority. This result can be explained by reference to the findings reported in 
Chapter 8. Article 142 promises an amendment to the constitution taking into account 
the views of the Sunni. Due to their boycott in 2005, the Sunni joined the constitution 
drafting late and established Article 142 as a guarantee for themselves. Without this 
article, the Sunnis would not have voted in favour of the constitution in the national 
referendum. This compromise is examined in depth in Chapter 8.  
 
The legislation variable showed 68 percent support for a legislature that has the final 
word on the constitutionality of its own legislation. The Sunni view the legislative as 
theirs as part of the power-sharing agreement and so, for example, the Speaker of the 
Parliament falls within the remit of the Sunni. They believe that judicial power in Iraq 
has been politicised by the Shia, a view shared by Kurds, Sunni, and even some Shia 
that were interviewed. It can be argued that the Sunni elite do not support a judicial 
review or constitutional supreme courts because any judicial review would favour the 
Shia.   
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TABLE	6.2	SUNNI	POLITICAL	ELITE	SUPPORT	FOR	MAJORITARIAN	AND	CONSENSUAL	INSTITUTIONS		
	 	 	 MAJ.	 CONS.	
THE	EXECUTIVE-PARTY	DIMENSION	
The	Concentration	of	Power		 	 33%	 67%	
Executive-Legislative	Relationship	 	 4%	 96%	
Party	system	 	 18%	 82%	
Electoral	System		 	 11%	 89%	
Interest	Groups	 	 61%	 39%	
	 	 	 	 	
THE	FEDERAL-UNITARY	DIMENSION	
Government	type	(Federal	or	Unitary)	 	 0%	 100%	
The	Legislative		 	 54%	 46%	
The	Constitution		 	 54%	 46%	
The	Legislation		 	 67%	 33%	
Central	Bank		 	 4%	 96%	
	 	 	 	 N=	28	
 
 
Conclusion  
Overall, the Sunni political elite support a mixture of consensual and majoritarian 
approaches to the two different dimensions. On six variables, the majority supported 
consensual traits. These include; concentration of the executive power in a multi-party 
coalition, executive-legislative balance of power, a multi-party system, a proportional 
electoral system; a federal decentralised government and independent central bank. On 
four variables, the greater number supported majoritarian traits. These are; a unicameral 
legislature, a flexible constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. A 
legislature that has the final word on the constitutionality of its own legislation and 
interest groups that are free for all.  
 
These findings partially confirm the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3; the smaller the 
group, the more likely it is that it will support consensus. On specific traits and 
institutions, however, the matter is more complex. The findings showed that group size 
has a significant role but it is not the only factor in determining preferences. On four 
variables, the majority of the Sunnis supported majoritarian traits, and those could be 
explained by the way in which the Sunni political elite view themselves, and other 
groups. Perhaps the most important factor, however, is the positions that the Sunni elite 
hold in the apparatus of rule. Based on the informal power sharing agreement, the post 
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of the Speaker of the House is reserved for the Sunni and this, as the findings 
demonstrated, has to a great extent influenced their preferences for the type of 
institutional arrangements in Iraq.  
 
6.4 The Kurdish Perspective 
Introduction 
This section indicates the formal institutions that the Kurdish political elite support in 
Iraq. As with the pervious sections, the preferences of the Kurds for the executive-party 
and the federal unitary dimensions will be explored. The responses of key Kurdish 
political figures will be discussed and the preferences of the majority of Kurdish 
respondents in the House will be examined.  
 
The findings show that the majority of Kurdish political elite support consensual 
arrangements but on certain variables their support for specific institutions could rather 
disadvantage their position in relation to the Shia majority. It will be demonstrated that 
group size plays a role but there are other key factors, including their perception of 
themselves as a group and the positions that they hold that are equally significant in 
influencing preferences for institutional arrangements.  
 
Kurds’ Support for Majoritarian and Consensual institutions  
The Kurdish elite support a political system that establishes and maintains the principles 
of power sharing. From a Kurdish perspective, post 2003 Iraq is the product of 
consensus among the main groups in Iraq and, on almost all variables, they demonstrate 
a preference for consensual institutional arrangements.  
 
Jala Talabani, President of Iraq until 2013, on both executive-party and federal unitary 
issues supported consensus. On the party-executive dimension, on four variables he 
favoured consensual institutions. He believed that the concentration of power in the 
executive branch should be shared in broad multiparty coalitions, and there should be 
a balance of power in the executive-legislative relationship. Concerning the party 
system, he favoured multiparty systems over a two party system, and preferred the 
consensus aspect of proportional representation for the electoral system. Regarding the 
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role of interest groups, he believed that the majoritarian element of a pluralist system, 
with free-for-all competition among groups, would be better for Iraq.   
 
On the federal-unitary dimension, concerning government type, the President favoured 
a federal and decentralised government. He believed that in the legislative, there should 
be a division of power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses; 
the Iraqi House of Representatives and the Iraqi Federal Council, thus supporting a 
consensus element. He also believed that the constitution should be rigid and should be 
changed only by an extraordinary majority. On the legislation, Talabani supported a 
majoritarian element in a system in which the legislature had the final word on the 
constitutionality of its own legislation. On the last question, regarding the Central Bank, 
he favoured consensus, where the central bank was independent of the majoritarian 
element and the central banks were dependent on the executive power. Overall, the 
President supported nine consensus elements and only one majoritarian. The current 
Iraqi President, Dr. Fuad Masoum, who is also Kurdish, was one of the participants in 
this study, but was then then a member of the Iraqi Parliament. Masoum, on all 
variables, preferred consensus institutional arrangements.   
 
Masoud Barzani, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, on all variables preferred 
the consensual approach. On the executive-party dimension, he supported sharing the 
executive power in broad multiparty coalitions; a balance of power in the executive-
legislative relationship; a multiparty system; an electoral system of proportional 
representation; and also coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at 
compromise and concentration. On the federal-unitary dimension, Barzani preferred all 
the consensus elements; federal and decentralised government, division of legislative 
power between two equally strong but differently constituted Houses, and a rigid 
constitution that could be changed only by extraordinary majority.  For legislation, he 
advocated a system in which the constitutionality of the actions of the legislature were 
subject to review by supreme or constitutional courts.  Finally, he supported 
independent central banks.  
 
Barzani and Talabani differed only in their support for interest groups. Talabani 
preferred a majoritarian arrangement of a pluralist interest group system, while Barzani 
preferred the consensual arrangement of a coordinated and corporatist interest group 
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system aimed at compromise and concentration. Barzani, while responding to this 
specific question, expressed the opinion that the institutions in Iraq were not yet fully 
consolidated, therefore, he preferred ‘a more coordinated system for interest groups’. 
He went on to elaborate on his views stating   that Iraq is not a pluralist society. 
Therefore, different groups had to coordinate and compromise to make the work of 
interest groups more effective and fair. Barzani supported all the consensual 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The Prime Minster of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, supported almost all 
of the consensus elements on both executive-party dimension and federal-unitary 
dimension, expect for interest groups. On this is issue, he favoured a majoritarian 
pluralist interest group system. That was also the view of the former Prime Minister of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, Barham Salih. He was still the Prime Minister at the time of interview 
and, like Nechirvan Barzani, supported all the consensus elements except for interest 
groups, where he preferred a majoritarian element.  
 
The responses from the Kurdish elite reveal an important point. Barzani and Talabani 
are the Secretary Generals of the two main political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, and they 
have been political rivals. Their preferences for political institutions, however, are 
almost identical, except for interest groups.  
 
The Executive-Party Dimension  
On the executive party dimension, the Kurdish political elite support for consensual 
institutional arrangements was 71 percent. On all variables, the greater number of 
preferences were for consensual institutions with the exception of interest groups, 
where a majority, 66 per cent, chose the majoritarian approach.  
 
On the type of the executive power, there was 67 percent support for executive power 
sharing in a multi parity coalition. Kurds, since the fall of the Ba’ath regime, have been 
very strong supporters of power sharing, where they can be partners in the apparatus of 
rule. This aspiration is articulated definitively by their top decision makers and, as the 
survey shows, it also represents the will of the majority of Kurdish members of 
parliament.  
	 187	
 
In the second and third variables of the executive party dimension, that is the executive-
legislative relationship and the electoral system, there was strong support, 94 percent, 
in favour of consensual arrangements. The strong support for executive and legislative 
balance of power may indicate Kurdish opposition to the concentration of power in the 
executive power in a way that might make it superior to the legislative. A superior 
executive power, to them, runs the risk of providing the opportunity for dictatorship – 
Kurds have had bitter experiences with centralised authorities in Baghdad in the past. 
Despite their political differences, Kurds in Kurdistan hold the same views concerning 
the concentration of power in Baghdad, and support the concept that federal power must 
be shared among the three main groups in the country.  
 
Strong Kurdish support, 94 percent, for a multi-party system can be better understood 
bearing in mind Kurdish views on Iraq’s society. From a Kurdish perspective, Iraq is a 
composition of three different groups that represent three different political cultures. 
Therefore, they see it as unlikely that any political party will be able to mobilise 
supporters across those groups (see Chapter 5). On the variable of electoral system, 
there was a 67 percent support for proportional representation. Kurds believe in their 
numerical strength and wish to be represented in the House based on their proportion 
of population. On the other hand, a pluralistic disproportional system could lead to an 
under representation of Kurds as they compose 18-20 percent of the population.    
 
The Federal-Unitary Dimension  
There is 80 per cent support for consensus in the institutional arrangements. On all 
variables, the larger number of respondents supported consensus. 100 per cent of 
respondents favoured the consensual characteristic of a federal decentralised 
government. It can be argued that all the Kurdish elite supported a federal decentralised 
government for two reasons; a federal system would allow Kurds to maintain their 
Kurdistan region as an independent polity within Iraq, and decentralisation of power 
would mean a weakening of central government power. The Kurds oppose a centralised 
authority in Baghdad and this subject will be discussed further in the following chapter.   
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In terms of the legislature, 78 percent support a bicameral legislative, indicating that 
Kurds want a Federal Council to be formed, a view shared by their key political leaders. 
Kurds find it to be in their interest for the legislative power to be divided between two 
equally strong but differently constituted Houses. This is because this would give Kurds 
another area of power to keep the power of the government and the Shia majority in the 
House in check.  
 
There was a 61 percent support for a rigid constitution that could be changed only by 
an extraordinary majority. The constitution is crucial for Kurds and will be discussed 
in depth in Chapter 8. They regard the constitution as the guarantor of Iraq’s unity with 
Kurds staying part of Iraq. Any amendments to the constitution, based on a simple 
majority, is perceived as a threat to the Kurds’ constitutional rights and their interests. 
A flexible constitution could be amended by the Shia alone, but a rigid constitution 
cannot be amended except by taking into account Kurdish views, giving the Kurds a de 
facto power of veto, enabling them to protect their constitutional rights.  
 
61 percent support a system in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their 
constitutionality by a supreme or constitutional court. This, coinciding with the view of 
Barzani and Talabani, shows that, for Kurds, the constitution is of great importance and 
any bills laid before the parliament by the majority Shia should be subject to the filter 
of the constitution.  
 
On the variable of the central bank, all the Kurdish political elite were in favour of a 
consensual concept of an independent central bank. No one believed that the central 
bank should be subject to the executive power. That could indicate concerns about a 
centralised government that in times of dispute could withhold the Kurdish budget to 
put pressure on them. Kurdish concerns proved well founded when a dispute between 
the Kurdistan region and the central government on law relating to oil led to the central 
authority refusing to give the Kurdish region its due share of the national budget. This 
included the resources to pay all state employees in the Kurdistan region. Given the use 
of this tactic by the government, it is easy to understand Kurdish support for an 
independent bank.  
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TABLE	6.3	THE	KURDISH	POLITICAL	ELITE	SUPPORT	FOR	MAJORITARIAN	AND	CONSENSUAL	INSTITUTIONS		
	 	 MAJ.	 CONS.	
THE	EXECUTIVE-PARTY	DIMENSION	
The	Concentration	of	Power		 34%	 66%	
Executive-Legislative	Relationship	 6%	 94%	
Party	System	 6%	 94%	
Electoral	System		 34%	 66%	
Interest	Groups	 56%	 44%	
	 	 	 	
THE	FEDERAL-UNITARY	DIMENSION	
Government	Type		(Federal	or	Unitary)	 0%	 100%	
The	Legislative		 23%	 77%	
The	Constitution		 39%	 61%	
The	Legislation		 39%	 61%	
Central	Bank		 0%	 100%	
N=18	
 
 
Conclusion  
The findings of this section demonstrate that the Kurds support a political system based 
on consensual institutions. The only variable on which the majority supported a 
majoritarian approach was the interest groups. For the other nine variables, the majority 
supported consensual attitude to; the concentration of executive power in a multi-party 
coalition; a balance of power in the executive legislature; a multi-party system; a 
decentralised federal government; a unicameral legislature; a fixed constitution; 
judicial review; and an independent central bank.  
 
Although the majority of the Kurdish elite supported consensual approaches, a 
significant number, almost one third, favoured majoritarian systems in relation to the 
concentration of power, the electoral system, the constitution and the legislation. Within 
the minority Kurdish group, a minority supported majoritarianism as was the case for 
the Sunni elite. The importance of these minorities within groups will become apparent 
in the next section.  
 
These findings confirm the hypothesis derived from the theoretical framework in 
Chapter 3 that the smaller the number of a group, the greater their support for a 
consensual model. The Kurdish group is smaller than the other two groups and the 
support for the consensus was higher, compared to both the Shia and the Sunni.  
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Two other fundamental factors were demonstrated as influencing Kurdish preferences 
for institutional arrangements; the Kurdish historical experience under former Iraqi 
regimes, and the Kurdish political experience of self-rule and autonomy. In the context 
of Iraq, the Kurds believe that consensus could prevent the rise of authoritarian rule in 
Baghdad, and that a consensual model based on power sharing and a type of federalism 
that ensures regional autonomy could protect Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. 
 
6.5 Cross-group Findings 
The empirical data in this chapter confirmed the hypothesis derived from the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3. The findings in sections 3 to 5 confirmed this hypothesis (see 
Table 6.4).  
 
TABLE	6.4	CROSS	GROUP	PERCENTAGE	OF	SUPPORT	MAJORITARIAN	AND	CONSENSUAL	ELEMENTS	
	 Majoritarian	system	 Consensus	system	
SHIA	ARAB										N=52	 52%	 48%	
SUNNI	ARAB							N=28	 31%	 69%	
KURD																	N=18	 25%	 75%	
MINORITIES								N=2	 10%	 90%	
OVERALL													N=100	 41%	 59%	
 
As Table 6.4 shows, the larger the group, the greater the support for majoritarian 
institutions. However, the matter is more complicated than that. This section shows the 
results of the survey among all Iraqi Parliament members, regardless of their ethnic, 
religious or political backgrounds. The results are derived from the responses from the 
three main groups, as well as the minorities, a total of 100 participants who were 
members of the parliament. In addition to the views of parliament members, this section 
also shares the views of members of the executive in Iraq, including the council of 
ministers and presidency, again regardless their ethno-sectarian differences.  
 
The aim is to establish the overall support for different institutions across different 
ethno-religious groups and to determine which political institution the majority of the 
Iraqi political class, irrespective of their ethno-religious backgrounds, favour.  
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Taking the responses of the 100 participants on the ten variables, the overall support 
for institutional arrangements is: consensual arrangements, at 60 percent support, with 
the majoritarian arrangements with 40 percent. This percentage is arrived at by counting 
the preferences of each participant on the ten different variables. For example, if 80 
participants on the first variable of concentration of executive power preferred the 
consensus in the  sharing power in a multi-party executive, then the consensual model 
on that particular aspect  has 80 percent support. However, as has been mentioned 
previously not all variables on the two dimensions are equally significant in making a 
political system more consensual or more majoritarian.  
 
To make an examination of the findings of the cross groups more precisely and 
accurately, the support for each aspect on a specific variable has to be treated separately.  
 
The Consensual Traits  
There are five variables on which the majority of the elite supported consensus; three 
of them are on the executive-party dimension and two on the federal unitary dimension. 
The variables on the executive-party dimension include; executive legislative balance 
of power; a multi-party system and consensual interest groups. The variables on the 
federal unitary dimension include; federal decentralised government and an 
independent central bank.  
 
The significance of the support for the consensual traits on those five variables are 
apparent when looking at the context of Iraq (see Section 6.3). Since the political system 
in Iraq is parliamentary, with a balance of power between the executive and the 
legislative power by default, then the 90 percent overall support for consensus on the 
executive legislative relationship is to be expected. This is particularly true, bearing in 
mind the fact that all the participants are members of parliament who, in the main, wish 
to see such a balance of power.  
 
Similarly, it is a given political reality that each ethnic or religious group has developed 
more than one political party. Therefore, a multi-party system has become not only a 
political reality in Iraq but also a political reality within each group in Iraq. Each group 
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has more than three politically significant parties representing them in parliament. 
Therefore, the political elites’ overall support, 65 percent, consensus for a multi-party 
system, is not surprising or significant. Moreover, the overall support for the consensual 
to interest groups at 56 percent, and for a central bank at 94 percent, does not require 
further investigation because for Iraq they are not of great importance, or subjects of 
controversy.    
 
Out of the five variables where consensus traits have majority support, one is of the 
greatest importance, government type. There is a 79 percent support for a consensual 
approach to the government type variable, a decentralised federal government. Iraq 
operates under a federal government, but the issue of federalism in the country is far 
from settled. The federal structure is incomplete and it does not reflect the structure that 
the Iraqi constitution envisioned and promised. This variable is of great importance in 
pushing Iraq’s political system either towards a majoritarian or a consensual model, an 
issue on which the views of the Iraqi political elite are diverse. The issue of federalism 
is controversial because of its importance and significance. Consequently, a separate 
chapter has been dedicated to examining elites’ views and preferences on federalism.  
 
The Majoritarian Traits   
There are five variables on which the Iraqi political elite have supported majoritarian 
traits; concentration of executive power, electoral system, the legislation the 
constitution and the legislation. The support for these variables is of great importance. 
Those institutions are significant both on their own, and because Iraqi formal political 
institutions are based on informal political practices that are inherently incongruent (see 
Section 6.3).   
 
There is a 60 percent support for the majoritarian concentration of power in a single 
majority cabinet. This result is in sharp contrast to the informal political agreement 
among Iraq’s main groups that advocates a grand coalition and concentration of 
executive power in a multi-party coalition. There have been efforts to form a majority 
government, especially based on Shia coalitions, such as the State of Law Coalition. As 
long as the grand coalition is the principle on which power is shared continues to hold 
Iraq together politically, the formation of a single majority cabinet remains unlikely.  
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The electoral system variable, although significant, has not been the subject of 
controversy in Iraq. The 52 percent overall support for disproportional representation 
is in sharp contrast to the proportional electoral representation used in Iraq. On the 
legislative variable, support for a majoritarian unicameralism is 55 percent. This could 
indicate the fact that the House of Representative is the only legislative house, 
notwithstanding that the constitution has provision for the establishment of a second, 
the Iraqi Federal Council. This issue is linked to the question of federalism in Iraq, as 
bicameralism is one of the principles of federalism. Eminent scholars maintain that 
despite the primary meaning of federalism as division of powers between the federal 
and local governments, a further fundamental characteristic of federalism is the 
existence of bicameralism (Wheare 1946; Elzar 1968; Friedrich 1968; Duchacek 1970).  
 
The 53 percent of support for the majoritarian idea, giving the legislative the final word 
on the constitutionality of its own legislation, reflects the political reality in Iraq. That 
is, the Iraqi parliament does not require a judicial review. This could indicate a support 
for the implementation of the constitution non-consensually, a majoritarian implication 
for the Iraqi constitution. When the Iraqi parliament has the final word on the 
constitutionality of its own legislation, then the issue of the composition of the 
parliament becomes crucial. Since the Shia are the majority, this could enable them to 
interpret the constitution or issue laws that serve their particular interests.  
 
The findings also show a 62 percent of support for a majoritarian approach to a flexible 
constitution that could be amended by a simple majority. The response on the 
constitution variable, together with the findings on the legislation variable, are 
interconnected, and of great importance. One of the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3 was that for a consensual system to be embedded 
in Iraq there should be support for a consensus on the constitution. These two variables 
will be further examined in a separate chapter.  
 
Federalism and Constitution 
This section examined the responses of politicians on different political institutions. 
The cross-group findings show that the support for either the consensual or majoritarian 
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models is complex. Overall, there is 60 percent support for consensual traits, but when 
examined on the single variables the support for both models are similar. That is to say, 
on five variables the consensual traits have the greater number of supporters but there 
is greater support for majoritarianism on the other five.  
 
It was argued that not all those variables are of the same significance in moving the 
political system towards either model. The variables that are of greatest importance are 
government type and the constitution. On either variable, a particular trait had the 
support of the greater number. On the type of government, the greater number 
supported the consensual traits of decentralised and federated government. On the type 
of institution, the majority supported the majoritarian trait of a constitution that could 
be amended by a simple majority.  
 
These findings were unexpected in that they are contrary to what is practiced in Iraq. 
Iraqi federalism, except in the Kurdistan region, is not consensual and the constitution 
is not majoritarian. The support for decentralised federalism, which is a consensual 
trait, needs more precise understanding to see what the Iraqi political elite understand  
by federalism. The Iraqi constitution allows for more than one form of federalism. 
Majority support for a majoritarian constitution for Iraq that could be amended by a 
simple majority also raises further questions.  
 
The views expressed by the Sunni and the Shia on those two institutions were also 
unexpected. On the variable of ‘government type’ it was rather surprising that a 
majority of Shia supported a consensual trait of ‘decentralised and federal.’ Similarly, 
on the variable of ‘the constitution’ it was also unexpected that the majority of the Sunni 
supported a majoritarian trait. Both of those positions seem to be counter-intuitive and 
therefore require more in-depth investigation as to what exactly each group means by 
their support for those two institutions.  
 
Federalism and the amendment of the Iraqi constitution are both controversial issues in 
Iraq. These are institutions that could determine the ultimate shape of Iraq’s political 
system, and, as such, will be examined in depth through empirical findings in Chapters 
7 and 8. The Kurds chose to remain within Iraq only when their demands for a federal 
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region with extended political and fiscal powers were guaranteed. The Sunni demand a 
federal region based on their provinces, similar to the Kurds. Both groups’ demands 
have, so far, been rejected by the Shia. The constitution is the key to these issues of 
federalism, and the clause in Article 1 that reads, ‘this Constitution is a guarantor of the 
unity of Iraq’ speaks to the issues of territoriality among different groups in Iraq. It is 
crucial to further explore, through the divergent perspectives of different groups in Iraq, 
these two key institutions since they not only affect the process of building democracy 
in Iraq, but also impact significantly on stability and instability.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter filled a gap in existing knowledge concerning the views of political elites 
on formal institutions in Iraq. It examined these views in four sections. In three sections, 
the views were analysed in detail and in the fourth, views across different groups were 
explored. The findings supported the main hypothesis: that there is a negative 
correlation between a groups’ size and their support for consensual systems. More 
importantly, they also showed that although group size is a significant factor, it is not 
the only explanatory factor affecting preferences for either consensual or majoritarian 
models. Other equally significant factors are group interests, the political context of the 
country in question, the political system already in place, the way in which groups view 
themselves, the historical grievances, and the political positions that each group 
occupies in the apparatus of rule. All of these factors combine to affect group preference 
for either model.  
 
One of the most important findings of this chapter was that support for either model is 
not clear cut. The sections on each group showed that there are variations within the 
same groups on particular variables and the section on cross-group findings showed 
that, in fact, those variations make a difference in the overall support for an institution 
to be majoritarian or consensual. A minority with the minorities supported majoritarian 
traits on each variable, while a minority within the majority supported consensual traits 
on each variable.  
 
The Shia supported a political system with 70 percent majoritarian traits, and the 
unexpected variable on which a greater number of the Shia supported a consensual 
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approach to decentralisation and federalism. The Sunni supported a political system 
with 60 percent consensual features, however, unexpectedly, a majority favoured 
majoritarianism for the constitution. The Kurds rather predictably supported a system 
with 90 percent consensual traits.  
 
Section 6 examined the findings across different groups and it was shown that although 
overall there is majority support for the consensual model, on specifics each model has 
the support of the majority on five different variables. The greater number supported 
majoritarian institutional arrangements in the concentration of power, electoral 
systems, the legislative, the constitution and the legislation. On the five other variables, 
the greater number supported consensual institutional arrangements for the executive-
legislative relationship, party system, interest groups, federal government type, and the 
central bank.     
 
It was also argued that some institutions are more important than others. The findings 
showed that the two most important institutions were federalism and the constitution. 
The overall support for each by the political elite varied. The greater number supported 
a consensual approach to decentralisation and federalism. On the constitution, the 
greater number supported majoritarianism within a flexible constitution that could be 
amended with a simple majority.  
 
Those two variables are of great importance. Iraq’s federalism is yet to be finalised and 
put into practice, and the constitution is yet to be amended. These two institutions could 
determine the future of Iraq’s political system, consequently the views of political elites 
concerning those two institutions are highly significant. This thesis has allocated the 
next two chapters to a separate examination of these views and preferences.  
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CHAPTER 7: 
Federalism through Divergent Perspectives 
 
7.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter confirmed that all of the key Iraqi groups prefer federalism, 
what is not as clear is whether they share the same interpretation of that term. The 
empirical data from interviews and surveys presented in this chapter is an innovative 
contribution to the investigation of the views of political elites concerning federalism 
and offers an assessment of the support for the concept and type of federalism among 
different Iraqi groups.  
 
There are two highly controversial issues linked to Iraq’s federalism. The first is 
whether the structure and the type of federalism should be based on the administrative 
units of 18 governorates or on three regions correlating to Shia, Sunni, and Kurd 
dominance. The second revolves around power distribution and the relative balance of 
authority between the federal, central, authority, and the constituent, more localised, 
units. This chapter investigates the views of the political elite on these two themes.  
 
As the support of the political elite for two different types of federalism, consensual 
and plural, are examined,111 it is essential to have an operational definition for each 
type. Consensual federalism,112 operationally, can be defined as a federal political order 
that has the three features of federal decentralised government, a bicameral legislature, 
and devolved segmental autonomy. Among the Iraqi political elite, this type of federal 
																																																						
111 In order to examine the political elite’s support for those two types of federal systems three areas are 
considered: the support for the type of legislation whether bicameral or unicameral, the support for the 
establishment of the federation council, and last but not the least support for segmental autonomy (i.e. a 
federal state of three main parts). In addition to the survey, I incorporate responses from in depth elite 
interviews, from a single question about Iraq’s federalism; ‘On what bases Iraq’s federalism should be 
based, sect, ethnicity, or geography?’  
112 In my conceptualisation of a consensual federalism, I combine Lijphart’s older works with his more 
recent ones, in particular Consociational Democracy (1969) and Patterns of Democracy (1999). One of 
the defining characteristics of a consensus system is a federal and decentralised government, and another 
is the concentration of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses 
(Lijphart 1999: 1-8). I employ a principle of consociational democracy as well (Lijphart 1969), one that 
relates to the idea of federalism, namely segmental autonomy. 
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structure is known as ethnic federalism (al-fidraliya al-taefiya), that is federal regions 
with borders coinciding with the ethnic boundaries of the three main groups.  
 
A pluralist type of federal political order, operationally, can be defined as a system that 
has a centralised federal authority, a unicameral legislature, and negates segmental 
autonomy. In Iraq, this type of federal system is known as ‘administrative federalism’ 
(al-fidraliya al-idariya) referring to the geographical boundaries, or the areas of 
territorial administration, of the 18 governorates. This type of federal system devolves 
certain administrative powers to the governorates but maintains a strong centralised 
authority in Baghdad, a political order called a ‘centralised federalism’ (Singh and 
Verney 2003). 
 
Federalism, both in theory and practice, involves issues of power distribution and power 
concentration between the central government and other administrative units (Watts 
1998; Føllesdal 2003; Norman 1994; 2006). Consequently, elite views on whether Iraq 
can be governed more successfully, in terms of the maintenance of stability, and in 
staving off secession, are explored (Simeon 1998, Linz 1997, Simeon and Conway 
2001). In parallel, the issue of whether federalism keeps Iraq united or entrenches 
division within Iraq is also assessed. A further issue related to federalism, and relevant 
to the Iraqi context, is the politics of recognition, which in turn is connected to identity 
politics, when different ethno-religious groups strive to exist politically based on their 
identity (Gutman 1994; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Carens 2000).  
 
The chapter begins by discussing the type of federalism that the Iraqi constitution 
allows, and then investigates the support for each type of federalism within the three 
main groups. Current debates on federalism in Iraq are highlighted and the position of 
this thesis located within them. The views of the Iraqi political elite are set out showing 
what elite members of different groups means by federalism, and what type of 
federalism they prefer.  
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7.2 Federalism in Iraq 
Federalism in the Iraqi Constitution and in Practice  
Much of the scholarly work in the current literature uses the terms ‘federal political 
order’, ‘federalism’, ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’ (William and Riker 1964; 
Friedrich 1968; Earle 1968; Elazar 1968; 1986; 1993; King 1982; Watts 1998; 1999 
Føllesdal 2003; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). A federal political order 
can be best understood as an organisation which has the main attributes of self-rule and 
shared rule between the central government and other constituent parts (Watts 1998: 
120). Federalism is the notion that final authority is divided between member units and 
the common institutions (Føllesdal 2003). In illustrating Iraq’s federal system, this 
research refers to the Iraqi constitution, Article 1 of which states that Iraq is a federal 
parliamentary democracy, and the constitution itself is the guarantor of its unity.113 
There are three types of federal powers identified in the constitution. Those powers that 
can be exercised only by the federal authority are covered in Articles 109 to Article 
113. Those powers that are devolved to the authority of the regions are found in Articles 
116 to Article 121, while those powers that are shared between the central authority 
and the regions and governorates that are not incorporated in a region are in Article 
114.   
 
A federal system is distinguished by the characteristics of power-sharing and self-rule. 
The Iraqi constitution, however, has given its federal system a third characteristic. In 
five Articles,114 the constitution gives the central authority means to exercise power 
over the constituent units of regions and governorates. The constitution, nonetheless, 
aims to balance this with a rather paradoxical attempt to restrict the powers of the 
central authority with regards to the powers shared between the federal government and 
the regional governments, by giving priority to the law of the regions, and governorates 
not organised in a region, in case of dispute (Article 115).  
 
																																																						
113 This matter is dealt with in greater depth in Chapter 8. 
114 Article 109, preserving the unity and sovereignty; Article 110, executive authorities in foreign policy 
and diplomatic representations, formulating and executing national security policy, formulating fiscal 
and customs policy; issuing currency, regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate 
boundaries in Iraq, drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy, and 
establishing and administering a central bank. Article 111 and Article 112, in oil and gas; and Article 
113, antiquities, archaeological sites, cultural buildings, manuscripts, and coins shall be considered 
national. 
	 200	
The other two terms often used are federation and confederation. Federation here refers 
to a territorial division of power between constituent units which, in the Iraqi 
constitution, are referred to as ‘regions’, ‘governorates’, and ‘local administrations’, 
and a common government, in the Iraqi constitution designated as the federal 
government, or the central authority. Confederation refers to a political system with a 
weaker centre compared to the former. Central authority is less powerful than in a 
federation where the central authority depends on its composite parts (federal regions) 
(Watts1998: 21). Iraq, at present, both in constitution and in reality, is closer to a 
federation than a confederation. 
 
Federations and confederations are categorised based on the degree of powers that their 
member units enjoy. A symmetric federation is one in which the member units enjoy 
equal powers, whereas an asymmetric system implies one in which power is not equally 
distributed (Føllesdal 2003). Iraq’s federal system, as the constitution spells out, 
envisions a symmetrical federation with regions or member units having equal powers. 
Articles 117, 118, 119 and 120 all make this point clear.115 The Iraqi constitution allows 
the formation of new regions from the governorates that are not formed into a region 
yet (Article 117, and 118) and the circumstances under which this can be done is stated 
in Article 119. This provides the opportunity for one or more governorates to organise 
into a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum.116  
 
A federal system is also categorised by the way in which it is formed and established. 
Two processes have been identified, coming-together and holding-together (Stepan 
1999). A coming-together federal system constrains the powers of the central authority 
with different former states joining together to form a federation. A holding-together 
																																																						
115 Article 117: First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognise the region of Kurdistan, 
along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its provisions. 
Article 119: One or more governorates shall have the right to organise into a region based on a request 
to be voted on in a referendum submitted in one of the following two methods: 
First: A request by one-third of the council members of each governorate intending to form a region. 
Second: A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates intending to form a region. 
Article 120: Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the 
region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not 
contradict this Constitution. 
116 The referendum to be submitted in one of the following two methods: First: A request by one-third of 
the council members of each governorate intending to form a region. Second: A request by one-tenth of 
the voters in each of the governorates intending to form a region. 
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federal system evolves within a unitary state, and the central authority shares its powers 
with the newly formed members so that a central government assigns its authority to 
territorially clustered groups (Friedrich 1968; Buchanan 1995). The constitution of Iraq 
lays out a blue print for a coming-together symmetrical federalism, while the reality in 
Iraq is rather more of a holding-together asymmetrical federalism. Based on the 
constitution, such potentially organised regions would enjoy constitutional symmetry, 
or more exactly, symmetry in their formation, with each region adopting its own 
constitution that defines its structure of powers, its authority, and the mechanisms for 
exercising that authority (Article 120).117 This, together with Article 115, makes the 
Iraqi federal system a coming-together federation, one in which the central authority 
depends on its regions once they are formed.  
 
Article 116 of the constitution states that the federal system consists of a ‘decentralised 
capital,’ regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations. Article 48 asserts 
that the federal legislative power consists of ‘two differently constituted houses,’ the 
House of Representatives and the Federation Council. Although Article 65 promises 
the establishment of an upper legislative council, to be called the Federation Council, 
to represent members from the regions and the governorates that are not organised in a 
region,118 it has not yet been  formed. In the constitution, decentralised central authority 
and a bicameral legislature are two of the consensual elements of Iraq’s federalism. 
Eminent scholars maintain that despite the primary meaning of federalism as division 
of powers between the federal and local governments, a further fundamental 
characteristic is the existence of bicameralism (Wheare 1946; Friedrich 1950; Elzar 
1968; Duchacek 1970). The Iraqi constitution indicates a symmetric federation with a 
bicameral legislature, but in practice, so far, Iraq’s federalism is asymmetric and 
unicameral. For example, the Kurdistan region enjoys greater powers compared with 
other governorates, and the House of Representatives is the only legislative body. 
 
																																																						
117 That with the condition that the regional constitutions do not contradict the Iraqi federal constitution, 
bearing in mind, on defining the powers of the regions and the powers that are shared between the federal 
constitution and the regions, priority goes to the regions. That is to say, the constitutions of the regions 
must not contradict the powers exclusive to the federal government.  
118 Article 65: A legislative council shall be established, named the “Federation Council,” to include 
representatives from the regions and the governorates that are not organised in a region. A law, enacted 
by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives, shall regulate the formation 
of the Federation Council, its membership conditions, its competencies, and all that is connected with it.  
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Current Debates on Iraq’s Federalism  
Current debates on federalism in Iraq revolve around questions of what type of 
federalism could help democracy building in Iraq. These include whether a symmetrical 
or asymmetrical federal system, and whether a coming-together or a holding-together 
approach, is more likely to lead to democratisation in Iraq. The central issue comes 
down to whether the central government should enjoy more power or should that 
authority be constrained and limited by the federal regions.  
 
This debate concerning the balance of power between central and local governments 
has been extensively explored in recent literature (Al Rubaie 2004; Brancati 2004; 
Smith 2005; Salamey and Pearson 2005; Anderson and Stansfield 2005; Galbraith 
2006; O’Leary, McGarry, and Salih 2006; Anderson 2007; Visser and Stansfield 2007; 
Alkadiri 2010; Natali 2011; Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, 2012; Danilovich 2014). 
However, the constitution itself is vague on this matter, giving considerable powers to 
both the central government and the regional administrative units in Article 115. In 
times of dispute over ‘powers shared’ between the federal and the regional 
governments, priority appears to be given by the constitution to the law of the regions 
and governorates not organised in a region, but the wording is indecisive and vague. 
Article 114 outlines all the shared powers between the central government and local 
administrative units. The first and seventh points ends with; ‘this shall be regulated by 
a law.’ This phrase is repeated in Article 112 and 113 with reference to the executive 
powers of the federal government. Such lack of clarity in the Articles has left room for 
debate, both among political elites and academics, as to what is better for the feasibility 
of successfully embedding democracy in Iraq; giving more powers to the central 
government or to the local governments and administrative units? 
 
There are two main propositions concerning Iraq’s federalism and the issue of 
devolution or centralisation of power. One proposition is that Iraq needs a strong central 
administrative state. Without a strong central state, formal federal structures in deeply 
divided societies will fail and federalism can, thus, provide scope for ‘regionalism, 
sectarianism and secession’ (Smith 2005: 133-141). Others argue that the only way to 
safeguard Iraq’s territorial unity from division and fragmentation is through federal 
institutions, with the House of Representatives and the judiciary needing to be 
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strengthened (Salamey and Pearson 2005: 206). In Natali’s words, ‘paradoxically, a 
devolved Iraqi polity may require a moderately strong centre’ (Natali 2011: 7).  
 
An alternative proposition is that Iraq’s federal government must be designed to give 
regional governments extensive political and financial autonomy (Brancati 2004: 20). 
Similarly, it has been argued that the only way to keep Iraq together is to fully 
implement a federal model that gives Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds each the authority to run 
their own regional affairs, a notion known as soft partition. That is to say, rather than 
pursuing the principle of symmetrical federalism, Iraq should instead pursue a 
deliberately asymmetrical federal model, because ‘an examination of the recent history 
of devolution in Iraq suggests that a holding-together asymmetrical model may better 
promote stability by serving the interests of all parties’ (Hiltermann, Kane, and 
Alkadiri, 2012). Scholars on all sides do agree on one single point; that Iraq’s federal 
political order can only succeed with modifications. 
 
The debate on federalism in Iraq is fundamentally prescriptive, and different 
arrangements have also been proposed. Three serious alternative recommendations for 
Iraq’s federal system put forward by academics and policy makers range from 
theoretical to operational. One suggests an 18 governorate federalism, another based on 
one region plus 15 administrative units, and, lastly, a five region model is also proposed.  
 
The idea of federalism based on the 18 provincial boundaries of territorial governorates 
is inspired, in theory, by Horowitz (1989) where he argues for administrative units to 
cut across existing ethnic and religious communities. He saw this as a solution for 
societies that are deeply divided, enabling them to assimilate such groups into smaller 
national sub-units.  Horowitz’s idea for Iraq’s federalism was endorsed by the Baker 
and Hamilton report (2006). They suggest a national reconciliation covering areas of 
security and governance; in essence recommendations to strengthen the central 
authority in Iraq as a means of helping Iraqis help themselves (Baker and Hamilton 
2006: 62-70). They urged the Iraqi government to send a clear signal to Sunnis ‘that 
there is a place for them in national life … to give a signal of hope’ (ibid: 64).  
 
	 204	
In theory, then prime minster, Maliki, had worked closely in consultation with the US 
and had put forward milestones in key areas of national reconciliation, security and 
governance. In practice, however, from 2007-2014, he effectively used the government 
apparatus to send a signal of no-hope to the Sunnis. The national reconciliation which 
was intended to eliminate, or at least reduce, further violence and maintain the unity of 
Iraq, was never realised. Centralisation and the establishment of a strong central 
authority undermined national reconciliation. Throughout the 8 years of his 
premiership, Maliki targeted the Sunni political elite, systematically marginalised them, 
and deliberately reduced their influence within the apparatus of rule (Butters 2005; 
2010; Dodge 2013). The milestones put forward by Maliki, in reality, brought about 
national sectarian violence; sectarian based Iraqi security forces with a sectarian 
attitude to  governance geared towards exclusion of Sunnis and Kurds.  
 
Horowitz’s theory about the objectives of the sub-division of communities being to 
create ‘lower layer conflict laden issues’ by drawing new territories that are not overly 
populated by members of a single group is also inappropriate and not achievable in the 
context of Iraq. The three main groups are geographically clustered in different areas 
over which they make historical claims, all seeing the land as part of their identity. 
Moreover, for the last decade, despite their political differences on ‘lower layer conflict 
laden issues’ within their groups, the Shia, Kurds, and the Sunni have formed intra-
group coalitions in the Iraqi House of Representatives. Consequently, the political map 
in Iraq corresponds to the three regions formed by the three main groups (see Chapter 
1).  
 
The second possible arrangement is to base federalism on one region, Iraqi Kurdistan, 
plus fifteen other administrative units for other Sunni and Shia governorates 
(Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri 2012; Danilovich 2014). This type of federalism has 
the attributes of asymmetrical federalism as far as Kurdistan is concerned but 
symmetrical for the other governorates, a holding-together119 form of federal structure. 
																																																						
119 Although Danilovich (2014) argues that the issue of a holding-together and coming-together structure 
for the Iraqi federal system depends on how one views the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan, if one regards 
the Kurdistan region before 2003 invasion as a separate polity form Iraq, it implies a coming-together 
federalism. If it is seen as a part of Iraq, then this would indicate a holding-together federalism.  
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The ‘one plus fifteen’ is conformist. It simply mirrors the current federal structure in 
Iraq, something that all groups aim to change, as the findings of this research confirm.   
  
The third proposition is called ‘democratic regionalism’, a view initially put forward 
by Muafaq al Rubae, the national security adviser for Iraq. He calls for the 
establishment of five regions; a Kurdistan region, a Sunni region, two Shia regions, and 
Baghdad as the capital.120 Rubae's idea is further developed in a study that applied the 
2005 Iraqi election results to this model (Anderson and Stansfield 2005). This approach 
advocates federalism based on democratic regionalism, referring to the population, 4-5 
million in each of the four regions and 7 million in Baghdad. It further suggests 
constitutional symmetry for the five regions to avoid preferential treatment for any 
group (Anderson and Stansfield 2005). A five region model relies entirely on intra-sect 
division, something that is not acceptable to the Shia. The totality of the assumption is 
based on dividing the Shia, both politically and territorially. Shia leaders, however, at 
interview and through survey have indicated that they believe their strength lies in their 
unity and intra-sect political coalitions. For them, giving that up would be political 
suicide as their majority comes from one Shia constituency. Dividing them makes them 
into two minority groups coexisting with other minority groups.  
 
7.3 The Shia Perspective  
Distribution of Power  
When addressing Iraq’s federal system through a Shia perspective, a crucial point needs 
to be made, and one that was repeatedly shared through the process of collecting 
information at the time when the constitution was being drafted; the Shia political elite 
favour decentralisation of the central authority. As one participant put it, ‘we wanted to 
make sure that the central authority’s powers are restrained and limited’. The Shia, at 
that point, were not sure about the future of Iraq as it was too early to know which 
groups the new democratic Iraq benefited. Therefore, they aimed at preventing a Ba’ath 
like regime that might concentrate power to their disadvantage. The reason that the Iraqi 
																																																						
120 The five-region model envisages the creation of the following regions: Basra province (to include 
Basra, Nasariyyah, and Amara), Kufa province (to include Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, and Hilla), Greater 
Baghdad (to include Ba’quba), and Mosul province (to include Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah, and Ramadi). 
Combined with the established Kurdish region in the north, these five regions would form the basis of 
Iraq’s new federal system (e.g. see. Anderson and Stansfield 2005). 
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constitution allows a federal system is the fact that at those early stages the Shia 
supported federalism and, together with Kurds, set a federal structure through the Iraqi 
constitution. The Sunnis joined the process of constitution drafting at a later stage 
having boycotted the political process prior to 2005.  
 
It was only later, as Homam Hamoody confirmed at interview, after the Iraqi 2010 
elections that the Shia, ‘realised that we are forming the majority in the political 
system’. In this way, the Shia fear of a Sunni return to power proved to have only 
restrained Shia power when they arranged the government cabinet and had a majority 
in the House of Representatives. There has been a shift in the Shia attitude to federalism 
from the time of the drafting of the constitution to the post 2010 election period. 
Federalism as a constraint and, indeed the concept of power sharing itself, has become 
far less attractive among the Shia political elite.  
 
The former Shia Prime Minister, Ja’afari, regards himself as devoted to the aspiration 
of   democratic justice, to the acceptance of a federal political order and to the support 
for the principle of federalism. Such a support, however, can be interpreted and put into 
practice in different ways. In fact, currently the idea of limited federalism gives all the 
sovereign powers to the central authority and devolves only administrative tasks to the 
governorates. The data shows that the majority of the Shia prefer a plural as opposed to 
a consensual type of federalism. This is consistent with the Shia stance in relation to 
their conceptualisation of democracy as majority rule, and their support of formal 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The Shia support an administratively decentralisation arrangement for the governorates 
but within a centralised federalism and a strong authority in Baghdad. Nevertheless, 
among the rationales put forward by participants at interview for their support of a 
limited type of plural federal system in Iraq, two are particularly relevant to core area 
of research of this thesis. The first proposition was put forward by the Minister of State, 
Dr Sahib Qahraman, and Minister of State for Non-Governmental organisations, 
Dahkhil Qasm Hassun, who supported a territorially based federal system to avoid 
ethnic and sectarian conflict. The second argument, made by the Minister of State, Dr 
Diaa Najm al-Asadi, and Minister of Planning, Dr Ali Yusuf Abdul Nabi al- Shukri, a 
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professor of public law, was that a federal system based on territory could create an 
atmosphere for pluralism and stability. Moreover, the Minister of State for Tribal 
Affairs, al-Shaikh Jamal al-Batigh, and Human Rights Minister, Muhammad Shiya al-
Sudani, both argued that federalism should be put into effect based on administrative 
decentralisation.  
 
It can be deduced from these responses that the Shia have two main goals in relation to 
federalism; to achieve pluralism and stability and to prevent ethnic conflict with the 
Kurds and sectarian conflict with the Sunni. Apart from two of those interviewed from 
the Sadrist movement, who said that they did not support any form of federalism,121 all 
other respondents preferred a type of territorially federalism based on the current 
governorates.122  
 
Consensual or Plural  
The wider Shia responses contained in the survey on federalism and their support for a 
consensual federal system in Iraq are now considered. A simple framework, based on 
two themes, is used to clarify the analysis and interpret the findings. Support for 
federalism is calculated by giving participants the option to choose between a federal 
system and a unitary system and to indicate whether federalism unites or divides Iraq.123 
Support for consensual federalism is determined by asking participants to choose 
between two plural and consensual forms of federalism. This is arrived at by gauging 
support for the establishment of a council of federation, bicameral legislature, a 
decentralised government and segmental autonomy.124 Support for federalism does not 
necessarily mean support for consensual federal system; this is a crucial point since it 
underpins the testing of the hypothesis. 
 
The data shows that when the Shia are given the option to choose between unitary and 
federal political orders, the support for a unitary system is a clear winner with a majority 
																																																						
121 Baha al-A’araji is spokesman for the United Iraqi Alliance and head of the bloc that is affiliated with 
the Sadrist Movement. The other one was from the Islamic Virtue Party, Bushra Hussein Saleh. They 
are the nationalist among the Shia and support a unitary Iraq. 
122 I lay a heavy emphasis on this point, as I have repeated more than once, because federalism based on 
geography is a contested phrase and it is interpreted differently by the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds. In 
the later sections, I will make it clear how each groups defines geography.  
123 See Appendix *, Questions 1and 6.  
124 Appendix *, Questions 2 – 5.  
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of 69 percent opposing federalism. Similarly, on whether federalism brings Iraq 
together or leads to secession, almost 60 percent believed that federalism divides Iraq. 
It could be said that federalism among the Shia has become a pejorative term associated 
with division and secession. The data also shows that the majority of the Shia are in 
favour of a centralised system, confirmed by a 75 percent support for a unitary state, 
and a belief that Iraq could be less oppressive as a centralised state. For a group to hold 
such a view, considering that it has been a victim of a centralised authority for the past 
century, is, perhaps, ironic, although also perhaps not surprising. In present day Iraq, 
the Shia are in control of the majority of the power structures, including the judiciary, 
the legislative and the executive. 75 percent  support for a unitary state, together with a 
70 percent opposition to federalism, reflects the fact of Shia dominance in the apparatus 
of rule in Iraq. Many Shia believe that a strong centralised government could 
consolidate their hold on power while the establishment of any type of federalism, let 
alone a consensual type, might undermine their authority.   
 
When the participants were asked to choose between plural and consensual forms of 
federalism, the opposition to a support for a consensual federal system was even more 
pronounced. On segmental or territorially based systems, almost 77 percent favoured a 
territorially system based on involving administrative decentralisation for the 18 
governorates. Similarly, on whether a unicameral or bicameral legislative system was 
preferred, 67 percent supported a unicameral legislature, that is the current House of 
Representatives, and 63 percent were opposed to the establishment of the Federation 
Council.  
 
The data provides vital insights into the present reality in relation to the Iraqi federal 
system. Among many other reasons, the support for a plural federal system and 
rejection of a consensual federal structure could be due to the fact that the constitution 
recognises Iraq as a single federal parliamentary democratic republic. The Shia now are 
the majority in that parliament. Given these two facts, it seems inevitable that the Shia 
would prefer to maintain a centralised parliamentary federalism since that is the source 
of their strength in the political structure. Having a majority in the legislative house, 
they are in a position to enact laws favourable to themselves or reject any bills that they 
perceive to be disadvantageous.  
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It is in Shia political interests to maintain a unicameral legislature. In parallel, it is clear 
that the overwhelming opposition to the establishment of the Federation Council, and 
hence to a bicameral system, is based on their determination not to weaken their hold 
on power, exercised through the House, as would happen if a second legislative body 
came into being. Article 65 states that a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Council of Representatives shall initiate, ‘the formation of the 
Federation Council, its membership conditions, its competencies, and all that is 
connected with it.’ Since the drafting of the constitution nearly ten years ago, this law 
has been left dormant. The Shia majority has prevented that law coming into force and 
it is unlikely, given present day realities in Iraq, that it will be enacted any time soon.  
 
Conclusion  
Based on the findings, the Shia majority could be seen as an obstacle to the 
establishment of a fully-fledged consensus system in Iraq. Among the Shia there is a 
majority who oppose any  consensual arrangement of federalism, as well as a lack of 
support for a federalism of any kind, opposition to a bicameral legislature, and no 
enthusiasm for political segmental autonomy based on sect and ethnicity. From a Shia 
perspective, if any federal system at all is to be established in Iraq, it must have the 
attributes of a symmetrical system giving equal powers to geographical territories based 
on governorates and a single holding-together federal polity with the central authority 
devolving only administrative powers to governorates. These attributes can best be 
characterised as administrative decentralisation with a strong federal centre.125   
7.4 The Sunni Perspective:  
Distribution of Power  
The Sunnis joined the constitution drafting process late and supported a unitary system. 
The reason for this support is tied to the history of modern Iraq and the position of 
Sunnis within it. Iraqi nationalism has been embraced by Sunni Arabs, whether secular 
or religious.  
																																																						
125 This should not be confused with the qualitative findings in the interview material with the Shia, when 
I argued they do not support federalism. The Shia do not support a consensual form of federalism while 
they prefer a sort of federalism that is combined with a strong central government –administrative 
decentralisation for the 18 provinces of Iraq.  
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The power shift after regime collapse came as a shock to the Sunnis who had, hitherto, 
regarded themselves as the founders and even the owners of the country. They could 
not accept the changes and resorted to violence and a boycott of the political process 
from 2003 to late 2005. Even when, as late as 2005, they decided to participate in the 
political process, the legacy of almost 100 years of centralised rule over Iraq manifested 
itself in their stances. That could be seen clearly in their attitude towards the structure 
of the Iraqi state, both in their support for a centralised unitary state and in their 
apprehension of, if not downright opposition to, a decentralised federal state.  
 
The Sunni, on the contrary, during the drafting stage of constitution were against a de-
centralised federal system for Iraq. It took the Sunni’s several years, including the 
implementation of the de-ba’athification order, to realise that in this particular game 
they had lost. During the premiership of Shia Prime Minister Maliki, 2006 - 2014, the 
Shia had concentrated power with control over the House. Punitive measures were 
taken against the Sunnis, marginalising them both politically, and by refusing their 
demands for a Sunni region. At the military level, Maliki refused to incorporate the 
Sahwa movement into the army (Section 2.5).  
 
It was now clear to Sunnis that the political map of Iraq had been transformed and the 
parliamentary system was dominated by the Shia majority, giving them effective 
control of the country. This was confirmed in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, when 
the victorious Sunni list, -al Iraqyya, was not given the opportunity to form the 
government.126 At the time of this study, 2011-2015, the Sunnis had mixed views on 
federalism with the data supporting the contention that there are still some among them 
who favour a centralised Iraq, but the majority now support a federal system. 
 
The Sunnis lack a unified political discourse for a federal system and are pulled in two 
different, if not diametrically opposed, directions, at least at the operational level. This 
is one of the main factors that has not restricted their power to press the central 
government hard on the issue of the establishment of a Sunni region of their own. The 
Sunni nationalists, who some call idealists, support a single Iraq with administrative 
																																																						
126 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 8. 
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decentralisation and strive to be real partners in shaping Iraq’s politics. The majority of 
Sunnis, however, are those that are more accurately defined as the pragmatists. They 
are also Iraqi nationalists but have realised and accepted the bitter realities of Iraq, and 
aim at running their own affairs with the least interference possible from the central 
authority.  
 
Plural or Consensual  
The discussion in this section follows a similar framework to that of the previous 
section. It begins with the interviews to highlight the underlying factors. Then, with 
reference to responses from a border range of participants, the data is analysed, based 
on the two themes of support for federalism and support for consensual federal 
arrangements.   
 
The Iraqi vice president, Tariq al Hashimi, was the only one among the Sunni 
interviewees to support administrative federalism, and he also acknowledged his 
opposition to the idea of dividing Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines. The underlying 
reasons for his preferences, it must be assumed, are different from the reasons behind 
the Shia preferences, as his discourse is a different one. Hashimi believes the Sunni 
could form a majority in Iraq as he regards the Sunnis as the Arabs, the Kurds, and the 
Turkmen combined. From the perspective of some Sunni leaders, an ethno-sectarian 
divide is not a desirable option as it cuts off the Kurds from the Iraqi Sunni community, 
while division along sectarian lines cuts off the other Shia Arab nationalists with whom 
Hashimi hoped to develop an Iraqi national front.127  
 
Related to that issue, attention must be drawn to a significant point of distinction, using 
the term ‘geography’ as the base reference for a federal system. The Sunnis give an 
entirely partisan connotation to the type of federal structure based on territorial 
geography. Those who chose geography as the foundation for federalism argued that it 
had to be implemented in a way that guarantees the unity of Iraq while preserving its 
diversity. That view was shared by Salman al-Jumaily, spokesman for the al-Iraqia list, 
																																																						
127 Here, I specifically refer to two points: first, Hashimi himself believed that the Sunni nationalists 
could join forces with the Shia nationalists to govern Iraq; second, also stemming from his vision, 
Hashimi led the al-Iraqyya list. It was a Sunni majority list but could bring other Shia secular nationalists 
under its umbrella (and in the 2010 elections, the list was the winner).  
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Culture Minister, Dr Saadun al-Dlemi, and Education Minister, Mohammed al-Tamimi, 
who also added that geography is ‘the best option for people to be where they feel they 
belong to’, referring to the governorates. Ayad al-Sammarai’s, a former Speaker of the 
Iraqi parliament, also believed that geography should be the foundation for establishing 
federalism because, in his words that ‘would reduce conflict among peoples of different 
sects and ethnicities’.  
 
By geography, the Sunnis, like the Shia, refer to the territorial boundaries of the current 
18 governorates. However, unlike the Shias, the Sunni preference for federalism based 
on geography is to give greater powers and autonomy to the governorates. Their support 
is for a mechanism that constrains the powers of the central authority. The main 
rationale for this Sunni support is that they form the majority in four governorates 
(Nainawa, Diyala, Saladin, Anbar) and are the second largest group in Baghdad.  
 
Sunnis wish to wield power in the governorates in which they form the majority and 
also share the rule in Baghdad with the Shia. The idea of a federal Iraq dividing Iraq 
along ethnic and sectarian lines, in a coming-together style, is rejected by some Sunni 
elite for more than simply nationalistic motives. A divided Iraq may well serve Kurds 
and Shia alike, since majority Kurdish and Shia regions are oil rich. The Sunnis’ 
concern is federalism might lead to secession at some point in the future and that would 
disadvantage the Sunni region in terms of wealth and revenue as it is considerably 
poorer in resources than the other two. Consequently, the Sunni political elite support 
a single federal Iraq, with the twofold motivation of supporting a united Iraq, and 
opposing secession.  
 
The data shows 75 percent support for federalism among the wider sample of the Sunni 
political elite. When they were given the choice between a federal system and a unitary 
system, there was strong support for a federal system and 82 percent believed that a 
federal system would be less oppressive. Nevertheless, the data highlighted Sunni 
concerns and uncertainty about the operationalization of such a federal system, as only 
57 percent believed that it would maintain unity – leaving a sizeable minority who had 
grave concerns. The majority of Sunnis prefer a single federal system to a centralised 
unitary system, but there is a very real fear among them that this might lead to secession 
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and alienation from a system from which they have already been systematically 
marginalised for the past decade.   
 
The data on support among the Sunnis for a consensual arrangement of federalism 
paints an  entirely different picture. 60 percent preferred ethno-religious bases and only 
40 percent favoured a federal system based on the territoriality of 18 governorates. The 
Sunnis support segmental political autonomy within Iraq and, since 2013, have 
demanded a region of their own similar to the Kurdish region in the north. The data 
shows an 85 percent support for a bicameral legislature, and this is confirmed by a 92 
percent support for the establishment of the Federation Council. This, on its own, 
indicates that Sunnis believe the establishment of a federal system that has two 
differently constituted houses would give them more political leverage and influence 
on Iraq’s political structure.  
 
Conclusion  
From a Sunni perspective, the federal political order in Iraq should be one that involves 
power sharing with the central authority devolving power to avoid unrest and prevent 
secession by the Kurds. They would prefer that all constituent units, the Shia, the Sunni, 
and the Kurds, enjoy equal powers in a system of symmetrical federalism. Sunnis see 
federalism as shared rule, and this reflects the political reality for Sunnis in Iraq, as they 
are the second largest group in the capital of the federal republic. Sunnis believe that 
federalism must be seen as a mechanism to enable shared rule, and to foster the unity 
of Iraq. Based on what has been discussed so far, the findings confirm the assumption 
of the main hypothesis that, from a Sunni perspective, it is more likely for a consensus 
system to be put in place, because there is a greater level of support for it. However, 
such support is based to a significant extent on the assumption that it ensures segmental 
autonomy.  
 
7.5 The Kurdish Perspective 
Distribution of Power  
The Kurdish political elite introduced the idea of federalism both before and after the 
invasion of Iraq. A month after the Kurdish uprising in March 1991, coalition forces 
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announced the creation of a ‘safe haven’.128 The Kurds had already prior to this opened 
negotiations with Saddam Hussein on autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan. Subsequently, in 
May 1992, parliamentary elections were held and a government was established. In 
October, the parliament of Kurdistan adopted a law calling for a federal system for Iraq. 
Consistent with that position, in June 2002, the Kurds took part in joint discussions with 
other Iraqi groups to coordinate the US-led military campaign against Iraq, and at that 
time Iraqi opposition accepted a federal system for Iraq. After the invasion, Kurdish 
leaders propounded the idea of federalism in the hope of sustaining their autonomous 
region.  
 
During the period when the constitution was being drafted, Kurds joined forces with 
the Shia, who initially supported a federal Iraq, to constitutionalise their claim to the 
Kurdish areas that were not under the control of the Kurdistan regional government. 
Article 140 promises that the executive authority would undertake the necessary steps 
to complete the implementation of the requirements of all the subparagraphs of Article 
58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. In Article 58 of the TAL and Article 140 of 
the permanent Iraqi constitution, these territorial claims were recognised. The Kurds 
demanded that the disputed areas, which they called the Kurdistan areas outside the 
borders of the Kurdistan region, must be annexed to the Kurdistan region. The disputed 
areas in question include the city of Kirkuk, in addition to areas in the Mosul and Diyala 
governorates. The Kurds accepted the terms of Article 140 which states that as part of 
the process of normalisation those Kurds who were forced from their homes by the 
former regime would be returned. A referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories 
would be held to determine the will of their citizens. That is, after normalisation people 
in those areas would decide whether or not to become part of the Kurdistan region.  
 
Although it is a view strongly held by the Kurdish political elite that federalism ensures 
and protects the unity of Iraq, as well as bolstering its sovereignty, at times Kurds have 
demanded more powers for their federal region. Throughout 2011-13, tensions 
escalated between the Kurdistan region and the central government. In particular, the 
																																																						
128 The 1991 Raparin (Kurdish mass uprising) provided the safe haven, no fly zone area, and this led to 
the formation of a self-rule region in the three provinces of Duhok, Hawler and Slemani in the north of 
Iraq, which subsequently gave birth to the Kurdistan Region. It is an autonomous region of Iraq. The 
regional capital is Arbil (Kurdish Hewlêr). The region is officially governed by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. 
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reluctance of the central government to implement Article 140 caused disquiet. Other 
issues of dispute involved territorial claims, budget and oil production, the way in 
which Iraq was ruled, and power sharing.  
 
Since the war against Daesh in 2014, begun with the northern Iraq offensive, the Kurds 
have seized most of the disputed areas including the city of Kirkuk and its environs. 
This has led the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, to announce that ‘now 
Article 140 is implemented.’ Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minster of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
in practical terms, has taken more powers for the Kurdistan region, and at interview 
ventured the opinion that ‘a pragmatic solution to Iraq is to divide powers between the 
Kurdistan region and the Federal Government.’ 
 
Plural or Consensual  
From a Kurdish perspective, federalism is not only a pre-condition for democracy, but 
also the guarantor of Iraq’s unity. Jalal Talabani, when still in office as president, at 
interview stated that ‘federalism in Iraq should be based on geography’ because this 
would ‘include all the citizens of Kurdistan region and would guarantee their rights and 
would strengthen the optional unity of Iraq’. One point of immense significance from 
the two previous sections that should be emphasised is that both Shia and Sunni political 
elite, while applying it differently, referred to geography as the territory of the current 
18 governorates in Iraq. Among the Kurdish political elite, geography means something 
else entirely; they call it ‘historical geography’, or ‘historical realities’.129 The president 
of the Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, argued that ‘the Iraqi constitution permits the 
establishment of federations on the basis of geographical history’. He further explained 
that on that basis, ‘Iraq consists of three geographic regions where the inhabitants 
historically share culture, belief and customs, language and race.’  
 
																																																						
129 The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq in March 2004, stated in Article 4. The system of 
government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared 
between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local 
administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the 
separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession. This was later 
replace with two other articles in the 2005 ratified constitution; Article 1: The Republic of Iraq is a single 
federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, 
representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq. 
Article 3: Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. Italics added for emphasis.   
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From a Kurdish perspective, as the qualitative data indicates, Iraq is inherently a 
composition of three different regions: the north, with Kurds and other ethnic and 
religious minorities; the south and the central Euphrates, a geographic area with a 
historically majority Shia Arab population, sharing customs and traditions of religious 
faith that differentiates it from other areas; and the west, a region that includes an Arab 
Sunni population with a shared faith and tradition. Barzani concluded that it is possible 
for Iraq to have ‘three federations on the basis of geographical history’, and further 
believed that as supplementary factors, the three region principle also involves other 
aspects such as religious beliefs, customs and traditions.  
 
Therefore, the Kurdish political elite made more precise references to geography as a 
foundation for a federal system by restricting them to history, ethnicity or sect. Barham 
Salih, previously deputy prime minister of Iraq, and the former prime minister of the 
Kurdistan region, believed in a mixture of ethnic-geographic bases for Kurdistan and 
perhaps administrational ones for some other parts. Displacement and Migration 
Minister, Dindar Najman Shafiq, Trade Minister, Khairalla Hasan Babakir, and Kamal 
Kirkuki all supported ethno-geographic foundations. Nawshirwan Mustafa, founder of 
the Change movement, however, preferred a mixture of ethnicity and sect as a basis for 
a federal structure.  
 
Other Kurdish elite, likewise, frequently claimed that the central government does not 
respect the principle of power-sharing; hence they counsel division of power. That 
became even clearer in subsequent discussions on oil and gas revenues. Initially, the 
Kurdistan region produced its own oil. During Barzani’s premiership, oil was exported, 
despite the objections of the federal authorities.130 That was an overtly political act 
aimed at achieving economic independence. As Nechirvan Barzani put it, ‘with every 
economic dependency comes political dependency, we yield our revenue and make our 
political decisions, and this is our right of self-determination within a federal state - our 
constitutional right’.   
																																																						
130 The matter of oil is linked to fiscal federalism. The Kurdistan region was not receiving its 17 percent 
share of the national budget from the central government. The Kurdish elite claimed that have been 
receiving only 13 percent of the national budget. KRG demanded more finances and Baghdad refused. 
In response, the KRG started searching for oil, made new oil wells and connected new pipelines to the 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. By the end of 2015, the KRG was exporting an estimate of 600,000 bpd to 
Turkey.   
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Support for federalism among the wider participants in the study from the Kurdish 
political elite was overwhelming. Those elites who are not in favour of a federal Iraq, 
are in favour of secession and a declaration of independence (although this aspiration 
is more common at the grass roots level). This was also confirmed by the totally 
unanimous view expressed that Iraq could be less oppressive as a federal state 
comprising three main regions. Kurds are, of course, viewing Iraq through their own 
experiences, and taking into account the atrocities they have suffered at the hands of 
centralised systems in Iraq. As such, there can be no surprise that there is absolutely no 
support for a unitary centralised Iraq. As to whether federalism could bring Iraq 
together or divide it, 66 percent of the Kurdish political elite believed that federalism 
keeps Iraq united, or it might be more correctly phrased as not yet being convinced 
about secession. The demand of the Kurds centre on the adoption of a system that 
respects the principle of power sharing and is based on historical realities. For them, 
this means recognising the legitimacy of Kurdish claims to areas they believe to be 
historically part of Kurdistan. Only in this way can their Kurdish identity be secured. 
 
The data shows a high level of Kurdish support for a consensual arrangement of 
federalism. Indeed, such a system is the only type of federal structure that is acceptable 
to them. However, support for the ethno-religious divide, or a federal system or a 
mixture of ethnicity and sect has only 55 percent support. This could be due to the 
unresolved issue of the disputed areas and the continuing fear that the central authority 
will not take into account ‘historical realities’. If those fears were realised then that 
would mean, perhaps, the permanent loss of ‘the Kurdistani areas outside the borders 
of the Kurdistan region’ to a neighbouring Sunni Arab region. Nevertheless, there was 
100 percent support for a bicameral legislature, and 94 percent were in favour of 
establishing the Federation Council. Data shows that the Kurdish political elite is in 
favour of a consensual federal system, with a bicameral decentralised structure that 
gives the regions extended powers, and the establishment of segmental political 
autonomy. Kurds demand greater powers for their own region with sufficient devolved 
authority and autonomy to run their own affairs.  
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Conclusion  
The findings in this section support the main assumption put forward in this chapter; if 
a consensus system is to be established, there must be enormous support for such an 
arrangement. From a Kurdish perspective, the absence of a consensual federal system 
that ensures segmental autonomy means that it is less likely that Iraq’s democracy can 
be nourished and sustained. Consequently, Kurds would be unwilling to remain within 
the system. For many of the Kurdish political elite, remaining part of Iraq as a purely 
optional matter is a point of view that coincides better with a holding-together, rather 
than a coming-together, federal system. The findings indicate that Kurds prefer a 
symmetrical structure, a three region federal system with equal powers, and a central 
federal authority with limited and constrained powers.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
The chapter began with a discussion on federalism, as detailed in the Iraqi constitution, 
and put into practice in Iraq so far. It was shown that the constitution sees Iraq as federal 
polity, with division of powers between the federal and the local governments. The 
constitution lays out a blue print for a coming-together symmetrical federalism, while 
in the reality Iraq is rather more of a holding-together asymmetrical federalism. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi constitution promises a decentralised federal system with a 
bicameral legislative house, while in practice, although decentralised as far as Iraqi 
Kurdistan is concerned, the country as a whole remains a centralised federated state 
with a unicameral legislative.  
 
This misfit between the constitution and the political reality in Iraq necessitated a 
fundamental examination of the views and preferences of the elites of different groups. 
The empirical data focused on the three main issues of; distribution of power, the type 
of federalism, and the impact of federalism in relation to the likelihood of secession. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated that the current debates on Iraq’s federalism have 
focused on the issues of power distribution between central and local government. The 
debate has been prescriptive and propositions do not take into account the views and 
preferences of those key elites. The focus on these views in this chapter marks a 
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departure from established approaches and, as such, makes a new contribution to the 
literature on federalism in Iraq.  
 
The data shows that the Shia support a federal structure that is conducive to 
administrative decentralisation with a strong central federal authority. In terms of power 
distribution, they prefer more powers for the federal government. That is, symmetrical 
holding-together. Moreover, they reject the idea of federalism based on three ethno-
religious regions. The Sunni also support a symmetrical type of federalism, in the sense 
that the central authority should devolve power to its constituent units. They further 
support a type of federalism that recognises ethno-religious differences but prevents 
partition, symmetrical holding-together federalism. The Kurds support a symmetrical 
coming-together federalism. As such, among the three groups, the views of the Kurds 
most closely match the constitution. This may be due to the fact that the Kurds 
introduced the idea and they want to maintain the system they originally envisaged. 
 
Any operationalization of federalism in Iraq is bound up with the Iraqi constitution. 
Shia and Sunni approaches on federalism would require a constitutional amendment, in 
effect moving the country’s federalism from a coming-together to a holding-together 
model. That, in turn, would affect the distribution of power between the federal 
government and its consistent parts. After analysing the various groups’ conceptions of 
federalism, the next fundamental issue is that of how each group views the constitution 
and whether a constitutional amendment or institutional implementation of any change 
is feasible in Iraq.  
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CHAPTER 8:  
The Iraqi Constitution  
	
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the views of those who drafted the Iraqi constitution are examined. In 
the process of drafting in 2005, the members of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
were allocated based on ethnic background; 36 Shia Arab, 15 Kurds and 15 Sunni Arab, 
one Christian, one Turkmen, and one communist. Despite deeply rooted differences, 
the committee was able to draft a constitution that recognised different identities, shared 
political power accordingly, and guaranteed unity of the state. In October 15, 2005, the 
Iraqi constitution was ratified following a national referendum in which 78% voted in 
favour. Scholars tend to agree on the most controversial issues in the constitution; the 
role of Islam, federalism and oil and gas revenues131 (Benomar 2004; Brown 2005a; 
2005b; on Morrow 2005; Jawad 2013).  
 
This chapter also examines inter and intra group views and the compatibility of Islam 
with democracy. The second article of the Iraqi constitution states that no law that 
contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be enacted and no law that 
contradicts the principles of democracy maybe established. These two statements are 
analysed since not all provisions of Islam are democratic. The issue is whether 
adherence to the first principle could make building a democracy challenging. This is 
elaborated on through an investigation of elite views on the extent to which the Iraqi 
constitution is democratic. A related point is whether or not democracy, as interpreted 
in the constitution, complies with generally accepted international norms or whether 
there are features that are unique to Iraq.  
 
																																																						
131 Although its significance is immense to Iraq’s democracy, I rule out the discussion on oil and gas 
revenues for it falls beyond the grasp of this thesis. Additionally, there is an extensive literature on 
theorizing constitutional design and also constitutional design in divided societies (e.g. Lutz 2006; 
Choudhry 2007; Choudhry 2008), moreover, scholarly attempts have been made to examine the 
relationship between constitutional design and democratic performance (e.g. Foweraker and Landman 
2002) this chapter examines the views of the Iraqi political elite, as members of a deeply divided society. 
Hence, it does not involve theoretical discussion on constitutional design.  
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The constitution makes provision for amendments to be made and the opportunity was 
taken to explore through interview and survey whether those responsible for drafting it 
still felt that it was entirely appropriate in its current form or whether political 
circumstances had changed their views. A further question was what, if any, 
amendments they would now like to see given those changed circumstances. The 
questions were framed in such a way as to elicit answers that did not contain caveats 
on what may or not be achievable in the current situation. The issue of what 
amendments would lead to the most intense controversy was, however, pursued. A final 
consideration was whether the constitution creates any obstacles to the establishment 
of federalism in Iraq. Article 117 affirms the establishment of new regions, and Articles 
119-120 gives one or more governorates the right to seek to organise into a region. 
 
To summarise, interviews and qualitative data are analysed as they relate to the process 
of drafting the position of Islam in the constitution and the prospects of constitutional 
amendment. All the data is analysed along four inter-complementary themes: the 
drafting of the constitution, democratic ideas and group interests, compatibility of Islam 
with democratic principles, and the allocation of power between the central and 
regional governments. Each group is dealt with in a separate section, with the initial 
one contextualising the interviews. In each section, the first issue examined with 
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee is whether the democratic ideas in the 
Iraqi constitution were proposed by an outside agency, for example, the United States 
or whether they were the result of consensual agreement between various political 
groups. The second issue addressed was that of the relationship between democratic 
ideas and groups interests. Linked to this matter was an attempt to determine, on an 
individual basis, whether their major priority was the establishment of democratic 
principles in the constitution or the protection of their own group’s interests. The 
answers provided insights into why, how, and for what objectives, different groups 
were motivated during the process of Iraq's constitutional design, issues generally 
neglected within the current debates on Iraq’s constitution.  
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8.2 The Iraqi Constitution 
The Iraqi constitution has aspects of power sharing arrangements. Article 49 states that 
the legislative shall uphold the representation ‘of all components of the people,’ and 
representation in the Council of Representatives is set at a ratio of one seat per 100,000 
Iraqis. Nevertheless, the detail of anything related to the elections has to be regulated 
by a law. The actual outcome of that, however, has been the adoption of a system of 
proportional representation aimed at maximising proportionality, an idea both 
recommended and preferred by Lijphart for deeply divided societies.  
 
The Iraqi constitution maintains that Iraq is a single federal state and its system of 
government is parliamentary, establishing the two traits of segmental autonomy and a 
parliamentary system as prescribed in Article 1 and Articles 116-121. Lijphart favours 
federalism as the most appropriate way to accommodate different territorially 
concentrated groups and prefers parliamentary to presidential systems in these 
societies. The Iraqi constitution, in Article 70, gives the Council of Representatives 
power to choose the Head of the Republic provided there is a two thirds majority. The 
term in office is limited to four years and the Head of State’s powers are extremely 
limited and essentially ceremonial. The Prime Minister, however, holds the prime 
executive authority and is responsible for the general policy of the state as well as being 
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Article 78). This is also one of Lijphart’s 
propositions, that the Prime Minister should have extensive powers, while a Head of 
State is restricted to symbolic and ceremonial powers.   
 
In the Iraqi constitution there is no mention of politicising ethnicity or sect, or to 
institutionalising ethnic or other differences. In reality, however, the constitution has 
been implemented using a variety of less-formal power sharing practices particular to 
Iraq that recognise its diversity. The federal executive operates power sharing among 
three main groups with the division of the major posts of President, Prime Minister and 
Head of the Council being given to a Kurd, a Shia and a Sunni, respectively. This 
division of power based on ethno-sectarian differences is a political reality in Iraq. 
There is a consensus among the politically significant community groups that such an 
arrangement guarantees political stability and, more importantly, it is what the Iraqi 
political elite regard as the only practical resolution.  
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Iraq’s federal executive power is shared in a broad or grand coalition. In the aftermath 
of the elections in 2005, 2010, and 2014, the political elite from different groups 
negotiated to reach various agreements including a distribution of power through power 
sharing. The constitution in effect allows for a de facto power of veto. In relation to 
constitutional amendments for a referendum to be deemed successful in approving a 
change, the majority of voters must vote for it but, crucially, it must also not be rejected, 
‘by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates’ (Article 142). This clause, 
with the stipulation of ‘three or more governorates’, was introduced by Kurds, as at that 
time in those three governorates they had an absolute majority. The inescapable 
conclusion is that the constitution implicitly gives the power of veto to community 
groups concentrated in a geographic area.  
 
Whether implicit or explicit in the constitution, or whether in formal institutions or 
informal practices, the context of Iraq manifests a consociational power-sharing system 
with proportional representation accompanied by grand coalition, segmental autonomy 
and veto. Further consensual traits are explicit in the constitution including: a federal 
and decentralised government, multiparty system, bicameral legislature, and a flexible 
constitution that can be amended by a simple majority. This analysis of Iraq’s context 
and constitution demonstrates that Lijphart’s recommendations for constitutional 
design in divided societies, in fact, coincides with resolutions that the political elite in 
Iraq have reached through a process based on an understanding on what could work for 
Iraq.  
 
8.3 The Shia Perspective  
Drafting the Constitution: Process or Proposal  
The Shia regarded designing the Iraqi constitution as a process rather than a set of 
proposals. They view the current constitution as the outcome of consensus between 
different groups. Although the interviewees132 referred to the presence of American 
advisers in some sessions, they stated that they did not direct but rather brought 
																																																						
132 The Shia members of the Constitution Drafting Committee who were interviewed here are: Human 
Hamoudi, Baha al Araji, Khalid Abazar Attyi, Abbas al-Bayati and Sami Askari. 
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differing views together on issues such as federalism, oil and identity, to help reach an 
outcome that would satisfy all parties. The design of the constitution relied on 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) had 
established. It was intended to be ‘the source’ for drafting the constitution, but the Shia 
clergy refused any source for the constitution other than the Iraqi people themselves.  
 
Humam Hamoudi, chairman of the drafting committee, at interview stated that the TAL 
was ‘only a point of reference,’ and further explained that what was important for the 
American’s during drafting stage was the chapter on freedoms and rights. They did not 
express direct views on any other issues.133 This stance was confirmed by the President 
of the United States during his visit to Iraq in 2005. Hamoudi said, ‘I told him that the 
constitution should be written by the Iraqis and the United States should not impose it,’ 
to which the President replied, ‘I have nothing on the constitution other than rights and 
freedoms.’  
 
The Shia viewed the United States proposal for designing and drafting the Iraqi 
constitution as a means of imposing democracy. Paul Bremer proposed the project and 
the idea that in each province the key figures, elite, tribesmen, and politicians should 
come together to elect those who would write the constitution (see, Bremer and 
McConnell 2006).134 Ayatollah al-Sistani opposed the proposal, issued a fatwa and 
demanded elections and the formation of a founding council for electing those who 
would write the constitution. Eventually Sistani’s fatwa superseded Bremer’s proposal.  
 
It is a view strongly shared by Shia members of the committee that Iraq is an example 
of an imposed democracy. Nevertheless, it can be argued that it is not completely 
imposed,135 particularly on the issue of the drafting of the constitution. Hamoudi 
asserted that, despite American objections, the members had embraced Islam, and in 
reference to the constitution itself commented that, ‘we discussed it word by word.’43 
																																																						
133 A meeting that the chairman of the committee had arranged, the US ambassador had attended together 
with the Sunni representative, Adnan al-Janabi, and Kurdish representative Fuad Masoum (Iraq’s current 
president) and the Shia representative, Humam Hamoudi (the chairman).  
134 By this I mean the liberal ones, and also some scholars and teachers of universities and academics to 
write the constitution. 
135 The constitution was not imposed like the Japanese model where the constitution was written by 
Americans and then translated and imposed on Japan. 
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percent of the Shia membership of the drafting committee believed that members of 
that committee had the most influence on the process and the outcome of the final draft 
of the constitution. In contrast, only 18 percent believed that the US authorities had the 
greatest influence over the process.  
 
Democratic Ideas versus Group Interests  
Related to the design and drafting of the constitution is the issue of priority. During 
constitutional design in a divided society, priority is given either to the interests of 
community groups or to the principle of democracy. It was a view shared by all of the 
interviewees that the groups who participated in drafting the constitution had as their 
priority the protection of the interests of the groups that they represented. Democratic 
principles were not taken into account unless they served to protect these same interests.  
 
This was confirmed by the wider response of the Shia members, 62 percent of whom 
believed that during constitution drafting sessions the interests of different groups was 
prioritised and only 6 percent believed that any priority was given to democratic 
principles. The data shows, from a Shia perspective, that the constitution is a genuine 
expression of the will of those Iraqi groups who participated in the process and was not 
imposed on a reluctant membership. While it is not mutually exclusive for the interests 
of community groups to be maintained while enshrining the principles of democracy 
within a constitution, it is evident that it was those interests that the committee members 
were determined to protect. As Atteya put it, the resolution of the conflict of interests 
between different groups is only one of the issues for which democracy has to find 
peaceful solutions.   
 
Islam and Democracy  
Another controversial issue, both during the drafting of the constitution and ever since, 
is the relationship between Islam and democracy. In Iraq’s constitutional design 
process, the members of the committee came up with a formula to constitutionally 
reconcile the established provisions of Islam and principles of democracy. As al Araji 
put it, it was the compromise between two worldviews held by the members of the 
committee, one secular and the other Islamic. From a Shia perspective, Islam and 
democracy are not irreconcilable, although both the established provisions of Islam and 
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democratic principles seem to have some elements that might be difficult to reconcile. 
They consider the order in which the clauses in the relevant constitutional article appear 
to be significant. ‘Islamic provisions’ proceeds ‘principles of democracy’, therefore, 
they argue, the article explicitly has precedence over democracy which comes second. 
In Bayati’s words, ‘the established provisions of Islam such as halal and haram cannot 
be subject to laws.’ In this way, Islam becomes part of the identity of the state, as the 
official religion. 
 
The Shia perceive democracy within the context of the Iraqi constitution, which equates 
either to a mechanism for elections and consultations akin to Shura in Islamic rule. 
Democracy is strictly applied in the context of the second chapter of the constitution 
where it addresses personal rights and freedoms. Hamoudi, nonetheless, elaborated 
further on this issue and argued that the second article ‘does not force Islamic law, but 
rather protects it,’ in matters of personal freedoms. For instance, legislation cannot be 
passed to instruct women to take off their headscarves and veils, similarly legislation 
cannot be passed which obliges women to wear a headscarf or a veil. Even if such a 
law was promulgated, it would be successfully repealed under the personal freedoms 
and rights sections of chapter two. The Shia believe that there is a wide degree of 
commonality between Islamic Sharia law and democratic principles that could enhance 
one another. 
 
Having said that, almost all the Shia interviewees regarded the Iraqi constitution as 
democratic, and believed that it could institutionalise democracy. The Shia members of 
the committee participated in the drafting process with parliamentary democracy in 
mind and so supported extended powers to the legislature, the House of 
Representatives. They also stressed the need to give many of the executive tasks to the 
House, such as appointing ministers, ambassadors, military officials, and the judiciary. 
A distinguishing characteristic of many parliamentary systems is a balance between 
executive and legislative powers. For example, the legislature can often pass a vote of 
no confidence in the cabinet while the executive, in certain circumstances, can dissolve 
parliament. Shia support for a parliamentary system in the constitution was far reaching, 
as Hamoudi said, ‘we have taken away this power from the council of ministers, they 
cannot dissolve the parliament, and the legislature has hegemony over the executive.’  
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In their reference to the democratic attributes of the constitution, other than those 
personal rights and freedoms possibly initiated by the Americans, the Shia refer to 
periodic peaceful alteration of power. Hamoudi specifically highlighted the 
independent commissions such as the Human Rights Commission, the High Electoral 
Commission, as well as the formation of the national media. According to the 
constitution, none of these are subject to either the executive or the legislature. This is 
a new experience in the Arab world, an example that both Libya and Tunis have 
followed. It is Bayati’s view that Iraq’s democracy is an Iraqi interpretation of a liberal 
version. 87 percent of members of the committee believed that democracy and Islam 
are compatible. For the Shia, in Attieyia words, ‘one of the duties of the Iraqi project is 
to work on the common grounds between Sharia and democracy to bring them closer.’ 
The following section on amendments on the Iraqi constitution makes it clear what type 
of democracy the Shia have in mind for Iraq, and whether that equates to some sort of 
consensual system or not.  
 
Constitutional Amendment and Concluding Remarks  
To the Shia, the current constitution was written during a critical political period in 
which they found themselves under a dual pressure, both of past experiences and 
uncertainties about the future due to their anger at Sunni dominated centralised rule in 
the past and their fear of a Sunni return to power in the future. Although while drafting 
the constitution the Shia comprised the majority of the committee, with 28 out of 55 
initially, their fears determined many of their preferences for the political structure. 
They established a federal government with limited power, supported a parliamentary 
system with extended powers, and embedded the role of Islam in the constitution.  
 
Nevertheless, their take on many aspects of the constitution has been affected by the 
way politics in Iraq has developed over the recent years. After almost a decade living 
by a mainly Shia influenced constitution, there is a strong view that the constitution is 
in need of revision and amendment. Accordingly, a constitutional revision committee 
has been established chaired by Humam Hamoudi.  The Shia has not changed in relation 
to Islam. However, on the political system, the federal structure, and oil revenues, there 
seems to be a change in attitudes. They demand that the constitution allows for the 
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Prime Minster to be elected directly by the people, the government to be formed based 
on the majority, more powers to be given to the central government, and the type of 
electoral system to be stated in the constitution as one of disproportional representation. 
In addition, the Shia members of the committee wanted to see federalism as only an 
administrative tool.  
 
Their interpretation of the constitution’s power sharing provisions between the central 
government and the regions and provinces is strictly applied to administrative bases 
and issues. For instance, Hamoudi believes that Article 140, on which the Kurds refuse 
any sort of amendment, is ‘politically written not legally’. He stressed that the article is 
vague and has no clear mechanism for implementing it, arguing that provincial 
boundaries are fixed. Thus, a view also shared by al Araji, Bayati and Attya is, if the 
constitution was to be amended on these issues, the wordings must be clear and explicit. 
The Shia insist that the constitution needs to be very precise, specifically in defining 
the majority, the powers of the federal government, and also the electoral system.  
 
Among the Shia, the preferences by a wider group of respondents in the committee 
showed 62 percent in favour of constitutional amendment and, if the opportunity arose 
to amend the constitution, 88 percent preferred that more powers should be given to the 
central government. Only 12 percent demanded more powers to the provincial 
administrative units. If the Iraqi constitution was to be amended it is inevitable that the 
Shia would support a more centralised government, government based on the majority, 
a disproportional electoral system, and administrative federalism. Hence, the findings 
indicate that the Shia are not in favour of a consensual application  of the constitution 
and without that support such a consensual application,  a consensual  democracy, 
cannot be achieved. 
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8.4 The Sunni perspective  
Constitution Drafting: Process versus Proposal  
The Sunni initially boycotted the constitutional committee and had no input into it other 
than through one token member. By the time their membership increased to fifteen,136 
the process of drafting was well underway and the Shia and the Kurds were a month 
into the process of drafting. The subcommittees had dealt with many of their tasks. 
Unsurprisingly, Sunni perceptions of the final document, as indicated by their many 
comments on its content was, and remains, highly sceptical.  
 
When it came to the ratification of the draft, Sunnis were divided on the matter; Salih 
al Mutlaq, one of the chief Sunni negotiators, urged the Sunni community to vote 
against the constitution, while Tariq al Hashimi supported the document after Article 
142 was added as a guarantee that the constitution would be amended to take Sunni 
views into account.137 That lack of a unified discourse among the Sunnis, perhaps more 
than any other factor, has undermined their influence in post 2003 Iraq. The Sunnis 
were persuaded, mainly by the American’s who were in a rush to meet the August 15 
deadline for the draft, to accept and vote in favour of a document that they had not 
thoroughly discussed. That is Jaburi’s view; the United States was directing the process 
closely and most aspects of the constitution ‘were not even discussed or addressed 
during the debates’ by the Sunnis.   
 
The Sunni accept that the Iraqi constitution was the outcome of an ill-conceived 
consensus among different groups, reached only on the condition that it would be 
amended no more than four months later. The Sunni, however, unlike the Shia, 
emphasise the presence of the United States as being a major influence on the 
constitutional committee. However, whether they see this influence as over the Sunnis, 
																																																						
136 The Sunni were not part of the national association but got elected based on a conference that 
represented the notable figures of the Sunnis who were then elected based on merit, expertise and also 
their representation of the provinces and political views. Four were from the Islamic party (ayyad, salim, 
salman al jumaliy and ala sadun) mahmood mash hadani, salih mutlag, faxir a qaisi, izadin dolla, and 
also two assassinated during drafting the constitution.  
137 Article 142, First: The Council of Representatives shall form a committee from its members 
representing the principal components of the Iraqi society with the mission of presenting to the Council 
of Representatives, within a period not to exceed four months, a report that contains recommendations 
of the necessary amendments that could be made to the Constitution. The committee shall be dissolved 
after a decision is made regarding its proposals. 
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as opposed to the elements included in the constitution, is not entirely clear. During 
drafting, the Sunni bought into American assurances and believed that many of the 
suggestions made by American advisors could help build democracy in Iraq. That was 
most obvious in the Sunni re-engagement in the political process, their vote in support 
of the constitution and participation in the Iraqi apparatus of rule since mid-2005. 
Samarai believed it was unfortunate that most of the positive suggestions put forward 
by American advisers, even on technical points, on how different parties could 
overcome their disagreements, were not taken up. 63 percent of the wider Sunni group 
on the committee believed that the United States had a major influence through pressure 
on the Sunnis to accept a constitution of some kind. Given their weakened political 
situation, and American attitudes, it can be argued that the Sunnis had no other option 
than to accept a constitution.  
 
Democratic Ideas versus Group Interests  
Whether for the Sunni elite, during the drafting of the constitution, the principles of 
democracy were a priority or the demands of different groups took precedence, most 
Sunnis canvassed had no doubt that the interests of different groups were the priorities. 
Samarai pointed out that the Americans insisted on personal freedoms and rights and 
left the rest of the political system for the members to sort out. Iraq’s identity was one 
of the main concerns for the Sunnis. Their aim was to establish in the constitution the 
proposition that Iraq was a part of the Arab nation. The Kurds refused to accept this 
and instead proposed the wording; ‘the Arabs of Iraq are part of the Arab nation.’138 
The view of 87 per cent of the wider Sunni membership of the committee was 
unequivocal; during drafting, priority was to be given to the interests of different 
groups, over the principle of democracy.  
 
Islam and Democracy  
The Sunni are, in the main, nationalist, secular, and not as overtly deeply religious and 
sectarian as the Shia. Most, whether secular or Islamic, think that the religion of Islam 
is one of tolerance and  openness to novel interpretations of some aspects of Islam that 
																																																						
138 The Kurds had also added to that; ‘and the Kurds of Iraq are part of the Kurdish nation’. In the final 
constitution, however, this was solved in Article 3. Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, 
and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter, and it 
is part of the Islamic world.  
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can be compatible with democratic rule while retaining key Islamic principles. 
Therefore, almost all the Sunni interviewees139 expressed the belief that, fundamentally, 
there is no inherent clash between Islamic provisions and democratic principles and any 
possible contention was not their prime concern. However, Jaburi referred to the second 
article as ‘incoherent text that reflected a problem which was overcome by the 
committee’ and as a sign of mistrust and fear between the Islamic and secular members 
on the committee. The former included the first part of the article to protect Islamic 
sharia, and the latter put the second half of the article in to protect individual freedoms.  
 
The Sunni interviewees, in their reference to the session on the position of Islam during 
the constitutional drafting, often referred to the stance taken by the Shia on the wording 
of the second article. During the session there were other suggestions, for instance, to 
state ‘no law shall contradict the principles of iIlam’ (Arabic: la tata arath ma’a 
mabade al islam) but the Shia demanded the exact wording of ‘established provisions 
of Islam’ (Arabic: thawbit ahkam al islam). Samarai voiced his concern that ‘the Shia 
might have some hidden intentions’ with their insistence on the exact wording, refusing 
to accept anything else. The Shia, in all probability, took the phrase   ‘established 
provision of Islam’ from the Shia clergy in Iraq, but at the moment this remains mere 
speculation, though a reasonable hypothesis. Unlike the Shia, the Sunni tend to avoid 
theorising about the relationship between Islam and democracy. They tend to be more 
pragmatic in their outlook, taking Islam as the religion of Muslims in Iraq and 
democracy as a system by which these Muslims willingly choose to govern their affairs. 
For them, therefore, there is no clash (and there should not be) between the two; 88 
percent of the Sunni membership of the committee believed that Islam and democracy 
are compatible.  
 
On the level of democracy within the Iraqi constitution, and whether it could facilitate 
a genuine democratic state, the Sunni maintained that the constitution is more 
democratic than the constitutions of the neighbouring regimes, especially in the areas 
of individual freedoms and rights. At the time of drafting the constitution, the Sunni, 
by and large, were in favour of a centralised and unitary Iraq. The Sunni Islamic party, 
																																																						
139 The Sunni interviewees on the Iraqi constitution include, Ayyad Samarai, previously the Speaker of 
the Iraqi House of Representatives and Salim al Jaburi, the current head of the Iraqi House of 
Representatives. A few others refused to share their names for security reasons.  
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which had four representatives on the committee, had proposed the formation of fifteen 
regions to coexist with the Kurdistan region, but this was rejected by a majority of 
Sunnis for, as Jaburi stated, at that point, ‘Sunnis were refusing federalism 
fundamentally.’ It was only later, through the way Iraq’s politics developed that the 
Sunni realised that a centralised government was not in their best interests. The 
interviewees, therefore, have now come to the other end of the spectrum; from 
favouring a centralised option, they have jumped over the decentralised option and gone 
straight to a demand for a region similar to the Kurdistan region in terms of powers and 
structure. This demand has been rejected by the Shia federal government.  
 
The Sunni members of the committee maintained that the constitution should give the 
power to the majority but with reference to their right to form a region and protect the 
rights of the minorities. Although they accept that the text of the constitution was 
democratic, they claim that chapter two on human rights has been put aside ever since 
the constitution was ratified. Jaburi, then the head of the Human Rights Committee, 
stated that there have been explicit violations of the constitution and the human rights 
of Sunnis. Samarai made a similar point, that it is not so much the text that is at issue 
but its interpretation. One of the weaknesses of the constitution, it is argued, is that it 
has many open ended clauses that are unclear and as yet not clarified. Therefore, from 
the Sunni perspective, the Iraqi constitution needs to be more precise with more respect 
for, and adherence to, democratic principles. Most of the complaints from the Sunni 
related to the neglect of Article 142 that had promised an amendment, a promise that 
formed the basis of Sunni endorsement of the constitution. A decade has passed and the 
promise has still not been kept. Consequently, many of the Sunni elite demand the 
complete re-writing of the current Iraqi constitution. 
 
Constitutional Amendment and Concluding Remarks  
Sunnis made choices during the drafting process which they later regretted. The Sunni 
boycott of the political process, prior to 2005, made them overestimate their position 
and underestimate the Shia. They lacked experience in post 2003 politics, and in the 
constitutional committee in which the Sunni had limited influence, they used it to 
propose a centralised state and oppose federalism. That centralised government took 
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very hard measures against them. As a Sunni interviewee put it, the sectarian politics 
have strengthened their faith in the idea of decentralisation. 
 
Over the past decade living by the constitution, and the way it has been implemented, 
the Sunnis have come to realise that they have become a minority in Iraq. Consequently, 
on almost all the aspects of constitution their stance has been reversed from its initial 
position. Currently the Sunni support power dividing mechanisms and, if an 
opportunity arose to adjust the constitution, they would hope to establish such 
mechanisms much more definitively. The findings show that Sunnis are in favour of a 
constitutional amendment, what they refer to as re-writing the constitution, and the 
issues requiring change, on which there is a total agreement among the Sunnis, are the 
structure of federalism in Iraq, the powers of the provinces, and the formation of 
regions, including disputed areas. Samarai argued that the constitution allows for the 
idea of federalism, but it is now necessary to articulate exactly how that is to be brought 
about.  
 
On the disputed areas, the Sunnis want a clear definition of ‘areas’, whether they are 
villages, towns or provinces, and it seems very unlikely that they would accept either 
Shia or Kurdish interpretations on what constitutes a ‘disputed area’. A frequent refrain 
is, ‘Who has the right to say it is disputed over?’ If the constitution was to be amended, 
the Sunni would support a federal system. They would demand more clarity on power 
sharing mechanisms, as well as on the structure of federalism, and they would insist on 
mechanisms being defined clearly in Articles. They would also hope to identify in an 
article which provinces form regions and put an appeal mechanism in place in the event 
of a dispute with, or violation by, the federal government that would include sanctions 
against the government for any breaches. A decade of sectarian rule has made it difficult  
for the Sunnis to accept their current subordination to a centralised authority, and many 
believe a Sunni region is inevitable, even if the necessary constitutional amendment is 
hard to achieve. Among the wider respondents, 62 percent support a constitutional 
amendment and more than 90 percent prefer that more powers are given to the regions. 
In short, the Sunnis demand a consensual application of the Iraqi constitution and hence 
support the establishment of a consensus system in Iraq. 
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8.5 The Kurdish Perspective 
Constitution Drafting: Process or Proposal  
The drafting of the constitution was a historic opportunity for the Kurds for which they 
were well prepared. They were more organised than either the Sunnis or the Shias and 
knew precisely what they wanted in a post-Saddam Iraq. Their prime objective was the 
preservation of their autonomy. The Kurdish autonomous region was a safe haven for 
the would-be leaders of post invasion Iraq140 and this gave the Kurds a greater leverage, 
both in re-making Iraq and also in designing its constitution. The Kurdish members of 
the committee pushed that the TAL should be ‘the source,’ and was the base upon which 
a consensus on Kurdish demands in a future Iraq had been reached.  
 
Although the Shia refused to accept any source for the Iraqi constitution other than the 
constitutional committee members, where they comprised the majority, the Kurds were 
successful in bringing their demands to the table and ensuring that many of the ideas 
that the TAL had addressed were included. For example, Article 142 in the constitution 
had previously been Article 58 of the TAL. This was achieved through intense Kurdish-
Shia bargaining. The Shia had exploited the opportunity created by the Sunni’s initial 
boycott to imprint their majoritarian mark on their constitution and to satisfy some 
Kurdish demands. Therefore, it is Mahmoud Osman’s view that the constitution was an 
Iraqi product; it was an outcome of consensus reached by the members of the 
constitutional committee over which the United States had little influence. The Kurdish 
interviewees seldom made any reference to the Americans, arguing that they did not 
participate in the drafting process, although they were in contact and at times attended 
some meetings. Crucially, however, only Iraqis themselves ever attended full sessions.  
 
Democratic Ideas versus Group Interests  
The Kurds, like the Shia and the Sunni, all stressed that during drafting priority was 
given to the demands of the different ethno-sectarian groups. Although Kurds made up 
only 15 out of the 55 initial members of the committee, their influence was far reaching. 
Thanks to their unity in Baghdad, Kurds had their demands for shared rule and 
federalism in the constitution met, and achieved both the offices of the presidencies of 
																																																						
140 Many of the opposition leaders of the former regime, both form the Sunni Arabs and the Shia Arabs, 
have been living for some period of time in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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Iraq and the federal region of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, it was Faraydoun Abdul 
Qadir’s view that much of the Iraqi constitution is a result of two competing sets of 
ideas, religious and secular, in which the religious had precedence and introduced a 
sectarian element into the draft. A majority of 75 percent of Kurdish members 
confirmed that priority was given to ethno-sectarian group interests, rather than 
democratic principles.  
 
Islam and Democracy  
The majority of Kurds are Sunnis, but the Kurdish question in Iraq is not a sectarian 
one. They are ethnically different from the rest of Iraq, hence their drive is to secure 
ethnic identity. The data shows that Kurds do not see any incongruity in a majority 
Muslim community and the establishment of a western style liberal democracy. Kurds 
are secular in their outlook and they have tried to maintain a distance from Iraq’s 
sectarian divide. Nonetheless, the position of Islam in the Iraqi constitution has 
concerned them as Iraq was already characterised by sectarian tension.  Kurds’ fear was 
not of Islam but rather of a certain sect’s interpretation of Islam that might contradict 
or be at odds with the type of democracy Kurds wanted for Iraq. That fear manifested 
itself during the constitutional session on the relation of Islam and legislation. Osman 
at interview intimated that the Kurds proposed a clause for Article Two, which 
maintained ‘the established provisions of Islam that are agreed upon by Muslim 
scholars,’ knowing that actually there are numerous issues within Islam, including 
political and legislative ones, that do not have universally agreed interpretations shared 
by all Islamic scholars. That proposition was rejected by the Shia. As an alternative, the 
Kurds put forward the proposal that, at the very least, there must be a law to state that 
‘no legislation should be established that goes against the principle of democracy.’141  
 
There is a similar problem with the Iraqi federal court which has still not yet been 
established. The Shia demand that religious scholars should have a veto on the laws 
that are deemed as anti-Islamic but Kurds have opposed this, perceiving in it an implicit 
threat. Osman stated, ‘it is a threat, not only Islamic, but also they want to force 
sectarian ideas.’ Ahmad Said Abdulwahab argued that with the implementation of such 
																																																						
141 Osman further explained that there was a proposition by the Shia to put into a different article, but the 
Kurds, along with other secular members of other groups, insisted that both clauses should be within the 
same article to give both equal significance and relevance. 
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views, the Shia aim ‘to build a state similar to Iran’s Velayate Fatqih, which is a 
theocracy.’ As to the wider respondents among the Kurdish members of the committee, 
50 percent were undecided as to whether Islam and democracy are incompatible, 30 
precent were convinced that Islam is compatible with democracy, while only 12 percent 
believed that Islam and democracy are irreconcilable, referring to a sectarian 
interpretation of Islam in Iraq.   
 
The Kurdish constitutional committee members see the constitution as democratic, and 
almost all the interviewees regarded it as a ‘good constitution’ and believe that if 
implemented correctly through power sharing, could pave the way for a true 
democracy. They made frequent references to themselves as the ‘democratic group’ on 
the committee and although they had comments on the final draft of the constitution, 
their objective then was to build a consensus which required accepting paradoxical 
views. In Dindar Doski’s words, ‘democracy in the constitution is characterised by 
Iraq’s particularities.’ The data shows that for Kurds the most important democratic 
elements that are specific to Iraq are the consensual un-written laws and the informal 
practices, which they called the political customs, which supplement the democratic 
traits of the constitution. Faraydon Abdulqadir, the head of the committee for the final 
revision and associated rules, stated that the current Iraqi constitution was the best 
possible democratic constitution that could be achieved taking into account the 
circumstances under which it was written.  
 
Constitutional Amendment and Concluding Remarks  
The Kurds, during the drafting process, had made political bargains at a time when they 
enjoyed some leverage on power. The data shows that revision of the constitution is not 
attractive to Kurds and it is not surprising that they are not in favour of an amendment. 
What they established in the constitution was partly due to the lack of experience of 
other groups at the time, now no longer the case, and in part due to the specific 
circumstances that led to sectarian violence in the country reaching its peak. An 
amendment could deprive them of their already established constitutional rights. 
Another reason that Kurds are not enthusiastic about adjusting the constitution is 
because much of what they had established in the agreed draft in 2005 has never been 
implemented, for example Article 140 on disputed areas such as Kirkuk.  
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Instead of an amendment, Kurdish interviewees are more inclined towards activating 
the federal court. That is because, unlike the Sunni and the Shia, Kurds have their own 
federal region. Over the past decade, there have been disputes between their region and 
the federal government over revenues and oil, delegated powers of region, and security 
forces. Kurds are of the opinion that such matters should have been handled by the 
federal court as the body that should be most qualified to provide binding 
interpretations of the constitution. Osman argued that so far, on many disputes, the Iraqi 
federal government has refused to undertake the legal procedures provided for. The 
Kurds believe that the mechanism in the constitution for amendment is problematic and 
cannot easily be determined unless a political agreement is reached by different parties. 
It was intended from the very outset of drafting that such agreement would be reached 
but this, also, has so far not materialised. 
 
Kurds have not shifted their stance on the content of the constitution in relation to the 
political system. The issues that almost all interviewees agreed should be re-considered 
were federalism, individual freedoms, and federal revenues. The Kurds are the pioneers 
of a federal Iraq, they supported a federal Iraq at the time of drafting and they support 
it now. They demand more powers to the regions and favour a decentralised 
government. They see federalism in fiscal terms, and demand more autonomy in 
dealing with natural resources and a fairer distribution of national wealth between the 
federal government and the region. In terms of individual freedoms, they feel that 
Article 41, where the sect has authority over family relations, should be amended. The 
view of the wider respondents re-affirmed the major findings, with a majority of 50 
percent not in favour of amendment while 30 percent preferred review of some articles. 
75 percent were of the view that more powers should be given to the regions and only 
25 percent preferred maintaining a balance between the powers of the region and the 
federal government. Hence, as long as federalism and the implementation of Article 
140 are concerned, in Doski’s words, ‘the possibility of its implementation depends on 
the integrity of the government’s intentions.’  
 
In summary, the findings show that Kurds strongly support a consensual application of 
the constitution, with more powers to the region and more autonomy. They see the only 
	 238	
guarantor to Iraq’s unity as being an approach that respects the principle of power 
sharing and shared rule, which could lead to the establishment of a consensual system 
in Iraq. In the absence of such an application of the constitution, Kurds might not wish 
to stay part of Iraq and secession is always an option.  
 
8.6 The Constitution: Persistent Challenges   
The Iraqi constitution is characterised by two distinctive features: it was written by 
political elites, and it is a politically driven document. Amendment requires a consensus 
among the Iraqi political elite, involving intra-group consent. Any amendment, 
therefore, will inevitably be a long drawn out process. Humam Hamoudi, the chair of 
the Constitutional Amendment Committee, stated ‘when we formed the committee the 
amendment was supposed to take only 4 months and it has taken more than 4 years and 
we have not reached any conclusive results.’  
 
An amendment is divided into three revisionist sections; first, re-wording; second, 
addition of articles and details (to date 80 non-controversial articles have been added 
with little disagreement); and third, revision in the area of sensitive political issues 
involving the structure of the political system and issues that lack agreement 
(federalism, powers of the regions, oil and federal revenue all remain contentious). The 
committee could find mechanisms to deal with these matters but almost all interviewees 
stated that there is a disagreement on how to actually start. The vagueness of the articles 
in the constitution, coupled with political unwillingness, seems to be almost 
insurmountable obstacles that make a constitutional amendment hard to achieve.  
 
The lack of clarity has encouraged mistrust among the political elite, and even for the 
members of the committee who wrote it, the mechanisms for implementation are not 
clear. In their responses to the question of whether the constitution provides 
mechanisms for implementation, a majority of 45 percent believed that the mechanisms 
are vague, and 34 percent believed that the constitution lacks any mechanism by which 
it could implement its articles.  
 
In the constitution, Article 76 states that, ‘The President of the Republic shall charge 
the nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc with the formation of the 
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Council of Ministers’. This was the subject of much controversy after the 2010 national 
elections, as the mainly Sunni Iraqyya list was the winner with 91 seats. The Shia 
objected, and took the matter to the federal government.  Meanwhile, the two largest 
Shia lists joined together in the parliament and formed a bloc of 156 seats. As a result, 
the federal court tasked the Shia with forming the government. Many believed that the 
article was not clear on this matter, as it referred to the largest electoral bloc in the 
elections, not the largest bloc after coalitions, within the parliament. The view of the 
majority of the members of the constitutional committee,74 percent, was that the 
formation of the 2010 cabinet was not in accordance with the constitution.  
 
Although the Shia were in the majority, they could not form a majority cabinet and 
started negotiations with other groups and formed a broad coalition cabinet. This, again, 
suggests that Iraq is run with consensus among its main group. As far as the constitution 
is concerned, an assumption universally shared by the members of the committee was 
the importance of the role and influence of the political elite in implementing the 
constitution. Many of them also argued that the future of Iraq rests on the decisions that 
the political elite make concerning the most controversial issues in the constitution.  
 
The qualitative data shows that the democratic ideas in the constitution originate from 
the consensus that the political elite of the Iraqi opposition groups reached in 1992 in 
Vienna and Saladin, as an alternative to the Ba’ath regime.142 In the aftermath of the 
regime collapse, that consensus continued and the Iraqi Governing Council, comprising 
25 members of the political elite, representing different ethno-religious groups, was 
initially appointed to govern the country. Together with input from American advisors, 
they wrote the TAL which was an expression of many views held by opposition leaders 
concerning a future Iraq. The intra-group findings show that the majority of the 
members within each group were of the view that in drafting the constitution in 2005, 
the interests of different ethno-religious groups were the priority. This was confirmed 
by 70 percent of the overall members of the drafting committee. That indicates a 
democratic Iraq can only be conceived as a consociational model, one that 
constitutionally accommodates the interests of different groups.  
																																																						
142 This analysis was shared by many other interviewees, among them Mahmood Osman and Hamid 
Majid Musa, who were members of the Constitution Drafting Committee and who also had participated 
in the 1992 meetings.  
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While designing the constitution, again with the exception of chapter two, which was 
directly, and some say strictly, supervised by the United States, on most other essential 
issues on which there was disagreement among the groups, the article was deliberately 
left open ended and denoted with the clause ‘this will be regulated by a law.’ That, 
understood within the context of Iraq, is really a method of ensuring a majoritarian 
implementation of the constitution. The Shia are the majority and since the ratification 
of the constitution they have manipulated those ‘regularity laws’ to further tighten their 
hold on power. Hence, they have deprived the other groups of their constitutional rights, 
not implementing Article 142 in the case of Sunni, and disregarding Article 140 in the 
case of the Kurds. The Iraqi constitution, therefore, implicitly is biased towards 
majority rule as Iraq’s political system is parliamentary and there are few restrictions 
on the powers of the majority in the parliament.  
 
That political consensus, present during the drafting of the constitution phase, has 
evaporated due to the hesitation in applying it on a consensual basis after its ratification 
in October 2005. Since the formation of the first representative government, the 
interpretation of the constitution has consistently been in line with the interests of the 
Shia majority. The principles on which it was drafted have been violated and its role as 
the safeguard of the interests of all groups in Iraq eroded. The main problem in the 
constitution is in its implementation. Certain issues might require a constitutional 
amendment, such as federalism. However, in the absence of political agreement, 
achieving any constitutional amendment remains a challenge.  
 
 
8.7 Conclusion  
This chapter began with an examination of the Iraqi constitution in relation to power 
distribution, and the system of polity that it envisions. It was clear the four principles 
of a consociational political system are blocked by the constitution. However, because 
the Shia have a majority, they have become an obstacle to a consensual implementation 
of the constitution. One of the main reasons that has led to a majoritarian 
implementation of the Iraqi constitution is its many opened clauses and articles, the 
interpretation of which have been manipulated by the Shia majority in the House of 
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Representatives. This has been regarded by the elites of the other groups as a clear 
violation of the power sharing principles on which the constitution was initially drafted.  
 
The findings in this chapter demonstrated that the constitution was the outcome of a 
process of negotiation and political agreements among the elites of different groups. 
The Shia had refused any alternative proposals, with the exception of the chapter on 
individual rights and freedoms. They would not accept the TAL as ‘the reference of’ 
the permanent constitution, they accepted it only as ‘a point of reference’ along with 
many other sources, including the constitutions of other democracies with divided 
societies. Many democratic ideas and practices that were recommended for post 
invasion Iraq by the US authorities and the UN did not find their way to the final 
permanent document.  
 
The findings highlight one further intriguing point; the greater number of elites from 
all groups confirmed that the group interests were prioritised during the process of 
drafting the constitution. Therefore, it could be deduced that the feasibility of 
‘democracy’, or any other stable political system, in the future will depend primarily 
on maintaining a delicate balance between the interests of different groups and, 
conversely, not maintaining such a balance will threaten progress towards, not only 
democracy, but also the very stability of Iraq. 
  
The findings confirmed that the majority of the elite from all groups believed that Islam 
and democracy are not mutually exclusive. However, the Shia views about the two 
clauses in Article 2 raises some concern. The Shia as a majority believe that the 
sequence of the two clauses in the article, with the first clause about Islamic provisions 
followed by the second clause on democratic principle, gives priority to Islamic 
provisions over democratic principles. This could indicate that as long as the 
interpretation and the implementation of the constitution is concerned, the future 
possible outcomes are going to be more ‘Islamic’ than ‘democratic’, based on a more 
Shia version of Islam.  
 
Concerning future possible amendments, the findings showed, in terms of power 
distribution, the Shia were of the view that more powers should be given to the central 
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authority, with administrative decentralisation. The Sunni, who during drafting were 
not supportive of federalism or a de-concentration of power, now support both 
federalism and decentralisation. Kurdish views are that more powers should be 
devolved to the local governments and that there should be more constraints on the 
central authority.  
 
The whole process of amendment has also been constrained by the expectations of 
different groups and their divergent, if not opposing, interests. As federalism has been 
one of the corner stones for the feasibility of democracy in Iraq, and with the Shia elite’s 
antipathy to federalism, in terms of dividing powers among different groups, it can be 
argued that the future is less promising for group rights. The issues of federalism and 
the Iraqi constitution remain points of conflict between different groups, and the 
distribution of power as envisioned in the constitution has remained the single point of 
hope. That, however, as the findings of this study have shown, is subject first and 
foremost to a political agreement among the political elite and is a precondition for 
stability. The study has been, to an extent, circuitous and returned to its starting point; 
the political elites are the key to the stability of the polity, and the feasibility of 
democracy is subject to the decisions that they make. The initial hypothetical 
assumption, now based on the findings and the evidence presented throughout this 
thesis, is confirmed and it is established that, in the context of Iraq, the political process 
and future prospects for democracy largely depend on the decisions and attitudes of 
those elites.  
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CHAPTER 9: Conclusion  
 
9.1  Introduction  
 
The previous chapters examined how political elites view democracy and political 
institutions. The empirical evidence indicates that the three main groups have different 
perceptions of what democracy means and they also support different institutional 
arrangements. This proved also to be the case for their understanding of federalism, and 
their proposals for constitutional amendment and power redistribution. This final 
chapter will now analyse what these findings mean for the future feasibility of 
democracy in Iraq.143  The main findings of the research relate primarily to the idea of 
democracy, institutional arrangements, federalism and the constitution. The limitations 
of this thesis will be acknowledged and suggestions will be made as to future areas of 
research in this field.  
 
At a time when the political body’s avowed intention was to create and embed 
democracy in the country, the solutions were inevitably going to be complex. In Iraq’s 
case, everything has hinged on the power sharing agreements negotiated by the key 
personnel from each ethnic or sectarian section of society. The agreements, and the 
approach of this thesis, were based on both conceptual and contextual premises.  
 
The first premise was that democracy is government by and for the people. The focus 
has been on the political sense of the term and its application to governmental 
institutions, as articulated by members of the elites. The second major premise was 
contextual; in a deeply divided society the type of democracy introduced is crucial. This 
thesis has explored at length the type of democracy, and the institutional arrangements 
that follow that preference, that is supported by the majority of key political figures 
who actually make the decisions.  
 
																																																						
143 As has been argued, this thesis is concerns democracy in divided societies and locates itself within 
the established literature in this regard. Therefore, it is argued that the findings regarding democratic 
development in Iraq (see section 9.4) may have implications for societies that have similar contexts to 
Iraq, (i.e. multi-ethnic, Muslim majority and divided societies, e.g. Syria). 
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Iraq’s political history and current situation is characterised by the role of the political 
elite as the representatives of divergent ethno-religious groups. Structure and agency in 
Iraq are not polar opposites, they are congruent. Political elites represent their groups’ 
causes and, in Iraq, it is unthinkable to divorce a group from its cause. Therefore, the 
emphasis on the political elite in the context of Iraq does not mean that the socio-
cultural differences within the country are ignored, quite the reverse. Political elites 
have different conceptions of and expectations from democratic ideals but they do 
mirror the views of their constituents. The groups’ conceptions of democratic ideals as 
either majoritarian or consensus are derived from not only their size but other factors, 
such as historical legacies, the values the group wants to serve, and the specific goals 
that they wish to achieve. Shia religious beliefs, Sunni Iraqi nationalism and Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism all play key roles in determining how each group defines the idea of 
democracy.  
 
In this chapter I will first describe the contributions of my thesis, which are both 
theoretical and empirical. Then I will pay attention to some limitations of my research. 
Finally, I will discuss some of the key implications of my findings for the potential of 
democratic developments in Iraq. 
 
9.2  The Contributions of my Thesis  
 
As chapter 2 showed, there has been a gap in the literature on the issue of institutional 
design for building democracy in countries that are culturally and ethnically divided. 
Some scholars recommend power sharing institutions,144 while others advocate 
majoritarian institutions.145 Although both, to varying degrees, emphasise the role of 
leadership, they neglect the views of the political elite in determining institutional 
arrangements and constitutional design. My thesis takes the views of the political elites 
on institutional arrangements as representative of the views of their groups.  
 
The gaps in the literature on ‘democracy’ in Iraq are twofold. The first concerns the 
general approach to the likelihood of a democratic system in Iraq becoming embedded. 
																																																						
144 For example, Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1984; and Reynolds 1999. 
145  Horowitz 1991; Sartori 1997; and Reilly 1997. 
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The second covers particular issues connected to Iraq’s democracy, such as federalism, 
the constitution, and the role of Islam. The general approach in the literature on 
democracy in Iraq examines the structural factors of transition and how attempts to 
build democracy should be structured.146 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the literature 
addresses the structural factors, social, economic and cultural, as challenges to 
democracy. Some scholars argue that these structures are not supportive to 
democracy.147 Others argue that Iraq has specific factors, such as oil revenues and an 
educated and secular population that could create and facilitate the conditions for the 
country to become ‘a successful model’ of democracy for the Middle East.148 By 
addressing the issues of feasibility, the existing literature has shifted the focus away 
from the role of agencies, such as political elites. This thesis has a markedly different 
approach and takes into account the significance of structure, in particular, the ethno-
religious divide in Iraq, and focuses on the role of the agency. The aim was not only to 
address the likelihood of democracy successfully flourishing in Iraq but also to inspect 
and dissect the support for different types of democracy among members of the political 
elite.  
As chapter 7 showed, a deficit in relevant literature on federalism in Iraq is another 
particular concern. The literature is characterised by a debate about power in relation 
to central and local governments.149 Once again, the view of political leadership in Iraq 
seems to have been ignored. The ultimate conclusion of this research is that a 
consensual federalism has to be established since that meets most nearly the three 
requirements for a federal decentralised government, a bicameral legislature, and 
segmental autonomy which any analysis of the situation suggests is the best way 
forward for Iraq. 
 
The literature on the Iraqi constitution has a structural focus on the role of Islam, 
federalism and the matter of oil and gas revenues.150 This thesis addresses the 
																																																						
146 See Lawson 2003; Byman 2003a; Anderson & Stanfield 2004; Dawisha 2005; Nader 2003; Diamond 
2005; Gupta 2007; Visser & Stanfield 2007; and Moon 2009. 
147 Moon 2009; Mokhtari 2008; Diamond 2005. 
148 Alterman 2003: 158; Byman 2003b: 72; Baracati 2004: 158; Ryan 2010: 65. 
149 Brancati 2004; Smith 2005; Salamey and Pearson 2005; Anderson and Stansfield 2005; Galbraith 
2006; Anderson 2007; Visser and Stansfield 2007; Alkadiri 2010; Natali 2011; Hiltermann, Kane, and 
Alkadiri 2012; Danilovich 2014. 
150 Brown 2005a; 2005b; Morrow 2005; Jawad 2013. 
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controversial issues in the Iraqi constitution through discussions with members of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee. Those involved in drafting prioritised their own 
group interests. Discussions, however, did reveal the extent to which individual 
members regarded the finished document as democratic. Those participants were also 
forthcoming about what amendments they now favoured, if any, in the light of 
experience and changed circumstances.  
  
Iraq, of course, is a Muslim majority country and Islam has become a part of the 
constitution. However, that linkage has the potential to restrict the scope of the 
legislature. The literature on Islam and democracy151 is highly relevant to this thesis and 
this research fills a gap in this area, specifically on the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. The existing literature covers the involvement of Islamic movements in the 
democratisation processes,152 but there is a twofold gap in the literature relating to the 
conception of different democratic ideals with regard to different religious sects and 
ethnicities. Secondly, there is little on what type of democratic ideal Muslims in a 
Muslim majority country want, and what type works best in terms of institutional 
arrangements. The empirical chapters filled this particular gap in the context of Iraq by 
demonstrating that Muslims engage in politics differently and, hence, construct 
different identities that, in turn, make them support one form of democracy over 
another. 
 
The main contribution is the analysis of opinions and responses from major political 
figures in Iraq, on key issues, during a turbulent period of political change and 
evolution. Single-country studies are of great importance and the field of comparative 
politics has benefited greatly from such research.153 This case study, with its in-depth 
empirical data, is an important contribution to the study of the feasibility of democracy 
in deeply divided countries. Both the in-depth qualitative semi-structured interviews 
and the Large-N quantitative surveys, are a major contribution to knowledge on the 
post 2003 Iraq. Hence, the main contributions of this thesis are the following.  
 
																																																						
151 See, for example, Fanjari 1973; Enayat 1982; Sisk 1992; Esposito 1996; Brumberg 2003; Abou El 
Fadel 2004. 
152 Bayat 2007; Clark 2004; Henfer 2011. 
153 See, in particular, Tocqueville 1888; Dahl 1961; Lijphart 1968; O'Donnell 1973; Scott 1976; Popkin 
1979, Tilly 1986, Tarrow 1989; Putnam 1993; Varshney 2002. 
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Chapter 3, in particular, makes an important contribution to the literature on democratic 
transitions, elite paradigm, and elite theory of democracy as well as the survival of 
democracy.154 The key concept, continually re-enforced throughout a number of 
chapters, was the pivotal role of the political elite in Iraq’s transition. This conclusion 
was based on the theoretical justifications for the role of political elites in relation to 
the survival of democracy.155 Similar to the core assertion of ‘elite paradigm’, this study 
clearly showed that Iraq’s transition towards either democracy or autocracy depends 
heavily on the ‘consensual unity’ of national elites. The elite paradigm argues that 
where consensually united structural integration and value consensus are extensive 
‘there is an underlying consensus about the worth of existing political institutions’ 
(Higley and Burton 2006: 14 emphasis added). This study, however, argued that beyond 
an underlying consensus about the worth of existing political institutions, an extra 
element is required, a support or consent among the greater number of elite for a 
consensual system, as potentially the single most significant factor in the establishment 
and maintenance of a democratic system in a culturally and ethnically divided country.  
 
The elite theory of democracy, in principle, concerns established democracies with 
complex societies. The application of elite theory to emerging democracies in a country 
culturally and ethnically divided can be regarded as a contribution to the elite theory of 
democracy. The theoretical framework developed for this thesis involved a model based 
on Dahl’s conception of democracy as ideal and actual (1998). This thesis contributed 
to Dahl’s work, by incorporating Lijphart’s work (1999), specifically to address which 
institutions and what conditions favour democracy. While other works have discussed 
the role of political elite and institutions in building democracy,156 this thesis differs 
from by studying the interrelation of political elites and the two forms of democratic 
ideals, majoritarian and consensus systems, in two interrelated steps. First, it examined 
the political elite’s conceptions of democracy as an ideal (what values and goals they 
wish to achieve and serve with their appeals to democracy). Second, it examined 
preferences for what elites believed democracy needed in reality, in terms of what 
																																																						
154 During 1980s, scholars focused on the role of political elites in democratic transitions and this research 
adds to that body of knowledge (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987; 
Baloyra 1987; Needler 1987; Karl and Schmitter 1991. 
155 This is proposed by a number of scholars, including; Hagley and Burton 1989; Field, Higley and 
Burton 1990; Dye and Zeigler 1996; Etzioni-Halevy 1997; Higley and Burton 2006. 
156 For example, Fukuyama 1995 and Diamond 2005. 
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institutional arrangement they supported (Chapter 6), and what conditions they thought 
such arrangements would necessitate (Chapters 7 and 8).  
 
Chapter 5 focused on political elites’ values and goals and their conceptions of 
democracy, connected to a relevant but different aspect of literature, that of Islam and 
democracy.157 Iraq, as a Muslim majority country, necessitated an examination of the 
extent to which Islam plays a role in elites’ conceptions of democracy. The findings 
illustrated that among the three main groups, only the Shia idea of democracy is limited 
by their interpretation of Islam. This thesis, therefore, extends the literature on the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy, and also that on democracy in Muslim majority 
countries. The real question does not lie in whether Islam is compatible with 
democracy, but rather what do Muslims really want. In a Muslim majority country, this 
chapter argued, the real focus should be on what type of institutional arrangement 
accommodates the different groups, and not to what extent democratic principles are 
compatible with Islamic values.  
 
Chapter 5 also examined the different definitions of democracy supported by different 
groups, in relation to consensual and majoritarian ideals. The Shia conceived it as 
majority rule, and Sunni and Kurds as consensus. It was argued that the political elite’s 
conceptions of democracy matter, and how elites conceive the idea of democracy could 
either build trust or destroy it. This thesis argued that the conception of democracy as 
majority rule in Iraq has undermined trust among members of different ethno-religious 
groups.  
 
Chapter 6 contributed to the debate on institutional engineering in culturally and 
ethnically divided countries. There are different views on political intuitions and their 
feasibility and function in deeply divided societies. Some scholars recommend power 
sharing institutions,158 while others suggest majoritarian institutions.159 In general, the 
approach of this thesis contributed information from both perspectives in terms of the 
preferences of political elites for institutional arrangements. While acknowledging both 
																																																						
157  Fanjari 1973; Enayat 1982; Sisk 1992; Esposito 1996; Brumberg 2003; Abou El Fadel 2004. 
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points of view, the conclusion of this thesis supports the arguments advanced by those 
supporting power sharing arrangements.  
 
Preferences of the political elite from divergent perspectives on all institutional 
arrangements were explored, adding to the debate on institutional design in divided 
countries. This debate is centred around electoral engineering such as ‘alternative 
vote’160 and objections to it.161 One finding that is of particular interest was that 
proportional representation, a consensual trait, had the support of 90 percent of the 
political elite across different ethno-religious groups. This particular institution, in the 
context of Iraq, favours the Shia majority, and allows a monopoly of legislative power 
in a unicameral legislature. It can result in undemocratic outcomes, unless the House is 
constrained by other consensual institutions, for instance, a supplementary consensual 
bicameral legislature. It was argued that consensual institutions require supplementary 
power sharing or consociational informal practices, with federalism combined with 
devolved segmental autonomy and a constitution which allowed for power sharing and 
a grand coalition.  
 
Considerable power is given to the parliament in Iraq by the constitution. This research 
specifically examined two areas in which the Shia majority act as a bloc and prevent 
the establishment of consensual elements within the power structure. Bearing in mind 
that a large number of the participants in interviews and surveys were members of the 
House, their views on this issue are especially pertinent. The Shia have concentrated 
the legislative power in the House of Representatives. They oppose the establishment 
of a second legislative unit, the Federal Council, as called for in the constitution. They 
have proved reluctant to implement the constitution consensually, examples of which 
are those articles concerning the Kurds (Article 140) on disputed areas, and the Sunni 
(Article 142) on amending the Iraqi constitution.   
 
The idea of power sharing and the distribution of powers between the central 
government and other administrative units was explored in Chapter 7, as was the belief 
that federalism can be a source of political stability, and reduce the likelihood of 
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secession. An issue dealt with because of its relationship to federalism, and relevance 
to the case of Iraq, is the politics of recognition, which in turn is interconnected to 
identity politics, when different ethno-religious groups strive to exist, politically, based 
on their identity.162 This thesis examined the preferences of political elites, both intra-
group and inter-group and contributed to the existing literature from the perspective of 
the political elite, their support for different forms of federalisms and federal structures 
in Iraq. Members of the Shia supported a form of federalism that could equate to 
administrative decentralisation while the majority of Sunni and Kurds believed that 
government would be less oppressive in a federal state comprising three different 
regions. The conclusion reached was that the best type of federal system for Iraq is 
‘symmetrical holding-together,’ that is, all three regions having equal powers and the 
central government having devolved significant elements of its power to the constituent 
units to preserve the unity of the county. 
 
Chapter 8 contributes to the relevant literature on the Iraqi constitution, which currently 
concentrates on the role of Islam and its relationship to federalism.163 The findings of 
the research extended the empirical data on these issues, from the perspectives of the 
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee. There has been much controversy 
and speculation regarding the level of democracy inherent in the constitution because 
of the second article.  The views of the members of the committee were certainly 
diverse, but the majority agreed that the two clauses in the second article are not 
contradictory. The first clause protects the established provisions of Islam as the 
identity of the state, and the second clause protects the ‘principles of democracy.’  
 
There has been a majoritarian implementation of Iraq’s consensual constitution, which 
has violated the principle of power sharing among Iraq’s main groups with the majority 
interpreting the open ended clauses and articles in a partisan manner. Iraq’s democracy 
requires a consensual implementation of the constitution. Issues that are controversial 
in terms of amendment are the relative powers of the regions and the federal 
government, and the issue of federalism in general. Group perceptions of the 
constitution have changed since drafting and the task of amending it will not be an easy 
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one. The Shia demand more powers for the federal government, while the Kurds and 
the Sunni argue for more powers for the regions and local administrations. The two 
subjects of federalism and the amendment of the constitution continue to put Iraq’s 
democracy to the test.  
 
The constitution itself is characterised by two distinctive features; it is written by 
political elites, and it is written as an essentially political, not a legal, document. It has 
not been amended because any amendment requires a consensual intra-group consent 
by the political elites. Any movement on these matters depends on consensual unity 
but, if achieved, it, in turn, could lead to the establishment of a consensual federalism 
in Iraq. The fate of Iraq’s political system depends very much on the decisions that the 
political elite make. 
 
The allocation of time given for the design of the constitution was not insufficient. The 
haste with which it was processed left it with a number of important open-ended clauses 
within articles that themselves were often far from clear. This has caused numerous 
problems. Intra-group findings showed that the majority of the members within each 
group were of the view that in drafting the Iraqi constitution, the interests of different 
ethno-religious groups were prioritised over the establishment of democratic principles. 
Paradoxically, however, the vast majority of members of the committee regarded the 
constitution to be ‘democratic’. This implies that the level of democracy of the 
constitution lies in its ability to accommodate different group demands and interests.  
 
The Iraqi constitution is the guarantor of Iraq’s unity. Each group has established its 
position in the constitution and these community demands have become their 
constitutional rights. That has two implications; the first of which is that a fully 
democratic Iraq can only be realised through a consensual model. The second is that 
the constitution has to be implemented consensually to preserve the constitutional rights 
of different groups, while safeguarding the unity of the country. The findings showed 
the issues in the constitution that are controversial are specifically related to Article 140 
and Article 142 and require a consensual application if they are to have any legitimacy. 
However, these are the very issues on which a consensus seems a long way off and they 
continue to constitute major obstacles to democracy building in the country. 
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9.3  Limitation of my Thesis and Suggestions for Future 
Research  
	
The first potential restriction to any academic work is the way in which the research 
issue is framed. This limits both the scope and the issues related to the particular case 
under investigation. However, narrowing the focus to concentrate on a manageable area 
for exploration is an absolute necessity if any in-depth research is to be undertaken. 
This research has consciously avoided the potential trap of investigating too much, at 
too shallow a level, and concentrated, instead, on the key role of the elites in the political 
process in Iraq.  
 
To examine the potential of democracy in Iraq, through a focus on the political elite, 
implies an inside-out approach which excluded many internal and external actors, 
factors, and forces. Concerning the internal actors, this thesis narrowed its focus to the 
political elite and formal institutions as key to the governance of the country. It does 
not include other issues related to democracy in Iraq, such as socio-economic 
conditions, security and political violence, oil as a political commodity, and the role of 
political parties in the democratisation process. The role of external actors, including 
the role of neighbouring countries hostile to democracy, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
and their role in democratic erosion and authoritarian promotion within Iraq as newly 
emerging democracy, were dealt with only tangentially. 
 
In terms of theory, this thesis is limited by its minimalist conception of democracy as 
applying only to institutions of the government, though the institutions themselves are, 
of course, wide ranging. This choice can be justified by the fact that Iraq is a case in 
transition and its present conditions do not allow a broader conception of democracy. 
Research into a more embedded and consolidated democracy would require a different 
theoretical approach. The focus of this thesis was on elites and institutions, not on the 
structural factors within society. Limiting the findings to the views and preferences of 
the political elite could be seen as another limitation. This choice, however, can be 
justified through an acknowledgement that in the theoretical framework, both 
institutions and the political elite matter. Institutions remain significant explanatory 
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factors for either democratic erosion or consolidation. It is true that institutions of 
themselves cannot explain the entire process of democracy building, but as long as 
modern democracies are representative and institutions are the only mechanisms to 
facilitate the democratic will, then political institutions remain central to any study of 
democracies, whether established or emerging, complex or in deeply divided societies. 
In turn, when studying the arrangement of political institutions, the role of the political 
elite inevitably becomes central.  
 
Limitation in methodology includes research methods and case study and design. As a 
single-country case study, there are limitations in terms of drawing generalised 
conclusions from such a prescribed sample, especially since the country in question has 
so many unique aspects. This, however, does not undermine either the significance or 
the integrity of the findings as a means of reaching a better understanding about the 
specific country in question. The research design is compatible with the theoretical 
framework and is based on a pragmatic philosophical worldview and qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. This thesis used concurrent triangulation design and 
concurrent embedded design as a framework through which data was analysed to 
satisfactorily answer the main research question.  
 
New questions have arisen in the course of the study, in particular, the issue of elite 
preferences for majoritarian or consensual traits, which were dealt with in individual 
chapters. Other traits, the executive-party dimension (the concentration of executive 
power), and electoral systems, could provide a base for future research. There is 
majority inter-group support for the concentration of executive power in a single party 
majority. There is also majority inter-group support for a majoritarian disproportional 
electoral system. Iraq’s cabinets have, so far, been based on broad multi-party 
coalitions, and its electoral system is one of proportional representation. Nevertheless, 
it is essential to examine those two traits in detail to ascertain whether such support 
implies that Iraq’s consensual democracy could lead to the formation of a majoritarian 
democracy. At the moment, even the achievement of a consensual democracy is hard. 
Further research could involve the study of the political elite’s   role in mobilising their 
groups to participate in building democracy, and their role in building social capital 
through an actively engaged citizenry. 
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The inter-play of oil and the political elite, and its effect on the process of democracy 
building and Iraq’s federalism in Iraq, could also be a fertile area for an independent 
study. Similarly, the Kurdish question and its impact on democracy building in the 
context of Iraq, with a focus on the role of political parties, could also prove to be an 
enlightening subject of inquiry. The role of Islam as an external factor on Iraq’s 
democracy is an area that is likely to grow in significance in the light of the rise and the 
fall of Daesh, and the Shia monopoly of state apparatus. The Sunni, who are the 
minority in Iraq, in fact make up the overwhelming majority in the Islamic world. The 
Shia, who are the majority in Iraq, are very much the minority. This particular area is 
crucial when taking into account the role of other Muslim majority countries. Iraq is 
located in a critical position between two Muslim majority countries hostile to a liberal 
form of democracy, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is vital that Iran’s 
influence on the Iraqi Shia political elite and Saudi Arabia’s impact on the Sunni 
political elite, and their respective effect on the future on Iraq’s political system and the 
future of its form of ‘democracy’, are considered and understood. 
 
The role of outsiders is a further relevant issue to the role the Iraqi political elite in 
building democracy. On the subject of efforts aimed at democratisation and assistance 
in achieving democracy, it is crucial to know what sort of impact international state 
players have on the political elite. It is also important to examine the position of those 
players on institutional arrangements, especially what type of democracy they deem fit 
for Iraq and what help they can provide to help the Iraqi political elite to build their 
institutions appropriately. Similarly, the role and effectiveness of international non-
state actors in relation to the political elite and institutional arrangement in Iraq could 
be an interesting subject of inquiry. As far as the Iraqi political elite and their 
preferences for democratic institutional arrangements are concerned, this research has 
been one among many. The case of Iraq remains crucial for democracy as a political 
ideal. Iraq is an oil rich country, it is a Muslim majority county at the heart of the 
Muslim World and in the middle of two extremes in terms of sects, as represented by 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is a culturally, ethnically, and religiously divided country, and 
it is an example of a country where democracy has been imposed. Iraq, as a case study, 
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will, in consequence, remain relevant for many years ahead and provide numerous 
opportunities for significant research.  
 
9.4  Implications for Democratic Development in Iraq 
The research findings in this thesis make suggestions on two distinctive points; which 
political system is more likely to emerge in Iraq and which prospects for developing a 
political system are more likely to ensure political stability. Taking into account the 
political reality in Iraq, where the Shia are the majority and, consequently, have the 
monopoly over the three branches of power, and the fact that the greater number of Shia 
political elite support a majoritarian system, it is not unreasonable to predict that Iraq 
is heading towards a majoritarian political system and a move away from the principle 
of power sharing. This is problematic as it has caused instability and political 
disagreement in Iraq.  
 
The evidence outlined in Chapter 6 showed that on five variables the support of the 
greater number of the political elite was for majoritarian traits. However, this support 
has to be understood properly in the context of Iraq.  That number included an absolute 
majority of the Shia, together with the minorities within the Sunni and the Kurds who 
supported the Shia stance. That is problematic because the outcome, in reality, has 
translated into a political system that does not have consent of the majority of the two 
latter key groups. The findings of this thesis suggest that the political system that would 
mostly likely work in Iraq and would have the consent of a majority of the minorities 
is a political system that respects the principle of power sharing.  
 
Post 2003 Iraq was based on the consent of the three main groups in Iraq and the four 
principles of power sharing established in the constitution. A consensus democratic 
system, which stands alone as the only possible outcome that will be successful in the 
long term, requires two preconditions; consensual federalism and consensual 
implementation of the constitution. However, members of the majority define 
democracy in terms of majority rule, meaning their own majority Shia group. This is, 
in effect, the tyranny of the majority and is against the values of most advanced 
democracies where accommodation of the minority groups within its society is the 
hallmark of a sophisticated political system. It was demonstrated that conceiving 
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democracy as majority rule has been at the root of the mistrust that has emerged among 
the Iraqi political elite. It was argued that a majoritarian idea of democracy as the rule 
by ‘the majority,’ in Iraq’s context, translates to rule by a specific majority and this 
could cause conflict rather than resolve it. Institutionalisation of power sharing 
principles requires a consensual form of institutional arrangements, in particular, 
through a federalism based on the segmental autonomy of the three main groups 
(Chapter 7), and the consensual implementation of the constitution in relation to Article 
140 and Article 142.  
 
A key conclusion confirmed by several chapters was that majority rule and majoritarian 
institutional arrangements are not suitable for Iraq. However, since the idea of 
democracy, on a small or large scale, includes both majoritarian and consensual ideals, 
this thesis examined both. Although the greater number of elites among the minorities 
supported a consensual form of democracy, the greater number of the majority 
supported a majoritarian system. The model for Iraq, therefore, depends mainly on the 
compromises and the political agreements reached between the different groups. The 
type of democracy, or any other political system that will work in Iraq, will be the 
outcome of those compromises and agreements, and will not necessarily follow either 
a purely majoritarian or consensual approach.   
 
Any prognosis about the feasibility of democracy in Iraq cannot be more definitively 
arrived at than through an understanding of its political elite, how they define 
democracy, what they see as democratic, and what their preferences are. As a deeply 
divided society, this is even more the case in the context of Iraq. This study calls for an 
inclusive approach, one that takes into account the interests of the three main groups, 
and also maintains a balance between them in the apparatus of rule, establishing and 
sustaining power sharing in such a way it is not open to the criticism that minority 
groups, while nominally partners in government, are not genuine partners in power.  
 
The findings of this research have demonstrated that state institutions cannot be natural; 
they are either democratic or non-democratic. Institution building in any given context 
either facilitates conditions for the emergence of a democratic regime or, conversely, 
hinders such progress. Therefore, state building efforts, as far as the institutions are 
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concerned, need to take into account the idea of democracy. Democracy in Iraq requires 
a gradual, rather than sequential, approach. This thesis puts great stress on the 
significance of institutions and this proved to be in line with the expressed views of the 
political elite as a whole. They believed that democracy building requires institution 
building first; that is, the idea of democracy necessarily preceding those institutions.  
 
The fact that Iraq is a deeply divided country has been highlighted consistently 
throughout this thesis because it is the key to any understanding of what might keep the 
country intact. The different ethno-religious groups are located in separate 
geographically concentrated areas. These groups are characterised by strong feelings of 
belonging, and a feeling of “otherness” by which they distinguish themselves from 
other groups. These ethno-religious groups are not flexible but rigid. Therefore, any 
type of democracy in Iraq, from its foundation up, has to accommodate all these groups 
in the apparatus of rule, represent them, give them the power to influence political 
decisions, in proportion to their numerical strength, and provide for the opportunity to 
run their own internal affairs. 
 
The type of federalism that the Iraqi constitution outlined requires the devolution of the 
country into three regions; Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Each of these regions is to have their 
own legislature and adopt their own constitution, with each having their executive and 
judicial powers based on the principle of devolution. The federal government, however, 
would retain overall policy for national defence, financial regulation and development 
of the economy. The regions are themselves expected to adopt administrative 
decentralisation based on the governorates that make up each region. The findings of 
this study confirm that administrative decentralisation is highly probable in intra-group 
provinces but not as a principle to govern inter-group provinces. In Iraq, with clear cut 
ethno-religious divides along three separate areas, a federation of three regions is the 
only practical way to sustain political stability while maintaining the territorial integrity 
of the state. The adoption of such a federal structure is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition for the feasibility of any form of democracy in the future. The main findings 
show there is a lack of majority consent for a consensual arrangement of federalism, a 
three region federation that respects the principle of power sharing, acknowledgement 
of political segmental autonomy, the establishment of a bicameral legislature, or a 
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decentralised federal executive. Federalism, however, remains a challenge because the 
different groups have different ideas about it, and support different types of application 
of the constitutional arrangements.  
 
The three main groups obviously have very different views. Although there is a lack of 
support for a federal political order among the Shia, they understand federalism as 
administrative decentralisation with a strong federal government. Sunnis and Kurds 
understand federalism as the division of real power between central and local 
governments and administrative units. Their conceptions equate to a form of consensual 
federalism, a political order that meets the three requirements of federal decentralised 
government, a bicameral legislature, and segmental autonomy. However, their 
motivation is different; Sunnis support a united Iraq and oppose division. Kurds support 
a consensual federal system that ensures extended powers to their regional government. 
 
Findings throughout this thesis confirm that Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, in particular, 
favour two entirely different, and mutually exclusive, modes of governance, world 
views, and different political cultures. In societies such as Iraq, with a clear cut ethno-
religious divide, a federation is the only way to sustain consensual democracy while 
maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. Federalism, of itself, however, cannot 
stop violence if it lacks the underlying political consent of the three main groups. The 
main findings suggest such consent on a consensual arrangement of federalism, a three 
region federation, that respects the principle of power sharing, acknowledges political 
segmental autonomy, establishes a bicameral legislature, and institutes a decentralised 
federal executive, are necessary for a consensual democracy and in turn could help 
facilitate its success in Iraq. Any other alternative would not accommodate Iraq’s 
diversity, fail to address the political will of the three main groups and, instead, simply 
embed the tyranny of the majority, in this case the Shia.  
 
Finally, three major conclusions stem from this research; first, concerning the views of 
the Iraqi political elite identified in this thesis. These are, of course, not the only views 
that elites have concerning democracy in Iraq (for example views on oil as a resource 
over a curse, a sense of national identity, the nation state itself and the role of the 
international community in national politics). While subsequent future research may 
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look to include and expand on some, or all of these areas, this thesis differs from other 
potential explanations by very consciously focusing on the role of the political elite 
only, and the initial decision to restrict the scope of the research has been more than 
justified by the depth of the responses from key political leaders.  
 
The second conclusion reached is that various challenges faced by the elites and, just 
as significantly, the reasons why the role taken by them in addressing them is important, 
are not all wholly independent of one another. Indeed, the rationale for emphasising the 
importance of the political elite can be explained, in part, by the international 
dimension. Although a lack of a sense of belonging to the same state among ordinary 
people in society might be advanced as an explanation of why the feasibility of 
democracy in Iraq is problematic, an account that focuses instead on the views of the 
elite cannot be divorced from consideration of ethno-sectarian differences and provides 
a more accurate picture of what confronts the country. In particular, the role elites play 
in heightening or conversely reducing divisions and conflict in society, and in 
influencing the people from their communities, cannot be underrated. The third 
conclusion is that while the choice of formal institutions and the agreements reached 
on them do matter, so do informal institutions, which can exert their own influence on 
the way formal institutions operate in practice. This thesis showed that in the Iraqi 
context informal institutions have, so far, played a positive role in helping prevent 
damage to the process democracy building.  
 
The main findings reached by this thesis is that the political elites’ importance to 
addressing the three core political challenges of building democracy in Iraq resides in 
their ability to put aside ethno-sectarian differences by institutionalising a combination 
of consensual formal political institutions and consolidating informal institutions by 
recognising different ethnicities, sects and religion. Although that entails making 
significant changes to the existing constitution, it will enable federalism to be 
operationalised more smoothly in practice. As always the real barriers to progress lies 
in the entrenched views of those wielding power and their inability to grasp the nettle 
of compromise to provide long term security and fairness for all members of a country. 
In Iraq, progress is possible but it will require statesmanship of the highest order, by all 
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vested interests, to reach the compromises that are so necessary for the future of the 
country.    
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees  
 
A) List of interviewees on democracy and federalism, mainly members of the 
executive, leaders of different political parties.  
 
Jalal Talabani, The President of the Republic of Iraq (2005-2014), The Presidential 
Palace, The Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, September 10, 2012  
 
Fuad Masum, The President of the Republic of Iraq (2014-Present), The Iraqi 
Parliament, Green Zone, Baghdad Iraq, September 5, 2015.  
 
Masoud Barzani, The President of Kurdistan Region, Pirmam, Erbil, Iraq, December 
30, 2013.  
 
Tariq Al-Hashimi, The Vice President of the Republic of Iraq, Istanbul, Turkey, April 
26, 2013.  
 
Ibrahim Al-Ja’afari, The former Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, The 
Headquarters of the Dawa Party, Baghdad Iraq, September 16, 2012.  
 
Salim Al-Jaburi, The Current Speaker of the Iraqi House of Representatives, the Iraqi 
Parliament, October 2012.  
 
Ammar Al-Hakim, The Leader of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, Erbil, Erbil 
Governorate, February 27, 2015.  
 
Ayyad Al-Samaraiy, The Secretary General of Islamic Party, the former Speaker of 
the Iraqi House of Representatives, September 15, 2012.  
 
Mohsen Abdel Hamid, President of the Interim Iraq Governing Council (February 
2004), Erbil, His Office, February 5, 2014.  
 
Barham Salih, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (2009-2012), 
The KRG Council of Ministers, Erbil, October 17, 2012.   
 
Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (2012-
Present), The Office of the Prime Minister, Erbil, March 16, 2015.   
 
Mohammed Al-Tamimi, Education Minister, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, 
Iraq, September 11, 2012. 
 
Khairulah Hassan Babakir, Trade Minister, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, Iraq, 
September 18, 2012. 
 
Did Najm Al-Asadi, Minister of State, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, Iraq, 
September 12, 2012. 
 
Sadun Al-Dulaimi, Culture Minister, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, Iraq, 
September 11, 2012. 
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Mohammdd Shiya Al-Sudani, Human Rights Minister, Iraqi Council of Ministers, 
Baghdad, Iraq, September 14, 2012. 
 
Ali Al-Shkry, Planning Minister, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, Iraq, 
September 20, 2012. 
 
Khalil Qasim Hasoon, Minister of State for Non-Governmental Organisations, Iraqi 
Council of Ministers, Baghdad, September 27, 2012.  
 
Dindar Najman Shafiq, Displacement and Migration Minister, Iraqi Council of 
Ministers, Baghdad, September 25, 2012,  
 
Sheikh Jamal Al-Batigh, Minister of State for Tribal Affairs, Iraqi Council of 
Ministers, Baghdad, September 23, 2012,  
  
Sahib Qahraman, Minister of State, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, September 
19, 2012,  
 
Bushra Husein Saleh, Minister of State, Iraqi Council of Ministers, Baghdad, 
September 26, 2012,  
 
Meer Tahir Al-Kinani, Head of the Legal Committee in the Iraqi Parliament, the 
building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, October 5, 2012.   
 
Unamdim Usif Kana (Christian), Member of the Iraqi House of Representatives, the 
main building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad,  
 
Abbas Al-Bayati (Turkmen), Member of the Iraqi House of Representatives, the main 
building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad,  
 
Nawshirawan Mustafa, General Coordinator of the Change Movement in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Sulaimani, Iraq, October 28, 2012.  
 
Saladin Mohammed Bahadin, Leader of Islamic Union of Kurdistan, the Headquarters 
of the IUK, Erbil, Iraq 6 August 2013 
 
Ali Bapir, Leader of the Islamic Komal of Kurdistan, the Headquarters of the IKK, 
Erbil, Iraq, May 5, 2013.  
 
Lisa C. McLean, Country Director of the National Democratic Institute, the 
Headquarters of NDI, Ankawa district, Erbil, July 8, 2010. 
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B) List of Interviewee for the Iraqi Constitution, all respondents were 
members of the Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee, from the three 
main groups, Shia, Sunni and Kurd.   
 
Humam Hamoudi, (Shia)The Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, The 
Iraqi Parliament Building, September 25, 2012. 
 
Mahmood Usman, (Kurd) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Baghdad, 
the main building of the Iraqi Parliament, September 14, 2012. 
 
Hamid Majeed Musa, (Secular Shia) Member of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee, The headquarters of the Communist Party, Baghdad, September 15, 2012.  
 
Adnan Al-Janabi, (Sunni) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the main 
building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, September 16, 2012.  
 
Salim Al-Jaburi, (Sunni) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the main 
building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, September 18, 2012. 
 
Khalid Aba Dar Atyya, (Shia) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the 
main building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, September 18, 2012. 
 
Abbas Al Bayati, (Turkmen Shia) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 
the main building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, September 13, 2012. 
 
Sami Al-Askari, (Shia) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the main 
building of the Iraqi Parliament, Baghdad, September 19, 2012. 
 
Alla’ Al-Makki, (Sunni) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Erbil 
Governorate, Erbil, October 12, 2012.  
 
Faraydun Abdulqadir, (Kurd) Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 
Sulaimania, Iraq, December 27, 2013. 
 
Ahmad Abdulwahab, (Kurd Islamic) Member of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee, His office, Erbil, Iraq, December 25, 2013.   
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Elaboration on the list of interviewees (A and B) 
 
The above interviewees, include members of the all segments of Iraq, Shia Arab, Sunni 
Arab, Kurd, Christian, and Turkmen, with religious and secular backgrounds.  In 
addition to the formal positions of those participants, most of them are members of all 
politically significant political parties from the three main groups in Iraq, Shia, Sunni 
and Kurd, the following elaborates some political parties -the wider range of 
interviewees, of course, includes members of a wider range of political parties.   
 
The members of politically significant Shia political parties and factions include, 
Ibrahim Ja’afary, spokesman of the Islamic Dawa Party, also known as Islamic Call 
Party (ICP); Baha’ al-A’araji the Spokesman of the Sadrist Movement, for the Islamic 
Virtue Party (IVP); Ammar al Hakim, the leader of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI).  
 
The members of politically significant Sunni party and faction include, Tariq al 
Hashimi, secretary general of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) (until 2009) - largest Sunni 
Islamist political party in Iraq. Ayad al-Samarrai, the secretary general of IIP, since 
2011. Also Salim al Jabuir, a member of IIP and was a member of the Iraqi Accord 
Frond (the largest Sunni political coalition in the Iraqi parliament), Jaburi was also the 
Head of the parliament’s legal committee.  
 
The members of the politicaly significant Kurdish political parites include, the 
Secretary General of the five major Kurdish parties, Jala Talabani, secretary general of 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Masoud Barzani secretary general of Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP), Nawshirwan Mustafa the general coordinator of Goran 
Movement, Saladin Mohammed Bahdin leader of Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK), 
and Ali Bapir leader of Islamic Komal of Kurdistan (IKK).   
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Appendix B: Interview Questions on Democracy and Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q1 How do you define Iraq’s Democracy?  
 
Q2 On what bases Iraq’s Federalism should be based; sect, ethnicity or geography? 
And why?  
 
Q3 How the Iraqi Government should be formed, in broad multiparty coalitions or in 
single-party majority cabinets? And why?  
 
Q4 What type of electoral system is suitable for Iraq, proportional representation or 
disproportional electoral systems? Why?  
 
Q5 What are the factors that could develop the performance of the Iraqi government 
and which of such factors should take priority?  
 
Q6 What are the challenges of democracy building in Iraq? 
 
 
 
 
 
Name and Position:  
 
 
 
Signature  
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  ﻛﯿﻒ ﺗﺼﻒ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻘﺮاطﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﯿﺔ ؟ﺳﻮال اﻻول: 
 
  اﻟﻘﻮ ﻣﻲ؟ وﻟﻤﺎذا؟ ،اﻟﻄﺎﺋﻔﻲ ﻲ،ﺳﺎس اﻟﺬي ﺗﺮاه ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎ ﻟﻘﯿﺎم اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺎت ﻓﻰ اﻟﻌﺮاق : اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻷﻣﺎھﻮ ا ﺳﻮال اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ:
 
  اﻷﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ؟ مﺳﺎس اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻟﺘﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻟﻌﺮاق: اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻘﻲ أﻷﻣﺎھﻮ ا ﺳﻮال اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ:
 
  ﺎم اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻟﻠﻌﺮاق؟ ھﻞ ھﻮ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ  أو اﻟﺘﻤﺜﯿﻞ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﻲ؟ وﻟﻤﺎذا؟ﻣﺎھﻮ اﻟﻨﻈ ﺳﻮال اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ:
 
  ھﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﯾﺮى أن ﺗﺤﺴﯿﻦ أداء اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﯾﺒﺪأ ﻣﻦ: ﺳﻮال اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ:
أو ﻣﻦ ﺑﻨﺎء دوﻟﺔ  اﻟﯿﮭﻢ، ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻛﺮات واﺳﻨﺎد اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﺔ ﻛﻮادر ﯾﺮى أﻧﮫ ﯾﺒﺪأ ﺑﺎﻋﺪاد ﺾﺒﻌاﻟﺳﺴﺎﺗﻲ, وﺆﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﻌﻤﻞ اﻟﻤ
  ﻚ ﻓﻲ ذاﻟﻚ؟ﺣﻀﺮﺗ يﻣﺎ رأ ،اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن
 
  ﻣﺎ ھﻲ اﻟﻌﻮاﺋﻖ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﺘﺮض اﻟﻤﺴﯿﺮة اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻘﺮاطﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺮاق؟  ﺳﻮال اﻟﺴﺎدس:
 
 
 اﻷﺳﻢ: ...................
 
 
 
 اﻟﻤﻨﺼﺐ: ..................
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Appendix C:  Interview Questions on the Iraqi Constitution  
 
 
 
Q1 Was the wiring up process on some guidelines by the US, in other words, were the 
democratic ideas in the constitution suggested by the US or were they introduced by the 
committee members -the outcome of a consensus? in your view, during writing the constitution, 
which of the following was the priority:  a) establishing democratic principles in the 
constitution b) protecting the interests of sect/ethnic group. And why? 
 
Q2 (Article 2.) A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be 
established. B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be established. Not all 
established provisions of Islam are necessarily democratic, Do not you think that this is a 
challenge to democracy building in Iraq, if not, why?  
 
Q3 The implementation of Articles 113., 114, 115, On forming regions and provincial 
administrations, the borders of Kurdistan region cuts across the neighbouring provinces (this is 
the case between Sunni/Shia areas) cant this be an obstacle to establishing federalism, in 
building a democratic Iraq?   
 
Q4 can the Iraqi constitution establish a democratic system, are there mechanism in the 
constitution to fulfilling the promise that it makes? This is to say, whether your ‘take’ on other 
aspects of the constitution has been affected by the way you have seen politics in Iraq develop 
over the recent years.  
 
Q5 if an opportunity to amend or adjust the constitution arose in the coming years then what 
features, if any, of the constitution would you most like to see changed? And what feature(s) 
do you think would be most likely to be changed, or would occasion the most intense discussion 
even if consensus on new wording or new features in the constitution proved hard to reach?  
 
Q6 to what extent do you see the Iraqi constitution as very democratic and why, that is to say, 
what is your idea of democracy here?  does this equate to some international standard or model 
of democracy, or are you saying there are some democratic elements that are specific to Iraq, 
that is to say an Iraqi version of democracy?  
 
Q7 has the current government formed according to the Iraqi constitution, and how you would 
explain the responsibility of the winner to form the government?  
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ﺳؤال اﻻول: ھل ﻛﺗب اﻟدﺳﺗور اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺿوء اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﺎت اﻻﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ أم ﻛﺎن ﻧﺗﺎج ﺗواﻓق 
ﺗﺛﺑﯾت ﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ او ﺣﻔظ  اﻟﻌراﻗﯾﯾن وﻋﺻﺎرة أﻓﻛﺎرھم اﻟذاﺗﯾﺔ؟ وأﯾﮭﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن ﻟﮫ اﻷوﻟوﯾﺔ
 اﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ اﻷطراف: اﻟﻣﺗﻌددة، وﻟﻣﺎذا؟
 
ﺳؤال اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ: اﻻ ﯾﺳﺑب اﻟﻣﺎدة اﻟﺛﺎﻧﯾﺔ ﻧوﻋﺎ ﻣن اِﻻﺷﻛﺎل واﻟﺗﺿﺎرب ﺛواﺑت اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ وﻣﺑﺎدئ 
 اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ؟ ﻓﺎن ﻛﺎن اﻟﺟواب ﻣﻧﻔﯾﺎ، ﻛﯾف؟    
ﺳؤال اﻟﺛﺎﻟث: ﺗطﺑﯾق اﻟﻣواد اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺣدود اﻟﺟﻐراﻓﯾﺔ ﻟﻺﻗﻠﯾم واﻟﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺎت وﻛذﻟك وﺟود ﻧﻔس 
اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺑﯾن اﻟﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺎت اﻻﻛﺛرﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﯾﻌﯾّﺔ واﻻﻛﺛرﯾﺔ اﻟﺳﻧﯾّﺔ، اﻻ ﯾﺷﻛل ھذا ﻋﻘﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ طرﯾق اﻟﻔدراﻟﯾﺔ 
 وﺑﻧﺎء اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق؟
 
ﺳؤال اﻟراﺑﻊ: إذا ﻣﻧﺣت اﻟﻔرﺻﺔ ﻟﻣراﺟﻌﺔ او ﺗﻌدﯾل اﻟدﺳﺗور، ﻣﺎھﻲ اﻟﻣواد واﻟﻔﻘرات اﻟﺗﻲ ھﻲ 
 ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﻟﻰ اﻟﻣراﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﺗﻌدﯾل وﻟﻣﺎذا؟
 
ﺳؤال اﻟﺧﺎﻣس: اﻟﻰ اي ﻣدى ﯾﻌﺗﺑر اﻟدﺳﺗور اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ دﺳﺗوراً  دﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺎ ً  وﻟﻣﺎذا؟ وﻛﯾف ﺗُﻌَّرف 
اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ، وھل ھﻲ ﻣﺑﻧﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳس دوﻟﯾﺔ ام ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﺟواﻧب ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻟﮭﺎ طﺎﺑﻊ ﻋراﻗﻲ ﻣﻣﯾز، 
 ﺑﻣﻌﻧﻰ اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ اﻟﻌراﻗﯾﺔ وﻟﯾﺳت اﻟدﯾﻣﻘراطﯾﺔ اﻟﻠﯾﺑراﻟﯾﺔ؟
 
ﺳؤال اﻟﺳﺎدس: ھل ﺗوﺟد آﻟﯾﺎت اﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﻓﻲ اﻟدﺳﺗور اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ ﻟﺗﺣﻘﯾق اﻟوﻋود اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺗﺿﻣﻧﮭﺎ؟ وھل 
 ﺗﻐﯾرت ﻧظرﺗﻛم ﺗﺟﺎه اﻟدﺳﺗور ﻣﻧذ ﻛﺗﺎﺑﺗﮫ، ﻣﺎھﻲ ﺗﻠك اﻟﺟواﻧب اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻐﯾرت ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﻧظرﺗﻛم وﻟﻣﺎذا؟
 
ﺳؤال اﻟﺳﺎﺑﻊ: ھل ﺷﻛﻠت اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق وﻓق اﻟدﺳﺗور ام ﻣﺧﺎﻟف ﻟﮫ، وﻛﯾف ﺗﻔﺳر 
 ﻗﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺎ ً  ﺗﻛﻠﯾف اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﺋزة ﻟﺗﺷﻛﯾل اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ؟
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Appendix D: Survey on Support for Democratic Institutions  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Gender:  
 Male    Female  
 
Ethnicity  
 Arab    Kurd    Turkman  Other: specify please  
 
Religion  
 Muslim-Shiite   Muslim-Sunni   Christian   Other 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The first option in each question is an element of majoritarian democracy  
The second option in each question is an element of consensus democracy  
 
Please tick the preferred option for each question, choose ONLY one 
 
Q1. Concentration of power  
 Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets 
 Executive power sharing in broad multiparty coalitions 
    
Q2. Executive-legislative relationship  
 Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant 
 Executive-legislative balance of power  
  
Q3. Party system 
 Two party systems 
 Multiparty Systems  
   
Q4. Electoral Systems 
 Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems 
 Proportional representation 
 
Q5. Interest Groups 
 Pluralist interest group systems with free for all competition among groups 
 Coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise and 
concentration 
 
Q6. The Government Type 
RESEARCH OUESTIONNAIRE.  
Political Elite Support for Consensus and Majoritarian 
Elements of Democratic Systems. 
The Iraqi House of Representatives,   
The Green Zone, Baghdad.   
 
	 299	
 Unitary and centralized government 
 Federal and decentralized governments 
 
Q7. The legislative:  
 Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature 
 Division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently 
constituted house 
 
Q8. The constitution 
 Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities 
 Rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities 
 
Q9. The legislation  
 Systems in which legislature have the final word on the constitutionality of their 
own legislation 
 Review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts 
 
Q10. Central Banks 
 Central banks that are dependent on the executive 
 Independent central banks 
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 اﻟﺠﻨﺲ: 
 □ اﻷﻧﺜﻰ                             □ اﻟﺬﻛﺮ                                            
 
 اﻟﻘﻮﻣﯿﺔ:   
 □ ﻋﺮب               □ ﻛﻮرد               □ ﺗﺮﻛﻤﺎن            □ أﺧﺮى .....
 
 اﻟﺪﯾﺎﻧﺔ:
 □ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﺳﻨﻲ              □ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﺷﯿﻌﻲ                 □ ﻣﺴﯿﺤﻲ         □ أﺧﺮى .....
 ___________________________________________________
 
 ﯾﺮﺟﻰ وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ■ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﯿﺎر اﻟﻤﻔﻀﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺳﺆال، اﺧﺘﺮ واﺣﺪا ﻓﻘﻂ:
 اﻟﺨﯿﺎر اﻻول ﻟﻜﻞ ﺳﺆال أﺳﺎس ﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻷﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ.
 اﻟﺨﯿﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺳﺆال أﺳﺎس ﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻘﻲ.
 
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ:ﺗ-1
   ﺗﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ
			 ﺗﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻖ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﻲ
 
 ﻋﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺘﯿﻦ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﯿﺔ واﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬﯾﺔ:-2
 	أن ﺗﻜﻮن اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬﯾﺔ ھﻲ اﻟﻤﮭﯿﻤﻨﺔ
	 أن ﺗﻜﻮﻧﺎ ﻣﺘﻮازﯾﯿﻦ
 
 ﻣﺎ ھﻮ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺤﺰﺑﻲ اﻟﻤﻔﻀﻞ:-3
 	ﻧﻈﺎم ﺣﺰﺑﯿﻦ رﺋﯿﺴﯿﻦ
		ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺘﻌﺪدﯾﺔ اﻟﺤﺰﺑﯿﺔ
	
	ﻣﺎ ھﻮ اﻟﺘﻤﺜﯿﻞ اﻟﻤﻔﻀﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ:-4
 	ﻧﻈﺎم ﺗﻤﺜﯿﻞ اﻷﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ
		ﻧﻈﺎم ﺗﻤﺜﯿﻞ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﻲ
 
 ﻧﻈﺎم ﺟﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻀﺨﻂ:-5
 	إﻋﻄﺎﺋﮭﺎ اﻟﺤﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻠﺔ
		□ ﺗﺤﺪﯾﺪ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل ﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻀﺨﻂ  ﻛﻲ ﺗﺘﻌﺎون ﻓﯿﻤﺎ ﺑﯿﻨﮭﺎ
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 :ﻧﻮع اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ-6
 	أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﺗﺤﺎدﯾﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ
		 ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔأن ﺗﻜﻮن ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻓﺪراﻟﯿﺔ ﻻ
 
 اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﻲ:-7
 إﻗﺘﺼﺎر اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻨﻮاب 
	 ﺗﻮزﯾﻊ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﯿﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﻦ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﯿﻦ وﻣﺘﺴﺎوﯾﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ  اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ □
 
	ﻧﻮع اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر:-8
	 ﻟﻤﺮوﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر ﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﯾﺠﺮى ﻓﯿﮫ اﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻷﻛﺜﺮﯾﺔ اﻷﻋﺘﯿﺎدﯾﺔا □
	 اﻟﺴﺎﺣﻘﺔ   دﺳﺘﻮر ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﻻﯾﻤﻜﻦ إﺟﺮاء اﻟﺘﻐﯿﺮ ﻓﯿﮫ إﻻّ ﺑﺎﻷﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ □
 
 اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻊ:-9
				أن ﯾﻜﻮن ﻧﻈﺎﻣﺎ ًﺗﻜﻮن ﻓﯿﮫ اﻟﻜﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﻨﮭﺎﺋﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﯿﺔ
		 اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎ    أن ﯾﻜﻮن ﻧﻈﺎﻣﺎ ًﺗﻜﻮن ﻓﯿﮫ اﻟﻜﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﻨﮭﺎﺋﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺤﻜﻤﺔ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮرﯾﺔ □
 
 اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ:-01
		أن ﺗﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬﯾﺔ
 أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ 
	
	 302	
Appendix E: Survey on Federalism in Iraq 
	
____________________________________________________________ 
Gender:  
Male   Female  
 
Ethnicity  
 Arab    Kurd    Turkman  Other: specify please 
 
Religion  
 Muslim-Shiite   Muslim-Sunni   Christian   Other 
________________________________________________________ 
Please choose ONLY ONE option of the following questions 
 
Q1 Federalism in Iraq:   
 In favour of Federalism  
 Not in favour of Federalism  
 
Q2 The Federation Council: 
 support the establishment of Federation Council 
 oppose the establishment of Federation Council 
 
Q3 Type of Federalism  
 Based on ethnoreligious divide 
 Based on territoriality of 18 Governorates  
 
Q4 Iraq can be governed less oppressively 
 As a federal state of three main parts  
 As a Unitary Centralized State  
 
Q5 Type of Legislation  
 Bicameral Legislation  
 Unicameral  
 
Q6 Type of Government  
 Based on Consensus   
 Based on Majority (largest block in the HR)  
 
Q7 Division and Unity  
 Federalism Keeps Iraq united  
 Federalism leads to the Division of Iraq 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE  
Preferences of the Iraqi Political Elite on 
Federalism in Iraq  
Iraqi House of Representatives 
The Green Zone, Baghdad 
September-October 2012 
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 اﻟﺠﻨﺲ: 
 □ اﻷﻧﺜﻰ                             □ اﻟﺬﻛﺮ                                            
 
 اﻟﻘﻮﻣﯿﺔ:   
 □ ﻋﺮب               □ ﻛﻮرد               □ ﺗﺮﻛﻤﺎن            □ أﺧﺮى .....
 
 اﻟﺪﯾﺎﻧﺔ:
 □ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﺳﻨﻲ              □ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﺷﯿﻌﻲ                 □ ﻣﺴﯿﺤﻲ         □ أﺧﺮى .....
 ___________________________________________________
 
 ﯾﺮﺟﻰ وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ■ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﯿﺎر اﻟﻤﻔﻀﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺳﺆال، اﺧﺘﺮ واﺣﺪا ﻓﻘﻂ:
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻻول: اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺮاق؛
 ادﻋﻢ اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ 
 اﺗﻌﺎرض اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ 
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ: اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻻﺗﺤﺎدي؛
 ادﻋﻢ إﻗﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻻﺗﺤﺎدي 
	اﻋﺎرض إﻗﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻻﺗﺤﺎدي 
  
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ: ﻧﻮع اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ؛ 
  اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻲ ،اﻟﻄﺎﺋﻔﻲﻗﯿﺎم ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺎس  
 ﻗﯿﺎم ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺎس اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻲ )ﻓﯿﺪراﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت( 
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ: ﯾﻤﻜﻦ ان ﯾﺤﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺮاق اﻗﻞ اﺳﺘﺒﺪادا؛ 
 ﻛﺪوﻟﺔ ﻓﺪراﻟﯿﺔ ﻣﻜﻮﻧﮫ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أﻗﺎﻟﯿﻢ  
 ﻛﺪوﻟﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﮫ وﻣﻮﺣﺪة 
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ: ﻧﻮع اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻊ؛
 ﻣﺠﻠﺴﯿﻦ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﻲ )ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻨﻮاب وﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻﺗﺤﺎدي( 
 ﻣﺠﻠﺲ واﺣﺪ )ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻨﻮاب ﻓﻘﻂ( 
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺴﺎدس: ﻧﻮع اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ؛ 
 اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻘﻲ 
 اﻷﻏﻠﺒﯿﺔ  
 
 ﺳﺆال اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ: اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم واﻟﻮﺣﺪة؛ 
 ﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ ﺗﺤﺎﻓﻆ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺣﺪة اﻟﻌﺮاقا 
 اﻟﻔﺪراﻟﯿﺔ ﺗﻮدي اﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ اﻟﻌﺮاق 
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Appendix F: Survey on the Iraqi Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity:  
Religion/Sect:  
Gender:  
 
Please Choose ONLY ONE option of the following questions. 
 
Q1 Designing the Constitution: who of the following had the major influence in designing the 
Iraqi constitution:  
 The US authorities  
 The Iraqi Political Elite  
 A consent of both  
 
Q2 Drafting the constitution: during drafting the constitution which of the following was 
prioritised: 
 Democratic principles  
 Interests of different groups (Shia, Sunni and Kurds) 
 A balance of both  
 
Q3 The official religion of the state: Islam is a fundamental source of legislation; the established 
provisions of Islam are: 
 Compatible with democratic principles  
 Incompatible with democratic principles  
 Undecided  
 
Q4 Amendment of the Constitution: if there is a chance to amend the constitution, you would be:  
 In favour of constitutional amendment  
 Not in favour of constitutional amendment  
 Undecided  
 
Q5 Power and the constitution: in case of constitutional amendment, you would be in favour of:  
 Giving more power to the central government  
 Giving more power to the regions    
 Making a balance between Centre and Regions  
 
Q6 How does the Iraqi constitution allocate mechanisms of implementation:  
 Mechanisms are clearly stated  
 Mechanisms are vague  
 Lack of mechanisms  
 
Q7 Forming the 2010 Government was:  
 According to the constitution  
 Not according to the constitution  
 Undecided  
  
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE  
The preferences of the Members of the Iraqi 
Constitution Drafting Committee  
Iraq: Baghdad and Erbil 
September-October 2012 
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 اﻟﻘﻮﻣﯿﺔ: .........
 اﻟﺪﯾﺎﻧﺔ )اﻟﻤﺬھﺐ(: ........
 اﻟﺠﻨﺲ: ...........
 
 ﯾﺮﺟﻰ وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ■ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﯿﺎر اﻟﻤﻔﻀﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺳﺆال، اﺧﺘﺮ واﺣﺪا ﻓﻘﻂ:
 
  ﺗﺼﻤﯿﻢ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر: ﻋﻤﺎ ﯾﻠﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎن ﻟﮫ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻛﺒﯿﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻀﻤﯿﻢ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر،  –ﺳﺆال اﻻول 
 اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت اﻻﻣﺮﯾﻜﯿﺔ
 ﯿﺔ اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ
 ﻛﻼھﻤﺎ 
 
  ﺻﯿﺎﻏﺔ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر: اﺛﻨﺎ ﺻﯿﺎﻏﺔ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر أﻋﻄﯿﺖ اﻻوﻟﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻰ؛  –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ 
 اﻟﻤﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻮﻗﺮاطﯿﺔ
 ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ )اﻟﺸﯿﻌﺔ، اﻟﺴﻨﺔ، اﻟﻜﺮد(
 ﺗﻮازن ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻮﻗﺮاطﯿﺔ وﻣﺼﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت 
 
  ﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﺸﺮﯾﻊ، ﻟﺬا ﺛﻮاﺑﺖ اﺣﻜﺎم اﻹﺳﻼم؛ اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ: اﻹﺳﻼم ھﻮ ﻣﺼﺪر اﻷ –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ 
 ﻣﺘﻮاﻓﻖ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻮﻗﺮاطﯿﺔ
 ﯾﺘﻌﺎرض ﻣﻊ ﻣﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻮﻗﺮاطﯿﺔ 
 ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺤﺪد
 
  ﺗﻌﺪﯾﻞ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر: إذا ﻛﺎن ھﻨﺎك ﻓﺮﺻﺔ ﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻞ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر، ھﻞ اﻧﺖ؛  –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ 
 ﻣﺆﯾﺪ ﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻞ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر 
 ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺆﯾﺪ ﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻞ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر 
 ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺤﺪد
 
  اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ واﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر: ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺪﯾﻞ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮري، ھﻞ اﻧﺖ ﻣﻊ؛  –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ 
 اﻋﻄﺎ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ
 اﻋﻄﺎ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﻟﻸﻗﺎﻟﯿﻢ
 اﻻﺣﺘﻔﺎظ ﺑﺘﻮازن ﺑﯿﻦ ﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ واﻷﻗﺎﻟﯿﻢ
 
  ﻛﯿﻒ ﯾﺨﺼﺺ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ اﻻﻟﯿﺎت اﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ؛  –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺴﺎدس 
 اﻻﻟﯿﺎت واﺿﺤﺔ
 اﻻﻟﯿﺎت ﻏﺎﻣﻀﺔ
 اﻻﻟﯿﺎت ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة
 
  ﻛﺎن؛  ٠١٠٢ﺗﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم  –ﺳﺆال اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ 
 ووﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﺪﺳﺘﻮر 
 ﻟﯿﺲ وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﺪﺳﺘﻮر 
	ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺤﺪد 
